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ABSTRACT
The Spanish settlers and friars who came to colonize the Indigenous nations of the
Southwest Borderlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought with them distinct
ideas of voting, town governance, and citizenship. Wary of dealings with large cadres of
traditional village elders, they sought to implement a streamlined system of Indian town
government whereby an Indigenous electorate voted for a governor, lieutenant governor, and
other town officers. Spain hoped that these semi-autonomous communities, known as repúblicas
de indios, or Indian republics, would eventually result in tax-paying citizens at the Pueblos of
New Mexico and Arizona, the mission communities of Pimería Alta, and in the Yaqui towns of
Sonora. Although missionization did not lead to citizenship during the Spanish period, these
Indian groups used imposed concepts of voting and secular town government to subvert and
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challenge Spanish colonial authority, protect land and water rights, and maintain village
sovereignty.
When Mexico gained its independence in 1821, it declared Indians citizens of the
Republic of Mexico. The Mexican government hoped to end all special distinctions for Indians,
and usher in their inclusion in the body politic. In some areas, Indians began participating in
politics beyond the limits of their communities, working alongside Hispanos on governing
councils. But in other areas, Hispano encroachments and the decline of the missions led to a
constricting of Indigenous land and rights. Still, under these challenging circumstances many
Indigenous communities continued with their systems of electoral town politics. While Indian in
New Mexico and Arizona remained mostly outside of the political mainstream, they maintained
their dedication to the vote on the town level, and to securing their status as independent Native
nations.
As New Mexico and Arizona passed to United States hands in the 1840s and 1850s,
Indigenous communities in the region maintained hybridized forms of voting and civil
government that had been adapted to local needs over the decades of colonization. The United
States sought to implement Indian policies that it believed would finally result in “fully
enfranchised” citizen Indians. These policies included allotment of land in severalty and
schooling. During the U.S. territorial period, Indians in New Mexico and Arizona rejected U.S.
citizenship and did not seek the right to vote on a large scale, because voting in municipal and
territorial elections would have opened up their towns to outside control. Instead, these
communities continued to turn inward, strengthening town electoral systems that had served to
protect Indigenous land and sovereignty for centuries. Acting as sovereign nations, they fought
to secure and protect their status as citizens of Indigenous nations, as they had during the Spanish
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and Mexican eras. The vote was an important tool for maintaining sovereignty, and it could be
rejected when it threatened Indigenous rights.
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Map 1.1

1
INTRODUCTION
There is power in stories. I recognized this from a young age. My mother once said
something to me along the lines of, “You were always listening to your elders and asking
questions about their lives and experiences. You were just more interested in that stuff than your
siblings.” I particularly loved hearing stories from my grandparents about when they were
young. From my Grandma, Bonnie Moore Russell, I learned that her family were Okies, sort of.
They were actually Pawnee, and made their way west in the early part of the twentieth century.
My great-grandfather, Perry Moore, eventually found work in Williams, Arizona. I also learned
that although Perry was Pawnee, and, from family photos, clearly Indian1 (to my eyes, anyways),
he somehow “passed” as non-Indian to avoid the prejudice of the era. He secured a relatively
high-paying job as a bookkeeper that he otherwise would not have been able to land had he
identified as Indian. I learned from my Grandpa, Ned Russell, that his parents, Daisy Quesada
(Cibecue Apache) and Henry Russell (Yavapai), had met and married on the San Carlos Indian
Reservation in southeastern Arizona. This was at a time when the United States Army had
rounded up Yavapais, Dilzhe’e Apaches, Pinal Apaches, Aravaipa Apaches, White Mountain
Apaches, Chiricahua Apaches, Cibecue Apaches, and Warm Spring Apaches, concentrating the
eight groups on a single reservation.2 My great-grandparents’ relationship, which paired a
Cibecue Apache and a Yavapai, was born of this congregative federal Indian policy. My

1

A note on terminology: throughout this work, I will use Indian, Indigenous, and Native
interchangeably. In many instances, I have favored the term Indian, not because I believe it best
describes the Indigenous nations and peoples of the Southwest Borderlands, but because it is the
term I am most accustomed to using in my interactions with family members and other Natives.
In my experience, in family and tribal circles, Indian is most commonly used, followed by Native
(not Native American). I have almost never heard the word Indigenous used outside of academic
settings.
2
Daniel J. Herman, Rim Country Exodus: A Story of Conquest, Renewal, and Race in the
Making (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 149.
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grandparents met in the sleepy mining company town of Clarkdale Arizona, where my greatgrandfathers—one Yavapai, one Pawnee—both found work.3
Although this information may seem superfluous or indulgent, it is my introduction as an
Indigenous storyteller, and that Indigenous history is an incredible confluence of stories. In fact,
it was a particular family story that inspired my interest in the history of Indian4 voting in New
Mexico and Arizona. On two separate occasions during his adolescence, my grandfather, Ned
Russell, was arrested and punished in the Arizona justice system without a formal trial. In the
first instance, he and several friends had broken into the local general store and helped
themselves to several items. My grandfather, who lived in destitute conditions in the Clarkdale
Yavapai-Apache community, took a pair of boots, some Levi’s, and a wallet. When the local
sheriff noticed a poor Indian boy with new boots and jeans, he immediately took him in. Ned
refused to implicate his friends, and was sent to the “Boys’ Ranch,” as they called it; a juvenile
detention center at Fort Grant in Wilcox, Arizona. He was incarcerated for “three months, three
weeks, and three days.” Fort Grant was remarkably similar to Ned’s Indian boarding school
experience, and he did not find his incarceration terribly trying. But, from that point on he was
labeled as a “troublemaker,” a situation only compounded by the fact that he was Indian. Around
one year after his first incarceration, Ned was falsely accused of a “burglary or whatever.” Law

3

A large smelter was located in Clarkdale, which smelted the copper ore from the Jerome copper
mines, These mines were once among the largest in the world. See “The History of Clarkdale,”
Town of Clarkdale Website, http://www.clarkdale.az.gov/history.html, accessed 28 September
2015.
4
A note on terminology: throughout this work, I will use “Indian,” “Native,” and “Indigenous”
interchangeably. In many instances, I have favored the term Indian, not because I believe it best
describes the Indigenous nations and peoples of the Southwest Borderlands, but because it is the
term I am most accustomed to using in my interactions with family members and other Natives.
In my experience, in family and tribal circles, Indian is most commonly used, followed by Native
(not Native American). In all honesty, I have almost never heard the word Indigenous used
outside of academic settings.
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enforcement officers again sent him to Fort Grant, and they intended to keep him there for one
year. But a remarkable thing happened after his arrival at Fort Grant for the second time. One of
the prison guards knew an elderly rancher couple who lived in the foothills of the nearby Galiuro
Mountains. Ned was sent to live with the family, where his situation resembled that of an
indentured servant. He recalled being expected to “milk cows, slop the hogs, feed all the
livestock…I also plowed the fields.” Fortunately, Ned grew to like the elderly couple, and
looked upon his year on their ranch favorably.5
On both occasions, which took place during the 1930s, my grandfather had no civil
rights. In rural, racist Arizona, there was no presumption of innocence, and he did not receive
any sort of trial in juvenile court. Even though the United States Congress had passed the Indian
Citizenship Act in 1924, through which, in the words of the foremost historian of Indian civil
rights John R. Wunder, “the citizenship odyssey for American Indians was concluded,”6 the
reality was that Indians had virtually none of the rights of citizens in many places during the first
half of the twentieth century, as evidenced by my grandfather’s experiences. How could my
grandfather and others have secured their civil rights under such circumstances? Wunder states,
“Colonial power over Indian peoples and their lands constituted a direct destruction of individual
rights and collective entitlements. Might a bill of rights have prevented the loss of rights for
Native Americans?”7 Felix S. Cohen, the father of federal Indian law and author of the seminal
work on the subject, wrote, “In a democracy suffrage is the most basic civil right, since its

5

Maurice Crandall, “The Early Life of Ned Russell, Yavapai-Apache, 1924–1946” (master’s
thesis, University of New Mexico, 2007), 40–44.
6
John R. Wunder, “Retained by the People”: A History of American Indians and the Bill of
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 50.
7
Ibid., 15.
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exercise is the chief means whereby other rights may be safeguarded. The enfranchisement of the
Indians has been a slow [sic] and is still an incomplete process.”8
From this commonly held perspective, Indian voting can be seen as a long process,
through which all other civil rights can be secured and safeguarded. I had determined to write an
expansive history of Indian voting that covered all three colonial regimes: Spain, Mexico, and
the United States. At an early stage, Sam Truett advised me to avoid a facile, triumphalist
narrative along these lines: Indians suffered under Spain and Mexico, but eventually “won” their
long struggle for the right to vote in U.S. courts. Such a narrative, even if nuanced and well
written, only serves to reinforce dominant Anglo-American historical tropes: what came before
the United States seizure of much of the American Southwest from Mexico only set the stage for
the more important events that would follow. Spain and Mexico were the introductory acts ion
this epic play, while the United States offered the dramatic conclusion. Such an argument does
not correspond with the extensive research I have conducted on the topic. The reality, and my
argument in this work, is that during all three colonial periods Indians absorbed and adapted
colonially imposed forms of electoral politics and exercised political sovereignty based on
localized political, economic, and social needs. Community sovereignty and internal control
were important to Natives above all else. Indians in New Mexico and Arizona created hybridized
forms of colonial civil government and electoral processes—many of which are still in practice
today—that are distinctly Indigenous and always seek to protect the interests of the community.
The story of Indian voting in New Mexico and Arizona must be seen as a long struggle to
continue to secure the franchise; to use the vote to protect internal citizenship and the
sovereignty of independent Native communities and subvert colonial power. This is the story that
8

Felix S. Cohen, Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Albuquerque: University
of New Mexico Press, 1971), 157.
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I encountered; one that counters prevailing progressive narratives of a long struggle with a
determinate ending in the post-World War II civil rights era.
A few noteworthy examples of works on the history of Indian voting include: Native
Vote: American Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (Daniel McCool, Susan M.
Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson, 2007); “The Fight for Indian Voting Rights in New Mexico”
(Carol A. Venturini, master’s thesis, University of New Mexico, 1993); and “A Study of the
Suffrage of the Arizona and New Mexico Indian” (Laird J. Dunbar, master’s thesis, University of
New Mexico, 1948). John Wunder and Felix Cohen also address Indian suffrage in their works,
as do a host of other scholars writing primarily on federal Indian policy issues of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. While these works and others ably tell the story of Indian voting in
many ways, they also favor a form of voting and “democracy” within the U.S. system, while
largely focusing their attention on the east to west progress of Manifest Destiny. They do not
generally characterize the colonial era, especially under Spain and Mexico, as one of Indian
voting. Some of these studies do point to Spanish-Mexican legal precedents in the history of
Indian voting in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. For example, when Mexico became an
independent nation in 1821, it declared Indians citizens. Thus, Indians living in the territory
conquered during the U.S.-Mexico War, which included New Mexico and Arizona, technically
possessed the right to vote.9 But, most of the studies on Indian voting clearly fail to acknowledge
Indian enfranchisement prior to the period of Anglo-American domination. McCool, Olson, and
Robinson correctly lament the lack of scholarship on Indian voting. In studies that address the

9

See Cohen, 157, and Carol A. Venturini, “The Fight for Indian Voting Rights in New Mexico”
(master’s thesis, University of New Mexico, 1994), 2–4.
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topic, they observe, “the focus is almost always on tribal elections. There is virtually no coverage
of the role of Indian voting in federal, state, and local elections.”10
This study adopts an opposite approach. Turning Wunder, Cohen, and McCool et al. on
their heads, my work considers questions of Indian citizenship and civil rights prior to the socalled full enfranchisement of Indians. “Republicans, Citizens, and Wards” refers to the evolving
political status of Indians in New Mexico and Arizona under the three colonizing nations of
Spain, Mexico, and the United States. But, I largely focus on the internal community affairs. I
explore the adoption and incorporation of voting and civil government on the village level by
assessing four major groups of New Mexico and Arizona Indians: Pueblos, Hopis, Yaquis, and
Pimas.11 The local community was and has remained, by far, the most important political entity
for these Indians.
Such an ambitious topic has required extensive research and the critical and creative use
of a variety of sources such as: oral history, Spanish colonial archival documents, Mexican
documents, period travel accounts, anthropological works, church records, letters and reports of
federal Indian agents, and other materials. Interpreting the colonizers’ documents has been a
difficult endeavor. It has required careful reading in a search for the Native voice, and bringing
to light the stories that are at the center of Indigenous existence. These stories have the power to
help Indigenous peoples make sense of our existence. Further, they counter, subvert, and
contradict prevailing hegemonic colonial narratives. The individual and collective voices in the
10

McCool, Olson, and Robinson, Native Vote, ix. The passage refers to scholarship on tribal
electoral and political systems established under the Indian Reorganization Act.
11
Although Pueblos refers to numerous sovereign Native nations, there are many similarities in
the experiences of the various Pueblos under colonization. I often refer to specific Pueblos, but I
also refer to the Pueblos as a whole when addressing aspects of colonial policy that affected them
collectively. Pimas also refers to a number of Piman-speaking groups in northern Mexico and
southern Arizona. These groups are all culturally related, and at times I will focus on specific
Pima bands, such as Tohono O’odhams near present day Tucson.
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chapters that follow demonstrate a certain cleverness; a coyote-like ability to lead hearers to
unexpected places.
With that said, there is still an important alternate narrative. What James C. Scott refers to
as the “hidden transcript,” pervades Indigenous history, and governs the stories we tell among
ourselves and to others. What Scott states in referring to the hidden transcript applies to the
Native peoples and communities in this study: “That hidden transcript could be recovered only in
the clubs, homes, and small gatherings [of colonized peoples].”12 In most cases, I have used
public transcripts in this work. In a few cases, I have had access to the hidden transcript through
interviews and conversations with members of the specific groups. I feel that the hidden
transcript, especially when it looks at sensitive issues such as internal governance, ought to
remain private. In the words of Pueblo scholar Joseph “Woody” Aguilar (San Ildefonso Pueblo),
there is a dialogue about the Pueblo Revolt that exists only within the Pueblos—it is a hidden
transcript consisting of the stories Pueblo people share with one another about the Revolt.13 I will
leave such stories of Indian voting and internal governance to Pueblos, Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas
to tell. Thus, the chapters that follow mainly rely on public transcripts.
Chapter 1, “Repúblicas de Indios in Spanish New Mexico,” examines the imposition of
the Iberian model of town government among the Pueblos of New Mexico. Wary of dealing with
a large council of traditional elders, in the early seventeenth century Spain mandated that each
Pueblo elect a cadre of civil officers for each calendar year. These officers included a governor,
lieutenant governor, sheriffs, ditch captains, and others. Documentary evidence shows that
during the initial decades of this system, the Franciscan friars and Spanish civil officers attached
12

James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 15.
13
Joseph “Woody” Aguilar, “Postcolonialism in Borderlands and Pueblo Histories,” Joe Sando
Symposium for Pueblo Indian Studies, Albuquerque, N.Mex., 5 March 2015.
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to each Pueblo mission community controlled the selection of Pueblo officers. The friars often
chose the most “hispanicized” Indians—and those most favorable to Spanish colonial aims—as
governors and other officers. But at some point later in the seventeenth century, the Pueblos
themselves began to take control and selected the annual civil officers. Spain intended that the
electoral process mirror that of Spanish towns, where an adult male electorate voted for town
officers. Only two of the Pueblos—Isleta and Laguna--implemented a system whereby the adult
men directly elected the annual officers. At all of the other Pueblos, traditional moiety chiefs,
ceremonial leaders, and village councils chose the civil officers in a modified form of Pueblo
democracy. In turn, these officers shielded the traditional Pueblo leadership structures from
outside control, as they shouldered the responsibility of all dealings with Spanish civil and
ecclesiastical leaders. Spain referred to these semi-sovereign Pueblo political entities, and others
like them, as “repúblicas de indios,” or Indian republics. Furthermore, Spain implemented some
form of this system among all of the Indian groups in this study.
Even though the electoral process within the Pueblos evolved into a seloctoral process
controlled by traditional leaders, Pueblo civil leaders were anything but an afterthought. The
Pueblos placed great importance on the selection of civil officers. Once they had been selected
for office, Spain recognized these men as the legal political leaders of their individual Pueblo
nations. The governor of New Mexico confirmed these men in a ceremony at Santa Fe, the
provincial capital, distributing a silver-tipped ebony cane decorated with lace fringes—known as
a vara de justicia, or cane of power—to each governor. The Pueblos entrusted these leaders with
all dealings with outsiders, and as civil officers they frequently fought to protect Pueblo land,
water, and culture, all of which constitute the Pueblo existence. Elected civil officers traveled to
local seats of justice and to Santa Fe time and again during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
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nineteenth centuries to air their peoples’ grievances and seek redress at the hands of Spanish
authorities. On a number of occasions, Pueblo officers traveled south over one thousand miles to
Mexico City to the Kingdom of New Spain’s highest courts and interacted with the kingdom’s
highest officials. Throughout the Spanish colonial era, Pueblo civil officers remained the crucial
link between colonial officials and the Pueblos. Elected through a hybridized form of PuebloSpanish democracy, they performed a critical role in protecting the sovereignty of their
communities, paving the way for solvent Pueblo nations through several centuries of
colonization.
Chapter 2, “Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas in Spanish Arizona: Political Incorporation by
Degrees,” addresses the varying levels of colonization and political incorporation for three
groups whose homelands lay in what I term the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands. All three groups
are related by language family—Uto-Aztecan—and they represent three extremes in the Spanish
colonial experience. To the far north, Hopis were located at the extreme edge of the Spanish
Southwest. Franciscans eventually succeeded in establishing missions at Hopi, and had particular
success at the village of Awatovi. While there is virtually no Hopi oral tradition or public
memory of a Spanish form of civil government existing at Hopi, traces in the documentary
record point to its establishment. Although Hopis participated in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680,
Awatovi was singular in that it allowed Spaniards to return after 1692. New Mexico Governor
Diego de Vargas placed a Spanish-speaking Hopi named Miguel in the governorship at Awatovi
in 1692. In 1699, Hopis at Awatovi offered to rebuild their mission church and permit
Franciscans to return. In an extreme act of intracultural violence, Hopis from other villages
attacked and destroyed Awatovi in late 1700. They murdered all of the men and boys, and
divided the women and girls as spoils after the massacre. Although Catholicism surely played a
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large part in the dispute, the Spanish political system must have also played an important role.
The Franciscan presence also meant a village electoral system and Hopi civil officers. The
massacre on that fateful morning surely killed all such officers and sent a bloody warning to
those who would allow such structural impositions. Spain never reestablished the Hopi missions
nor were there any further Hopi governors.
The contrast between Yaquis and Hopis could not be more stark. In the early seventeenth
century, Yaquis fiercely resisted Spanish incursions, thus signaling the beginning of the oftrepeated trope of the “savage” and “bloodthirsty” Yaqui. But after fierce fighting, Yaquis made
peace with Spain and congregated around eight Jesuit mission towns. In the eight Yaqui towns,
they fully implemented the Spanish town electoral system, complete with elections of governors
and other officers by an adult electorate, which in some cases even included women. The system
became deeply ingrained in Yaqui town culture. In 1740, after Jesuits repeatedly meddled in
Yaqui town elections, economics, and political affairs, Yaquis revolted. Two Yaqui town
governors, who had both been removed from office by an overbearing Jesuit friar, led the Yaqui
fight for town sovereignty. The two governors traveled to Mexico City, where they had an
audience with the viceroy, who agreed to their demands, which included the demand for Yaqui
elections free from outside interference. Although the Yaqui Revolt of 1740 subsequently failed,
it is quite possibly the first voter rebellion in the history of North America; the Yaqui franchise
lay at the heart of Yaqui grievances.
The electoral experiences of the Native peoples of Pimería Alta, the region that straddles
today’s U.S-Mexico border, lie somewhere in between Hopis and Yaquis. Beginning with the
pioneering missionary effort of Jesuit Father Eusebio Kino in the latter part of the seventeenth
century, Piman-speakers in the region congregated at missions such as San Xavier del Bac and
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Tumacácori, living under the governor system. But the Jesuits who missionized the area seemed
far less interested in viable village governments at the missions. They were only too happy to
oversee sham elections and prop up their own candidates. The journals of Jesuit chroniclers such
as Ignaz Pfefferkorn, Jacobo Sedelmayr, Joseph Och, and Juan Nentvig, all of whom labored
among Piman peoples during the Spanish period, describe an anemic town electoral system.
Even so, town officers still engaged in much of the same intermediary negotiation as their Pueblo
and Yaqui counterparts, advocating for their people in the courts and defending Indigenous land
claims. These three groups—Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas—provide a useful comparison in the
varying implementation of a system of Indian voting under Spain.
In Chapter 3, “The Rise of Pueblo Power in the Mexican Period,” I explore the voting
activities of the Pueblos during the relatively brief Mexican period in New Mexico. From 1821,
when Mexico became an independent nation, until 1846, when United States troops entered
Santa Fe, Pueblo peoples participated in New Mexico electoral politics in unprecedented ways.
The governor system persisted, but under Mexican law all Indians became citizens of the
Republic of Mexico. Administrative changes also brought about a municipal system that grouped
Pueblos and Hispanos into the same electorate for ayuntamientos, or town councils. In areas such
as Santa Clara Pueblo, which borders the Hispano town of Española, Pueblo Indians and
Hispanos were elected and served together in municipal governing bodies. But in other
municipalities where Pueblos were a distinct minority, their political voice in the new
ayuntameintos was at times negligible, although they did avail themselves of the services of such
governing bodies on issues they deemed significant. In the most important display of Pueblo
electoral power in New Mexico up to that point, Pueblo Indians took an active role in the Rio
Arriba Rebellion of 1837. The rebellion, initiated by Hispanos unhappy with administrative
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changes that took away local autonomy and brought direct taxation to New Mexico, grew to
include significant numbers of Pueblo Indians. A joint force of Pueblos and Hispanos deposed
and killed the governor, Albino Pérez. Remarkably, a joint legislative body of Pueblo Indians
and Hispanos met briefly at the Palace of the Governors and selected a Taos Indian by the name
of José Gonzales as the first, and only, Indian governor in New Mexico’s history. Gonzales’s
term was very brief. Former governor of New Mexico Manuel Armijo crushed the rebellion and
executed Gonzales in early 1838. But the legacy of Pueblo voting during the Mexican era in New
Mexico remains one of expanded political participation, and the assumption of a leading role in
the affairs of the territory for a brief time in the late 1830s.
While the Pueblo peoples of New Mexico exhibited assertiveness in claiming their
political rights under Mexico, Arizona’s Indians did not weather the chaotic Mexican period
nearly as well. Chapter 4, “Stagnant Arizona: Indian Politics in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands
During the Mexican Period,” describes a deteriorating Indian political situation under Mexico.
The Hopi, whose traditional governing structures remained relatively unmolested through the
Mexican era, suffered from greater numbers of Navajo and Apache raids between 1821–1846.
They made overtures to Santa Fe for protection, but no help arrived. An opportunity to
reestablish political power at Hopi was thus lost, and Hopis continued to function largely outside
of colonial control. Even though Hopis showed almost no interest in participating in Mexican
electoral politics, Hopi oral history tells of at least one example of a Hopi traveling to Santa Fe to
retrieve kidnapped kin. The governor of New Mexico found and returned the kidnapped Hopis,
who were already household servants, and severely punished the Hispano kidnappers. Even
though they were functionally independent of Mexican control, in this instance both Hopis and
Mexicans acted as if the Hopi were Mexican citizens, which they legally were.
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Yaquis similarly struggled against violent outside forces, but these came in the form of
the Mexican military. Another Yaqui revolt, this one led by a Yaqui visionary who appearedin
the same vein as other Indian prophet-revivalists between the late eighteenth and early twentieth
centuries, positioned Yaquis in opposition to Mexican aspirations to control Yaqui territory.
Much of the trouble stemmed from Mexican administrative changes that aimed to bring Yaqui
towns under the control of Mexican municipalities, a situation previously seen in New Mexico.
But Yaquis had a weaker tradition of coexistence with their Mexican neighbors, and balked at
the possibility of diminished town autonomy. Mexican officials also were less willing to leave
Yaquis to govern their own communities, which was, perhaps, more the result of the Yaqui’s bad
reputation than any real Yaqui aggressions. While the revolt, which lasted from the late 1820s
through the 1830s, eventually failed, Yaqui town elections continued. The Yaqui governing
system would come under increased pressure in the decades that followed, and was eventually
stretched to the breaking point.
Pimas in Pimería Alta also faced dire circumstances during the Mexican period. The
missions of northern Sonora had sharply declined after the Jesuit expulsion of 1767. By the
1830s, many of the missions of Pimería Alta had been completely abandoned. The Indian town
electoral model, which was weak to begin with, further atrophied under Mexican rule. In
addition, as vecino populations grew and began encroaching on Pima land, Indian populations
sharply declined. For all of their faults, the Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries of the past had
been reasonably strong advocates for Pima land rights. In their absence, Pima governors did as
best they could. Pimas continued selecting governors in the absence of mission officials, but the
method of selection had completely reverted to pre-contact tradition. Indians at San Xavier del
Bac did an admirable job of preserving the mission structure and its reliquary, but Anglo-
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American travelers who visited the region in the wake of the U.S.-Mexico War commented on
the destitute condition of Pimería Alta’s Indians. They had been left high and dry by Mexico, as
it were. Pimería Alta did not become part of the United States until the Gadsden Purchase in
1854. Its Piman peoples thus endured six more years of dreadful Mexican administration, devoid
of protection from Apache raiders and vecino encroachments.
Chapter 5, “Refusing Citizenship: Pueblo Indians and Voting During the United States
Territorial Period,” marks the dramatic administrative changes that took place after 1846. Under
the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, former Mexican citizens had the option to become
United States citizens. This included Pueblo Indians. Pueblo peoples and Office of Indian Affairs
employees soon faced challenging questions regarding the citizenship status of the Pueblos.
Indian Service employees recognized that Pueblo Indians were entitled to citizenship and the
franchise, but exercising the right to vote proved problematic. Two opposing factions developed
over the citizenship question. On one side, many Hispanos and Anglo-Americans favored full
Pueblo citizenship, because it would open up Pueblo lands to alienation and the eventual demise
of the Pueblos. On the other side, Indian Service employees favored a plan whereby the Pueblos
would be made wards of the federal government and their lands protected from outside
encroachments. This plan would require that Pueblo Indians forego voting in elections outside of
their communities. New Mexico Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs James S.
Calhoun met with Pueblo leaders in the late 1840s and early 1850s, seeking to convince them to
renounce citizenship rights in favor of wardship. Calhoun’s successors pursued a similar course,
resulting in several decades of Pueblo disenfranchisement.
While the paternalistic goals of Calhoun and his successors are clear, the Pueblo
perspective is more problematic. The documentary record indicates that the Pubelos did not see
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overtures by Indian Service employees as paternalistic and damaging. Instead, they provided the
only viable option for protecting village autonomy and internal government. Pueblo civil officers
repeatedly traveled to Santa Fe stating their desire to forego U.S. citizenship in favor of local
sovereignty. Delegations of Pueblo leaders also traveled to Washington, D.C. on several
occasions to express their desire to remain outside of the political mainstream. Their goal was to
protect the rights of citizenship in the individual Pueblo, which they deemed to be far more
important than U.S. citizenship. As a result, the Pueblos refused to pursue or accept citizenship;
it only threatened the community sovereignty they had maintained under Spain and Mexico.
The sixth and final chapter, “Disparate Designs: Indian Voting in Territorial Arizona,”
begins with an examination of Hopi political developments under the United States. The U.S.
took a far more active role in the Hopi villages than Spain and Mexico, eventually establishing
schools, centers of Protestant missionary activities, and trading posts. But, Hopis maintained
their resistance to colonial control. The U.S. allotted some Hopi lands under the General
Allotment Act (Dawes Act) in the early 1890s, hoping to turn Hopis into farming citizens who
could eventually exercise the right to vote. Indian Service officials reported success in their
assimilationist efforts among Hopi young men. At one point, the Hopi Indian Agent reported that
several Hopi young men had progressed to the point of exercising their rights as citizens and
would soon be voting in territorial elections. This Indian agent proved rather unrealistic in his
optimism, and a Hopi electorate never developed. Citizenship and voting offered no benefits to
Hopis, for whom protecting the villages from outside forces remained the primary concern.
During the U.S. territorial period, Yaqui refugees fled en masse to southern Arizona.
They did so to escape extermination campaigns waged by Mexican soldiers, and mass
deportations that placed Yaquis in slavery on the plantations of Yucatan. In the Yaqui
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communities that coalesced in southern Arizona, the complex Yaqui town voting and governing
system that had characterized life in Sonora did not persist. Because Yaquis in these
communities came from disparate villages, a sense of community unity—of being from the same
Yaqui town—was lost. Further, fear of deportation and the horrors of their experiences in
Mexico led many Yaquis to keep a low profile. Since Yaqui political stridency would likely
attract undue attention, Yaquis sought to remain incognito in Arizona. Throughout the U.S.
territorial period, Yaquis in southern Arizona were a people without a homeland, without a
reservation, and with none of the protections offered to other Arizona Indian groups. Exercising
the right to vote was out of the question.
Tohono O’odhams at the old mission of San Xavier del Bac provide the final case study
for Indian voting in territorial Arizona. When representatives of the United States government
made their way to O’odham territory in the 1850s, they commented frequently on the similarity
between O’odhams and the Rio Grande Pueblos; they were peaceful, they farmed, and they lived
in fixed communities. But, the two groups were dissimilar in that the governor system had all but
died out among the O’odham by the latter half of the nineteenth century. Stepping into this
environment, Indian Service employees began proposing various schemes for O’odham political
organization. One proposal would have set up an O’odham republic with national elections for
leaders. Another would have placed O’odham on farms under the Homestead Act. In the end,
O’odhams at San Xavier were allotted under the Dawes Act. The Indian Service employee in
charge of San Xavier hoped that would begin exercising their right to vote as the twentieth
century neared. But just as Hopis and Pueblos had shown little enthusiasm for the franchise,
O’odhams did not seek to vote during the Arizona territorial period. Although O’odhams had a
long history of colonial interaction and participated in the regional economy, political
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involvement in issues outside their communities only opened up their villages to further
incursions by forces they preferred to keep out.

Taken in its totality, the history of Indian voting in New Mexico and Arizona presents an
intriguing story of colonial relations, power, and Indigenous sovereignty in the Southwest. In
New Mexico, an effort that began as a Spanish attempt to more easily control and govern Pueblo
communities—the governor system—eventually became a deeply ingrained element of Pueblo
culture. Pueblo people initially embraced this system out of necessity, but over the decades and
centuries that followed, they came to rely on its resilience in safeguarding Pueblo land, culture,
and rights. Thus, when U.S. officials proposed political changes that would shift power away
from Pueblo officers and place the Pueblos within the political mainstream, the Pueblos labored
to reinforce the governor system, even though it was a colonially imposed system of electoral
politics. The Pueblos embraced voting when they understood that it would reinforce their ability
to function as sovereign Pueblo nations, and on occasion they went outside their communities in
their voting and political participation. This was not the case in the U.S. territorial period; in this
era they preferred to continue under the political system imposed by Spain in the early
seventeenth century, one that looked inward and protected internal Pueblo control.
In Arizona, three Native groups confronted colonial power and electoral institutions in
vastly differing ways. While Hopis repeatedly resisted colonial domination and succeeded in
remaining outside the political mainstream well into the U.S. period, Yaquis readily accepted
Spanish ideas of village government and electoral politics. Hopis found sovereignty in isolation
and resistance; Yaquis used colonial structures to maintain an evolving, complex
religious/social/political culture. But under both Spain and Mexico, Yaqui political power proved
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too much of a good thing. While Spain and Mexico sought politically self-sufficient
communities, they did not want them to be too self-sufficient. Yaquis made voting a bulwark in
their defense against colonial aggression. Mexico eventually broke Yaqui power, forcing them to
flee for their lives across the border. In southern Arizona’s Yaqui communities, these refugees
did not reconstitute the town electoral system from the eight Yaqui towns, because their survival
depended on political anonymity. Pimas’ choices lay in between Hopis and Yaquis, both
geographically and politically. A weak town electoral model was in place at the missions of
Pimería Alta during the Spanish period, but it eventually reverted to traditional methods of
leadership selection. Pima governors still performed many of the functions of their Yaqui and
Pueblo counterparts, but mission decay, depopulation, vecino encroachments, and Apache raids
in the late Spanish period and throughout the Mexican era eventually led to the complete erosion
of Spanish-influenced Pima elections. The United States believed it had found ideal potential
citizens in Pimas, particularly the Tohono O’odham of San Xavier del Bac. But O’odham
citizenship and voting proved as elusive as they had been at the Pueblos. O’odhams, who had
been subjected to schooling, allotment, and assimilation by the federal government, simply
ignored pleas by their Indian agent to go to the polls. Once again, an Indigenous group under
U.S. colonial domination could see no material benefits to embracing U.S. citizenship and the
franchise.
With a few exceptions, such as Pueblo political forays during the Mexican era, voting as
a colonial imposition only succeeded on the village level from the Spanish period through U.S.
statehood in New Mexico and Arizona. When the colonizers attempted to bring New Mexico and
Arizona Natives into elections outside of their towns, Natives were largely unresponsive. For
Pueblo Indians, Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas, voting in larger municipalities beyond Indigenous
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boundaries meant further opening up their communities to outside forces. Voting and civil
government in Indian towns worked within the colonial sphere because they could be used to
deflect, and sometimes stymie, colonial power. All of these groups embraced voting as a concept
of internal governance at some point. For those who succeeded in indigenizing the Indian vote
and harnessing its potential, it became a powerful tool in maintaining citizenship in the Native
nation and protecting Indigenous sovereignty.
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Chapter 1
REPÚBLICAS DE INDIOS IN SPANISH NEW MEXICO

Introduction
Imagine a scene in a Spanish colonial Indian pueblo, or village. It is the first of the New
Year, and the entire village has turned out for an important event, perhaps even called to the
central plaza by beating drums or clanging bells. On this day village citizens will choose their
civil officers for the coming year. There is a great deal of excitement accompanying this event,
because the men whom they elect will meet frequently with Spanish leaders, travel to the
provincial capital and perhaps all the way to Mexico City, and see to it that the land and rights of
their people are secured and protected during their term in office. These officials will constitute
the civil arm of village government in their pueblos. They will confront both internal matters
such as the punishment of crime, and external matters such as Hispano encroachments on Indian
land. Spain hoped that by organizing Indians in such a way, with defined leadership structures
and duly-elected officers, they would be able to quickly transition the Indigenous peoples of this
hemisphere from their savage, natural state into tax-paying Spanish citizens. The Spanish crown
optimistically envisioned an orderly, relatively brief process. Turning Indian pueblos into
municipalities with an Indigenous electorate was a key facet of the Spanish program of Indian
political incorporation. This civilizing program could only succeed when Indians became voters
who dutifully elected those who led them in the Spanish town model.
The present chapter examines Indian voting and the attempted reorganization of New
Mexico’s Pueblo Indian nations into municipalities based on the Spanish model. The electoral
scene briefly narrated above, or some variation of it, has repeated itself in the numerous Pueblos
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across New Mexico for over four hundred years. The Pueblo electoral-municipal organization
has proven to be a durable, adaptable system, one that the Pueblos have maintained across the
centuries and three colonial regimes. The crucial questions I will address are as follows: what
form did the system of civil government imposed at the New Mexico Pueblos actually take? Did
a Pueblo Indian electorate ever materialize? What did participation in civil government mean to
Pueblo Indians and Spaniards? There are no definitive answers to these difficult questions, but
maneuvering their nuances sheds new light on the New Mexico Indian experience in voting and
civil governance under Spain.

Indigenous Electoral Foundations in Spanish Colonial America
It is important to address the main political and religious underpinnings in Spain’s
dealings with New Mexico’s Indian peoples.1 The idea that Spaniards possessed a legal right to
conquer and subjugate specific peoples, especially heathens, was established during the
Crusades. By the time of the Spanish invasion of the so-called New World, the pope, who was
the supreme authority in both temporal and spiritual matters, had sanctioned the colonization of
all the lands “discovered” by the Spanish and Portuguese, the conversion of their infidel
inhabitants, and their eventual political incorporation.2 By the time Spaniards entered New
Mexico to establish permanent settlements, they did not simply lump all Indians into a single
entity. The so-called Indios bárbaros (barbarian Indians), such as the Comanches, Navajos, and
Apaches, did not experience the same degree of colonization and incorporation as Pueblo
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Indians, except in the case of the genízaros.3 By contrast, Spaniards referred to Indians who lived
under Spanish rule as Indios naturales, or simply as naturales.4 Beginning in the years
immediately following Don Juan de Oñate’s entrada of 1598, Spaniards sought to impose a
system of civil government on the Pueblos, whom they viewed as Indios naturales. This system
would be well entrenched by the second half of the seventeenth century.
Indian civil government has clear foundations in Spanish law and policy. Following El
Camino Real deep into Mexico, then to the first Spanish island settlements in the Caribbean, and
back to Iberia, these roots are easily discernable. In the decades following its first encounters
with the Indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere, imperial Spain dictated Indian policy
through a series of laws. The ultimate goal of these legal measures, according to Spanish colonial
historian Lesley Byrd Simpson, was to transform Indians into “tax-paying and God-fearing
Christians.” The Leyes de Burgos (Laws of Burgos), established in Burgos, Castile, in 1512, and
amended in 1513, were the first comprehensive Spanish code specifically for administering
Indians. Among other things, the Leyes de Burgos bolstered the encomienda system,5 and
highlighted the importance of placing Indians in a town setting, because, “it is our determination
to remove the said Indians and have them dwell near the Spaniards,” so that they could be more
easily converted and controlled, and avoid the backsliding that occurred when Indians lived in
remote areas, far from Spanish eyes. Once Indians were converted and sufficiently instructed,
they would be ready to govern themselves. Amendment IV to the Leyes de Burgos (1513) states:
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And whereas it may so happen that in the course of time, what with their indoctrination
and association with Christians, the Indians will become so apt and ready to become
Christians, and so civilized and educated, that they will be capable of governing
themselves and leading the kind of life that said Christians lead there, we declare and
command and say that it is our will that those Indians who thus become competent to live
by themselves and govern themselves, under the direction and control of said
judges…shall be allowed to live by themselves and shall be obliged to serve [only] in
those things in which our vassals in Spain are accustomed to serve, so that they may
serve and pay tribute which they [our vassals] are accustomed to pay to their princes.6
Thus, with an eye towards citizenship and tax paying, Spaniards attempted to reduce Indians
(congregate them into Indian towns), and instruct them in religion and government. What
followed next over the course of the sixteenth century was the Leyes de Indias (Laws of the
Indies), a long, complicated set of Spanish legal codes. These laws were compiled and published
in 1681 as the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias.
Over the course of the 1500s, Spanish military, clerical, and civil administrators
organized Indians in the villages in Mexico into what they termed repúblicas de indios, or Indian
republics. Each Indian town was entitled to form its own town government and governing town
council. The Spanish town council, or cabildo, served as the model for the Indian town council.
Spanish colonial documents refer the Indian town council variously as a cabildo, ayuntamiento,7
or even república. Broadly speaking, the cabildo or ayuntamiento served as the preeminent
institution of local government in organized municipalities throughout New Spain over the
duration of the Spanish colonial period, both Native and non-Native. These local town councils
were crucial—most of all on the local level—to the overall political structure of Spanish
America. The cabildo is ancient in origin, with an evolution that can be traced back at least as far
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as Roman times, through the Castilian towns during the Christian Reconquest of Spain, and then
to Spanish colonial America.8 The Recolpilación, which established guidelines in Spanish Indian
policy, mandated that each new settlement in Spain’s American colonies have a cabildo. Title 7,
Law 18 of Book IV of the Recolpilación states that a “Justicia and governing body shall be
chosen from among the settlers” of each town, while Title 10 clarifies that, “Citizens of the
village must be elected as officials.”9 Indian town officers were to be chosen through elections
held on or near the first of the calendar year. The offices named include gobernador (governor),
alcaldes (mayors), alcaldes mayores (local chief magistrates), principales (headmen or nobles),
regidores (alderman or town councilmen), and corregidores (local magistrates, similar to
alcaldes mayores). Tradition holds that Hernando Cortés set in motion the process of Indian civil
government after the Iberian model in 1525, when he conferred the titles of gobernador, alcalde,
regidor, escribano (notary), and oficial on Indigenous elites in Milpa Alta, Oaxaca.10 When
Spain established a permanent colony in New Mexico, it already had three-quarters of a century
of experience in restructuring Indian town governments.
These self-governing colonial Indigenous communities, or repúblicas, are best described
as semi-sovereign. The elected Indian officials had jurisdiction over town government, but still
had to answer to local and provincial Spanish officials, courts, and even the viceroy, all of which
intervened in electoral processes at the repúblicas on various occasions, thus limiting the
sovereignty of Indian towns. There was even a special court in Mexico City that heard a wide

8

Gilbert R. Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American Southwest,
1610–1810 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1988), 5–6.
9
S. Lyman Tyler, ed., The Indian Cause in the Spanish Laws of the Indies. Western Civilization
and Native Peoples series (Salt Lake City: American West Center, University of Utah, 1980), 51,
52.
10
Robert Haskett, Indigenous Rulers: An Ethnohistory of Town Government in Colonial
Cuernavaca (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1991), 20.

25
variety of cases involving Indian litigation, including conflicts over elections, called the Juzgado
General de Indios (General Indian Court).11 Spanish law mandated that all town officers be
elected at intervals of one or two years,12 and these elections were to take place in January.13
How elections were conducted varied, sometimes widely, from one Indian town to another. In
Spanish colonial Cuernavaca, for example, the vote was restricted to males in the upper echelons
of local society.14 The election was usually a major event in the town’s annual calendar, with
voters called to the election by the sound of trumpets and drums. In many instances electoral
processes maintained some pre-contact traditions. For example, voters often deliberated all day
and placed great value on consensus when choosing their officers.15 Although there were
variations in implementation among Indian towns, the Recopilación was quite clear in its
language that Indians were to elect their own leadership, reaffirming the Leyes de Burgos from
the previous century. Speaking specifically of the office of alcalde, Book VI, Title 3, Law 15 of
the Recopilación reads, “[Alcaldes] are to be elected each year in the presence of the Curates, as
is the practice in Spanish and Indian towns.”16
Juan Solórzano Pereyra, the preeminent scholar of Indian law of the seventeenth century,
wrote extensively on the legal framework governing Spain’s Indian communities in the Western
Hemishpere. His three-volume work, Política Indiana, treats nearly every aspect of Spanish legal
tradition concerning Indians. Pereyra, who served as oidor, or judge, in the Real Audencia of
Lima, and later as a council member of the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies, clarified
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many aspects of Indian law in his work.17 Pereyra wrote that, in general, man is “‘sociable,’
‘political’ [and] ‘civil,’” and that man’s ideal state is to live in towns and places where he can
better communicate, help others, and defend himself. He spoke for Spanish policymakers of his
time, who believed Indians must be congregated in larger communities for their own security,
conversion, and governance. Of course, he and others overlooked the fact that Indians already
lived in communities that insured their security and governance; this was one of many oversights
built into the Spanish colonial model. Pereyra wrote categorically that Indians must be reduced,
and that every reduction must have a church, Catholic ministers, Indian instructors of doctrine,
Indians trained as singers to lead mission church services, a sacristán (an Indian charged with the
care of the sacristy and church possessions), and a fiscal (church officer who made sure town
residents attended mass and generally obeyed doctrine). He further stated that each village with
at least forty households was to have an annually elected Indian alcalde, or mayor. Towns with
more than eighty households were to have an alcalde and a regidor. Very large villages could not
have more than two alcaldes and four regidores, with these officials “being elected as is
customary in towns of Spaniards and in the presence of the curates.” And, “because Indians are
fond of wandering,” he stressed that Indians from one town not be allowed to live in another
Indian town, and that Indians not even be allowed to relocate to other Indian villages. He further
clarified, “So that they may live in the greatest liberty and peace it was commanded that
Spaniards, blacks, mestizos, and mulattos not live in [Indian] pueblos, unless they are mestizos
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born of Indians of the same pueblo.”18 Pereyra’s statements clarify and reinforce Spain’s Indian
policy, and they demonstrate the crown’s larger preoccupation with the administration of Indian
villages and government, all in the hopes that Indian pueblos would become orderly, selfgoverning Indian republics in the Spanish municipal model. For this to happen, Indians must be
congregated and placed under the control of competent elected Indigenous leadersip.
The documentary evidence demonstrates that both Spanish colonial officials and Indians
in these early repúblicas took the elections of civil officials quite seriously. Indians frequently
aired their electoral grievances to Spanish officials. Letters in the Archivo General de la Nación,
or the Mexican National Archives, contain enlightening information regarding Indian elections.
For example, there is a series of letters relating to elections in the Indian town of Otumba, which
is located approximately sixty-one kilometers from Mexico City.19 In one letter dated 29
December 1589, the viceroy in Mexico City notifies the local Spanish official that he has
received complaints from the Indian headmen and others that the same four men have been
holding and controlling the office of alcalde for over ten years. He informs the local Spanish
official that he has also received reports that these four Indian leaders have been “soliciting and
gaining votes from their important friends by extraordinary means [connotes extralegal means],
that [the people of the town] receive notable vexations and threats from the abovementioned
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men…”20 The viceroy then set term limits so that a man could be alcalde for only one year at a
time, and could not serve in the office until two years had lapsed from the end of his previous
term.
Spaniards concerned themselves not only with who was elected and how, but also if nonIndians were present at the elections. Initially, república elections took place in the presence of a
local curate, but complaints by Indians of outsiders exerting undue influence at their elections led
the crown to do away this requirement in 1622.21 The presence of Spanish clerics or civil
officials put undue pressure on Indians to elect officials favorable to these outsiders. On
numerous occasions, higher-ups in Mexico City wrote to local Spanish officials and clerics,
forbidding their presence in Indian towns on election days. Another letter to the Spanish
magistrate of Otumba dating from 1590 states, “the Alcaldes and Rejidores [sic] and headmen of
the town have made known to me that in order for them to freely hold the elections of the
República that are to be held in the coming year 1591 as is customary[,] that religious officials or
people who are not citizens of the town must not disturb in the voting process.”22 Spanish
officials in the Indian town of Ozolotepec23 received the same rebukes in July of 1591:
[Indian officials] of the town of Ozolotepeque have made known to me that the times that
they hold their cabildos and ayuntamientos to elect officials of the Republic…the
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Religious that administer and some of the Spanish that reside nearby enter into the
cabildos to obstruct them and to impede them so that they do not elect sufficient and
worthy people to the said positions…[I order that] no Spanish enter into their councils
and that they be allowed to liberally be and reside alone in the said Cabildos, not even
you, unless it were with my express permission.24
Even with these express prohibitions by viceroys and other officials, Spanish civil and religious
officials continued to meddle in Indian elections throughout the colonial period.25 But in theory,
at least, Indian elections for the repúblicas were to be free and open to Indians only. All of these
developments set the precedent for Spanish implementation of Indigenous civil government in
New Mexico. These Mexican Indian communities were the antecedents for Pueblo civil
governments as Spain brought the concept of repúblicas de indios up the Camino Real into their
distant northern province, adapting the system to the unique circumstances and conditions in
New Mexico.
When it comes to the elected Indigenous officers of New Spain, sweeping statements
about their powers and responsibilities are a bit tricky, since these were often adapted to suit the
needs of the individual village. But we are able to make some general statements on the official
powers and responsibilities of these officers. Using colonial Cuernavaca as an example,26 elected
officers engaged in tribute collection and delivery to Spanish officials, oversaw a municipal
treasury used for community expenses and emergencies, supported the local church, and oversaw
cases involving petty crime and community land issues, among other things.27 Speaking broadly
of Indian town government in Mexico, prominent historian of repúblicas de indios Dorothy
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Tanck de Estrada neatly summarizes the duties of elected Indian officials, which could include:
travel to the capital of the jurisdiction to receive ceremonial staffs (Santa Fe in the case of New
Mexico); oversee the mass and communal meal for the newly-elected officials each year; judge
minor crimes; oversee the planting and harvesting of crops on communal lands, and the
necessary labor for this work; pay for and direct the repairs of the church, village meeting house,
and community roads; fund and oversee the fiesta of the pueblo’s patron saint; pay for and
consult with attorneys regarding village litigation; and carry out the annual elections for the new
government.28 It is important to keep all of this information in mind as we turn to the Pueblos of
New Mexico. A lack of documentary sources regarding the establishment of self-governing
Pueblo repúblicas forces us to turn to Mexico and later Pueblo sources.29 Dorothy Roman of
Jemez Pueblo, who was interviewed in 1968, related her family history which discussed the
duties of Pueblo officers: “The way I understand…my daddy used to tell us that the governors
[are supposed] to take care of the Pueblo, to take care of roads, to take care [of the] ditches, to
take care of water gates and fans and everything like that…and then to go to meetings, and
whenever they put up a meeting to see what is right or what they want for somebody to do…”30
It is safe to assume that elected Pueblo civil officers held some or all of the powers discussed
above.
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Pueblo Elections, Civil Government, and Officers in New Mexico
First, there is the obvious: Pueblos had and still have Spanish-style civil governing
officers and structures. A brief look at the official websites of several New Mexico Pueblos gives
enlightening information on these matters. The Pueblo of Sandia (Na-Fiat in Tiwa31) website
indicates:
A Governor, Lt. Governor, Warchief, and Lt. Warchief are appointed for annual terms
according to Sandia's cultural tradition. Each man can be appointed to consecutive terms.
The Governor and Warchief will become Tribal Council members for life. The Warchief
and Lt. Warchief are responsible for all religious activities held in the Pueblo. The
Governor oversees day to day government operations, while the Lt. Governor is the
Tribal Court Judge.32
Taos Pueblo’s (Tuah-Tah in Tiwa) website states:
A tribal governor and war chief, along with staffs for each, are appointed yearly by the
Tribal Council, a group of some 50 male tribal elders. The tribal governor and his staff
are concerned with civil and business issues within the village and relations with the nonIndian world. The war chief and staff deal with the protection of the mountains and
Indian lands outside the Pueblo walls.33
The Jemez Pueblo (Walatowa in Towa) website explains, “Our secular tribal government
includes the Tribal Council, the Governor, two Lt. Governors, two fiscales, and a sheriff. These
officials are appointed every year to carry out all secular duties and responsibilities of the tribal
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government.”34 Finally, the Keresan speaking Pueblo de Cochiti’s (Ko-Tyit) website indicates
that civil officers for the Pueblo include a “War Chief, Lieutenant War Chief, Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Major Fiscale and Lieutenant Fiscale.” There are also “minor officials” in
the Pueblo’s government.35 Other Pueblo websites list the names of various individuals filling
offices and explain their forms of civil government. Although the titles are not always the same,
one commonly finds governors, lieutenant governors, fiscales, and others.
Looking back, in many of the Pueblo communities that lay to the far north, Spaniards
believed that they had found ideal candidates for tractable self-governing Indian communities
that conformed to their vision of Indian municipalities. For starters, the Pueblos were sedentary
and stable communities requiring little by way of reduction compared to other Indian groups.
Furthermore, Spaniards were convinced that Pueblo peoples were of a favorable, docile
disposition. For example, Hernando de Alvarado, a member of Coronado’s expedition who spent
time among the Tiwas in the middle Rio Grande Valley, related that “The people seem excellent,
more like farmers than warriors.…[the Pueblo people from surrounding areas] came to this place
to offer me their friendship.” Alvarado also commended the Tiwas for what he perceived as their
worship of Catholic crosses erected by Spaniards in his party:
In those places where crosses were erected, we showed them [how] to venerate them.
They offer their powders and feathers [to the crosses], and some leave the mantas they
are wearing. [They venerate the cross] with such great ardor that some climbed on top of
others in order to reach the arms of the crosses so they could place feathers and roses
[there]. Others brought ladders, holding them, [and still] others climbed up to tie on yarn
in order to attach roses and feathers.36
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Alvarado clearly failed to see the Indigenous nature of their actions, but his characterization of
Pueblos followed a common trope. New Mexico historian Marc Simmons summarizes the
favorable view of the Pueblos reported by Fray Agustín Rodríguez’s exploratory party of 1581:
Pueblos Indians were “clean, handsome, and industrious, and…if interpreters had been available,
some [Pueblo Indians] would have quickly become Christians.”37 Under such ostensibly
favorable circumstances, Spaniards hoped to quickly pacify, convert, and then incorporate
Pueblo Indians into civil society.38 The reality that the Iberians encountered was quite different
from what they had hoped. Coronado, for example, met with fierce resistance along the middle
Rio Grande during the brutal Tiquex War of 1540–41, and events at Acoma in 1598 threatened
to derail Oñate’s nascent colony. In spite of these violent initial encounters, Spaniards intended
to bring Pueblo Indians into the sphere of Spanish institutions, including access to the Spanish
legal system and eventual citizenship.39 Soldiers would accomplish the goal of pacification,
while Franciscans would tackle conversion. Most important of all, in order for peace and order to
be established so that the civilizing program could proceed, the Pueblos needed to be
incorporated into the body politic, and Pueblo Indian repúblicas served this purpose.
The precise date when Spaniards implemented civil government at the Pueblos remains
unclear. Establishing repúblicas must certainly have been an important order of business directly
after Oñate toured the Pueblos in the summer of 1598, a moment when the Pueblos nominally
swore fealty to the Spanish crown and god. Dr. Joseph Henry Suina, who served two separate
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terms as governor of Cochiti Pueblo, recounts the oral tradition of the meeting between Oñate
and Pueblo leaders at Santo Domingo (Kewa in Keres), during this early period of Oñate’s New
Mexico governorship. Pueblo leaders were made to “submit” to Spanish civil and Catholic
religious authority, though Dr. Suina contends that this likely made no sense to these Pueblo
Indians.40 At some point, probably in the early decades of the seventeenth century, Spanish
authorities sought to establish permanent Pueblo repúblicas modeled after those already in place
to the south. Ohkay Owingeh anthropologist Alfonso Ortiz states that, “it is really not known
when the Spanish system of local government was imposed, since most church and
administrative records in New Mexico were burned during the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.”41 Jemez
historian Joe Sando contends that prior to approximately 1620, Spanish governors felt it was
within their power to appoint Pueblo civil officials, or “governors” of the Pueblos.42 Renowned
New Mexico Historian Marc Simmons summarizes:
When Oñate accepted the submission of individual [Pueblo] villages, he acknowledged
their status as repúblicas, which, in the Spanish sense, referred to semiautonomous
municipalities with certain inherent rights of self-government. It was recognized that a
form of native administration already existed under a system of caciques, but to fit more
smoothly into the Spanish scheme, a new set of officers was soon created to deal directly
with the governor in Santa Fe.43
The admittedly scant documentary evidence dealing with Spanish-Pueblo relations in New
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Mexico before the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 suggests that the seemingly eternal power struggle
between clergy and civil officials also spilled over to the selection of Indian magistrates. Civil
governors and clergy battled one another over who would control the selection of Pueblo
officers.
Eventually, none other than King Phillip III of Spain intervened and sought to resolve
this matter as it concerned Indian elections at the Pueblos. Writing to Governor Juan de Eulate in
a letter dated 10 March 1620, the viceroy of New Spain, Don Diego Fernandez de Cordova,
informs Eulate that he has been made aware of “certain differences and disputes which there
have been between you and the Father Custodian of the Religious of Sr. St. Francisco and the
Religious themselves…in matters of jurisdiction.”44 One of the principal issues at hand was the
annual elections of Pueblo civil officers. Noted New Mexico historian France Scholes asserts
that Governor Eulate had meddled in Pueblo elections.45 Scholes, who worked tirelessly to bring
many Spanish archival documents to New Mexico and pointed to the church-state conflict in
colonial New Mexico during the seventeenth century, comments, “The clergy had complained
that the governor tried to impose his will in such elections in order to further his own selfish
ends. The civil authorities, on the other hand, had asserted that the custodian and other friars had
given the Indians to understand that their [the friars’] authority was superior to that of the
governor.”46 Such power jockeying and attempts to control Pueblo elections by Spanish civil and
clerical leaders surely undermined the early vitality of the repúblicas de indios of New Mexico.
Nevertheless, the system did take hold in due course.
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The text of the viceroy’s letter is very telling as to what the king and his representative
envisioned for Pueblo electoral procedures. A section of the letter under the subheading
“Elections” reads:
And Because of the part of the said custodian and [other] Religious some complaints
have been presented to me to the effect that Ye interfere in the matters under their care
even to naming the fiscals of the church and in other lesser things, Ye shall give order
how each of the pueblos of those provinces, on the first day of January of each year, may
hold its elections of governor, alcaldes, topiles, fiscals, and the others who serve the
Republic, without You or any other Judiciary, the custodian of other Religious being
present at the said elections, so that in them the said Indians may have the liberty which is
fitting. And the [elections] which in this manner they may hold, they shall report them to
You that ye may confirm them if they have been effected by the majority and with the
liberty Stated, that everything is in accord with what is customary in this New Spain.47
This mirrored events in Mexico, where the presence of Spaniards at elections inspired the
instructions cited earlier. This crucial letter, which fortunately survived the Pueblo Revolt of
1680 due to copies remaining in Mexico City, demonstrates that these elections were important
enough for the highest Spanish civil official in New Spain—the viceroy—to write about them in
a very specific and straightforward manner to the governor of a sparsely-populated province on
the farthest fringe of the kingdom. In a letter dated 9 January 1621—another one of the few
surviving documents from the Spanish Archives of New Mexico predating the Pueblo Revolt—
the governor is directed, “That things that might be of importance to the common welfare of the
baptized Indians and to the universal preservation of the republic to the Spaniards and Indians
will be consulted with you the governor of the villa of Santa Fe…”48 In other words, in those
matters that pertained to the preservation of the Indian repúblicas, consultation between Spanish
and Pueblo officials was essential. Spaniards placed great value on properly functioning Pueblo
repúblicas, so that orderly relations could be maintained between the church and crown on one
47
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hand, and the Pueblos on the other. Without repúblicas de indios and their cadre of elected
Pueblo civil officials, Spain saw no way to maintain harmonious relations between Indians and
Spaniards, both secular and religious.

The Evolution of Pueblo Elections
As Joe Sando and others have hypothesized, Spanish officials probably appointed the
first Pueblo civil officers. It is impossible to know exactly how long the practice of Spanish
appointments for Pueblo officers persisted, but it lasted at least as late as 1665. On February 9 of
that year, the Viceroy of New Spain, Don Antonio Sebastián de Toledo, issued a royal decree
appointing Pedro de la Aguila of Isleta Pueblo (Tue-I in Tiwa), “Governor of the said province of
the Tiwas…for the rest of his life.” He was made governor of the Tiwas of that province due to
his “having served His Majesty on various occasions for more than ten years” as an interpreter
and missionary to the Ypotlapigua Indians.49 Nevertheless, at some point the electoral process at
the Puebos became thoroughly indigenized. This process did not take place overnight, nor did it
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yield the same results at each Pueblo, although there are similarities among them.50 Only two of
the Pueblos ever implemented actual elections in the Iberian town model during the Spanish era.
As anthropologist Florence M. Hawley, who conducted field work in the Pueblos in the 1930s,
points out, “Only two Pueblos, Isleta and Laguna [Ka’waika in Keres], ever comprehended and
adopted the elections system.” She described these elections in some detail:
Isleta is one of the two Eastern Pueblos in which we find elections of secular officers
actually being held according to the old Spanish decree. The men of the pueblo elect a
governor, a lieutenant governor or right hand man, a second lieutenant who is left hand
man, six war captains (three from each moiety)…[At Laguna] the secular government
consists of a governor, two lieutenant governors, and three war captains. As in Isleta,
these officers are elected annually by a council composed of all the men. Contrary to the
usual custom, these officers have ritual as well as secular functions.51
But two out of perhaps several dozen is a very low yield. At all of the other Pueblos, the
elections mixed Spanish customs with traditional Pueblo practice.
Detailed descriptions of Pueblo elections during the Spanish period simply do not exist.
Instead, I cautiously reference two descriptions of the Pueblo electoral process at Cochiti and
Ohkay Owingeh Pueblos. These two descriptions come from prominent Pueblo scholars: former
governor of Cochiti Joseph Suina and famed Ohkay Owingeh anthropologist Alfonso Ortiz.
While I concede that the election process must certainly have changed and evolved between the
Spanish period and the late twentieth century, the period from which these accounts are taken, I
still believe that the process remains similar enough to render these accounts extremely useful.
They are the best and most complete that we have. Dr. Suina’s rich description reads as follows:
There are two kivas in the village, two moieties, of which one of them you are born into,
and they’re the hubs of our government. The moieties, which are religious in nature, take
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turns providing the leaders for the village. The leaders are in place for one year, and then
at the end of the year, they switch kivas furnishing the leaders.
And every year that the leaders are in place, they have a layer of another six to 12 junior
officers underneath them—drawn from the opposite kiva. The junior officers do the dog
work, if you will, but that's how you learn. What's happening in that process, of course, is
that, as a junior officer [he was chosen to serve as a junior officer four times, serving four
one-year terms], you're privy to council meetings and to ceremonies in the kiva that are
only for tribal leaders. So that while you’re doing your piddly stuff—sweeping floors, or
getting the message out to the people and those kinds of things—you’re also learning the
way of life and laying the groundwork for governing in the future….[Then] I was given
my first major responsibility of a post within the tribe in 1995. I became lieutenant
governor, and that sort of changed my whole relationship to the tribe. Before you're an
elder, you can be fairly lax about attendance at events. You can offer an excuse when you
miss something, and so forth. But as an elder, which I became, you’ve got to be there for
things; that’s expected of you. If you expect the youth to be there, then you better be
there first. I had to drop out of university teaching for that period of time in office….Then
in 1998 I became the governor of Cochiti Pueblo…in 1995, when I was lieutenant
governor and went with delegations to Washington to lobby for financial aid for an
irrigation project, for a problem with seepage from the dam on our land, and for the
construction costs for an elderly center and other projects. Being governor was another
level of education for me, which clearly involved my pueblo but not so much on the
traditional end. It was more about assisting with the tribe's intersect with the big world,
where we dealt with highways, hospitals, social services, schools and much more.52
I have cited much of Dr. Suina’s interview because it contains many of the essential elements of
Pueblo electoral processes: selection of officers by moiety leaders and elders; the divisions of
leaders into junior and senior; the responsibility of senior officers—namely the lieutenant
governor and governor—to deal with outside entities and protect Pueblo interests; and the overall
importance of these offices. As Dr. Suina states, being chosen to serve as an officer was not to be
taken lightly. I will return to many of these important aspects shortly, but it is important to point
out the hybrid Pueblo-Spanish nature of the electoral process at Cochiti and many of the other
Pueblos.
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Ohkay Owingeh anthropologist Alfonso Ortiz provides an even more in-depth description
of the election process.53 Ortiz’s description of an election at Ohkay Owingeh in the 1960s is the
most detailed account by a Pueblo Indian. In The Tewa World: Space, Time, Being, and
Becoming in a Pueblo Society, he describes the organization of Spanish-imposed civil authorities
at Ohkay Owingeh: they include a governor, two lieutenants, and an aguacil (sheriff). According
to Ortiz, the officials are selected on 1 January of each year, but none are notified beforehand,
since being selected as a civil official requires a large commitment of time, travel, and resources,
with very little compensation. Without foreknowledge, those selected for positions have less
chance to refuse. Ortiz even cites examples of individuals leaving town when somehow notified
in advance.54 The newly elected Pueblo governors received black canes adorned with silver and
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silk as symbols of their offices.55 Today the governor receives three canes: one for the Spanish
government, another for the Mexican government, and the third—the so-called Lincoln canes—
representing governing authority granted by the President of the United States. The other
officials receive only a single, shorter, cane, which they leave hanging on their wall while in
office, while the governor may carry his canes when acting in his office.56 The Spanish referred
to these canes as varas de justicia (staffs of justice or canes of power), and they played an
important symbolic role in the confirmation of Pueblo officials.57 Pueblo tradition holds that
leaders used canes or staffs as symbols of power before the arrival of the Spaniards. These canes
were viewed as living entities with a life and heartbeat of their own. Thus, the use of varas
corresponded nicely to this traditional practice. Furthermore, former governor of Tesuque Pueblo
Gil Vigil relates that the canes also served Spanish purposes. Vigil asserts that the Spanish
established elected Pueblo offices and canes because “they wanted to have one person to deal
with, instead of having to deal with ten, twelve, fifteen people,” or a large group of traditional
Pueblo elders, in whose hands power rested.58 There was religious significance to the canes as
well. According to the Pueblo of Acoma [Haaku in Keres] website, “The good Franciscan
Fathers following the Good Book of Moses impressed upon the Indians the lessons of leadership
in Exodus Four and Numbers Seventeen. The rod and staff should be their comfort and strength,
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and their token against all enemies.”59 The electoral process would have varied from one Pueblo
to the next,60 but the example of Ohkay Owingeh is extremely informative. What is certain is that
some version of this election process eventually occurred in all of the Pueblos of New Mexico
that came under Spanish rule.61
Ortiz also carefully outlines the duties of the elected officials at that time. Their
responsibilities included maintaining and supervising the Pueblo’s irrigation system. This is a
considerable undertaking, since the irrigation system has long been shared with neighboring
Hispano communities. Officers oversee the Pueblo’s stock and grazing rights on communal
lands, and direct the renting of land and Pueblo property to outsiders. The village aguacil, or
sheriff, may punish minor crimes, and is to bring those who commit more serious crimes to the
governor, who has the power to fine such individuals. The fiscales, or church officers, maintain
the church grounds and help the priest with his duties on feast days and during special religious
observances. Ortiz relates that in past times, fiscales forced Pueblo citizens to attend church
services under the threat of whipping, taught catechism to village children, and buried the dead
in the Catholic manner.62 Perhaps the most important duty of Pueblo officers, and one which
falls mainly to the governor, is to represent the Pueblo in its dealings with other Indian nations
and outside governments.63 All of the official responsibilities illuminated by Ortiz are mostly in
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keeping with Indian república officials in other parts of Spanish America.
These two narratives by Pueblo citizens, one a former governor, are the most detailed
accounts by Pueblo members that I have encountered. But, there are also anthropological studies
by non-Indians who affirm what Suina and Ortiz tell us about Pueblo elections. These studies
may contain some mistaken information, since they came from informants and were not actually
observed by the anthropologists. They must be used judiciously. Anthropologist Leslie A. White,
who studied Santo Domingo Pueblo in the first decades of the twentieth century, wrote about the
governing structure of the Keresan Pueblo from information she gathered from Santo Domingo
informants.64 At Santo Domingo, the ruling authority is the cacique, known as the ksaik,
hotcanyi, or taimoni. He is the spiritual leader of the Pueblo and carries a basket full of clay
images that represent the people of his village, on whose behalf he frequently fasts and prays.
White states that the cacique appoints two lesser officials, the war priests, and their ten helpers.
The war priests “take charge” of nearly all of the important ceremonies, and they select the
successor to the cacique. The war priests and their helpers serve for terms of one year. White
states, “The cacique appoints the two war priests and their helpers at the annual elections.” The
war chiefs each receive a vara at their investiture, while their helpers all receive a smaller
wooden staff about eighteen inches long as a symbol of their office. The position of war chief
predates the Spanish period. The elections of civil officers are held each December 31. The
heads of the Flint and Cikame societies (two of the main medicine societies) announce the names
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of those men whom they have selected to serve in the offices imposed by the Spaniards.65
The civil officers present at Santo Domingo at that time were the governor, lieutenant
governor, six capitani, and six bickari, or fiscales.66 The head of the Cikame society chooses the
governor. The governor carries his cane as his badge of office, but he has absolutely no
ceremonial responsibilities: “His duties in general are to transact such business as the pueblo has
with outside, non-Indian agencies, such as the Government, tourists, church organizations, etc.”
He helps to oversee work on the irrigation ditch, assists at times with quarrels in the Pueblo,
gives permission to Pueblo members to leave for jobs, schooling, or other reasons, and
supervises the sentries when sacred and/or masked ceremonies and dances are held. The Cikame
head also selects the lieutenant governor, and he receives a vara for his office. He assists the
governor in his duties. The Cikame society leader also chooses the six capitani each year. They
act as the governor’s helpers—as messengers, errand boys, and lookouts during ceremonies,
among other things. They each carry a short cane, as the war priests’ helpers do. Being one of the
capitani is not considered an unimportant office, and neither are they young men. White lists
junior officers all aged forty and above, with one man even in his seventies. He refers to the
fiscales as those who, “in the old days,” took care of the church, gathered food and supplies for
the resident Franciscan, and accompanied him on his visits to the Pueblo. Fiscales also bury the
dead. There is a hierarchy among the fiscales, or bickari, with a bickari mayor, a bickari teniente,
and four bickari helpers. The fiscales all carry small staffs, with both younger and older men
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holding office.67
As at Ohkay Owingeh, a few days before the official elections are to take place, on 29
December, all of the Pueblo’s officers meet at the governor’s home. This is the final day of postChirstmas dancing. The governor and war chief, who preside at this meeting, inform the officers
that their term is ending. They then proceed to the cacique’s home and inform him that the end of
the year has arrived and the officers are through with performing their duties of office. The
outgoing officers wait at the governor’s house for the war chief and governor to return.
The next day all of the medicine men, principales, and officers meet at the Turquoise kiva. The
cacique and Cikame head both announce the new officers, and everyone is to meet the next
morning again at the kiva. The following morning, there is an installation ceremony in which the
cacique and Cikame head bring the old officers forward along with the new ones. They take the
outgoing officers’ canes and present them to the new officials, also making speeches about
fulfilling their duties and serving the people. Pueblo citizens gather at the main plaza for a dance
on January 1 where they celebrate the installation of new officers.68 This is Santo Domingo
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democracy, and one can observe the subtle differences between this Pueblo, Ohkay Owingeh,
Cochiti, Laguna, and Isleta. They all follow a similar general model, but have been adapted to
the individual Pueblo over time. Through these examples, we see Pueblo voting and democracy
in action.
After the electoral process occurred at each Pueblo, and village leaders confirmed the
new officers and distributed the canes, one important step in the process remained. Spanish
authorities in Santa Fe received Pueblo officials and swore them in. One Spanish document dated
10 January 1706 details the reception and confirmation of numerous officers from the Pueblo
repúblicas for that year:
Captain Don Alfonso Rael de Aguilar, secretary of government and war, alcalde
ordinario of the villa of Santa Fé, the capital of this kingdom and province of New
Mexico, protector-general of the Indians native to its pueblos and frontiers…I certify, as
is my duty…That on the sixth day of January of the current year, 1706, there appeared
before me as their protector-general the Indian governors, chiefs, captains, and the other
officials of justice of the pueblos of this kingdom and jurisdiction, of the nations of the
Zuñis, Queres [Keres], Teguas [Tewas], Hemes [Jemez], Thanos [Tanos], Pecos, Tiguas
[Tiwas], Pecuries [Picuris], and Thaos [Taos]. They had come to this villa for the purpose
of being confirmed in the positions to which they had just been elected.69
This formal reception and confirmation process persisted throughout the Spanish period. In a
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letter written much later in New Mexico’s Spanish colonial era, dated 16 January 1811, Ignacio
Sanchez, a Spanish official with jurisdiction over Jemez Pueblo, wrote that “The Justices who
have been elected in the Pueblos of my care, have gone [to Santa Fe] to be confirmed with their
staffs [of justice] and to receive the orders of their office.”70 As cited in the earlier example from
Ohkay Owingeh, religious leaders at that Pueblo would have already sworn in the civil
authorities in a scripted, ceremonial manner, but the physical act of traveling to Santa Fe to be
confirmed, which served as a sort of Spanish colonial inauguration, gave legitimacy to the whole
process, at least to Spanish eyes. These men were now recognized as the governing figures of the
individual Pueblo repúblicas.
As a final caveat, while the Pueblos had attained a relative degree of autonomy in the
selection of their officers, perhaps reaching the greatest degree of freedom in the wake of the
Pueblo Revolt and Reconquista,71 Spaniards persisted in their efforts to sway Pueblo Indians in
their leadership choices, and had clear opinions on the attributes of an ideal Pueblo governor. In
an undated document, presumed to be from 1773, Father Joaquín de Jesús Ruiz, who had
ministered at both Jémez and Isleta, penned a short treatise on the governing of Franciscan
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missions in New Mexico, including the duties of Indian governors. Regarding the Pueblo
governor, he wrote:
Each pueblo shall have its head, who shall be satisfactory to the missionary father and
confirmed by the governor. He must be a man who will make himself respected by the
Indians and unite us with them, and he must be of temperate disposition…It is his
obligation to join the minister immediately when the bell rings, to see that none of the
pupils are missing at catechism, or the married people at mass, without sufficient cause;
but shall not be allowed the right to punish without consulting the missionary father or
minister, so that the latter may decide whether or not there is sufficient reason for the
punishment. It should be the duty of this leader to see that the Indians live in peace…He
should exert himself to make them plant crops, for if they have enough to eat in their
pueblos they will not wander about. He should take note of what Indians go out and come
in and report to the father; he should see that they keep watch over the country…Citizens
are not permitted to enter the community, nor shall girls enter it when there are travelers
there…And if this leader becomes sick, or joins in with the Indians [engaged in
prohibited behavior], the minister shall report it to the prelate, so that the latter may
inform the governor [of New Mexico], who will remove him from office.72
This document illustrates how Franciscans viewed the powers of Indian governors as limited,
and best used to influence Indians to follow Spanish religion and work patterns. This fact
notwithstanding, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Pueblo
communities took control of their electoral processes, fusing elements of Spanish democratic
town government and traditional Pueblo practices. What resulted were Pueblo elections and
officers adapted to local conditions.
As a final note on the evolution of the Pueblo democratic process, accounts of Pueblo
election disputes are rare in the Spanish colonial period. During Governor Pedro Rodríguez
Cubero’s term (1697–1703), reports came in of a dispute at Zuñi Pueblo [She-We-Na in Zuñi]
over the governorship. Apparently, the cacique, don Juan, was upset because “the cane was taken
from him.” A Zuñi by the name of don Antonio was serving in office, and Governor Cubero
72
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ordered Captain Juan de Ulibarrí to investigate whether Antonio “was elected as governor of
Zuni Pueblo with the agreement and at the pleasure of all the Indians or whether this was done
based on the opinion of the alcalde mayor, José Naranjo [a Spaniard], and not that of the Indians.
If the latter is true, Ulibarrí will return the governor’s cane to don Juan, the cacique of Zuni
Pueblo.” Spaniards collected accounts from a number of witnesses on the matter, and Captian
Ulibarrí found that, “don Juan [the cacique and seemingly the previous governor] though at very
first sad to give up control (since because of it, he had been made governor), is today very
happy.”73 This closed the dispute over the overnorship at Zuñi, with the cacique seemingly
bending to the will of the Zuñi people, even though he would have at first preferred to retain
power.

The Work of the Governors
While few, if any, scholars have written book-length studies that specifically address
Pueblo civil government in Spanish colonial New Mexico, a number of studies have focused on
Indian town governments in Mexico and other parts of Latin America.74 Tracy L. Brown’s
Pueblo Indians and Spanish Colonial Authority in Eighteenth-Century New Mexico does address
73

“Bartolomé Lobato, Opinion, Cochiti Pueblo, 25 February 1702, DS,” 143; “Pedro Rodríguez
Cubero, Order, Zia Pueblo, 28 February 1702, DS,” 150; “Juan de Ulibarrí to Pedro Rodríguez
Cubero, Zuni Pueblo, 8 March 1702, DS,” 179, in John L. Kessell, Rick Hendricks, Meredith D.
Dodge, and Larry D. Miller, eds., That Disturbances Cease: The Journals of don Diego de
Vargas, New Mexico, 1697–1700 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000).
74
Titles include: William F. Connell, After Moctezuma: Indigenous Politics and Self-government
in Mexico City, 1524–1730 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011, now in its third
printing); Brian Pwensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Pres, 2011); Dorothy Tanck de Estrada, Pueblos de Indios y
Educación en el México Colonial, 1750-1821, cited previously; Charles Gibson, Tlaxcala in the
Sixteenth Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967); Robert Haskett,
Indigenous Rulers: An Ethnohistory of Town Government in Colonial Cuernavaca, cited
previously; and Bernardo García Martínez, Los Pueblos de la Sierra: El Poder y el Espacio
Entre los Indios del Norte de Puebla Hasta 1700 (México D.F.: El Colegio de México, 2005).

50
Pueblo civil officers and their power. In her work, Brown combines an examination of Pueblo
politics with chapters on Pueblo economics, gender relations, marriage, and other topics. She
argues that Pueblo Indians incorporated new forms of Spanish civil government in ways that
reinforced the power of Pueblo elites, as well as buttressed gender and class distinctions.75 In his
classic study, Spanish Government in New Mexico, Marc Simmons only briefly mentions Pueblo
government, and then only in a footnote. It reads: “Indian justicias (justices, or officials) were
elected annually by the Pueblo and confirmed in their offices by the provincial governor in Santa
Fe where they received their varas de justicia or staffs of justice.”76 Noted historian of
Southwestern Indigenous history Edward Spicer summarized the entire Indian república system
in his work, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the
Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960, with this description:
The effort to organize all Indian villages into formal governments resembling the local
governments of Spain was of course official policy from the first in northern New Spain.
It involved the appointment by a governor of a province of civil and military officials
among the Indians of each village. Canes of office were distributed to such individuals
after they had been picked out. They were held to be responsible for maintaining peace,
for enforcing discipline by whipping or use of the stocks as the missionary or other
official might require, and serving as a communication channel with the Spanish civil
authority….The [Indian] governor and his associated officials, once appointed (or
elected), were, however, under the supervision of the Spanish alcaldes who were the
administrative executives set up by a Spanish governor within his province. There is little
indication that any but the most fragmentary communication systems were set up during
the Spanish period between Spanish and Indian governors.77
While this description and others are factually correct, they fail to capture the essence of Pueblo
government and the important functions these leaders performed for their communities.
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Even Pueblo historians such as Joe Sando (Jemez) can seem somewhat dismissive of
Pueblo civil officers: “[Spanish imposition of the governor system was] a form that the Spaniards
understood; and with this kind of government, he saw a way of making village officials conform
to his way of doing things.” Sando points to the fact, earlier elaborated by Suina and Ortiz, that
the cacique and his staff have always selected the governor and all other officials annually. In
other words, the imposition of the república model did not diminish the power of traditional
religious leaders at the Pueblos, who in nearly all cases assumed the responsibility of selecting
civil officers. As Tracy Brown contends:
…caciques and the assistants continued to govern Pueblo communities…governors were
appointed by them and subordinated to them. Secular officials had no real power in the
Pueblo communities and made no policy decisions. The imposed Spanish system was
simply incorporated into the traditional, corporate form of governance, with caciques and
their assistants directing the actions of governors and other imposed officials.78
As Sando astutely explains, the governor system was “superimposed upon the ancient tradition
of selecting war captains and their aides to govern the civil aspects of pueblo life.”79 Still, even
with caciques, society chiefs, and traditional elders pulling the strings within the república
system, each type of government required a specific body of knowledge. The governing religious
leaders were the keepers of ceremonial and historical knowledge necessary to maintain cultural
continuity, while the civil governors had to be versed in Spanish law and culture in order to treat
successfully with the colonizers. In other words, the Pueblo civil governors were the cultural
intermediaries in New Mexico’s Pueblo repúblicas. Their work, though subservient to that of the
caciques and other traditional leaders, was still crucial to the survival and well being of the
Pueblos. Both forms of Pueblo government operated, and continue to operate, in a symbiotic
manner.
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Santa Clara Pueblo (Kha’p’oo Owinge in Tewa) anthropologist Edward P. Dozier80 noted
the importance of the elected civil authorities, but qualified his observations with this caveat: “it
is important to note only that the officers of the civil government system are recognized in all the
pueblos today as an imposed set.” Still, he goes on to say, “This is not to imply that the latter are
unimportant, for these officers are crucial in dealing with profane matters and the outside world.”
Dozier lists the elected officers in a general manner, describing them as a governor, a lieutenant
governor, alguacil, mayordomo (ditch captain), and fiscales. He provides a clear and succinct
summary of official duties during the Spanish colonial period from the Pueblo perspective:
The governor was to represent the village in all important dealings with Spanish
authorities. The lieutenant governor was to serve as an assistant to the governor and
represent him when absent; and, in the event of the governor’s death, succeed him. The
alguacil was to maintain law and order within the pueblo; the sacristan was church
assistant and aid to the priest; the fiscales were responsible for mission discipline; while
the mayordomos were ditch superintendents.81
Dozier echoes other scholars, pointing out that religious leaders control the civil authorities and
hold the real power. This is proven by the fact that “in most pueblos, the religious officers select
and appoint the secular officers, a practice not ordinarily known to outside administrators.” He
states that the secular affairs of the Pueblos are controlled by the religious leaders so that, “The
secular officers simply carry out the decisions and instructions of the priests.” Dozier makes one
interesting final assertion about what he sees as an essential function of the civil officials: “The
set of secular officials served as a convenient façade behind which the more important and vital
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organization of native priests carried out the social and religious functions of the pueblo.”82
Thus, in Dozier’s—and others’—interpretation any power held by Pueblo civil authorities was
secondary to that of the religious rulers. Pueblo civil governors were to carry out the will of the
ruling religious body, and these civil officers conveniently obstructed Pueblo ceremonies and
traditions from outside view, calling Spanish attention away from the continued exercise of
traditional Pueblo culture and practices.83
An example of civil officers carrying out the wishes of the religious leadership is found
in Governor Diego de Vargas’s account of the Reconquista, and the retaking of Santa Fe in
particular. As Vargas had reconquered the various Pueblos and made them once again
subservient to church and crown, a question arose as to what to do about Tano Pueblo Indians
who had moved into Spanish buildings in the capital. One of Vargas’s requirements was that
each group of Pueblo Indians have a Catholic church for religious observances. For these Santa
Fe Pueblo Indians, the logical choice was the San Miguel Mission, located centrally in the city.
But the church had been damaged during the revolt and was not in serviceable condition at that
time, which happened to be the winter of 1693–94. Indians were required to repair the chapel,
but this was nearly impossible due to “the many freezes and the snow, [so that they] could not go
to the forest to cut the beams necessary [to repair] the roof.” At the direction of traditional
leaders, the governor of the Santa Fe Pueblo, a man named only as José, and another Indian
leader named Antonio Bolsas, proposed a solution:
…having communicated last night with the elders they obey and the other inhabitants of
the walled pueblo they have here in this villa. They said it would be better to make a door
in a kiva they have at the corner of their pueblo for a chapel than to use the hermitage of
82
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San Miguel….The elders and other inhabitants said in the chapel kiva, it would [be] more
likely that all will be able to attend mass and pray, because they will be able to come
down through their pueblo without having to go outside.
Governor Vargas went and inspected the kiva, and found it a satisfactory temporary replacement.
He ordered the Indians to “cut a door in it immediately, whitewash it, and also make adobes in
order to put up an altar.” He also instructed the Indians to make the adjoining building into a
residence for the priest.84 With these actions taken, Spanish civil and religious authorities, and
Pueblo civil and traditional leaders had all worked together in order to solve a problem.
In a contemporary account, Santo Domingo Pueblo scholar Estefanita Lynne Calabaza
relates an episode at her Keresan Pueblo in which her aunt’s father had to ask the governor’s
permission for his daughter to attend nursing school out of state. In Calabaza’s words, this
demonstrated how “The governor was and still is responsible for the well-being of his
‘community’ children. This included protecting the community from external institutions that
may negatively affect the collective whole. He needed to know where each ‘child’ was.” Though
she states that matters at Santo Domingo have changed considerably since her aunt’s youth, this
example highlights the idea that the governor protected his Pueblo from outside influences, thus
helping it remain culturally solvent.85
What Dozier and others collectively refer to is the concept of compartmentalization.
Distilled to its simplest form, the idea is that the civil officials of the Pueblos acted as a front to
protect the more important traditional government, which governed from the kivas. The
traditional leadership directed the civil governors in all matters, and these civil officers had no
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executive power. While in the strictest sense this is true, it is important to point out that the civil
officials did have a say in executive decisions at the Pueblos. Regarding Santo Domingo Pueblo,
Leslie White states that any man who has served as one of the important civil officers “becomes
automatically a principale for the rest of his life. The principales are regarded as men of
influence in the pueblo. They very frequently advise or collaborate with the officers of the
pueblo, including the heads of the two kiva-kachina groups. The principales do not constitute an
organization; there is no head principale, no meeting house, no paraphernalia.”86 The same is
true of the Pueblo of Cochiti. Returning to their official website:
While the Governor has authority to guide the day-to-day operations of the Pueblo the
Pueblo Council is responsible for policy development and making all decisions by
consensus at monthly council meetings, affecting the Pueblo as a while. The Pueblo
Council consists of approximately 40 male members who have served in one or more of
the top positions of Tribal Government and by tradition are council members for life.87
These brief statements are crucial for several reasons. First, they show that men who served as
civil officers did possess influence within the Pueblos, and served in an advisory role in Pueblo
decisions. Furthermore, the fact that council members advised both civil and traditional leaders
would indicate a potentially less rigid form of compartmentalization. While civil officers closely
followed the instructions of the cacique and other leaders in their dealings with officials in Santa
Fe and elsewhere over complicated issues of land, rights, and sovereignty, the majority of those
who advised in these matters had themselves been governors or lieutenant governors. The
governor and other officers maintained strictly secular power answerable to traditional leaders,
but on a more conceptual level, while leadership offices and responsibilities were
compartmentalized, individual leaders were not. There was no such thing as a strictly secular
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Pueblo person. The holistic nature of Pueblo culture and society meant that the secular and
sacred were intertwined. While acting in a secular office, a Pueblo man still needed to keep the
sacred foremost in his mind, and act to protect it. Furthermore, the overarching responsibility of
any Pueblo leader is the same: to maintain the people’s well-being and the sovereignty of the
Pueblo. All worked together to this end. Seen in this light, the work of governors and other civil
officials is markedly more important. Lastly, a cooperative effort in governing between
principales and traditional leaders constitutes a hybrid Indian town council, or ayuntmiento.
Although Spaniards probably would not have considered Pueblo governing councils consisting
of traditional religious leaders, sitting civil officers, and former officers true ayuntamientos, they
remain an intriguing example of an alternative form of Indian voting that emerged under Spain—
a hybridized Indian town council where strictly “civil” and “religious” leaders worked in tandem
on Pueblo affairs. It is important to remember that the voice accorded to civil officers—both
current and former—in decision-making councils would have varied between Pueblos. Still,
speaking in 1879 of the Pueblos after several years of observation as Pueblo Indian Agent,
Benjamin H. Thomas wrote:
The Governor is appointed by the cacique for one year, and is the executive officer of the
pueblo. Nothing can be done without the order of the governor. The position is purely
honorary in respect to remuneration, but the honors do not cease with the office, for the
dignified position of principal is awaiting him at the close of his term…The principales
(ex-governors) compose a ‘council of wise men’ and are the ‘constitutional advisers’ of
the governor. All important matters seem to be decided by a vote of the council.88
Dorothy Roman of Jemez Pueblo, cited previously, also referred to this hybrid council: “The
governor tells the councilmens [sic]…[There are] a whole bunch of councilmens
[sic]…everybody that [has been] an officer is what they call a councilman. Almost all of the men
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are councilmens [sic].”89 The evidence from a variety of sources, mostly contemporary, points to
a hybrid democratic governing council at the Pueblos, influenced by Spanish policy and Pueblo
tradition.90
Statements by Pueblo and non-Indian scholars—coupled with the documentary record—
clearly demonstrate that Pueblo religious leaders found a way to maintain control of civil affairs
by selecting governors, lieutenant governors, fiscales, and other officers of their repúblicas, and
insuring that these Indian magistrates acted in accordance with the will of the traditional
leadership. But, this does not diminish the actual importance of Indian voting and the selection of
Pueblo officials. Pueblo peoples considered their civil governments of the utmost importance.
Spanish leaders also recognized the key role they played in maintaining order in the Pueblo
communities and keeping these repúblicas in harmony with both cross and crown. Allowing
Indians to freely elect their own civil officials had a purpose. The Spanish crown wanted the
Pueblos to become part of the Spanish body politic through the establishment of semi-sovereign
repúblicas de indios. Furthermore, they understood that well run, self-governing Pueblos meant
fewer administrative headaches for themselves. Religious and secular Spaniards certainly
meddled, but that the system persisted throughout the colonial period, and still persists to the
present, demonstrates its resilience and importance.
Nowhere is the importance of Pueblo officers more apparent than in Governor Vargas’s
account of the Reconquista. After over a decade of Spanish absence, a time when the Pueblos
likely did not follow the Spanish system of annual elections and officers, one of Vargas’s first
actions was to see to the reestablishment of these secular power structures. Although a large
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uprising would later occur in 1696, in 1693–94 Vargas recorded extensively in his journal about
his efforts to recommit the Pueblos to elections and officers. In a sort of reeducation policy, he
lectured traditional and civil leaders about their responsibilities. For example, in his visit to
Pecos Pueblo [Cicuye in Towa91] on 24 September 1694, Vargas addressed the assembled
leadership:
… speaking and conferring with their cacique and governor as well as with the captains
and elder Indians who are their leaders {mandones} and war captains…[I] told them that
in order that they may live in an orderly political manner, recognizing their leader to
govern them and administer justice among them, it was necessary for them to elect freely,
meeting together as His Majesty, our lord, orders and directs them to do, and to present to
me those elected from among those Indians best qualified and required to exercise the
said offices and that I would present them with the rods of office and would receive in the
name of His Majesty their oath, which they should make in recognition of the law of God
our Lord and the holy cross, and which I, said governor and captain general, would
confirm and approve so that he {the elected} would be and continue to serve as the head
of the head of the government of the said natives, and understanding my wishes, they
assented and indicated that this was their true wish. And in fulfillment of the above,
today, said day, at two o’clock in the afternoon they appeared before me bringing the
rods and requesting that I, said governor and captain general, present them to the said
elected persons. They were: for governor of this said pueblo, Diego Marcos; for
lieutenant governor, Augustín; for alcaldes, Pedro Pupo and Salvador Tunoque; for
captain of war, Pedro Lucero Tuque; for alcalde unfeto, alguacil, Pedro Cristóbal
Tundias; as fiscals, Antonio Quoaes, Pedro Coctze, Diego Ystico, and Augustín Gocho;
and as captaions of war, Juan Chiuta as chief war captain and Miguel Echos, Juan
Ombire, Miguel Himuiro, Juan Diego, Diego Stayo, don Lorenzo de Ye, and Augustín
Tafuno. And to all of the said I gave the said rods and canes….And in this form I carried
out these measures and completed the said visit and election.92
In this rare account in which all of the Pecos officers are listed, the formal, almost liturgical,
interplay satisfied both Spaniards and Pueblos, demonstrating how the system had become
accepted and workable. Vargas also visited San Felipe, Zia, Jemez, Santo Domingo, Tesuque,
San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, Cuyamungué, Ohkay Owingeh, and other villages. In some Pueblos,
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the Indians had already held their elections in anticipation of his visit. At Santo Domingo, he
states, “And they asked that I accept their officials, whom they had already designated, which I
did, and they presented the elected officials, to whom I gave the said rods and canes.”93 What
Vargas writes about his interactions with the Pueblo of Zia94 leadership can be said of his
instructions to all of the Pueblos: “I made clear to each of them the obligations of their office.
And I emphasized to them that they should assist their minister and reverend father preacher in
every way and [re]build the church as soon as possible…”95
While the governor system was clearly indispensable to Spaniards in New Mexico, it is
impossible to know the degree of ambivalence Pueblo peoples felt regarding their imposed civil
governments. But we find clues in the documentary record. As historian Charles Cutter notes,
“Like indigenous subjects throughout the empire, Pueblo Indians had become adept through
decades of experience at playing the legal game, and their continual activity in the courtroom led
to the incorporation of certain customary rights into the legal culture of the province.”96 One
crucial aspect of this “legal game” which Pueblos played time and again had to do with
protecting the land base. For the Pueblos, as for all Indigenous peoples, land is life. As Pueblo
land grant scholars Malcolm Ebright, Rick Hendricks, and Richard W. Hughes point out, “the
ability of an Indian pueblo to maintain its culture and its religious life is closely linked to the
pueblo’s preservation of its land base.”97 Without the land within which they constructed their
sacred kivas, and upon which were situated the landmarks that informed their geographic
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reckoning, the Pueblo way of life could not exist. With their efforts to insure the survival of
Pueblo religion, culture, and sovereignty inseparably tied to protecting Pueblo land, the
importance of elections and civil officers becomes clearer. The electoral process must be viewed
not simply as a way to compartmentalize and protect the inner Pueblo leadership from outside
forces, or even to satisfy demanding Spanish overlords, but as a proactive means of securing
those leaders best equipped to guarantee survival through the conservation of sacred Pueblo land.
Spanish archival sources contain scores of examples of efforts by Pueblo officers to
maintain control over their land, curb the constant encroachments by Spanish vecinos, and deal
with problems caused by outsiders living in their midst. These documents show that in many
cases Pueblo officials served as powerful advocates for their people, and their efforts made the
crucial difference in interactions with Spaniards. For example, in 1705 several northern Pueblos
faced difficulties with Hispanos living inside their land grants.98 These Spaniards were ostensibly
there to take part in the trade with Athabaskans and other neighboring tribes. The Pueblos of
Taos and Picurís99 were among the most prominent trading centers due to their location at the
mountain passes that controlled access to the Plains. These non-Indians often meddled in Pueblo
affairs, or felt themselves above the laws governing Spanish Indian towns. Governor Francisco
Cuervo y Valdés issued an order regarding Taos and Picurís, stating:
Whereas there have come to my notice the gravest disadvantages, damages,
deteriorations and extortions which ensue and are perpetuated in the pueblos of Pecos,
Thaos (sic), Pecuries (sic), and the other pueblos of these frontiers and their fortresses
because (some) of the residents of this kingdom are living in the pueblos and because of
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the presence there of those who come in from outside to trade with the heathen friends, as
they have been accustomed to do in the trading expeditions held each year; and because
of the personal complaints which I have had from the Governors of said pueblos,
insinuations from the rest of the Indian inhabitants…and because of the grave damage to
the Indians of the said pueblos, whom I must take care of according to the duty of my
office: by virtue thereof, I expressly command by this, my order, that no resident of the
said (province), regardless of what state, quality or condition he may be in shall dare to
pass to the said pueblos for any purpose whatever, or on any valid or invalid pretext,
without my special permission, (under) penalty of life (as a) traitor to the King, with the
confiscation of property, which, after confiscation, shall be assigned from this time
forward by halves to the Chamber of his Majesty and expenses of government. In the
same penalty are comprehended those found at present in the said pueblos who must
immediately depart from them…100
Governor Cuervo y Valdés also ordered that the Spanish alcaldes mayores of the area publish the
order and see that all were in compliance under penalty of a harsh fine of two hundred pesos. We
can only surmise the nature of the “disadvantages, damages, deteriorations and extortions,” but
they were serious enough for the governor to intervene on behalf of the Pueblos. This order was
the direct result of actions taken by Pueblo governors, the very men elected by the Pueblos to
represent them in their important dealings with Spanish officials. Such orders often went
unheeded or lightly enforced, and in all likelihood outsiders still found ways to live in the
Pueblos, but these Indians had clearly learned how to use the system to address problems they
were experiencing, and they turned to their governors to mitigate these difficult circumstances.
Furthermore, controlling borders and access to land and resources within a homeland are
hallmarks of independent nations, a status the Pueblos continuously battled to maintain against
outside efforts to the contrary.
In another example, Santa Clara Pueblo officials fought a long battle to protect lands
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from Hispano encroachments as far back as 1724. The dispute between the Tafoya family and
Santa Clara Pueblo over lands located near Santa Clara Creek is too long to narrate here, actually
lasting from the first half of the eighteenth century through the U.S. territorial period. In 1724
Juan and Antonio Tafoya petitioned Governor Juan Domingo de Bustamente for land within the
Pueblo’s grant. The Santa Clarans protested, and an agreement was reached that the Tafoyas
could only use the land for pasturage for cattle and horses. They were not to use the land for
agriculture, for the water from Santa Clara Creek was not sufficient for both Hispano and Pueblo
needs. Over the course of the next several decades, Hispanos did not keep to this agreement,
farming on the land and funneling off precious water upstream for irrigation. Time and again,
Santa Clara officers argued their case, seeking to protect their land and water through every
means short of armed revolt. The Santa Clarans won legal victories on a number of occasions,
and Hispanos were ordered off the lands by both governors and lesser officials. For example, in
1763 Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupín declared the Tafoya grant null and void, quoting the
Recopilación that grazing grants to Hispanos were to be at least a league and a half from Pueblo
grants. Governor Juan Bautista de Anza reaffirmed Vélez Cachupín in 1780 as well, stating that
upstream irrigation by Hispanos was forbidden. But these declarations did not settle the issue,
and in 1788 the local Spanish alcalde finally ordered that Hispanos remove their cattle from
Santa Clara Pueblo lands.101 It is questionable whether the alcalde’s orders were carried out, and
the problems of Hispano encroachments at Santa Clara continued into the twentieth century, but
this example demonstrates that persistent efforts by Pueblo governors and other officers did yield
favorable decisions, as difficult as they were to enforce.
Other examples show the nearly insurmountable nature of the battles fought by Pueblo
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officers against encroachments, battles that they often lost. In 1704, Pueblo inhabitants of San
Ildefonso [Po-wo-ge-oweenge in Tewa] took Captain Ygnacio de Roibal to court in Santa Fe
over lands that he claimed to have been granted near their Pueblo. They claimed that the lands
encroached on their peoples’ lands, and crossed the boundaries of their original Pueblo land
grant. The court took testimony from Pueblo witnesses in the case, who acted on behalf of the
plaintiffs. Those who appeared before the court were, “Mathias Cuntzi, native governor of the
native Indians of this said pueblo of San Yldephonso, and the other ministers of justice of this
said pueblo.” All of these men were the elected civil officers of San Ildefonso. In their testimony,
they claimed that, “the natives of this pueblo are hemmed in in the same (pueblo) because the
Ensign Ygnazio de Roybal has intruded in the lands which belong to this said pueblo and to the
natives of the same.” The Protector de Indios, Captain Alphonso Rael de Aguilar, acted on behalf
of the Indians.102 He asked that measurements of one league in each of the cardinal directions
from San Ildefonso be retaken in order to assess whether Roybal’s land fell within the Pueblo’s
four square league boundary. The San Ildefonsans also countered Roybal’s assertion that the
territory under question was not arable land and only good for grazing, a tactic he employed to
diminish both the land’s relative value and his own illegal encroachment. The Indians insisted
that the land was indeed arable, and that there was obvious evidence of their prior cultivation of
the disputed land.103 Spanish governor Páez Hurtado ordered that four square leagues be
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measured, but local Alcalde Cristóbal de Arellano purposely measured a full league to the north,
but only a half league in the other three directions. San Ildefonso Governor Matías Cuntzi, with
the support of Protector Aguilar, pleaded for the correct measurement to be made and respected,
but Governor Páez Hurtado rejected the request.104 This example and others show that Pueblo
leaders tirelessly worked to protect their lands, often sparing no effort or expense in the process.
In their battle for land, Cochiti Pueblo officers traveled to Durango and Mexico City to secure
support for their cause.105 In some cases, Pueblos won favorable decisions, but these often turned
out to be unfulfilled promises by Spanish officials.106 In other cases, they simply lost. The system
was undoubtedly tipped in favor of Spaniards. But, even if it would appear that legal actions in
their own defense were fool’s errands, it is still significant that elected Pueblo officers went
before Spanish officials and to Spanish courts time and again to fight for the rights of their
people. It is a testament to the perseverance of Pueblo peoples and their elected governments.
The unfavorable results notwithstanding, elected Pueblo officers repeatedly represented their
Indigenous nations in court and before the crown.
Not only was it difficult for Pueblo officers to obtain a favorable decision in court, there
were also limits to their powers within the Pubelos. In 1797, Spanish officials opened up an
investigation against Sandia Pueblo officials over the fate of an Indian named Cristóbal whom
Pueblo residents had accused of witchcraft. Sandia Pueblo governor Juan Domingo and War
Chief Diego Antonio had gathered the people together at the kiva. Pueblo officers had Cristóbal
bound and drawn from the roof beams of the kiva, after which they whipped him numerous
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times. Sandians accused Cristóbal of using witchcraft to assist Apaches in a raid on the Pueblo
that resulted in the loss of several livestock and other items. He confessed after the lashing, but it
continued in spite of his confession, leading ultimately to Cristóbal’s death. Local Spanish
officials submitted reports to Governor Fernando de Chacón in Santa Fe, who reviewed the case.
Governor Chacón decided that the evidence was too scant to charge Sandia Pueblo officials with
criminal wrongdoing, and that, in the words of Marc Simmons, “at least in this instance [it was]
not worth stirring up the Indians.” Chacón ordered the investigation halted.107 Even though
Pueblo officials were to govern the affairs of their own people and could punish lawbreakers,
there were bounds set to this power, and overstepping these bounds could have serious
repercussions, which, fortunately, were avoided in this case.
The limits of Pueblo civil government notwithstanding, one document dated 20 October
1815 perhaps demonstrates most clearly of all how seriously Pueblo peoples took their electoral
process and their civil officers. A letter instructs Interim Governor of New Mexico Alberto
Maynez regarding Pueblo officers. A Cochiti Indian by the name of Juan Antonio Ignacio, as
well as other Pueblo Justiciales (Justices), complained after several elected Cochiti officials had
been removed from office. Spanish advocate Pedro Bautista Pino, one of New Mexico’s greatest
statesmen and the man who represented New Mexico at the Spanish Cortes at Cádiz from 1810–
1812, filed the complaint on behalf of the Pueblo officers. No reason is given as to why the local
Spanish magistrate removed the Pueblo officers, but it is made very clear to Governor Maynez
that this should not have happened. Referring to these Pueblo officials, Maynez is ordered to
“Immediately restore them to the exercise of their responsibilities.” The official writing the
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letter, one Bernardo Benavides, goes on to say, “Even if there had been cause [for removal], you
should not have removed them from their offices; if this were the case, this would fall under my
jurisdiction.”108 When Spaniards removed Indian magistrates from office in a manner that the
Pueblos perceived as unfair, they took their case to Spanish officials and, at least in this instance,
received a positive outcome. One may suppose that Spanish officials were more willing to
reinstate Pueblo officers than to give back land, and it is hoped that these elected officials were
allowed to once again take their place as Indian magistrates.
While the efforts of Pueblo officers from individual Pueblos were generally a force for
good in their communities, there are also examples of collective action by elected Pueblo leaders.
The previously cited example of Indian governors and officers who came to Santa Fe in January
1706 is more than just a confirmation of república officials. In his statement, Captain Don
Alfonso Rael de Aguilar, who received and confirmed these officers, relates that these governors
and justices from the “Zuñis, Queres, Teguas, Hemes, Thanos, Pecos, Tiguas, Pecuries, and
Thaos… all came together, having been incited thereto each by the other, asking me to hear
them, as their protector-general on certain subjects upon which they had conferred, and which
had been dealt with and discussed in their pueblos by the old men, the chiefs, and the men,
children, and women.” Aguilar summarizes statements made by Pueblo officers on this occasion:
“Don Domingo Romero began to speak in our Castilian tongue (in which he is very well
instructed). He said that the occasion for having called together the governors, chiefs, and other
captains who were present was the fact that they were exceedingly well satisfied, pleased, and
content with the good treatment given them by Señor Don Francisco Cuervo y Valdez…present
governor and captain-general of this kingdom and province.” They praised Governor Cuervo
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specifically for his swift actions in assisting them, especially the most remote frontier Pueblos,
against the Apaches, and also against the Navajos, “who had stolen some beasts and cattle from
the towns of San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, and San Juan.” This invaluable document gives the
names many of the Pueblo governors: Don Felipe Chistoe (Pecos Pueblo, who, we shall soon
see, served for a number of continuous years as governor, which was against the letter of the
law); Don Juan Pacheco (Taos); Don Christóbal Corís (Santo Domingo); Francisco Enjenoe
(Nambé); Don Luis Conitzu (Xemes); Don Luis Romero (Cochití); Don Antonio Cossío (Zia);
Don Felipe (Santa Ana, no last name given); and Don Joseph (Acoma, also no surname). These
men apparently all spoke Spanish and asked that Cuervo be kept in power for a long time.
According to Aguilar, those who only spoke their Native language “said the same thing through
their interpreters.”109 Aside from its value as another rare document that names a great number of
the Pueblo civil leadership in a given year, it also says much about the role played by elected
Pueblo leaders. The officers came to Santa Fe to address “certain subjects upon which they had
conferred,” meaning upon which they had already conferred as civil magistrates. This is clearly
an early example of the All Indian Pueblo Council, with governors meeting to counsel on
important issues that concerned all of the Pueblos. In addition, these leaders related that these
issues “had been dealt with and discussed in their pueblos by the old men, the chiefs, and the
men, children, and women.” Although this account is filtered through a Spaniard, it seems to
give a much more inclusive view of Pueblo internal discourse, one where leaders and others,
including women and children, had a voice.
Another intriguing illustration of the concept of collaborative efforts between Pueblo
civil leaders can be found in incidents relating to the trial of Tewa leaders in 1793. Spaniards
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accused Tewa leaders of holding illegal juntas (meetings) at San Ildefonso and Santa Clara. They
claimed that Tewa leaders had conspired at these meetings to revolt against the government of
New Mexico and join the “heathen” Indian nations. Spaniards arrested a large number of Pueblo
civil leaders and held a trial in Santa Fe. They questioned all of the leaders at trial and
individually, a tried and tested method to garner confessions from some and keep them isolated
from each other so that they would incriminate one another. But the Pueblo officers worked
together in an ingenious way to deflect the questions and confuse the Spanish system of justice.
Ultimately, the governor of New Mexico, Fernando de la Concha, condemned four Tewa
governors and three other leaders. Governor Antonio Guille of San Ildefonso was given twentyfive lashes, administered by the Alcalde of the Tewa district. Miguel Cacugé, Antonio Tafoya,
and Francisco Chiche, governors of Ohkay Owingeh, Santa Clara, and Nambé, all spent four
months in chains doing hard labor without pay. The four governors, along with three other
officials, were barred from ever holding office again.110 Although they were all eventually
punished, these leaders of Tewa repúblicas did demonstrate an admirable degree of solidarity and
cooperation in challenging the power of New Mexico’s colonial system.
While all of the previous examples demonstrate that the Pueblos took to the governor
system and used it to protect their land, rights, and sovereignty, it also created darker examples
of contested loyalties. When Pueblo officers swore allegiance to church and crown, receiving a
cane and the right to govern in exchange, there was always the possibility that this new power
could lead to divided loyalties on the part of Pueblo officers. While it is safe to assume that the
overwhelming majority of Pueblo elected officers dutifully served with the best interests of their
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people at heart, there are a few examples of conflict cause by this colonially-imposed system of
government. During the Pueblo Revolt, religious and secular leaders reportedly clashed at Ohkay
Owingeh. One of Popé’s notable decisions was to exclude Pueblo civil leaders, and even entire
Pueblos, that were viewed as too sympathetic to the Spanish cause. Popé purportedly went far
beyond simple exclusion. There is the declaration of a Pueblo Indian named Juan, given at El
Paso del Norte to Governor Don Antonio Otermín’s men, which made a number of claims about
Popé. Juan claimed that Popé communicated with the devil and received his instructions from
him. Juan also asserted that Popé killed his own son-in-law, a man by that name of Nicolás Bua,
who also happened to be the governor of Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo. Juan contended that Popé had
killed Bua “so that he might not warn the Spaniards of the rebellion, as he intended to do.”111
The possibility of conflict between Pueblo civil and religious leaders on the eve of the Revolt is
not difficult to imagine. It is true that some Pueblos, especially the Southern Tiwas (such as some
at Isleta Pueblo) and Piros (near present-day Socorro, New Mexico),112 did not support the
Revolt, and sympathy for the Spaniards is given as the root cause of their failure to join with the
other Pueblos in the uprising. Another statement, this one from Otermín, reinforces the divided
loyalties among Pueblo Indians on the eve of the Revolt. In testimony sent to the viceroy shortly
after the Pueblos expelled Spaniards from New Mexico, Otermín states, “[I] received notice of
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the said rebellion from the governors of Pecos and Tanos…they came to tell me of it and of how
they were unwilling to participate in such wickedness and treason, saying that they now regarded
the Spaniards as their brothers.”113 As several scholars have pointed out, before the Revolt
Spaniards had appointed sympathetic Pueblo civil officers. Were Bua and the governors of Pecos
and Tanos simply sellouts more loyal to Spaniards than their own people? It is difficult to know
what to make of these cases. Still, they illustrate the very real fact that Pueblo Indians felt the
pull of divided loyalties; leaders were not immune to these forces.
A more graphic example comes from a 1696 episode at Pecos Pueblo. In the wake of the
Reconquista, Spaniards faced several revolts while they struggled to fully subdue the Indians of
New Mexico. Felipe Chistoe, the Indian governor of Pecos Pueblo, appeared before Governor
Vargas in Santa Fe. He requested royal permission to execute a number of rebellious Pecos
Indians, led by one Diego Umbiro. Governor Vargas wrote of the meeting with Governor
Chistoe: “[I told him] ‘Yes…you can call them to your house at night for the purpose of
discussing the people of the [rebellious] pueblos. In this way you can succeed for sure in taking
their lives.’ This seemed fine to him and he said he would do it.” The governor of New Mexico
had encouraged a loyal Indian governor to trick rebels into coming to his house to discuss
conspiracy plans and then execute them! He lured the rebel leaders, who included men from
113
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Jemez and Nambé, into the Pecos kiva, and asked for their opinion of rebellion. When they
voiced their support, he brandished his vara de justicia, then announced, “Here we are the king’s
men!” Governor Chistoe’s men seized these leaders, and hanged Diego Umbiro and three others.
One rebel escaped, but Governor Chistoe chased him down and personally shot him. Governor
Vargas recorded their next meeting in his diary: “[Felipe] presented me the head, hand, and foot
[of the rebel he had shot]. All the citizens of the villa saw them, marveling at the loyalty of this
Indian. I thanked him and gave him a gift, as well as the others.” The episode resulted in two
factions at Pecos Pueblo, with the families of Diego Umbiro and the other executed Indians
attempting to incite the Pueblo to rise up against Felipe Chistoe in 1700. They failed in their
attempt, were jailed in Santa Fe, but escaped. On five occasions, the two parties were perilously
close to civil war at Pecos Pueblo. Chistoe’s faction won each showdown, largely thanks to
Spanish support, but the infighting left Pecos Pueblo weakened, and this was one of the causes of
its eventually abandonment in the nineteenth century. This violent example illustrates the
negative effects of Spanish-imposed Indian government in New Mexico—turning Indian against
Indian in a world of divided loyalties.114

Genízaros in Spanish New Mexico
Any discussion of Indian voting in New Mexico would be incomplete if it did not
mention, at least briefly, one important Indian group that also fell within the control of Spanish
authorities: the Genízaros. The meaning of the term Genízaro evolved over the course of New
Mexico’s Spanish period, but originally it designated captive Plains Indians who had been
“ransomed” (bought) by Spanish settlers or officials, and placed in Spanish homes to work off
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the cost of their ransom, more or less as indentured servants. Spanish leaders expected Genízaros
to receive a Spanish education and Catholic religious instruction as well. Over time Genízaros
also came to include Pueblo Christian Indians who, for one reason or another, had left or been
forced out of their Pueblos and gone to live with other Christian Indians and Genízaros.115 A
contemporary New Mexico source, that appears as a 1744 declaration by one Fray Miguel de
Menchero, a Spaniard who held various religious offices in New Mexico during the first half of
the nineteenth century, describes Genízaros in this manner:
…the Indians are of the various nations that have been taken captive by the Comanche
Apaches…[who] sell people of all the nations to the Spaniards of the kingdom, by whom
they are held in servitude, the adults being instructed by the fathers and the children
baptized…[At one Genízaro settlement, Valencia and Cerro de Tomé, now Los Lunas]
[t]he people engage in agriculture and are under obligation to go out and explore the
country in pursuit of the enemy [Indios Bárbaros], which they are doing with great
bravery and zeal in their obedience, and under the direction of the said father they are
erecting their church without any cost to the royal crown.116
A definition that has come into common usage for Genízaros is simply detribalized Indians.
Large numbers of Genízaros lived in New Mexico during the Spanish period, and they
formed ethnic enclaves in towns where other Spaniards lived. Anthropologist Albert H.
Schroeder asserted that by that by the late 1700s, roughly one-third of New Mexico’s population
was Genízaro.117 These Genízaro neighborhoods, or barrios, kept them apart as a group, and also
enabled them to develop a distinctive group identity, particularly as warriors.118 Genízaros often
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lived in border villages on the far edges of New Mexico, acting as buffers against raiding
Comanches, Apaches, Navajos, and other groups. In addition, they proved extremely valuable in
Spanish campaigns against these Indios Bárbaros, serving bravely and being highly valued for
their military skills.
But if Genízaros were respected for their abilities as warriors, they occupied a difficult
space that was not quite fully Indian, yet certainly not fully Spanish. They were continually
stigmatized for their Indianness and their low social position as household servants, even after
they completed their period of indenture.119 Spaniards also stigmatized Pueblo Indians to some
degree, but Pueblos had important rights to self-government in their repúblicas. The Spanish
governor in Santa Fe respected the civil officials elected in the Pueblo repúblicas, and this
provided some degree of protection to the Pueblo peoples. Genízaros did not have the same
rights and entitlements as citizens of the Pueblo repúblicas. They could sue in court, and on
many occasions they did, and won. For example, in one court case a group of thirty-four
Genízaros petitioned the governor after being removed from their homes in Santa Fe and sent to
the Comanche frontier to serve as a buffer against raids. These Genízaros were unhappy with
their forced move, and desired to return to their former homes. They even threatened to rejoin
their former tribes, using these words: “…we find ourselves burdened and without having
anything in our favor. This affliction has forced us to have idle thoughts, as to whether we shall
suffer our anxieties and hardships or shall leave in order to seek comfort in our domain and
tribe.”120 This example illustrates that Genízaros did have access to official channels in Spanish
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New Mexico.121
But they did not have access to self-government on a formal basis; they did not form
independent Genízaro repúblicas. They recognized their own informal leaders known as cabesas
(heads), as well as captains. These informal leaders argued for Genízaro causes in the courts.122
But Genízaros did not elect their own governing bodies as the Pueblos did. They did appear
before local town councils and participated in town government, but they were always subject to
the decisions of local officials, who would have seen them through the stigmatization of
Genízaros so common in Spanish New Mexico. Their inferior political and social position
notwithstanding, in some cases Genízaros formed political alliances with local Hispanos. In the
Genízaro grant of Abiquiu, for example, Genízaros and Spaniards joined together to protest
actions by the local Franciscan, Father Teodoro Alcina, for perceived abuses against both groups.
They presented a unified front at the local court, but a strange exchange took place in which the
friar purportedly damned the District of Abiquiu. The next day, a severe hailstorm destroyed
much of the local crops, and then locusts ate what was left.123 The strange conclusion aside, this
episode illustrates that there was room for political alliance between Genízaros and Spaniards,
with Genízaros wholly subject to Spanish jurisdiction. There was no separate Genízaro
jurisdiction, and the archives make no mention of Genízaro self-government as they do with the
Pueblo repúblicas. They were limited to political participation in Spanish towns and were not a
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distinct Indian people in their political rights.

Conclusion
Eminent New Mexico historian Eleanor B. Adams once wrote, “Spanish law for her
overseas possessions is probably the most humane code ever developed for the rule of subject
peoples.”124 Although she correctly points out that too much depended on Spanish civil and
religious leaders in the ultimate treatment of Native peoples, her statement has particular
relevance with Indian voting in New Mexico. Spanish law did indeed firmly establish the rights
of Indian communities to freely elect their own civil officers. The Pueblos established methods,
according to the needs and traditions of each individual Pueblo, of selecting república governors
and other officers who served their people in critical ways. Pueblo civil leaders had to be
knowledgeable in Spanish law, customs, and procedure. They advocated for their people. They
could not be unreliable, and they had to be men of trustworthy character. These república
officers, who operated mostly outside the ceremonial realm—which remained the true center of
Pueblo life—performed the critical work of protecting land, water, and sovereignty, regulating
crime, and punishing offenders of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical and Pueblo law. They
tirelessly petitioned official Spanish channels for redress of wrongs committed by Spaniards in
their midst. Because the work of república officials was so important, Pueblo voters and religious
leaders did all they could to ensure those chosen as civil leaders were up to the task. Many of the
same characteristics required of traditional leaders—wisdom, honesty, reliability, service to the
people above all else—correspond with those listed above for civil leaders. The two groups,
though often operating in different spheres, had more in common than it might seem. Both
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Spaniards and Pueblo peoples realized the crucial work república officers performed, and thus
sought to insure that the process of election and governance proceeded in an orderly manner.
When it did not, both groups made their voices heard. But it must be remembered that all of this
occurred within the context of colonialism. As William Adams points out, the Spanish system
sought a form of incorporation that proved to be very sinister:
Indians were drawn—indeed forced—into the economy but at the same time excluded
from society. They were often uprooted from their aboriginal villages and resettled in
towns under Spanish control, but, apart from religious conversion, they were largely
allowed to retain their Native cultures, languages, and systems of control. They retained
legal, generally communal title to their traditional lands…Indians had none of the special
rights allowed to Spaniards. For generations, they remained subject to special taxes and
labor conscription policies that applied only to them and also a variety of sumptuary laws
that restricted what they could wear, eat, and ride.125
All the more reason that the work that Indian civil leaders did in Spanish New Mexico was
remarkable given the extremely difficult circumstances in which they found themselves. They
persevered, never wavering in their battle in the people’s behalf.
It is interesting to note that at various points over the course of the eighteenth century, the
bulwark of local Spanish municipal government in New Mexico, the Santa Fe governing council
or cabildo, experienced “a demise in its importance.” For much of the Spanish period, New
Mexico’s Hispano communities had no popularly elected town councils. This demise of local
government in New Mexico’s Spanish towns did not begin to abate until after the Bourbon
Reforms of the 1780s and beyond.126 The Pueblo repúblicas seem to have experienced no such
interruptions, excepting, or course, during the Pueblo Revolt. Thee Pueblos continued to elect
civil officers from year-to-year throughout the Spanish period. The irony is that the Pueblos
elected their own governing officials during a period when their Spanish counterparts largely did
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not exercise this right. New Mexico’s repúblicas de indios withstood the political turmoil that
unfolded as Spain’s empire in the western hemisphere unraveled, which is remarkable
considering the political and cultural pressures exerted on them by vecinos, military officials,
Spanish magistrates, and clergy. That this form of civil government, with governors, lieutenant
governors, fiscales, and others still exists today in the Pueblos is a mark of its true importance in
the Pueblo world. The Pueblos ultimately used this imposed system to protect their status as
sovereign Pueblo nations.
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Chapter 2:
HOPIS, YAQUIS, AND PIMAS IN SPANISH ARIZONA: POLITICAL INCORPORATION
BY DEGREES

Introduction
For the purposes of a comparative study of American Indian voting in New Mexico and
Arizona, it is rather difficult to determine just what qualifies as Arizona. Compared to its
neighbor to the east, Arizona’s borders were not as fixed and recognizable during the Spanish
colonial era. “Arizona” never existed under Spain, for that matter. During the Spanish period, the
Indigenous peoples who now inhabit the state we call Arizona resided in what was then part of
New Mexico, Sonora, and even Sinaloa. To this end, expanding our geographic reckoning to
include a larger area, one that incorporates what is now northern Mexico, gives a much more
complete picture of how Native peoples experienced electoral politics in Spanish “Arizona.” As
a result, while I will use the term “Arizona” throughout this work, the term “Arizona-Sonora
Borderlands” conveys a better geographic picture of the area under study.
I have chosen three Indian groups for the present chapter: Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas.1 All
three fall within the Uto-Aztecan language family. These groups come from varied geographical
locations within my expanded Arizona, with Hopis at the far northern extreme, Pimas in the
middle, and Yaquis inhabiting the far southern region. Differing locations, as well as
colonization under different civil administrations and religious orders, resulted in a wide
spectrum of Indian voting and political incorporation for these three groups. Franciscans
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ventured into the Hopi homeland in the sixteenth century, but the Spanish missionization project
failed miserably, with Hopis eventually expelling not only Franciscans, but turning on their own
people in brutal fashion. In many respects Spanish efforts to missionize and politically
incorporate Yaquis seemed spectacularly successful, but this success belied a deep Yaqui
ambivalence for the colonial system. In the 1730s–1740s, Yaqui elected officials would demand
that Spaniards respect sovereignty rights guaranteed to their people under royal policy. Pimas,
somewhat isolated in the region known as Pimería Alta, lived with both Jesuits and Franciscans.
But even with their missionary zeal, encapsulated so perfectly in the tireless efforts of Father
Eusebio Francisco Kino, the representatives of both cross and crown never accomplished the
goal of bringing Pimas into the kingdom as citizens. Thus, American Indian voting in Spanish
Arizona was as varied as the disparate landscapes that these peoples inhabited.

Arizona’s “Most Famous Apostates”—the Hopi
Discussions of Spanish colonial New Mexico sometimes leave out the distant western
Pueblo people, the Hopis. The Hopi villages were, administratively, part of the Kingdom of New
Mexico. They fell under the jurisdiction of Santa Fe, and treated with New Mexico’s Spanish
governors, soldiers, and friars. But the various representatives of cross and crown exercised a
fleeting hold over Hopiland, never fully bringing the Hopi villages under administrative,
military, or religious control. For centuries, the Hopi were allied with their eastern Pueblo
neighbors, and most closely aligned with Zuñis to the south. But distance, language, and culture
also separated the Uto-Aztecan Hopi from the Tewa, Tiwa, Towa, and Keresan Puebloans of
New Mexico, and this separation is clearly discernable in Hopi interactions with Spain.
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Spaniards never fully succeeded in establishing a Hopi república answerable to royal
representatives, and their efforts to manage Hopi affairs often met with frustration and failure.
Spaniards entered Hopi territory as early as 1540, during the Coronado expedition, but
the net results of Hopi-Spanish contacts from Coronado through Oñate were fairly minimal.
When Oñate opened New Mexico to permanent Spanish colonization in 1598, he went through
the familiar ceremony of subjecting Hopis to Spanish royal authority, as he had done at the other
New Mexico Pueblos. In a Spanish archival document penned by Juan Velarde, Oñate’s
secretary, dated 21 February 1599, he recounts the meeting between Spaniards, Hopi leaders, and
“common people” from “Oraybi [Oraibi], Xumupami [Shongopavi], Cuaurabi, and Esperiez [it is
unknown to which villages he was referring].” Through Don Tomás, an Indian interpreter, Oñate
made the following declaration:
He [Oñate] had come to their lands to bring them to the knowledge of God and the king
our lord, on which depended the salvation of their souls and their living securely and
undisturbed in their nation, maintaining justice and order, secure in their homes and
protected from their enemies, and that he had not come to do them any harm….[I]t was
fitting that they should render obedience and vassalage to God and the king…2
Velarde also wrote in his account that the Spaniards would “employ them [Hopis] in many
offices and posts in connection with political and economic matters, as would be explained more
at length to them later.” This was a reference to the future establishment of a Hopi república,
though such political entities did not fully come into existence in New Mexico for roughly
another twenty years. Hopis were clearly included in the plan to force New Mexico’s Pueblo
poeples to adopt a Spanish form of civil governance under the república system. Velarde
concludes his retelling of the Hopi-Spanish encounter by stating that the Hopi “chiefs, having
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heard, understood, and discussed among themselves all the aforesaid, replied, with signs of
spontaneous contentment and agreement, that they wished to become vassals of the most
Christian king our lord.”3 As with the eastern Pueblos, the extent to which Hopis understood this
swearing of vassalage to the Spanish monarch is questionable, but these Spaniards fully intended
to place the Hopi under Catholic religious authority, and Spanish civil jurisdiction.
This ceremony had little immediate effect on Hopi political matters. Historian Peter
Iverson writes that the Oñate colonizing mission of the late 1500s “did not have as much as [sic]
an impact as one might have anticipated.”4 Hopis were a clear exception among the Kingdom of
New Mexico’s Puebloans, since the years following Oñate’s 1598 tour of the various Pueblos,
and their subsequent swearing of vassalage to the Spanish cross and crown, were followed by
actual Spanish political, military, and religious domination of most of these Pueblo nations.
Historian Richard O. Clemmer concludes that the lack of continual contacts between Hopis and
Spaniards after the 1598 ceremony was due to the aridity of Hopiland: “Because Hopi country—
which the Spaniards called ‘Tusayan’—had no permanent streams, Spanish settlers confined
their colonizing to the Rio Grande Valley…”5 Whether it was aridity, distance, or some other
cause, the Spaniards largely failed in their early seventeenth century efforts to subdue and
control Hopis.
As Eleanor B. Adams, one of the foremost authorities on Hopi-Spanish relations,
explains, “[After Oñate’s official visit of 1598], thirty more years went by before the Spaniards
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could spare time and effort to reduce the Hopi pueblos to the service of both Majesties, God and
the King.”6 Three Franciscan friars, Francisco Porras, Andrés Guitiérez, and Cristóbal de la
Concepción (who was a lay brother) established their first mission at Awatovi in August 1629,
and followed this initial foothold with a missionary presence at Shongopavi and Oraibi. But this
missionary work was fraught with difficulty, as were all Spanish attempts to build the churches,
schools, and infrastructure needed for a functioning Hopi república. Even before their 1629
arrival, an “apostate” Pueblo Indian from the Rio Grande Valley arrived to warn the Hopi that,
“the Spaniards and their man-eating horses would destroy them. And if they allowed the priests
to sprinkle water on their heads, they would certainly die of it.”7 The Hopi were pacified when
the friars’ escort of soldiers threatened to call upon the governor of New Mexico to bring an
entire army to their land to burn and destroy them if they made any threatening movements.8
Contemporary Spanish accounts attributed Hopi pacification to the power of the Christian God,
but the threat of destruction must certainly have been the most convincing factor in the Hopi
decision not to attack and destroy the small Spanish religious-military party that arrived in 1629.
After all, two Hopi men had been at Acoma for the 1599 massacre there. They had been taken
prisoner and each had one of his hands cut off and then released so that they could warn all
Indians with whom they came in contact of how deadly serious the Spanish were about their God
and crown. These events were deeply ingrained in the Hopi memory, and perhaps for this reason
they allowed the Spaniards to remain that fateful year.
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Fray Alonso de Benavides, who recounted the events of the year before in his 1630
account, A Harvest of Reluctant Souls (an appropriate title, especially in reference to Hopis),
states that the pacification, and subsequent permission granted to the Franciscans to stay in the
Hopi villages, was due to miraculous circumstances. According to Benavides’s narrative, the
villagers who greeted the Franciscan friar in 1629 initially venerated the cross. The Hopi
“sorcerers” became so enraged at this sight that they stirred up their people nearly to the point of
killing the priest and his companions. In an account mirroring the story of Elijah’s showdown
with the priests of Baal in 1 Kings, the Hopi holy men produce a “boy of twelve or thirteen, blind
from birth, born with his eyes shut tight” and challenge the Catholic cleric, whom they call “an
incredible liar,” to put their cross to the boy’s eyes and heal his blindness. Just as Baal’s priests
had failed in the Old Testament, so too were the Hopi priests powerless to help the boy. The
Franciscan, playing the part of Elijah, dramatically drops to his knees, imploring God to
“confound those barbarous infidels,” and grant him the faith to work this miracle. He heals the
boy, who is then hoisted up by the villagers and paraded around with loud cries for all to believe
the padre and be baptized.9 It makes for a great story, one in which King Philip IV of Spain, to
whom it was written, would have reveled. But, even Benavides comments that the Spaniards
were unharmed in 1629 “on account of the vigilance of the soldiers.” But then, almost correcting
himself, he states that it was even more “because of divine aid.”10 One is inclined to believe that
Spanish guns and horses were more convincing than Spanish friars.
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On the heels of these opening episodes, from the late 1620s through the mid 1630s,
Franciscan missionaries “persuaded”—in Clemmer’s words—the Hopi to build three large stone
mission churches in the villages of Awatovi, Shungopavi, and Oraibi. Hopis did all of the heavy
lifting, quite literally, providing the stones for building and all of the labor, even hauling huge
trees from the San Francisco Peaks near Flagstaff, a trip which today takes well over two hours
by car and traverses over one-hundred miles, one-way. The mission at Awatovi was built directly
on top of a kiva, thus demonstrating the Spanish view of the superiority of their faith.11
Franciscans also established smaller, satellite churches, called visitas, at Walpi and
Mishongnovi.12 These friars struggled over the next several decades, up to the Pueblo Revolt of
1680, and saw meager returns to their evangelizing efforts.
The retelling of early Hopi-Spanish relations in this remote northern stretch of what is
today Arizona begs the question: to what extent did Hopis incorporate Spanish forms of civil
governance? Did events in Hopi territory mirror developments at the Rio Grande Pueblos? To
what extent did Hopis incorporate Spanish electoral processes? Did Hopis gather each New Year
and select the civil officials for the following year? Did Hopi governors and other officers ever
make the trek to Santa Fe to be confirmed and receive instructions? Were Hopis ever recognized
as a legitimate república de indios, with the corresponding cadre of governor, lieutenant
governor, and other officials? These are all very difficult questions that, unfortunately, cannot be
answered definitively.
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What is indisputable is that the years 1629–1680 (followed by a brief period after Diego
de Vargas’s Reconquista) were the period of greatest Spanish influence among the Hopi, when
Spaniards made the most inroads religiously, culturally, and politically, though these successes
were quite modest. Clemmer makes the broadest assertion regarding Spanish influence on Hopi
government, referring to Awatovi, Shungopavi, and Oraibi: “These three mission
villages…probably had schools and village functionaries on the Spanish model: sheriffs,
governors, sacristans, catechists, church wardens.”13 Clemmer is borrowing from Edward Spicer,
who also briefly touches on the subject in his earlier work with this terse statement: “The mission
villages of Awatovi, Shungopovi, and Oraibi probably at this time also were provided with
schools and village organization in the Spanish form.”14 What Clemmer and Spicer refer to as the
“Spanish model” and “Spanish form,” respectively, meant elected village leaders such as
governors, lieutenant governors, and others and a town roughly modeled after Spanish
municipalities. The elected officers would have traveled to Santa Fe with their varas de justicia
to receive official approval from New Mexico’s governor. All of these are the essential
ingredients of a república de indios, and that likely took place at the missionized Hopi villages.
But what should have happened at Hopi and what actually happened are not necessarily
the same thing. There is a strong possibility that during the seventeenth century Hopis possessed
some form of Spanish civil government, but it is difficult to establish what this Hopi república
looked like. First of all, if Hopi elected leaders made the trip to Santa Fe for their swearing in,
receiving official endorsements with their varas, there is no record of it. Unfortunately, the era of
greatest Spanish influence among the Hopi happens to be the pre-Revolt period, the years for
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which records are incredibly scarce.15 Second, and more importantly, the traditions of civil
government (such as the governor system with its annual elections), which remain entrenched in
the Rio Grande Pueblos, are nonexistent at the Hopi villages. There are simply no remnants of
secular governance at Hopi. If this governing system was once in place, one explanation for its
conspicuous absence is that Hopis consciously and systematically eliminated all vestiges of
Spanish power, including those Hopis who had supported the Spaniards.
The most obvious and potent example of Hopi elimination of Spanish influence is
the destruction of Awatovi in 1700. Since the Franciscans had experienced a reasonable degree
of missionary success there, the strongest contingent of pro-Spanish Hopis likely resided there.
But, as was surely the case in other Pueblos of divided loyalties, this led to enmity between Hopi
villages, especially between Hopi Spanish sympathizers and those intent on driving all things
Spanish from their communities. In 1680, in conjunction with the Pueblo Revolt, Hopis rose up,
killing their priests and driving the Spaniards out of their homeland. In 1692, Governor Diego de
Vargas, who led the so-called “Reconquista” of New Mexico, conducted a party of soldiers to
Hopi territory. They endured a tense initial meeting at Awatovi, thanks in no small part to
Vargas’s castigation in which he lamented:
How is it when you are Christians, though such bad ones, that, forgetting what you
promised in baptism, you have profaned the churches, destroyed the images, murdered
the missionaries, and sacrificed yourselves to the Devil to your own damnation! [How is
it that] you do not humbly cast yourselves upon the ground and revere the true Mother of
your God and mine who, in the image which ennobles this banner, comes with
forgiveness to offer you salvation! Kneel, kneel at once before I consume you all with the
fire of my indignation!16
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The threat of force prevailed. Hopis capitulated, making signs of penitence to the image of the
Virgin and pledging loyalty to the crown. Vargas proceeded to the other Hopi villages and
secured similar responses. But, Hopi fealty did not persist. Events unfolded in 1700 that would
prove disastrous to Catholic Hopis and their Spanish allies. Writing over thirty years after the
fact in 1732, Fray José Narváez Valverde gives an account of how Fathers Juan de Garicochea
and Antonio Miranda in 1700 gained permission to return to the Hopi villages to minister there.
They made their way to Awatovi, where they “reduced all the natives and baptized many.”17 The
commitment of Hopis at Awatovi to the Catholic faith did not sit well with the more defiant
Hopi. Many had verbally committed to Catholicism and the crown when the threat of Spanish
arms compelled them to do so, but had then returned to their traditional ways once Spaniards left.
But now, the devotion of those at Awatovi went beyond the lip service intended to satisfy the
watchful Spaniards. Captain John G. Bourke, the famous U.S. Army officer and ethnographer
who spent time in Hopiland, told of the “legend of Awatovi,” which had been related to him in
the 1880s. When he and others came upon substantial ruins of a Hopi village, he stated that “The
Moquis tell the story that this town was destroyed by the people of Mu-shang-newy
[Mishongnovi], who came over in the night, got on the top of the roofs, and tossed bundles of
lighted straw down upon the people inside and stifled them.” Interestingly, his Hopi informants
told him that, “this attack [was carried out because] the town was full of ‘singing men,’ whom
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the Moquis did not like.”18 This last part could possibly refer to the performance of Catholic
liturgy, which angered traditional Hopis.
The story of Awatovi’s destruction becomes clearer when all of the events are
considered. For one thing, there is archaeological evidence that Catholic practices persisted there
during the Revolt years. After killing their Franciscan minister and destroying the mission
church, Awatovis’s residents continued to inter their dead at the mission, mixing traditional Hopi
items and Catholic objects in their burials.19 Second, Awatovi is the only location where a village
governor is definitively mentioned, and this comes after the Revolt period. Governor Diego de
Vargas entered Awatovi on 19 November 1692, finding the Hopis friendly but suspicious.
Vargas identified a Hopi named Miguel, who also spoke Castilian, as the head of the village.
After a tense first night in which the Spaniards refused to camp at Awatovi, the party baptized
122 children. Vargas was godfather to Miguel’s son and daughter. Vargas then relates:
Afterward, I appointed Miguel as their governor in their presence, telling him to obey
him in every way. I had him swear the oath to properly exercise his office, which he did
and I received, before God Our Lord, and the sign of the cross. Then, he asked me to go
up to his house and eat, which I did to please him and the Indians so that they might not
think I was afraid of them.20
The oath Vargas made Miguel swear, and the speech he gave regarding his duties of office, were
doubtless the same ones Vargas delivered to the Rio Grande Pueblos. While this is the only
specific mention of a Hopi governor in the historical record, I am inclined to believe that this was
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not out of the ordinary; the matter-of-fact way in which Vargas relates these events demonstrates
that Hopis had had governors previously and understood this designation.
Vargas’s retelling of events after Miguel’s selection reveal much about Hopi intentions.
Before Vargas went to Hopi, he had stopped at the Zuñi villages. While there, he sent a letter
ahead to Hopi stating his intentions to return and resubmit the letter. The Hopi leader Miguel had
received this letter, and notified his own village, as well as the villages of Walpi, Shungopavi,
Mishongnovi, and Oraibi. The villages hastily called a junta, in which they all agreed that they
could easily kill the Spaniards, who were very few in number. Miguel and others from Awatovi
were the only ones who did not support such a course, and Hopis from the other villages had
threatened him, telling him that once the Spaniards left they would kill him. In fact, Miguel came
to Vargas privately, and “crying a river of tears,” he “was well aware [Hopis from the other
villages] would kill him after [Varas] left with the men-at-arms.”21 Contacts with Governor
Miguel were practically nonexistent after this episode, but Vargas did attempt to write to Miguel
and Awativi in 1694, when many of the Rio Grande Pueblos had again risen up against Spanish
colonial power. He writes:
Son, compadre, and governor, Miguel, of the pueblo of Awatovi and the rest of its
Indians and war captains, I advise you that I am in this villa of Santa Fe with the priests,
many soldiers, and the Spaniards and their wives and children, and that many more
people are coming. Once everyone is together, I shall go to see you, which I greatly wish,
to embrace you and tell you that the king, our lord (may Gold keep him), sent me only so
that you may live as Christians, which you are. I come to you neither to ask for anything
nor to do you harm whatsoever. You may know me. I was with you and paid you for
what I needed. I also gave you what I had, as I shall do. You are all my children, and I
love you, and God, very much. May He keep you, my compadre, for many years.22
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Miguel was already a leader before his selection as governor, and barring some egregious
offense to his people or being killed at the hands of other villagers, he would have remained in
power. It is impossible to know if the governor designation meant anything to anyone other than
Miguel and his village, but it could be that it was a powerful symbol of everything Hopis hated
about the república system. A solitary friar was bad enough, but a sympathetic Hopi governor
and other officers were likely more than they could bear. Miguel’s fear for his own life proved
remarkably prescient.23
Following sparse contact with Spaniards, in 1699 Hopis at Awatovi offered to rebuild
their mission and permit the Franciscans to return. Spicer believes this was because they had
seen the proverbial writing on the wall with the resubmission of the Rio Grande Pueblos, and
wanted to keep destructive warfare from reaching them. They sent a preemptive delegation to
Santa Fe in 1699 to ask for missionaries. Thus, the aforementioned Fray Garicochea reported that
the Catholic Hopis were already rebuilding the mission at Awatovi when he arrived. But as the
Spanish hold at Awatovi took root for a second time, Hopis at the other villages grew more
alarmed. One of the priests who had labored at Awatovi prior to the Revolt of 1680, José de
Espeleta, had a protégé to whom he gave the name Francisco. Francisco, who was also called
Espeleta, had been baptized and was fluent in Spanish. By 1700 he was a cacique at Oraibi, and
strongly opposed the growing Spanish influence at Awatovi. Espeleta then traveled at the head of
another delegation of Hopis to Santa Fe. They were implacably opposed to the return of
missionaries and hoped to negotiate a peace with Governor Pedro Rodríguez Cubero. Adolph
Bandelier insists that Espeleta and the chiefs at Oraibi, along with twenty other delegates,

23

It is unknown if Miguel was alive in 1700, since he is not named in the accounts of Awatovi’s
destruction. If he was, and he had remained faithful to the Spaniards, he was almost certainly
killed that day.

91
appeared before Governor Cubero “not as subjects of the crown, but as delegates of a foreign
power sent to conclude a treaty of peace and amity.”24 Espeleta later masterminded the attack on
Awatovi. With the assistance of the chief of Awatovi, the conspirators, who now included men
from Oraibi, Walpi, Mishongnovi, and Shungopavi, planned the attack for a morning when all
the men of Awatovi would be in their kivas. Early on a December morning in 1700, the attackers
greeted the men, who were now in the kivas, from the roofs above. They pulled out the ladders,
and threw in bundles of burning wood. The victims below panicked, and in a final show of spite,
the attackers threw in Spanish peppers, for which their victims had apparently developed a taste.
The roof beams burned and collapsed, killing many, while others were shot with arrows. They
then poured through the village, killing most of the possibly 800 residents, and taking the
surviving women and children as spoils of war and dividing them among the villages.25
Hopi oral tradition also sheds potential light on the events of that fateful day. The
(possibly new) chief of Awatovi, Ta’palo, summed up how Spanish influence had corrupted
Awatovi:
In our village the sorcerers, those creatures of evil [the Spaniards], do not let anyone go
free anymore. Their influence is devastating. They are destroying people whenever they
can. They are seducing the unmarried girls and having intercourse with them wherever
they can. It’s a lot worse than it ever was before. I’m at my wits’ end. I do not know what
to do anymore.”26
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In his attempt to enlist the help of the other village chiefs, he stated:
My children over in Awat’ovi are out of control. They have no respect for people nor do
they listen to anyone. The elders are nothing to them. They are ravishing the women and
girls. Our shrines and ceremonies are in shambles. They don’t mean anything. These
Spaniards, nothing but sorcerers and witches, are hoping to settle here for good. That’s
why they came. The same thing took place when we still lived in the underworld. Now I
want my village erased from the surface of the earth. It is to disappear completely. If you
assist me, therefore, you can have everything. You can bring women and girls here. They
can help you to increase in number….I’ll let you have all these things if you help
me….Awat’ovi is to be no more.27
Hopi oral tradition even speaks of the intentional use of chilis in the attack:
[T]he Spaniards used to grow a lot of the chile at Awat’ovi…The chile caught fire and,
mixed with the smoke, stung most painfully. There was crying, screaming, and coughing.
After a while the roof beams caught fire. As they flamed up, they began to collapse, one
after the other. Finally, the screams died down and became still. Eventually, the roofs
caved in on the dead, burying them. Then there was just silence. All of the people inside
the kivas had perished.28
When a dispute arose after some from Walpi and Mishongnovi took the most attractive women
and girls before the attackers from Oraibi got their chance, they angrily grabbed the women and
began stabbing them, shooting them with arrows, and mutilating their bodies. Men from the
party who tried to intervene in their behalf had their penises and testicles cut off.29 These Hopi
accounts speak to the depth of he hatred for the Spaniards, their religion, and even Hopis who
embraced them.
In a single stroke, the Hopi village that had proved the most fertile ground for
establishing Spanish power in Hopiland was destroyed. With this destruction all traces of
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Spanish civil government among the Hopi came to an end. Awatovi was the likely location of
Spanish-imposed Hopi civil government, and these Spanish concepts of civil government and
electoral town politics surely perished along with those unlucky men in the kivas and women on
the road. If Hopis had practiced some form of elective government and sent officers to treat with
Spanish officials in Santa Fe—possibly those who had traveled to the capital to request friars be
sent—they certainly would have been among those killed. If Hopis from other mission villages
who had taken part in Spanish civil institutions had survived, they surely left these concepts to
die with those at Awatovi. Hopiland was securely Hopi and would remain so for many decades,
despite various Spanish attempts to reassert authority there.
Hopis succeeded not only in eradicating Spanish influence, but also in destroying public
memory of Spanish civil governance. Hopi oral history does mention the Spanish presence in
their territory, but when referring to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, tradition speaks
almost entirely of the influence of Franciscans, making no mention of how the Spanish presence
there influenced Hopi secular government. In these stories, the priests are always the villains,
ruling over the Hopi as despots. For example, in an account from 1936, Edmund Nequatewa, a
Hopi from Shungopavi, tells the story of how the Spaniards came to the village long ago. The
Hopi agreed to build a mission for the priest. But, relations eventually soured when the priest,
“who had great power,” sent the men of the village away on long trips to fetch him water from a
certain spring that had his favorite drinking water, only to seduce their wives while they were
away.30 In this retelling the people of Shongopavi, outraged at the priest’s behavior, eventually
join with Hopis at Mishongnovi and Awatovi, and all killed their priests on the same day in
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1680. In a similar version told by an Oraibi informant, the Hopi there tired of the oppressive
priest, even though the Spaniards “were not bad to them at first.” After a series of bad harvests,
no rain, and the priest’s constant demands for tributes of food, the men of Badger clan dragged
him out of his house and slit his throat. Wíkvaya, the Hopi telling this story to ethnographers in
1905, states that, “The killing of the padre in Oraíbi was the signal for the other villages to get
rid of the padres that lived in those mesas also.”31 Absent in these accounts is any mention of
Spanish institutions other than Catholicism. There is mention of Spanish material culture—tools,
woolen goods, etc.—but there are no governors, lieutenant governors, alcaldes, ayuntamientos,
or other elements of Spanish municipal government.
Even more contemporary Hopi accounts collected as part of The American Indian
History Project supported by Doris Duke in the late 1960s focus almost entirely on Spanish
missionary activity. Interestingly, though, when Robert Sakiestewa, from Oraibi, was asked,
“Did the Spanish actually have a province out here [at Hopi] or a state or something of this
kind?” he answered, “Yes, they did.” When asked how many Spanish there were, he said that
there was one priest at Oraibi, two at Shongopavi, and two at Awatovi. Sakiestewa also clearly
stated that only priests, not soldiers, came to the Hopi villages.32 In order for a province or state
to exist at Hopi, officers were needed. These would have been Hopis elected by their own people
in some manner. In a similar interview from the same collection, Emil Pooley from Hotevilla
tells of the Spaniards coming to Oraibi. He similarly relates an account of Hopis initially being
content under the influence of the Catholic priests, a relationship that soured when the men of the
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village were subjected to long hours of hard physical labor with little food and frequent
whippings. Eventually these men determined to kill their Catholic priests, with each village
holding their own secret meetings to that end, and carrying out their plans. This interview differs
from Sakiestwa’s in that Pooley, when asked if there were Spanish soldiers present, stated,
“There must have been, just a few, a very few. They were all killed off because of what they had
done. They had made slaves out of the Oraibi people, and they had killed many young men, had
been mean to them and raped their women…”33 Pooley mentions a nominal military presence,
but there is no talk of civil government. The Hopi república, whatever form it took, surely only
existed between 1629 and the destruction of Awatovi in 1700.
Thus the erasure of these institutional memories is so complete they do not even survive
in the oral history of the Hopi. Clemmer asserts that “the Hopi are one of the few groups to have
endured prolonged domination by the Spaniards—more than 50 years—without being influenced
even a little bit by Spanish culture, unlike their Puebloan cohorts to the east, who were
influenced to some degree.”34 Still, the tantalizing question remains: did the Hopi have some
form of tenuous república under Spain? And if so, did Hopis institute some sort of civil
government in the 1600s, with elected leaders recognized by officials in Santa Fe and who
treated with them in the proscribed manner? A Spanish program similar to the one established
along the Rio Grande must have been instituted at Hopi, but their resistance to Spanish influence,
expulsion of Franciscan priests, destruction of sympathetic villagers, and erasure of whatever
collective memory of Spanish civil institutions did exist points to weak Spanish political
institutions in Hopiland, institutions that were successfully destroyed by obstinate Hopis. All that

33

Emil Pooley, interviewed by D. Corydon Hammond, September 3, 1967. Doris Duke Indian
Oral History Project (Salt Lake City: J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah), 6, 8.
34
Clemmer, Roads in the Sky, 27.

96
remains is a sparse account of the beleaguered Governor Miguel, who feared for his life after
accepting a Spanish position.
In a letter to the governor of New Mexico dated October 28, 1775, while Spaniards were
debating how to bring Hopis under colonial control once again, Fray Silvestre Velez de
Escalante, who had spent a brief period among the Hopi, wrote:
The Moqui are very civilized, apply themselves to weaving and cultivating the land by
means of which they raise abundant crops of maize, beans and chile. They also gather
cotton although not as much….Understanding that the Moqui, although rebels, are really
vassals of our sovereign, that they bowed for some time their arrogant heads beneath the
gentle yoke of our Lord, Jesus Christ that in as many years as they count their rebellion
and apostasy, it has not sufficed to conquer their obstinacy by the suave exhortations of
many religious who have entered from this Custody to preach to them, and finally that in
them the apostates of Christianity may have foundation and even defense against the
Christian religion of great prejudice to it, it appears to me that the proper means that can
and ought to be taken is as follows: with forces of the projected expedition they be
subdued by arms to the dominion of their legitimate sovereign; that they be brought down
from the pueblos to a plain and proper site, and whatever measures considered imperative
be taken to require of them the necessary compliance….As they are subjects and are
without hope of giving up their ignorant licentiousness, I hold for certain their prompt
and complete conversion inasmuch as the principal obstacle with which Infernal
astuteness has always frustrated the Christian zeal of those they have tried to convert to
the fold of the Church, is the inordinate religious control which the caciques and chiefs
have, the absolute dominion which they usurp to the injury of both Majesties. For this
reason they prevent by terrible threats any of their people from seeking conversion or
even addressing a religious, or harkening to him when he preaches, reserving to
themselves solely the faculty of hearing and speaking on points of religion.35
Though such hyperbolic pronouncements about the undue influence of traditional holy men of
New Spain’s frontier Indian nations were common, Father Escalante does not seem far off in his
summary of their power at Hopi. The lengths to which Hopis were willing to go to eliminate
Spanish influence, including town elections and civil government, served notice to those who
may have been sympathetic to the Spaniards and their colonial system.
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Yaquis, Jesuits, and North America’s First Voter Rebellion
The Yaqui colonial experience is one of diaspora. Mobility has become a key Yaqui
cultural component over the last five centuries. Today Yaquis reside primarily in the Mexican
state of Sonora, as well as in southern Arizona.36 The present section, which examines Yaqui
voting and civil government from 1617 to the early1740s, focuses on the eight Yaqui pueblos
along the Yaqui River: Pótam, Vícam, Tórin, Bácum, Cócorit, Huírivis, Bélem, and Ráum.37 The
Yaqui language is a dialect of Cahita, a group of mutually intelligible languages spoken by
Yaquis, Mayos, Fuertes, and other Indian nations of northern Mexico. Cahita is in the UtoAztecan family, and so Yaquis are related, linguistically, to Hopis and Pimas. While it is
extremely difficult to piece together the nature of a Hopi República that may have existed during
the brief period of Spanish missionization there, the Yaqui experience under Spanish Jesuit and
civil authority is quite well documented. And while the Hopi briefly flirted with Spanish religion
and material culture, Yaquis seem to have “Hispanicized” quite readily, eventually becoming the
most prosperous mission in northern Mexico.38 But the success of the Jesuit missionary efforts in
Yaqui territory, and the Yaquis’ subsequent reduction to eight mission towns in the years
following the Jesuit entrada, belie a deep ambivalence that developed over the decades between
the 1610s and 1740s. Yaquis adopted Catholicism, mission life, and civil government, yet they
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revolted violently when these Spanish institutions did not conform to their idea of how systems
of religion, economics, and politics should benefit Yaqui people. They revolted, at least in part,
when the system of voting for town officials broke down and silenced the Yaqui voice in electing
their Native governors. Yaquis rebelled in 1740 because the Yaqui República broke down; they
were fighting in favor of a distinctly Spanish-imposed system of civil government.
Yaquis, or the Yoeme people in their own language, traditionally occupied the area
around the river bearing their name, which in the 1500s was at the extreme northwestern edge of
New Spain. The Yaqui River, which flows from 9,000-foot highlands to the coastal plain,
emptying into the Sea of Cortés, provided the water needed for Yaquis to cultivate maize, beans,
squash, amaranth, and cotton. Since the river frequently flooded and shifted its course, Yaquis
and their river villages had to be mobile.39 Diego de Guzmán was the first Spaniard to reach the
Yaqui River Valley and its Indigenous occupants while on a slaving mission along the coast of
the Sea of Cortés in 1533. An anonymous contemporary chronicler recorded what happened in
that first encounter. After not seeing any Yaquis during the first part of their sojourn in Yaqui
territory, they eventually came across a group of intimidating Yaquis at a distance, arrayed for
battle, “shaking their firsts in the air, with bows trembling and making menacing faces.” He
made special note of one Yaqui, set apart by his elaborate dress and regal appearance: “This
Indian who governed the others came ahead of the group and with his bow made a very long line
in the ground, knelt down and kissed the ground.” After this he arose, and the Spaniards were
made to understand that if they crossed the line, “they would kill all of us.” Captain de Guzmán
told the Yaquis that they meant no harm, desiring peace and friendship with the Yaquis.
Predictably, de Guzmán and his men crossed the line, and a violent encounter ensued in which
39
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twelve Spanish horses were wounded and one man killed out of a party of seventeen. The
chronicler praised the Yaqui for their abilities as warriors, stating that, “These Indians fought as
well and as spirited as any I have seen since I have been in the Indies, and I have seen none fight
as well as they.”40 It was a fairly typical encounter in the annals of Indian-white first contacts.
And yet, with this short description of a violent first encounter between Yaquis and
Spaniards, the narrator initiated the oft-repeated epithet of “the bellicose Yaqui.”41 Spaniards
repeated this trope in the following decades, and it still finds a prominent place in the Yaqui
historiography. Andrés Pérez de Ribas, the first Jesuit missionary to minister to the Yaqui over
an extended period of time, referred to them as a “bellicose, and arrogant nation.”42 In his classic
study of armed conflicts with the Yaqui, Mexican officer Francisco P. Troncoso characterized
Yaqui history as “a history extremely abundant in wars, in bloody episodes and in scenes of
savagery, perpetrated by them and on them.”43 Pérez de Ribas tersely summed up what Spaniards
believed about Yaquis when he commented, “I found hardly a single Indian who did not have a
name derived from or signifying the murders he had committed, such as who-killed-four or –five
or –ten, he-who-killed-in-the-monte or –on-the-road or –in-the-field.”44 This reputation as a
fiercely warlike people belies the rapidity with which Yaquis were Christianized, brought under
Jesuit control, and reduced to their eight principal mission towns. Further complicating this

40

“Segunda relación anonima de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzman á la Nueva Galicia” in
Joaquín García Icazbalceta, Coleccíon de Documentos para la Historia de México Vol. 2
(México: Antigua Librería, 1866), 301–2. Translated by the author.
41
Robert C. West, Sonora: Its Geographical Personality (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1993), 29.
42
Andrés Pérez de Ribas, translated by Daniel T. Reff, Maureen Ahern, and Richard K. Danford,
History of the Triumphs of Our Holy Faith Amongst the Most Barbarous and Fierce Peoples of
the New World (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999), 327.
43
Francisco P. Troncoso, Las Guerras con las Tribus Yaqui y Mayo, Clásicos de la Antropología
Mexicana (México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1977), 20. Translated by the author.
44
Pérez de Ribas, History of the Triumphs of Our Holy Faith, 328–29.

100
reputation is the fact that the Yaqui, after over one hundred years of Jesuit domination, rebelled
against their Catholic spiritual fathers, not solely because they chafed under the autocratic
regime, but also because one of the fundamental tenets of the república system—Indian voting—
was not properly respected. Yaqui actions in the late 1730s and early 1740s constitute a
complicated response to Spanish religion, politics, and economics.
Sustained, transformative contacts between Yaquis and Spaniards did not begin until the
first decades of the 1600s. During the entradas of Captain Diego Martínez de Hurdaide in 1607–
1608, Spanish soldiers and their Indian auxiliaries suffered a series of humiliating defeats by the
Yaqui, thus strengthening their fame as a savage, fearsome people. The worst of these defeats
occurred in 1610, and actually paved the way for Yaqui evangelization. Captain Hurdaide
invaded Yaqui territory at the head of 40 mounted Spaniards and 2,000 Indian allies, many of
whom were from the neighboring Mayos, the Yaquis’ close cultural relations but fierce enemies.
He came perilously close to being killed by Yaquis that year, but somehow managed to escape
back to the base for Spanish operations in this area, the Villa of San Felipe. Captain Hurdaide
circulated rumors that the Spaniards planned to bring their full military might to bear upon the
Yaqui, and that three squadrons of ships were making their way up the Yaqui River to attack.
Furthermore, the captain intimated that there was an open invitation for any Indian nations that
wished to settle old scores with the Yaquis to assist in the impending military campaign.45 Pérez
de Ribas had not been present during the battles between Hurdaide and the Yaqui. Arriving a few
years later, he related that since the Yaqui had been unable “to take the head” of Hurdaide, nor
any of his captains, and “When the threats of this brave man, of whom they had heard a great
deal, reached their ears from the villa [of San Felipe], some of the caciques of the nation decided
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to negotiate peace with him and the Christians.”46 Early Jesuit scholar Francisco Javier Alegre
(1729–1788) similarly asserted that Yaquis sued for peace after “Seeing…men battle without any
break for an entire day, without losing a soldier and finding a way to escape in the midst of more
than seven thousand enemies who had encircled them, they were frightened by such heroic valor,
and did not want such valiant men for enemies.”47 Hyperbole aside, the Yaqui made a strategic
decision to negotiate. Recent historian of Yaqui-Spanish relations, Raphael Brewster Folsom,
posits that Yaquis referred to Hurdaide as a wizard and a dwarf (apparently the dwarf moniker
related to his being compared to the supernatural, powerful Yaqui Surem, who were thought to
be small in stature). Yaquis had beaten Hurdaide back, but they “recognized that the captain and
his allies represented a formidable enemy….cunning in battle and [possessing] skill in
negotiations over captives.” Hurdaide also knew that he was one defeat away from disaster and
possibly his own death. Both sides were tired and scared of more violence; negotiating benefited
both parties.48
Whatever their motivations, a complicated diplomatic mission followed, in which Yaquis
first sent small, female-led delegations to the Mayos, whose territory they would need to traverse
in order to reach the Villa of San Felipe and who had served as Spanish auxiliaries. One of these
Yaqui delegations also brought two female Mayo captives taken years before as a sign of
peaceful Yaqui intentions. Acting as go-betweens, the Mayos traveled to San Felipe and
informed Hurdaide of the Yaqui desire for peace. Hurdaide and the Jesuits present at the Villa
were pleased with these developments, and initiated direct contacts between the Yaqui and
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Spaniards. Two Yaqui delegates arrived at San Felipe, and according to Pérez de Ribas’s
account, informed Hurdaide that after having suffered many casualties in their battles with the
Spaniards, they “recognized that their neighbors, the Mayo, and other Christian nations were at
peace, happy, and content—protected by the captain and cared for by the priests, who treated
them as children. Thus, they wished for the same. This was the reason the Yaqui gave for their
[peace] mission.”49
The large peace delegation, consisting of one hundred and fifty Yaquis, signed a formal
peace agreement with the Spaniards at San Felipe on 25 April 1610. As quoted above, Pérez de
Ribas believed that Yaquis saw that their Indian neighbors, among whom Spanish religious and
laypersons labored, were “at peace, happy, and content,” and desired the same. Expert on Yaqui
history, Evelyn Hu-DeHart, speculates that the Yaqui, even though they had defeated Hurdaide
in battle, chose “pragmatism and flexibility,” rather than “a futile, protracted struggle,” and that
allowing the Spaniards to enter would mean “essentially two or three unarmed, peaceful
missionaries, not whole settlements of rapacious foreign intruders.”50 Yaquis likely feared the
costs of continued armed struggle with Spaniards, and perhaps saw that their neighbors, who
were then coming under the Jesuit mission system, were not all the worse off for it. Yet, these
types of explanations gloss over what must have been the incredibly strong coercive element. For
example, when Hurdaide told the Yaqui, after initial small groups came bearing news of their
desire for peace, to come back with a large formal delegation, he also ordered them to return any
stolen horses, silver items, weapons, and other treasure, and not to ever again fight any Christian
gentile Indian nations under Spanish control. He also demanded they kill any rebels from other
49
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Indian nations who were hiding among them, which they did not do. The Yaqui did return the
silver and weapons, and inexplicably “left…a good number of their sons” to live with the priests
at San Felipe and learn Spanish and the Christian gospel, “so that their seriousness in seeking
peace and will to receive the instruction of the Gospel and become Christians would be
understood.”51 These appear to be the actions of a people under duress. It is also entirely possible
that the Yaqui themselves did not realize the power of their own position. With a total population
estimated at perhaps 30,000, they greatly outnumbered whatever forces the Spaniards could
marshal in their remote northern frontier. Pérez de Ribas even states that the Yaqui “could have
been much more daring and arrogant than they had been in the beginning.”52 Yaquis and
Spaniards did establish peace, but it was a slow process, as permanent Jesuit missionaries would
not arrive among the Yaqui for several more years.
Yaqui oral tradition offers intriguing insights into why Yaquis negotiated. Yaqui
ethnographer David Delgado Shorter asserts in his work, We Will Dance Our Truth: Yaqui
History in Yoeme Performances, that Yaquis knew they could defeat the Spaniards in battle, and
had no reason to believe that they could not continue to do so if they so desired. He turns to a
Yaqui prophecy called the Talking Tree. In this traditional Yaqui story, there is a tree that begins
speaking to the people, and nobody can understand it. Eventually, a young woman interprets
what the tree is saying, and it is a prophecy in which the Yaqui are told of the coming of
Spaniards and Christianity. The prophecy states that Yaquis will split into two groups—the
baptized and the unbaptized—with the baptized remaining in the villages, while the unbaptized,
who are known as the Surem (mentioned previously), go to live in the mountains, caves, and
hills that are part of the Yaqui homeland, where they are mostly unseen but can make themselves
51
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known to Yaquis. Shorter thus asserts that Yaquis agreed to negotiate with Spaniards in
fulfillment of prophecy; they knew baptism was coming.53
Spanish missionization spread in the 1610s to include many of the Yaquis’ neighbors, but
none as important as the Mayos. They were the steppingstone to the Yaqui, and the official
Yaqui mission opened on 20 May 1617. The oft-quoted Andrés Pérez de Ribas was one of the
two Jesuits who opened the mission. His account, History of the Triumphs of Our Holy Faith
Amongst the Most Barbarous and Fierce Peoples of the New World, serves as my main source in
assessing how Yaqui politics changed under Jesuit control, and what constituted the early Yaqui
electoral process under the Spanish-Jesuit system. Pérez de Ribas first came to Mexico in 1602,
and from 1604–1619, he labored among several groups of northern Mexican Indians, eventually
returning to Mexico City in 1619 due in large part to poor health. His account of Jesuit
missionary activities among these indigenous peoples, first published in 1645, is similar to the
Relations de Jésuites de la Nouvelle-France. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative
period primary sources on the indigenous peoples of northern Mexico, it does much to uncover
the dynamics of Spanish-Indian relations in the seventeenth-century Arizona-Sonora
Borderlands.54 Pérez de Ribas highlighted important political changes that occurred within Yaqui
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society, changes that Spicer asserts brought Yaquis “into the state of citizens of Spain.”55 In fact,
Spicer sees the 1617 opening of the Yaqui mission as so important that, beginning in that year,
Yaquis embarked on remodeling their existing military, political, and ecclesiastical
organizations in ways suggested or required by the Spaniards. Then for 150 years the
process of incorporation proceeded with increasingly intensity, always with members of
the highly organized Society of Jesus playing a major role…[It was] a vitalization that
extended through all aspects of native life.56
The arrival of the Jesuits was certainly transformative, but whether it can be characterized as a
“vitalization” is questionable. Yaqui life changed significantly over time, with Yaqui politics and
voting forming a significant portion of this change. Folsom cautions that the process of Yaqui
change was “slow, piecemeal, fraught with violence and loss, and very much on Yaqui terms.” It
was Yaquis who dictated the pace of change, as Jesuits were forced to accept only a “precarious
foothold” among the Yaqui.57
After quickly baptizing thousands of Yaquis, Spaniards then attempted to reduce Yaquis
to Jesuit mission towns. The idea of Indian reduction followed the instructions laid out by the
Council of the Indies for all colonial towns: a large central plaza on elevated ground with the
parish church and administrative buildings lining the plaza, surrounded by rectangular blocks
and streets intersecting at right angles. The town perimeter was stockaded or walled off, and the
area outside the perimeter contained the pasture and farm lands. Jesuits adapted their reduction
towns to suit their own needs: the priest’s house and church lined an entire side of the plaza, with
adjoining storehouses for food and other goods, as well as workshops for various trades.58 Pérez
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de Ribas wrote of reduction as a primary concern. He did not believe Indians were inherently
inferior or lacking in intelligence, but he did believe that true civilization entailed living in towns
or cities with rulers, elites, and government. According to chroniclers, the Yaqui Reduction fit
perfectly with this ideal. Pérez de Ribas described Yaquis as a ranchería people, living in small
villages of one to several families. He stated that they lived in some eighty rancherías along the
Yaqui River, with an estimated total population of around 30,000. Interestingly, he asserted that
the Yaqui who formed the 1610 peace delegation to San Felipe “offered to reduce their
rancherías to large pueblos, where they could build churches when the priests came to instruct
them.” Again, when he arrived in 1617, “They offered to bring their rancherías together in the
form of pueblos to make enramadas for churches, just as other nations had done to receive us.”59
The enthusiasm with which the Yaqui reduced is highly questionable. Again, Folsom asserts that
reduction was anything but a smooth and easy process. Within a few years many Yaquis had
coalesced in the eight principal Jesuit towns, while many others still remained in the
countryside.60 What is without question is that the process of political incorporation began in
earnest along with the work of reduction.
The importance of reduction to Yaqui civil government and voting cannot be overstated.
The coalescing of Yaquis in eight large towns made their conversion to Catholicism easier, and it
also brought them into political bodies that could function in the Spanish political model. With
the Yaqui reduced from dispersed rancherías to permanent villages along the river, villages that
could be more easily monitored and controlled, Spaniards focused on instituting the religious,
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political, and social reforms they believed would convert Yaquis into Spanish citizens. The point
is that while the Yaqui Reduction paved the way for Spanish-style political institutions, it also
helped create the Yaqui political consciousness that would eventually lead to the violent Yaqui
Revolt of 1740.
As interested as Pérez de Ribas was in converting and civilizing the Yaqui, he said
relatively little about the role of civil government in accomplishing this goal. He spoke generally
about traditional indigenous government, but described it in rather derisive terms:
There were no laws or kings among them to chastise their vices or sins, nor was there any
kind of authority or civil government that could punish them. It is true that they
recognized some principal caciques, who were the heads or captains of families or
rancherías. But their authority consisted only in organizing for war or attacks against their
enemies or working out peace agreements with other nations. Such actions were in no
instance undertaken without the consent of said caciques, who for such purposes
commanded great authority, It was at their houses that well-known drunken war revels
were held. In addition, their subjects helped cultivate their fields, which were usually
larger than those of others. These caciques acquired authority not so much through
inheritance, but rather through their bravery in war, the number of children,
grandchildren, and other relatives they had, or at times because they were orators or
preachers.61
What Pérez de Ribas described as a lack of law or civil authorities sounds rather like a complex
system of government with leaders, meritocracy, and a keenly developed sense of action by
consensus, which it was. What he actually noticed in this passage was a lack of coercive
religious or social control, which he would have considered a hallmark of civilization. This is
further illustrated by a statement of an encounter at the pueblo of Tórin, where an as yet heathen
Yaqui angrily fired arrows at Pérez de Ribas. When the Jesuit asked the baptized cacique of the
pueblo to punish the offender, he replied, “He could not punish it, for one thing because the
Indian who shot the arrow was not yet reduced to his kin group [or baptized as he was].
Moreover, these caciques…do not have authority over their people to punish them for offenses
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they commit.”62 It is also noteworthy that he made a detailed account of the speeches he gave to
large gatherings of Yaquis at these initial meetings, but in these speeches he spoke exclusively of
spiritual matters. There was no mention of civil government, as Oñate had done at the New
Mexico Pueblos and at Hopi.
When Jesuits reduced Indigenous nations they were supposed to establish civil as well
ecclesiastical government, but it was not until Captain Hurdaide returned to Yaqui territory in
1618, with a full military escort, that Yaquis saw the roots of Spanish-style civil government in
their pueblos. Pérez de Ribas’s account provides the best primary source for Hurdaide’s
important 1618 tour. He recounts:
Captain Diego Martínez de Hurdaide decided to visit this nation in peace to win them
over with affection and friendship and to establish political government in their numerous
pueblos…In order to introduce some type of government and civility, the captain
appointed governors and alcaldes for the pueblos. All this helped to prepare them to
receive with pleasure and esteem that which the priests preached to them.63
It is important to note that Hurdaide appointed the governors and alcaldes with no elections.
Furthermore, as Evelyn Hu-DeHart points out, “Although in theory these secular officials were
to answer directly to [Hurdaide], in practice he left it up the fathers to define their specific duties,
to appoint their assistants, and to supervise their performance in office.”64 With Hurdaide and his
soldiers residing some distance away at the Villa de San Felipe, Jesuits controlled Yaqui civil
government, and did as they saw fit, enjoying a great deal of autonomy over the next roughly one
hundred and fifteen years. In theory, Indigenous civil government in Sonora functioned in much
the same way as it did in colonial New Mexico. The town governor was the most important
Indian official, and was to be elected annually by the Indian residents. His powers included

62

Pérez de Ribas, 357.
Ibid., 361.
64
Hu-DeHart, 32–33.
63

109
maintaining community order, judging disputes, and punishing guilty parties. He was also to
organize town communal work, and give authorization to those who needed to leave the town for
whatever reason. The governor also had an alguacil, who informed him of offenses committed by
town residents. Indigenous governors in Sonora could administer punishments, which included
warnings, lashings, stocks, and the cutting of offenders’ hair. The sovereignty Indigenous
governors enjoyed would depend on the Jesuits, and in many cases they were merely the priests’
auxiliaries. There were also several Indian religious officials in each town, with varying degrees
of ecclesiastical power.65
As the Jesuits saw it, civil government was a tool to facilitate civilization and conversion
to Christianity, not to affirm indigenous sovereignty. In Pérez de Ribas’s observations on the
implementation of Spanish civil government among the Yaqui, he was careful to note how the
gospel and civility went hand-in-hand, with religious conversion always the primary goal. For
example, he stated, “It is…certain that the introduction of the Faith and divine law to these
people not only made them Christians, but also taught them a rational and human way of life,” or
civility. He concluded, “it is…true that the Yaqui nation provides the greatest and clearest
evidence of this change”—the change from being base heathens to civilized Christians.66
Speaking of the changes in Yaqui political life, he pointed out that even though the Yaqui were
among the most barbarous of Indian nations he had encountered,
[T]he Yaqui’s bravery and ability to reason exceeded that of many [others], and with
cultivation, their moral and political life have improved greatly. In all of their pueblos are
governors, alcaldes, church fiscales, and their own ministers of justice. These individuals
govern with order, respect, and obedience. Some of these officials are appointed by the
captain [meaning Hurdaide], although he is more than fifty leagues away. The
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missionaries appoint the fiscales of the church. The latter are responsible for keeping the
priest informed of all matters that pertain to the church (as has been described
previously), including marriages that Christians wish to contract, newborns who need to
be baptized, the celebration of feast days, and those who become ill and are in need of the
sacraments…The civil governors likewise inform the captain of matters that require his
attention. Because the missionary is right there and everyone regards him as a father, the
people normally go to him with everyday complaints, which usually concern land or
similar things. The priest settles these disputes, and they obey him and are satisfied.67
Thus the Jesuits retained the lion’s share of civil authority, selecting civil and ecclesiastical
authorities and having the final say in disputes. In none of Pérez de Ribas’s writings did he
mention Indian voting. He saw Jesuits as benevolent parents, who were there to lead Yaquis on
their new spiritual path. Civil government was helpful and necessary, but full sovereign power
was not in Indian hands. While the Spanish crown envisioned the Jesuit missionization as a
transitional period to bring these Indians into the body politic as citizens, Jesuits seemed content
to maintain an open-ended process, one in which Indians need not worry about such things as
voting, sovereignty, and self-government. Their main responsibility was to become obedient
Christian charges. This is all in keeping with the guiding principles of the Jesuit order in Sonora.
In the “Rules for the Government of the Missions, As Approved by the Father Visitor Rodrigo de
Cabredo, 1610,” Rule 12, though referring specifically to work to be performed by Indians in the
Jesuit missions, reads, “Ours ought to encourage and introduce the Indians to beneficial works
which will eradicate laziness that is the root and mother of all vices; in this way they can live a
more politically organized life.”68 Furthermore, Pérez de Ribas believed that Yaquis should
possess as little political power as possible because “it avoided burdening the Indians.”69
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Scholars have frequently commented on the rapidity with which the Yaqui converted to
the Spanish municipal system, and the scale of the change. Spicer succinctly summed up this
rapid change from traditional Yaqui government to a Spanish-modeled one in this way:
[C]omposed at least by 1619 of two kinds of secular officials, namely governors and
alcaldes (judges). In accordance with Spanish custom in rural communities, the governors
of local communities were elected by the general populace. This system of election was
instituted in the Yaqui communities, although some confusion was introduced by the
initial appointment of governors by the Spanish military commander Hurdiade. The
secular government like the church government developed steadily and became fully
accepted by Yaquis during the following century. Both organizations became closely
interlocked under Jesuit influence into a single local government unit.70
There are a number of problematic elements in Spicer’s assertion, but my focus is not on how
“fully accepted” the new secular government was by Yaquis, but that theses significant changes
did, indeed, happen. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to know when and where Yaquis
actually began voting, as opposed to having their officers appointed for them. What is certain is
that political matters fell almost entirely to the Jesuits. In many cases, Jesuits chose officials or
manipulated elections, which resulted in Yaqui leaders favorable to their own goals. Historian
Susan M. Deeds summarized, “Jesuits introduced a new political-religious hierarchy, in which
they were the final arbiters…For many decades, Jesuits were successful in manipulating the
election of Yaqui officials who were effective in brokering conflicting interests. Even more
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significantly, they were able to minimize the demands of Spanish secular society on Yaqui
peoples for nearly a century.”71
Despite Jesuit manipulation, there can be no question that Yaqui sought to integrate the
political changes needed for a fully functioning Yaqui República. In this light, the Jesuits’ lack
of respect for Yaqui sovereignty must certainly have been galling to independently minded
Yaquis. One single event best illustrates Yaqui integration of Spanish concepts of civil authority:
the Yaqui Revolt of 1740.72 If any single event can be pointed to as leading directly to the 1740
Revolt, it was the appointment of Manuel Bernal de Huidobro as lifetime Governor of the
Provinces of Sonora y Sinaloa in 1733, the first and only lifetime appointment in New Spain.73
Conflict had long been brewing between Jesuits and vecinos, with Yaquis in the middle of the
two feuding sides. Hu-DeHart points to three reasons for the conflict between Yaquis,
vecinos/Spanish civil authorities, and Jesuits: 1) as the possibility of mine productivity in
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Navarro García, Hu-DeHart, and Folsom.
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Sonora/Sinaloa grew, miners intensified their calls for Indian labor; 2) local Spanish civil and
military officials grew more bold in their exercise of legal authority over temporal affairs at the
missions; and 3) Indians themselves began pushing for changes in the mission system.74
Governor Huidobro represented the interests of the crown and vecinos. He argued that the Jesuits
were taking too many liberties in their control of the Yaqui, overstepping their powers as
Christian ministers. More importantly, he agreed with vecinos that the Jesuits were monopolizing
the labor of the Indians for themselves. Huidobro reported to superiors in Mexico City that only
a very few of the Indians in his province were actually paying taxes, which by law they were
supposed to do after ten years of missionization. In addition, he reported that Yaquis were not
holding regular elections for their governing officials, as they should. Jesuits had kept town
officials in office for extended periods, in one case up to seventeen years, while in other cases
they had removed officers after only three or four months. In response, Jesuit Padre Crsitóbal de
Cañas, the missionary at Arizpe and rector of San Francisco Javier de Sonora, presented a
contradictory report. He stated that while the work of evangelization had proceeded well among
the Yaqui, many were still holding to heathen and heretical practices, and the very men the
Yaqui elected were encouraging or allowing such practices.75 As Folsom points our, Governor
Huidobro sided with reformers who believed that Indians needed to take their place in the
mainstream of Sonora’s political and economic life. He aimed to “suppress laziness and
vagrancy, form militia companies in the region, open up roads and pathways, look into
allegations that idolatry persisted among mission Indians, examine the labor practices and
finances of each mission, and make sure the Jesuits were not abusing the Indians in their care.”76
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Huidobro’s political views and goals would pit him against the Jesuits who controlled the
missions.
In September 1735, Pedro Álvarez Acevedo, a vecino militia captain and miner from Río
Chico, complained to local Spanish civil authorities that he could not keep the mines running
because he lacked Indian workers. In response, the alcalde mayor of Ostimuri, Miguel de Quiroz,
ordered the Yaqui Cristóbal de Gurrola, captain general of the Yaqui and Indian magistrate of
Pótam, to send the required workers to the mines. Gurrola emerged as one of the main objects of
Yaqui complaints. He was one of their own, yet he had been chosen by the Jesuits and always
supported their interests. Gurrola ignored Quiroz’s order, because it would have taken labor
away from the Jesuits, and Acevedo logged the same labor complaints in October and
November. Huidobro eventually became involved, ordering a tapisque, or work detail, of twenty
Yaquis each fortnight. Again, the required workers failed to show up, and vecinos complained
that Pótam’s priest, Diego González, told the Yaqui not to work in the mines and directly defy
Governor Huidobro’s orders.77 It was later reported that Indians indeed mustered for work duty,
but Father González said to one of the Indian leaders, “Where do you think you’re going? Are
you the alcalde mayor’s sheriff? You don’t know your place. I’ll give him an answer for all of
you.”78 Quiroz, frustrated at his powerlessness in confronting the Jesuits, wrote to Huidobro in
1735:
[The] cause for the Indians’ failure to obey the [civil] authorities [is] because these
missionaries so dominated them that they only did what the padres wished, and the
padres wanted to be despotic lords, who install and depose [Yaqui] gobernadores at their
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whim…as if each padre in his station was so absolute that there were no sovereign power
than he alone.79
The significance of Quiroz’s words as they pertain to Yaqui voting is clear: the Jesuits, in
addition to obstructing Yaqui labor at the mines, had usurped supreme political power in the
Yaqui towns. Instead of the formal electoral process called for in Indian villages under Spanish
law, Jesuits selected Yaqui governors who were favorable to their own aims and policies. The
conflict was not just about labor, but Yaqui voting and sovereignty.
In the ensuing months and years, a strange alliance emerged, which Navarro García
characterizes as Yaquis, Spanish civil authorities, and miners all combining in order to remove
Yaquis from Jesuit tutelage. The important actors in this complicated dispute included Governor
Huidobro, vecino miners, Jesuit fathers, chief among them the Sicilian priest of Pótam, Ráum,
and Huírivis, Ignacio María Nápoli, and the Yaqui governors of Ráum and Huírivis, Juan Ignacio
Usacamea (known as Muni), and Bernabé Basoritemea (known as Bernabé), respectively. Muni
and Bernabé were related, and both had authority in their respective pueblos as war chiefs in
addition to their elected status. Muni had been elected ensign of Yaqui auxiliaries during the
famous campaign of Juan Bautista de Anza I (the father of New Mexico Governor de Anza)
against the Seris and Tiburones. Bernabé had worked as a mule driver, traveling the region with
his teams.80 The two were at the center of Yaqui resistance, and led the call for Jesuits to respect
Yaqui voting rights, and the sovereign power of Yaqui elected officials. Because of their military
service, Muni and Bernabé were also highly experienced with life outside of the missions. They
were not simply backward-looking defenders of Yaqui tradition, but, as Folsom states, “leaders
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of rural resistance who gained contacts outside of the mission and perhaps prestige within it
through their extensive travels.”81
On 13 March 1736, Muni and Bernabé appeared before Quiroz to complain about
Gurrola, who they said had improperly wielded his power over the Yaqui as captain general,
with the Jesuits’ blessing. They also complained about a number of mestizos and coyotes living
in the Yaqui pueblos, whom they alleged had used their friendships with Gurrola and the Jesuits
to appropriate lands and extort money from the Yaquis.82 The Jesuits sent a convoy of loyal
Yaqui officials, under Gurrola’s command and accompanied by Father José Roldán, to visit
Quiroz. They stated that all was well, and that Yaquis and Jesuits had been reconciled. Quiroz’s
term ended in the middle of this mounting controversy, and the new alcalde mayor, Francisco
Ordóñez, did nothing to resolve the matter. It was clear that the alcaldes mayores, both Quiroz
and Ordóñez , supported the Yaqui side and were unfavorable toward the Jesuits.83
Complicating matters, Governor Huidobro was away taking care of matters in California
(over which he had jurisdiction) for much of this time. In his place was Lieutenant Governor
Don Manuel de Mena. The disgruntled Yaquis, unsatisfied with Jesuit and Spanish responses to
their complaints, began making their way to Sinaloa in October to visit Lieutenant Governor
Mena. Mena’s messengers intercepted the pair, and told them and the twenty of so other Yaqui
leaders with them to return to their villages and await his visit, promising resolution to the
conflict. He appeared to be favorable to the Yaqui cause. With the Yaqui leaders back in their
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villages, Mena came, as promised, and was greeted with celebrations. But, what happened then
was the complete opposite of what Muni and Bernabé expected. After meeting with the Jesuits,
who bribed him with pearls and other riches, Mena changed his stance on the developing
conflict, throwing Muni, Bernabé, and other leaders, including Muni’s father, in Pótam town jail.
He harassed the Yaqui governors, telling them to admit that Quiroz had put them up to their
agitation, which they denied, but when he threatened to take them to Guadalajara to be executed,
they relented.84
What occurred next marked the point of no return in the conflict. Led by Muni’s nephew,
Luis Aquibuamea, a group of over 2,000 Yaqui warriors, regaled for battle with banners and
weaponry, surrounded the jailhouse and began shouting loud threats at the Spanish soldiers. It
looked as though a battle would follow, one in which the heavily armed Yaquis would have
easily overpowered the handful of Spanish defenders. Muni decided to pacify the surrounding
Yaquis, asking Mena to allow him to speak to his compatriots. He convinced his Yaqui
supporters to disperse as long as Mena promised to release him and the other prisoners the next
day. They agreed and duly dispersed, and Muni and Bernabé were released. It was a resounding
victory for the elected Yaqui governors, and among Muni’s greatest moments as a leader of his
people.85 Muni, Bernabé, and the others clearly viewed themselves as the legitimate Yaqui
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leadership, possessing political power officially sanctioned through proper electoral processes.
Both Muni and Bernabé were restored to office in October 1736.86
Yaqui-Jesuit relations continued to sour after the Pótam prison incident, with Muni and
Bernabé at the center of controversy. The Jesuit father of Pótam, Ráum, and Huírivis as of
November 1736, Padre Nápoli, despised Muni and Bernabé, and often sought opportunity to
accuse them of wrongdoing. Nápoli accused Yaquis of stealing various items intended for the
California missions, and questioned Muni and Bernabé about the missing items. They told him
that the king was rich and would not miss the goods. The king had stolen so much from Yaquis
in the past so it was only right that they steal from the king. When Nápoli sought to repremand
them, they slapped the table and told him that they feared no man. The friar was enraged at their
insolence. Nápoli had particular ire for Bernabé. When he called the governor of Huírivis in for
questioning, he refused to come, telling the Jesuit that he knew where to find him and for Nápoli
to come to his house if he needed him. Nápoli also had seen Bernabé wearing silk stockings and
high heels from the looted goods. Furthermor, Bernabé had shielded the accused, among whom
he was one.87
In a somewhat strange turn of events, Muni and Bernabé left their offices as governor.
Whether or not they did so voluntarily is up for debate. By this time Muni had apparently begun
advocating that Yaquis pay tribute to the crown, which would place them under Spanish civil
jurisdiction and outside Jesuit authority. He was called to Nápoli’s residence, and they quickly
began to argue. Muni reportedly placed his vara de justicia, which he carried with him at all
times as a legal governor of a Spanish Indian town, on a chair. Nápoli took this as a sign of his
Padre Reynaldos that had Muni and the other prisoners freed when the Indians became “stirred
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giving up his civil authority, and even alleged that Muni had said that he no longer wanted to be
governor of Ráum. Nápoli held an election for a new governor of Ráum four days later, and at
this election only a few men turned up to vote, with most of the votes cast by women. Juan
Turimea succeeded Muni as governor. Bernabé left office around this same time because his
one-year term was up. Nápoli once again oversaw an election in which Bernabé’s nephew, Diego
Marquina, was elected. Bernabé was unhappy with the result, and vandalized his nephew’s
home, taking back his vara.88 Nápoli had thus single-handedly subverted the entire electoral
process for the Yaqui towns under his jurisdiction, casting aside the principles of voting and
Indian town sovereignty.
Muni and Bernabé refused to acquiesce to these Jesuit actions and traveled to Sinaloa to
see Lieutenant Governor Don Martín Cayetano Fernández de Peralta to complain of their
treatment at Nápoli’s hands. They claimed that they had been removed from office for refusing
to abuse other Yaquis, and that the new governors were unfit for office. Turimea was a cruel
adulterer and Marquina was a backstabbing gossiper who had threatened to cut off their heads if
they went to Spanish authorities.89 On 29 Novermber 1736, Lieutenant Governor Peralta adopted
two measures: 1) He sent immediate notice to Huidobro, who was still in California, to apprise
him of all of the happenings in Yaqui territory; 2) Peralta commissioned Don Manuel Gaspar de
Flores, a vecino civil officer from Baroyeca, to go to Ráum and Huírivis, reinstate Muni and
Bernabé in their positions, and inform Gurrola that he was not to mistreat the Yaqui anymore.
Peralta also wrote to the vice-rector of Sinaloa about Nápoli ‘s behavior, informing him of the
Jesuit’s misbehavior, but he was also careful to declare himself the most beloved son of the
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Society of Jesus.90 He did this because the Jesuits had threatened him with excommunication if
he misstepped.91 Muni and Bernabé’s actions in the unfolding events are of the utmost
importance. Factors such as labor, tribute, and land continued to play a part in the events of the
late 1730s, but the fact that Muni and Bernabé repeatedly went through civil channels to voice
their complaints, not just as aggrieved Indians, but on behalf of Yaquis as their legally elected
civil governors, illustrates the importance of the electoral process to these Indians.
The disputes continued over the ensuing months, with Nápoli, the two Yaqui governors,
and Spanish officials locked in a back-and-forth battle of accusations and counteraccusations. At
both Ráum and Huírivis, small groups came out in support of the new governors and stated that
their elections were legitimate, followed by hundreds of Yaquis in support of Muni and Bernabé,
disputing the elections.92 On 14 January 1738, Muni, Bernabé, and thirty-one other Yaqui leaders
finally made their way to Sinaloa. They intended to flex their muscle. They came attired in battle
clothing, with drums beating and flutes blowing, and Muni at their head on horseback. It was a
dramatic scene, one that undoubtedly made an impression on the Spaniards. Muni and Bernabé
were not reinstated, but Peralta intimated that they were still governors, just temporarily
suspended from the exercise of their office. Peralta also convinced the Yaqui to return to their
villages, and somehow convinced them to apologize to Nápoli, who for his part immediately
questioned their sincerity.93 With these events the Yaqui officers had experienced a setback, but
they did not give up. Most importantly, these Yaqui were exercising their customary rights as
elected officers, airing their grievances against infringements by Jesuits and their allied Yaqui in
crown-sanctioned electoral institutions.
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Governor Huidobro finally returned from Baja California in June 1738. He had been gone
for twenty months, and his absence had complicated events in Sonora considerably. Huidobro
received a letter, purportedly from Gurrola and the three Jesuit replacement governors of Pótam,
Ráum, and Huírivis, with accusations against Muni, Bernabé, and fifteen others. They accused
them of openly carrying arms, disobeying the captain general, stealing items from the churches,
not going to mass, and other offenses. The letter also claimed that Muni aspired to be captain
general of the Yaqui Nation, and that Bernabé intended to make himself the perpetual governor
of Huírivis. Upon further questioning of Nápoli, the new governors, and others, Huidobro
learned that the Yaqui had not even written the accusatory letters; the priests and some of the
coyotes living among the Yaqui had penned the statements. Huidobro’s first red flag was likely
that the letters were written in perfect Castilian, when Gurrola and Governors Marquina,
Turimea, and Buimea were all illiterate. On 21 July, Nápoli appeared before Huidobro. He
claimed that the Yaqui had been showing a clear pattern of insubordination for two years,
repeating the previous charges in the letters he had helped author. Nápoli was horrified to
witness Muni and Bernabé presenting themselves as gentlemen, or hombrearse, in his
presence.94 Muni had dared to go with Nápoli into the church with his hat on and had seated
himself as Nápoli’s equal at the padre’s mission dwelling. Muni did openly carried weapons and
dressed as a Spaniard. Nápoli went so far as to claim that Yaquis were worshiping Muni, and that
it was clear to him that Muni was possessed by the devil. Perhaps his most interesting accusation
was that when he had arrived at his assignment over the Yaqui villages, the Natives had told him
he would have to do what they wanted, they would not consent to a mayordomo or outsiders, and
they would name their own pages and other mission servants. Nápoli had clearly been caught in a
94
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lie, but he was still a fierce opponent with powerful allies.95 Even if his claims were exaggerated,
they demonstrate a clear sense of Yaqui political identity; the Yaqui intended to exercise their
own sovereignty in choosing not just town officials, but also church officers. This marked a
blatant display of political power on the part of the Yaquis, which transcended voting (though
this was a key Yaqui complaint). Nápoli’s accusations also illustrate how Muni and Bernabé, as
duly elected governors, expected even the priests to respect their authority and offices.
Huidobro held public meetings in which he listened to Yaqui complaints: they had been
forced to work on Jesuit mission lands for little or no pay, they had not been allowed to work in
the mines or elsewhere, they did not see any of the profits from their mission labor, which they
said all went to the unprofitable missions in Baja California, and they had often been subjected to
severe corporal punishment with little or no cause. It became clear that Governor Huidobro
favored the Yaqui side of the dispute. He decided that this was the perfect moment to read a
letter that had just conveniently arrived from the Viceroy, Archbishop Vizarrón, dating from
March 1737. It exonerated the Yaquis for the Pótam prison incident and invited Yaqui leaders to
Mexico City for a private audience.96 Support from the viceroy, a cleric himself, must have been
extremely troubling to the Jesuits. On 30 July, Huidobro accompanied Governors Marquina,
Turimea, and Buimea to see Nápoli. They resigned their posts, which was probably Huidobro’s
idea, and new elections were held at Pótam, Ráum, Huírivis, and Vícam. Huidobro likely saw
this as the best option, since the previous elections had been so heavily disputed. Yaquis were
purportedly happy with the results.97
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The accounts of Huidobro’s visit provide a fascinating window into the Yaqui electoral
process. This process was somewhat similar to those in place at the Rio Grande Pueblos, but also
distinctly Yaqui. At each Yaqui pueblo, a group of forty to fifty men met at the casa de
comunidad, where they presented around three candidates for governor. They then voted on the
three candidates. If there was a tie, they drew lots to determine a winner. The Jesuit was not shut
out of these proceedings, and could oppose their choice. When this happened, the captain of the
Villa de Sinaloa would select a replacement, always subject to the consent of the voters and the
Jesuit. After the governor was elected, they named lesser officials such as teniente, alcalde, topil,
alguacil, and others. It was a delicate balance that required the cooperation of Yaquis, Jesuits,
and Spanish officials.98 This window demonstrates that, at least in this particular moment in
Yaqui history, the electorate consisted of male elites. This is why the election at Ráum in 1736
had been so problematic; mainly women had voted, and it had been almost entirely under the
control of Nápoli. Such sham elections did not conform to Yaqui electoral ideals. What is more,
Muni and Bernabé forewent running for office in the elections overseen by Huidobro. Instead,
they attended to their most important mission: traveling to Mexico City to speak with the viceroy
and insure Yaqui electoral freedoms once and for all.
The Yaqui diplomatic mission to the capital of New Spain departed in October 1738. An
interpreter and five other Yaquis accompanied Muni and Bernabé.99 Their role transcended their
previous terms as governors of Ráum and Huírivis; they represented the political voice of the
Yaqui Nation. They desired to no longer be treated simply as children of the Jesuits and intended
to take their place as citizens of Spain. They stopped in Sinaloa, where Huidobro gave them
passports, and then traveled on to Mexico City. It was a long journey, and in their absence the
98
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situation worsened at home. Yaquis lacked reliable leadership. Jesuits persisted in their
mistreatment, and after a bad crop yield, they horded what food remained, selling to starving
Yaquis at inflated prices. Yaquis reached their breaking point and revolted in 1740. During that
time, though, the actions undertaken by Muni and Bernabé in the context of political leadership
by two former elected officials of the Yaqui República are quite remarkable. Certainly, Huidobro
was using the aggrieved Yaqui for his own political purposes. He disliked the Jesuits, thought
Yaquis should be politically and economically integrated, and saw the economic interests of
miners and vecinos as more important than the Jesuit mission enterprise. Still, his actions also
indicated at least some measure of sympathy for the Yaqui cause, and he was willing to put his
political career on the line in their behalf. He was eventually relieved of his position for his
handling of the Yaqui Revolt, and universally criticized by the Jesuits in the wake of the revolt.
It was at his urging that Muni and Bernabé made the long trip to the capital, and he respected
their office and status as Indian magistrates.
The Yaqui petition, which they presented to Viceroy Duque de la Conquista, and which
became widely distributed at the time, confirmed the Jesuits’ worst nightmares about the Yaqui,
their leaders, and their demands. The document presented the viceroy with a number of requests,
not least of which was that Muni and Bernabé have their names cleared (particularly for the
Potám prison incident), and their lands restored. But, more importantly, the document
demonstrated a political maturation on the part of the Yaqui; they desired to exercise their own
political rights and sovereignty as an Indian republic. They condemned Padre Nápoli and other
Jesuits for poor treatment of Yaquis, asked that Gurrola be replaced, that the coyotes brought in
by the Jesuits be expelled, that Yaquis be allowed to carry arms, that they be paid for their work
for the Jesuits, that the Padres not impede Yaquis from working in the nearby mines, and that
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their old Spanish ally, Don Miguel de Quiroz, be named their Protector. Their most important
political demand, number nine, was encapsulated in a single, brief phrase: “que se guardase
dicho auto, en quanto a la livertad de las elecciones” (That the before mentioned order be kept,
regarding freedom of elections).100 Among a litany of other complaints, this one speaks to the
Yaqui desire to self-govern, to have the final say in choosing their leaders, and in whose hands
ultimate political power at the local level would rest. Yaquis envisioned a república that followed
guidelines set by the Spaniards themselces, and this could happen only when Jesuit political
hegemony was broken.
The long-feared revolt raged while Muni and Bernabé were away in Mexico City.
Governor Huidobro, continually accused by the Jesuits of plotting with Yaquis to overthrow their
power, failed to act decisively and the revolt spread to neighboring Indian nations, where the
Mayos offered particularly fierce resistance. Viceroy Duque de la Conquista, who had conceded
to Yaqui demands, died in office in 1741, and his replacement, Viceroy Conde de Fuenclara,
grew impatient with Huidobro, eventually replacing him in 1741 with Sonora’s sargento mayor,
Captain Agustín de Vildósola, first as interim governor, and then on a permanent basis.
Vildósola was much more closely allied with the Jesuit fathers, and acted decisively to put down
the Yaqui Revolt. In addition, on 22 June 1741, after the events of 1740 had largely subsided,
and even though they had pushed for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, he had Muni and
Bernabé executed and then decapitated, sending their heads to all of the Yaqui villages as a
warning against further rebellions.101 Still, even with Huidobro’s removal and the executions of
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Muni and Bernabé, the Viceroy Conde de Fuenclara directly addressed two central Yaqui
demands: Jesuits were expressly forbidden to name or depose Yaqui governors; and coyotes,
lobos, and mulattos were expelled from the Yaqui pueblos.102 The importance of the actions of
the governors of Ráum and Huírivis, who at a particular moment in Yaqui history, labored
mightily to assert Yaqui sovereignty, and secure the right of Yaquis to elect their own officials
free of Jesuit or Spanish meddling, cannot be overstated. The Jesuits would never regain their
power and status in Sonora. Spain eventually expelled the order from the New World in 1767
after prolonged fears of disloyalty to the crown. Yaquis would maintain their fierce political
independence, fighting a number of wars against Spain and Mexico well into the twentieth
century, when many fled Sonora as political refugees, settling in what is today southern Arizona.
It was a steep price to pay for votes and sovereignty, but one that Yaquis were willing to pay.

Yaquis, Huidobro, and vecinos. Among other things, Ansaldo accused Huidobro “of not having
trusted the good Indians.” He also listed the Yaquis’ “false” accusations against the order, one of
which was “mistreating the Indians,” but did not include the denial of voting rights specifically.
In fact, he did not once mention Yaqui complaints of political meddling by Jesuits, and a Yaqui
desire for sovereignty and free elections as a major cause of Yaqui unrest. John D. Meredith,
“The Yaqui Rebellion of 1740: A Jesuit Account and its Implications,” 247, 243. Interestingly,
this was not Huidobro’s only confrontation with Jesuits during his tenure. He also had problems
with jurisdiction in Baja California at the same time. For example, when Huidobro and civil
officials fought with Jesuits over Aripes (who occupied the southern tip of Baja California)
accused of stealing church valuables, Huidobro wrote to the viceroy on October 26, 1738 that
unsanctioned Jesuit punishments needed to stop, “So that it be recognized in those dominions
who is the sovereign and whom they must obey.”
It also must be seen as at least a partial admission of wrongdoing that Padre Nápoli was
eventually expelled from the order sometime after the 1740 revolt (the preceding expulsion trial
is dated 1736, and the trial immediately after his is dated 1744). See MSS 867 CSWR Vol 41A
AGN CSWR– Historia – Legajo 295, Parte 1. In addition, the Yaqui Revolt was not a unified
effort on the part of Yaquis. For example, when dissident Yaquis attempted to enlist the help of
the village of Belén, they refused. In response, they stole Belén’s church ornaments and then
danced the matachín in front of the priest there while wearing the stolen church cloth and
vestments (Folsom, p. 146).
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The Incomplete Political Incorporation of Pimería Alta
The area identified as the far northern region of New Spain, which Herbert Eugene
Bolton referred to as the “rim of Christendom,” has, for millennia, been inhabited by numerous
Native peoples, prominent among whom are the various tribes collectively referred to as Piman
peoples. The Pimas, which include Pimas, Tohono O’odhams (Papagos), Akimel O’odham,
Sobaipuris, and others, inhabited a large territory that today falls within the States of Sonora,
Arizona, and California. Spaniards had various names for these groups, but generally
distinguished between Upper and Lower Pimas. They referred to the Upper Pima homeland as
Pimería Alta. In simplest terms, Pimas and Sobairpuris lived in far northern Sonora, while
Papagos, or desert Pimas, lived in the far northwest.103 The current section focuses mainly on
these three groups of Pimería Alta, to whom I will collectively refer as Pimas. In particular, I
refer to the villages of San Cayetano de Tumacácori, San Gabriel de Guevavi, and San Xavier
del Bac. Since the final decades of the seventeenth century, these Indigenous groups have gone
through a process of political, religious, and cultural incorporation, which Edward Spicer has
summarized in this manner:
Upper Pima history through the Jesuit period is a story of a people whose interest in and
demand for elements of Spanish culture was never fully satisfied. It contrasts with the
histories of the Opatas, Mayo-Yaquis, and Lower Pimas…The Upper Pimas…did not
divide sharply into pro-mission and anti-mission groups. As far as we can tell there was
throughout the Jesuit period a genuine demand for missionaries all through the Pima
country [although this demand was never fully satisfied].104
Scholar of the Papagos Bernard Fontana agreed with Spicer’s assessment, further stating, “For
three centuries Papagos have been encouraged directly…and indirectly… to become Spaniards,
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Mexicans, and Anglo-Americans. The results to date have been very uneven; the process
continues and perhaps always will.”105
In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Spanish Crown tasked the Society of
Jesus with bringing the various groups of Pimería Alta into the sphere of the Kingdom of Spain
and the Catholic Church. The indefatigable individual who spearheaded this directive to
Christianize and civilize the Upper Pimas was none other than the “padre on horseback,”
Eusebio Francisco Kino. From Kino’s arrival in Pimería Alta in 1687, through periods of Jesuit
and Franciscan missionization, and under the flags of Spain, Mexico, and the United States,
Pimas experienced varying levels of political incorporation, and saw the promise of Indian
voting largely unfulfilled, even though they, like the other indigenous peoples of northern New
Spain, were entitled to that right under the Spanish colonial legal system.106
Father Kino established his headquarters in Pimería Alta near the Pima village of Cosari,
founding the Mission Nuestra Señora de los Dolores on 13 March 1687. It was situated at a
strategic point on the San Miguel River of northern Sonora, and a number of Pimas lived in the
vicinity. An important headman by the name of Coxi lived there. Coxi held a considerable
amount of sway among Pimas of the region.107 Kino followed the tried and true method of
befriending and converting the headman, baptizing Coxi, his wife, and more than forty other
adults and children on 31 July 1687. Kino related that he was received very well by all of the
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Indians in his early encounters at Dolores and the outlying areas: “In all places they received
with love the Word of God for the sake of their eternal salvation.”108
After a few years of ministering to the Pimas of northern Sonora from his base of
operations at Dolores, Kino embarked on many expeditions to the Indians of today’s southern
Arizona, in the land “más allá.”109 My intent here is not to narrate Kino’s countless interactions
with Upper Pimas, nor even necessarily to trace his steady progress into this far northern region.
Instead, I will highlight actions taken by Kino and those who followed, and how these actions
established a pattern of political interaction between Upper Pimas in Southern Arizona and
Spanish government and church officials. In a 1691 journey with travel companion Father
Visitor Juan María Salvatierra110 designed to assess the feasibility of missions to the Pimas and
Sobaipuris, Kino’s party visited the villages of San Cayetano de Tumacácori and San Gabriel de
Guevavi and met with Indian representatives from San Xavier del Bac. Kino reported that the
Indians asked him to come to visit them at his earliest convenience. The padres delivered the
customary orations on Catholic theology, and baptized several individuals, including children.
The Spanish representatives distributed gifts and promised that priests would come in the future
to live in their villages. They also began the process of political incorporation that took place in
so many Indian-Spanish encounters before and after. They identified Native leaders, conferring
the titles of gobernador, alcalde, and mador (herald). They distributed varas de justicia as
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symbols of Native leaders’ power and responsibilities in the new Spanish order, and informed
the Pima that they were now subjects of His Most Catholic Majesty, King Charles II of Spain.111
As large as Kino looms in the history of Spanish-Pima interactions in Arizona, it is, not
surprisingly, Kino’s military escort on many of his expeditions to the region in the late 1690s and
early 1700s who recorded the most information on the political implications of these early
encounters. Though Kino preferred to travel without a military escort, we are fortunate that
Captain Juan Mateo Manje, the Lieutenant Alcalde Mayor of Sonora, escorted him on nine major
trips of discovery and exploration, which covered thousands of miles and interactions with
thousands of Native peoples. Kino rarely wrote of Indian civil government in any detail, but
Manje had a keen eye for such issues. His narrations frequently contain descriptions of meetings
in which he distributed varas de justicia all over Pimería Alta. But more importantly, Manje
often commented on his attempted explanations to Indian leaders of the meaning of such titles
and power. Manje’s comments illustrate that these Spaniards firmly believed in the significance
of the staffs and titles, even if they completely missed the irony of what they were doing. For
example, Manje related a February 1694 encounter at the village of Caborca of the Soba Nation,
located on the Río Altar in northern Sonora, in which “We gave them [the Indian officials] staffs
of justice showing them how to govern their people and to take an interest in the public welfare.”
Just what did he think Indigenous rulers had been doing before the Jesuits and soldiers came?
Manje also narrates the ideal scenario in which Native rulers and their people came under
Spanish dominion. He described Chief Soba of said Soba Nation, who lived directly south of the
Papagos, as a “vigorous, strong and valiant Indian…[who, along with his people] heard the Word
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of God and His Sacred Law and submitted to His Royal Majesty…[and thanks to his conversion
and leadership], in a short time this nation was subdued…and indicated their willingness to serve
God and to become loyal subjects of His Majesty.”112
By late 1697, Manje and Kino were ready to travel north to the Sobaipuris of Southern
Arizona. They brought gifts with them, for “Benevolence is the only thing with which you can
attract those Indians.” At the villages of Busac and Tubo, they conferred varas de justicia, “so
they may enter into politics and government.” Again, they must have believed that Indian leaders
had no concept of leading and governing their people, and that they were there to introduce them
to the world of politicking. The party traveled a loop through Sobaipuri and Pima territory,
visiting numerous villages including Bac, Tumacácori, and Guevavi, all the while observing the
conditions of the villages, noting the growth of horse and cattle herds that Kino had brought on
previous visits, and commenting on the fervent desire of these Natives to have their own resident
priests. Manje saw these many expeditions as a means to establish bases from which many more
Indian nations to the north could eventually be incorporated into the Spanish body politic, since
they were “ripe to be initiated into the science of government and politics.”113
What Manje, Kino, and Spanish church and civil officials must surely have understood
was that such initiation into the kingdom’s political realm required a constant Spanish presence
at or near Indian towns in the form of missionaries. In some instances, they quickly established
these missions, while in other areas they were years in coming. Kino constantly demanded more
help—more Jesuits to minister to Pimería Alta—with mixed results. Church and secular officials
had good reason for their trepidation. Despite Kino’s assertion that he was always well received
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and the Indians’ desire for resident fathers, things did not always go smoothly. In some cases
Spanish attempts at political incorporation were at the root of the problem. For example, in
October1694, after much lobbying from Kino, Jesuits established a Soba mission at La
Concepción de Nuestra Señora del Caborca and assigned Father Francisco Javier Saeta to serve
there. Saeta was young and ambitious, but his mission was beset with problems from the
beginning, including the father’s own physical difficulty with the harsh environment. Less than
six months later on 2 April 1695, Saeta met a violent death at the hands of Sobas from nearby
villages. What is fascinating is that, according to Kino, the ringleaders were none other than the
Native civil leaders of the neighboring town of San Antonio de Oquitoa. As Kino narrated the
episode, when Father Visitor Salvatierra had gone to Oquitoa in 1690, he had promised to
provide a priest for the town. The Oquitoans waited patiently for a number of years, but when
Father Saeta was assigned to Caborca instead of their own town, their patience was at an end.
Jealous of both the spiritual benefits and the “inner and outer clothing, cattle, sheep and goats,
horses, mules, a farm, cow-hands, pack-trains and drivers” a resident priest would bring, many
from Oquitoa left their town and went to live at Caborca, “leaving the [Indian civil] officials
almost alone, etc., with all their dissatisfactions and other grievances.” The Acalde of Oquitoa,
with fifty to sixty followers from the surrounding area, went to Caborca and shot Saeta with
arrows and clubbed the father, while “the Captain and Governor of [Caborca] responded
immediately…[but] were defenseless…so they turned and fled in fear with all of the people of
the pueblo, the officials, etc.”114 Kino placed the blame squarely on Oquitoa’s appointed Indian
officials, who were jealous of Caborca’s new material benefits and their own lack of power when
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town residents moved away. These were unintended consequences of both resident priests and
imposed civil government in Pimería Alta.
The Sobaipuri missions in southern Arizona were slow in coming as well. Kino made
periodic visits during the 1690s, and even recorded the appointment of two new governors in
1698 at Guevavi and Los Reyes: “Two Governor’s batons of authority were presented; one to the
Governor of Guevavi and one to the Governor of Los Reyes, in place of those of the two
Governors who had died in the previous months.”115 What effect these appointments of Native
governors actually had on the Sobaipuri towns is impossible to know, but when Kino and others
visited, they met with Native officials at many villages, and as noted in the above example, even
replaced those who had died or left office for some reason. But, an actual functioning Indigenous
town government in the Spanish model, with Spanish oversight, required resident priests.
Finally, in 1701, Jesuits were assigned to the far north of Pimería Alta. Father Valenciano
Francisco Gonzalvo was selected for Bac, while Father Juan de San Martín went to Guevavi.
Within a short time, both Gonzalvo and San Martín had left their posts due to illness.116 San
Martín had only lasted a few months at Guevavi, while Gonzalvo died in 1702 of the illness he
contracted at Bac.117 It would be another thirty years before any fathers would again take up
residence at the Sobaipuri towns.
Finally, in 1730, the viceroy gave instructions for missionaries in Pimería Alta to once
again proceed to the far northern Pima missions: “For the conversion of those heathen Indians to
our holy Catholic Faith and their education, three missions are to be erected and planted in
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northern Pimería Alta and entrusted to three religious of the Sacred Company of Jesus.” The
towns of Bac, Guevavi, and Santa María Saomca were chosen, and missionaries arrived in the
spring of 1732.118 This began the first period of extended missionization among these Upper
Pimas. Many of these Jesuits who ministered at the Upper Pima missions loom large in the
chronicles of northern Sonora and southern Arizona, perhaps less so than Kino, but still with
recognizable names: Ignaz Pfefferkorn, Jacobo Sedelmayr, Joseph Och, and Juan Nentvig. These
missions still experienced a great deal of instability, and even periods without priests (at Bac, for
example, between 1692 to 1767, the padre’s house stood vacant four out of every five years on
average119), but their relatively sustained presence led to a more formal establishment of Indian
civil government in the Spanish town model. Whether or not these qualify as repúblicas de indios
is debatable; they were remote, under-populated, and constantly exposed to attacks from
Apaches.
What form or level of civil government did these Indian towns attain in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries under Spanish control? Borderlands scholar Cynthia Radding neatly
summarized the structure of Sonora’s Indian civil governments: “Mission pueblos replicated
Iberian town government in a colonial setting through the election of Indian officers, who
received a cane of office and the titles of gobernador, alcalde, fiscal, topil and, for purposes of
religious instruction, of mador and temestián.”120 Papago expert Ruth Underhill similarly
summarizes the Pima town governments instituted by Kino in this way:
In the San Pedro valley, [Kino] gave many staves of “governors, justices and captains,”
and he frequently was guided on his trips by Indian “justices.” Just how universal the
system of appointment was, he does not say, but the complexity of organization probably
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depended on the size of the town since the “very great rancheria of Adid” received a
governor, chief fiscal and sheriff, while Anegam and Bitter Wells received only one cane
apiece…[Royal policy] provided that Indian officials should be elected every year in the
presence of the parish priest. But the Papago villages (except Bac) had no parish priest
and they soon relapsed into their traditional method of choosing an official by heredity
subject to the approval of the villagers, and holding office for life. The different villages,
in time, worked out slightly different methods [of selection].121
Like the Pueblos of New Mexico, each Pima village adapted the annual elections (which were
held much less frequently in many Pima towns), and officers often had a formal installation,
which included traveling to the provincial capital at Pitic (now Hermosillo), to be confirmed by
Spanish officials.122
Jesuit chroniclers who labored in the Pima missions left invaluable clues about civil
government and the electoral process in Pimería Alta. Other than the Natives themselves, whose
accounts we unfortunately do not have, these Jesuits were best equipped to comment on how
Indian town governments were instituted. Ignaz Pfefferkorn, who served at Guevavi from 1761–
63, summarized Indian town government in this way:
Certain Indian magistrates were put at the head of each village…Indians who were best
fitted for the position and who seemed also to be true and pious Christians were
appointed as magistrates. The first and most distinguished of these magistrates was the
govenaar.
His duty it was to pass judgment on disputes which occurred in the village, to see that the
laws were obeyed, and to punish transgressions according to their seriousness. However,
he was not permitted to punish anyone without the pastor’s knowledge and consent, lest
passion cause him to misuse his power.
The second in command bore the name of alcalde…The alcalde carried out the
governor’s orders and filled his office during the governor’s absence.123
Every community had also a fiscal…who was, so to speak, a summoner. He was obliged
to assemble the people when a community enterprise was to be undertaken or when a
general announcement was to be made…Similarly, he reported…misdeeds which he
discovered among the people…
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In each village there were also one or two…madores, who supervised the grown children
and also cared for the sick. This office was filled by Indians, who from their reputations
could be expected to be faithful, careful, and diligent.124
Father Pfefferkorn also refers to special clothing worn by Indian magistrates while performing
the duties of their office, such as scarlet shirts and pants with silver borders, a decorated hat
(which had so angered Father Nápoli), and their varas de justicia.125 But for all of his detail on
the magistrates and duties of office, he does not once use the word “elected.” There is no
mention of Indians choosing their own leaders; the Jesuits selected the officials.
Similarly, laboring in Pimería Alta in the 1750s and 1760s, Father Joseph Och affirmed
much of what Pfefferkorn stated, but went a step further in describing the selecting of town
officials:
The Indians’ actual superiors [magistrates] in the villages are mainly chosen by the
father, who knows them best, and then approved by the provincial governor. These Indian
magistrates may become somewhat conceited and consider themselves of the nobility or
as caciques; yet it lies in the father’s power, if they conduct themselves badly, to depose
them along with a public whipping, and reduce them to common folk. Others are then
elevated in the name of the King, and receive the staff of authority. Such a staff is often
fitted with a silver knob weighing a pound.126
And yet, despite such a blatant lack of real authority on the part of the Indian magistrates, and
apparently little say in the selection of these officials, Och asserts that “The Indians recognize the
King of Spain as their overlord, or much more; they believe he is the man who can give them
orders.”127
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Father Juan Nentvig, who also labored in Pimería Alta in the 1750s and 1760s, differed
from Pfefferkorn and Och in his 1764 account, observing that, “The governor is a native selected
by the inhabitants of the pueblo in the presence of the missionary who directs the inhabitants to
be sure that the elected man is one who leads a good life thus setting an example that all will
stimulate and spur them to be good.” His narrative stands out in that he actually referred to a
Native electoral process, and the governor as an “elected man.” He also wrote that the temastian,
or Native teacher of catechism, “also serves as scribe for the town council,” and that all of the
preceding was in line with directives from the viceroy. This is a rare mention of a town council,
or ayuntamiento, in Pimería Alta.128 Since Jesuits held a great deal of power in the establishment
of secular governments in the missions, it is possible that Nentvig allowed more political
autonomy to the Indians under his direct care. But, real electoral power in Indian hands certainly
seems to be the exception. Jesuit chroniclers and scholars generally agree that Jesuits selected
Indian magistrates in Pimería Alta; these were not free Indian elections. Even Kino, who
tirelessly wrote in behalf of Upper Pimas and lauded their good character, wrote, “The Indian
governors do not know how to obey the missionary fathers nor how to command their own
subjects. Their rather uncouth subjects, in turn, do not know how to obey the governors or
officers.”129 Even though he was referring to the early stages of missionization, it still bespeaks a
Jesuit and Spanish belief in the Indians’ inability to truly govern themselves. In a later letter from
1783, one Franciscan lamented that mission Indians on work assignments labored neither hard
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nor long, “but when and how they choose, since they are not the most obedient to their justicias
[who were in charge of assigning such work details].”130 Thus, Indian town officials voted into
office by the Indians themselves remained mostly an illusion in Pimería Alta from Kino to
Mexican independence. The whole purpose of Indian town government—to make Indians into
taxpaying Spanish citizens—must be seen as a failure, since Upper Pimas at Guevavi, Bac, and
Tumacácori were never politically incorporated. Bernard Fontana concludes, “In the case of the
Pimería Alta, neither the Jesuits nor the Franciscans who succeeded them were ever able to bring
the O’odham beyond the stage of conversion/reduction. The natives never became tax-paying
vassals of the crown nor did they ever have to pay ecclesiastical tithes.”131 Still, even though they
kept power to themselves, Kessell points out that “[The priests] tried to choose natives who
commanded respect of their brethren and who might have been headmen among them even in
their heathen state.”132 In the worst-case scenario the priests chose leaders at odds with their
people, while in the best possible outcome they selected traditional leaders respected by fellow
Pimas.
In 1767 Charles III expelled the Jesuits from the Spanish Empire and attempted to put
New Spain on course for missionary reform. In Kessell’s words, “the reformers tried to throw
out the traditional paternalism along with the Jesuits. They would grant the Indians civil rights
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and put mission economics in the hands of government agents,” thus hastening the political
incorporation of Upper Pimas and the secularization of their missions, which the Jesuits had
failed to accomplish. Franciscans replaced Jesuits in Pimería Alta, but they soon found their
missionary task nearly impossible without the carte blanche of the old system. They reverted to
the same form of paternalism within a short time, and the idealistic reform rhetoric that had
heralded the Jesuit expulsion gave way to several more decades of missionary control.
Franciscans continued to control Indian elections by selecting those Indians most disposed to
support the aims of the priests. Kessell summarizes the “election” of town officials in Pimería
Alta with this succinct passage:
The annual mission “election” was never intended to be free and open. The missionary
provided close supervision, seeing to it that indios ladinos, the most hispanicized of his
neophytes, were chosen. At Tumacácori cooperative Indians were elected over and over.
As mission justicias, they maintained order and assisted the Father in his relations with
the people. In turn they learned something of how civilized men governed themselves.
[Franciscan Antonio María Reyes wrote in 1772] “The missionaries must…teach and
make the justicias understand the obligation, love, and veneration they owe our beloved
Sovereign, and that in his name they must punish the bad in moderation and serve as
protectors of the good.”133
Writing in 1778 about annual elections at the Opata Pueblo of Nuestra Señora de la Asunción de
Arizpe in Sonora, an unidentified Spaniard recorded what an Indian election there looked like.
Although he was documenting Opata activities, it is safe to assume that the same applied to the
Indians of Guevavi, Tumacácori, and Bac:
The annual election of these officials should be in the community house by vote with the
assistance of the Spanish justice of the district. But ordinarily they yield to the
proposition which is made at the door of their house, and immediately that they are
admitted, he [the justice] places them in possession [of the office] without any other
formality then to inform those present that so and so are the officials.134
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The rhetoric of Indian self-government clearly remained empty for Upper Pimas in the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and into the nineteenth centuries.
This is not to say that the Indian officials in Pimería Alta did not frequently complete
important work for their people, even if they were merely selected by priests as opposed to being
voted into office. In many cases Upper Pima magistrates performed the same duties as their
Pueblo counterparts in New Mexico. In a positive example from the late Spanish era of Indian
justicias using their position on behalf of their people, Father Narciso Gutiérrez encouraged
Tumacácori’s justicias to travel to the administrative capital at Arizpe in 1806 to ask for a formal
grant of land for the Indians. The mission did not have a land grant. In fact, there was absolutely
no legal document stating Tumacácori’s boundaries, and vecino ranchers and others were
beginning to encroach upon Indian lands. By now the mission was a mix of Sobaipuris and
Papagos from the west. The priest told Tumacácori’s governor, a Papago named Juan Legarra,
and the other justicias, to petition for a formal land grant. The legal proceedings that ensued
continued from late 1806 into 1807. The Indians of Tumacácori won their land grant, and none
too soon as ranchers on all sides encroached more and more on their land. The justicias made
statements in court on behalf of their people, called witnesses, and generally handled all the
important parts of the case.135 This demonstrates that, even if they were selected by and acted
under the direction of a priest, Indian magistrates in southern Arizona still could play a very
important part in the affairs of their people and act in their behalf. But this was not true Indian
sovereignty, and Pimas lingered in a state of unrealized political freedom, while Pueblos, Hopis,
and Yaquis clearly controlled more of their own affairs.
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Conclusion
The history of Indian politics and voting in Arizona, illustrated through the examples of
Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas, is replete with the unfulfilled promise of Indian self-government and
voting. The plan to politically incorporate Indian peoples in Spain’s far northern region hinged
on efforts by Jesuits and Franciscans, and included civil authorities as well. The Spanish goal to
complete this incorporation within one to two decades was foolhardy. Jesuits, Franciscans, and
civil authorities in the region never proved willing to give up control over their Indian charges to
the degree that would allow for free and open voting and the exercise of Indian sovereignty.
Spaniards imposed a system of government in which Indian magistrates were often puppets of
cross and crown. Though the system was fraught with problems in New Mexico during the same
period, by comparison, New Mexico’s Indians enjoyed a greater degree of power in selecting
their governors and officials, and in directing the affairs of their Pueblos. Spaniards in New
Mexico, both civil and religious, were more willing to compromise, allowing Indians to decide
how village elections would proceed.
Some Indians in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands recognized their lack of political power
and engaged in armed revolt on several occasions (Lower Pimas in 1737, Yaquis, Mayos, and
others in 1740, Upper Pimas in 1751). This series of Sonoran uprisings has been characterized by
one scholar as motivated by “Pimas [who] were dissatisfied over certain abuses in the exercise of
civil authority.”136 Yaquis are unique among these groups. They revolted when Jesuits
disrespected and abused their elected civil officials and barred their right to vote. They, at least,
had internalized the Spanish system of town government to a large degree, and were willing to
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risk their lives when this system of civil governance was implemented incompletely when
outsiders infringed upon their legal rights to autonomy.
Spaniards implemented this system among Hopis and Pimas in a manner that can only be
characterized as incomplete. Far to the north, Hopis endured the arrival of Spanish civil and
religious representatives, followed by the establishment of Franciscan missions at Awatovi and
other villages. A system of civil government in the Iberian model would surely have
accompanied the missions. Yet, the very men who would have served as gobernadores and
alcaldes, working within a tenuous Hopi República, were murdered at Awatovi one fateful
morning in 1700, and whatever memory there was of Hispanicized Hopis wielding varas de
justicia died with them. Perhaps Miguel had surely met such a fate after accepting a village
governorship in the Spanish system. The image of Hopis killing other Hopis over power and
Christianity is one of the darkest illustrations of the dangers of colonialism, and how Spanish
efforts to incorporate Native peoples could result in unimaginably brutal consequences. For their
part, Pimas in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands experienced more than a century of
missionization. Yet in the end, they were never truly brought into the Spanish body politic. The
project to make Upper Pimas tax-paying Spanish citizens failed completely. Priests there proved
too unwilling to place control of Pima affairs squarely in Indian hands. For these reasons, the
history of Indian politics and Indian voting in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands is much more
disparate and varied than New Mexico’s dealings with Pueblo peoples. Still, both areas would
share in the further promise of secularization and expansion of civil rights that accompanied
Mexican independence during the pivotal first half of the nineteenth century.
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Chapter 3
THE RISE OF PUEBLO POWER IN THE MEXICAN PERIOD

From Spanish Twilight to Mexican Republic
The years from 1821, when Mexico formally gained its independence from Spain, to
1846, when United States Army forces began a war of conquest against the Republic of Mexico,
are remembered as politically, socially, and culturally chaotic for Mexicans of all races and
classes. For Indigenous peoples, that chaos did not simply begin with the Treaty of Córdoba in
1821, in which Spain formally recognized an independent Mexico, or even with Miguel Hidalgo
y Costilla’s “Grito de Dolores” in 1810, which called upon criollos (Mexicans of Spanish
descent born in the New World), mestizos, and Indians to throw off the Spanish yoke of
oppression. The roots of the profound changes that also came to engulf the Indians of New
Mexico are to be found in the latter half of the eighteenth century, culminating in the events of
the 1840s, when yet another colonial power forced its administration on the Indians of this
territory (as well as the Native peoples of Arizona, the subject of my next chapter). The Mexican
period in New Mexico would mark the final stage of colonial administration in the Hispanic
model, a model that agents of the United States would later drastically alter in favor of their own
vision. For Indians, this brief interlude was a period marked by the high ideals of independence,
racial equality, and opportunity promised by those who heralded in an independent Mexico. But
the reality was that New Mexico’s Indian peoples found Mexican promises as empty as those
offered by the Spaniards who had preceded them. Government officials in Mexico City and
provincial seats of power were far too preoccupied with the upheavals that accompanied
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independence to fully implement the reforms intended to bring political and social equality to
Indians.
Repúblicas de indios were part of a larger effort by viceregal officials in the Spain’s New
World possessions to allow a relatively high amount of autonomous political power to local
officials. By the mid 1700s, Spanish residents of the Western Hemisphere had come to be ruled
by a political framework of consensus. This meant that, on the municipal level, many criollos,
mestizos, and Indians enjoyed political power. Part of this was due to the fact that political
positions from the mid-sixteenth century on—from corregidores and members of ayuntamientos
all the way up through the viceroy—were available for sale. The Spanish crown was in steep
decline after the seventeenth century, and the sale of positions was intended to raise funds for the
nearly bankrupt treasury. This practice provided ambitious criollos and mestizos the opportunity
for some upward mobility. Indian villages also continued to select their leaders in whichever
manner best suited each individual village—some through selection by traditional village elders,
others through an electoral process—and continued with the tradition of Indian political
autonomy within the repúblicas. But, after Habsburg rule of Spain came to a close in the early
1700s, Spain was in need of drastic reform. Felipe V of Spain initiated the Bourbon reforms,
which aimed to centralize government in Spain, restore the royal finances and depleted treasury,
and reorganize the military. These Bourbon rulers who came to power in the latter half of the
eighteenth century sought to implement reforms that would allow for better tax collection, more
efficient provincial government, and the development of regional economies.1 In addition, the
colonial government took greater fiscal control of Indian pueblos in 1766, which left Indian
rulers under greater oversight and with less autonomy in dispensing community funds and
1
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determining budgets.2 These developments were harbingers of attempts to phase out repúblicas
de indios, first by the Spanish crown, and then by the Mexican government.
In the midst of the crown’s desperate attempts to reform colonial administration in the
Americas, one crucial phenomenon of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was the
development of a distinct New World identity—an American identity—particularly among
criollos in Mexico. Criollos became more and more disillusioned with the lack of opportunities
for those who were not peninsulares (Spaniards born in Iberia), or gachupines as criollos came to
call them. This heightened sense of American identity brought a reactionary response by Spanish
rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who then attempted to reduce a politicallystrident New Spain to its earlier colonial status. For example, Spain replaced the sale of
provincial offices with regular paid officials chosen by the crown. This significantly diminished
the power of criollos.3 Naturally, there was a pushback from Mexico in particular as prominent
criollos and their supporters agitated for more home rule.
Events came to a head in the early nineteenth century when Napoleon Bonaparte’s
French armies invaded Iberia. King Charles IV abdicated in March 1808, and Napoleon replaced
him with his own brother, Joseph Bonaparte. In response, Spaniards rallied around Charles’s son,
Ferdinand VII. They called for him to be king, and a movement in support of Ferdinand became
synonymous with the movement against the Napoleonic presence in Spain. In addition, emerging
political players in the Americas saw the collapse of the Bourbon crown as the perfect
opportunity to push for the desired home rule.4 But, the movement for independence was still in
its earliest phase. In Mexico City and elsewhere in this hemisphere, peninsulares, criollos,
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mestizos, and Indians all watched anxiously to see how the Spanish struggle against Napoleon
would unfold.
The events following 1808 marked the beginning of a political revolution in the Americas
that would eventually result in changes to the way Pueblo Indians voted and participated in
politics. While they had initially rallied around Fernando VII, some criollos began to argue that
in the absence of a Spanish monarch, sovereignty reverted to the people and their institutions.
The ayuntamiento of Mexico City, and the other important provincial governing bodies, took a
leading role. With the remaining Spanish government hemmed in by the French at the port city
of Cádiz, in the southern Spanish region of Andalucía, the Spanish government called together a
national congress, or Cortes, to deliberate on political reforms that would result in a new
constitution for Spain and the restoration of Ferdinand to the throne. Furthermore, the
deliberations that led to the Constitution of 1812 would make Spain into a modern constitutional
democracy.5 From the outset, the Cortes faced a dilemma: in order to maintain unity in the face
of a protracted war in Iberia, support from overseas possessions was essential. But in order to
achieve this they would need to allow greater political participation from those residing outside
of the peninsula, both at the Cortes and in Spanish politics in general. Many peninsulares at the
Cortes of 1810–12 were terrified by the prospect of full political participation for the 15–16
million American and Philippine residents.6 These developments, and those that followed, which
eventually led to Mexican independence, would directly impact how Indians in New Mexico
voted and participated in political processes. New Mexico had its own representative at Cádiz.
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Don Pedro Bautista Pino traveled to Spain to participate in the Cortes, but by most accounts he
played a rather anonymous part in the proceedings.7
In Cádiz, the struggle between peninsulares and non-peninsulares over representation and
political participation played out over the coming year-and-a-half. The single Indian
representative at the Cortes that drew up the Spanish Constitution of 1812 was a Peruvian by the
name of Dionisio Inca Yupangui. Still, the American contingent pushed for political equality. A
leader of this contingent, José Mejía Lequerica delivered an impassioned statement on 2 October
1810, calling for the Cortes to “grant equality to all the free castes.” He even got down on his
knees in a bit of dramatic flair, reportedly drawing tears from the gallery. Unfortunately, the
peninsulares at the Cortes made up the majority of the delegates, with their seventy-five deputies
greatly outnumbering the thirty American and Philippine deputies. They refused to grant full
political participation to all free men, in spite of the impassioned pleas uttered by nonpeninsulares.8
Iberians put up particularly stiff resistance to the proposal for Indian political rights. A
statement was read on 11 September 1811, declaring that more than two hundred years of efforts
to Christianize and civilize Indians had accomplished little, since Indians were of an inferior
nature. They simply were not fit for self-government. This statement, called the Representación
del Consulado de México, read:
[The Indian] is endowed with a laziness and languor….He never moves unless hunger or
vice drive him. Congenitally stupid, without either innovative talent or strength of
thought, he despises both the arts and work; they are not necessary to his way of life. He
is a drunkard by nature….Sensual because of lascivious thoughts and bereft of chaste
ideas about physical closeness, modesty or incest, he takes his fleeting pleasures with the
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woman closest at hand. As careless as he is insensitive to religious truths…, and lacking
love for his fellow-creatures, he only avoids those crimes which will bring him
immediate punishment.
American representatives were so outraged they even attempted to leave the proceedings, but the
president of the Cortes ordered the guards to bar their exit.9 The peninsular desire to exclude
Indians from political representation proved impossible, since the nominal freedom and equality
of Indians had already been too firmly established in the Laws of the Indies to pursue this course.
Instead, peninsulares turned to Spanish Americans of African descent, both free and enslaved, as
their targets of exclusion. Those of African ancestry, known collectively as castas, proved easier
to marginalize than Indians and mestizos. On 15 October 1810, the Americans presented a list of
eleven demands, the most important of which called for equal representation between Spain and
its overseas possessions. The language of this list called for representation for “natives derived
from both hemispheres, Spaniards as well as Indians, and the children of both.”10 Peninsulares
simply could not overlook these demands while still seeking the loyalty and support of criolloes,
mestizos, and Indians, which they desperately needed.
In the end, the Constitution of 1812 represented a compromise between American
demands and peninsular fears. Article 5 states, “Of those who are Spaniards, and lawfully
considered as such: 1. All free-men, born and bred up in the Spanish dominions, and their sons.”
This meant Indians were considered Spaniards under the law. Furthermore, Article 18 grants
citizenship to “Those who, by both lines, are of Spanish parents, of either hemisphere, and have
resided ten years in some village of the Spanish dominions.” Article 23 states that “those who are
citizens can obtain municipal employments; and elect for them, in the cases pointed out by
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law.”11 The constitution allowed all areas of the Spanish dominion with 1,000 or more
inhabitants to establish ayuntamientos, with significantly expanded political participation. For
purposes of representation, one deputy to the Cortes was granted for every 70,000 inhabitants.
But, the Cádiz Constitution left out all of the castas. Still, on paper at least, the long fight for
Indian citizenship and voting rights in Spain had finally been resolved. The granting of the
franchise to all adult males (except Africans), without a literacy test or property requirement,
made Spain the most politically open society in the western world to date.12
With the establishment of the Constitution of 1812, the first popular elections in New
Spain were held in Mexico City in 1812–1813. These elections, designed to choose deputies to
participate in the Cortes, represented the first direct participation in Spanish national politics by
large sectors of the population, since the constitution had declared all Spaniards equal before the
law. It was an extremely complicated electoral process, but electoral juntas chose electors, who
then chose the deputies to the Cortes. Among the chosen electors were former Indian governors
of Mexico City’s Indian communities, such as Dionisio Cano y Moctezuma, who had been the
governor of the San Juan section of the city. Many were excluded from the elections, since the
constitution did not grant citizenship to castas and also suspended the voting rights of debtors,
domestic servants, the unemployed, and those who were under criminal indictment.13 Still, these
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elections represented an important step in the electoral process: the first Indian participation in
national politics.
Even with these constitutional concessions and the elections, peninsular Spain could not
avoid unrest in its overseas dominions. Criollos who favored home rule in Mexico, led by Father
Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, the priest of the mostly Indian parish of Dolores located in the central
Mexican state of Guanajuato, realized that their uprising would certainly fail unless it attracted
broad support. This meant that it could not be a movement of criollos alone; mestizos and
Indians had to take part.14 Hidalgo and others had been plotting a revolt for October of 1810.
When it was prematurely discovered in mid-September, Hidalgo and others made the decision to
carry out the revolt immediately, much like the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680. What
happened next is steeped in legend, and it is impossible to know what Hidalgo said when he
reportedly called his parishioners, many of them Indians, to join the revolt.15 The popular
retelling of what became known as the “Grito de Dolores” has a distinctly Indian feel. In the
most common version of the Grito, Father Hidalgo states:
My Children: a new dispensation comes to us today. Will you receive it? Will you free
yourselves? Will you recover the lands stolen three hundred years ago from your
forefathers by the hated Spaniards? We must act at once….Will you not defend your
religion and your rights as true patriots? Long live our Lady of Guadalupe! Death to bad
government! Death to the gachupines [another word for peninsulares]!
Hidalgo embraced la Virgen de Guadalupe as a symbol of the revolt. This appealed to Indians, as
the Virgen de Guadalupe was an indigenous representation of the Virgin Mary.16 In addition,
Hidalgo called for an end to tribute, which disproportionately burdened Indians. The propaganda

14

Michael C. Meyer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, The Course of Mexican History,
Sixth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 127.
15
Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1966), 118–119, 121.
16
Meyer et al., The Course of Mexican History, 276.

151
of the early movement for Mexican independence was aimed at criollos, mestizos, and Indians.
Printed materials were popular with literate white Mexicans, while slogans, songs, and banners
prevailed among Indians and mestizos.17 Thus, while the Cortes in Spain debated citizenship for
people of color in Mexico and elsewhere, Father Hidalgo carried out an independence movement
that called upon Indians specifically to expel the colonizers and reclaim their lands. The
movements were simultaneous: on the one hand, Spain reluctantly granted citizenship and voting
rights to all non-African Spaniards, while Father Hidalgo called upon Indians to unite in his
struggle to cast off corrupt Spanish government.
As the independence movement gained traction in the 1810s, culminating in a free and
independent Mexico in 1821, it maintained the rhetoric of racial equality and rights for mestizos
and Indians. General Augustín de Iturbide, who inherited Hidalgo’s mantle in the years
following the priest’s capture and execution, championed the Plan de Iguala, independent
Mexico’s first governing document. At its core, the Plan de Iguala was a conservative attempt to
balance the interests of the Church, the army, and the new nation. It proposed a constitutional
monarchy, and still proposed that Fernando VII come to Mexico to rule as emperor. When
Mexican forces finally defeated royalist armies and seized Mexico City, the newly-arrived
Spanish Jefe Politico Superior (essentially the equivalent of viceroy), Juan O’Donojú, signed the
Treaty of Córdoba on 24 August 1821, thereby accepting the Plan of Iguala and recognizing
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Mexican independence.18 The Plan de Iguala, so important in the annals of Mexican
constitutional history, called for the so-called Tres Garantías (Three Guarantees): Catholicism,
Union, and Independence. The ideology of equality is clear from the preamble:
When I speak of Americans, I speak not only of those persons born in America, but of the
Europeans, Africans, and Asians who reside here. May they all have the good grace to
hear me!…For three hundred years…Spain educated and aggrandized [North America],
forming its opulent cities, its beautiful villages, its remote provinces and kingdoms…a
general union between Europeans, Americans, and Indians, is the only solid base upon
which our common happiness can rest.
For the status and rights of Indians, the most important element of the Plan was Article 12: “All
of the inhabitants of that Empire, with no considerations except those of merit and virtue, are
citizens qualified to accept any employment.”19 With this action, Mexico continued the trend
toward racial equality, begun in the last years under Spain, except that even Mexicans of African
descent were full citizens. But, it remained to be seen how these developments would affect the
Indians of New Mexico.
Returning to the 1810s, in November of 1812, in addition to granting citizenship and
voting rights to Indians and mestizos, Spain also abolished personal servitude by Indians and
gave them control of communal lands in order to encourage agriculture, industry, and population
growth. But the biggest reform measure of the new constitution was its establishment of
ayuntamientos in all towns with more than 1,000 residents. This change marked the virtual
elimination of repúblicas de indios. Constitutional ayuntamientos lumped Spaniards, mestizos,
and Indians together in a single voting body, thereby replacing the traditional cabildos and town
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governments of the repúblicas. Indians were no longer to vote for leaders solely of their own
race. In larger urban areas with Indian neighborhoods, they had traditionally elected their own
town governments. But now, these Indians were swallowed up in the larger urban population.
Many Indians grew disillusioned, believing their participation in the new ayuntamiento system
was useless. In large villages with multiracial populations, Indians had essentially lost their
special status. Circulars eminated from Mexico City that repúblicas de indios would be closed
down with no more local elections beyond those for the new ayuntamientos.20
But it proved extremely difficult to completely eliminate the repúblicas, and in many
areas they persisted. Even though they had been legally abolished, in rural areas populated
almost solely by Indians, residents continued to elect Indian town governors and officials. Some
of these areas had Indian populations as high as 70–90 percent. In such places, systems that
looked a lot like repúblicas simply continued. Depending on the proportion of Indians to nonIndians, there were three possibilities for the compositions of town councils: ayuntamientos or
cabildos without a single Indian, those with some, and those that were completely Indian.21 The
latter was certainly the case in New Mexico, where Pueblo Indians lived in their own villages,
sometimes removed from Spanish centers of population. Indian elections of town officials in the
Pueblos persisted into the Mexican period. By contrast, the Republic of Mexico continued the
trend of eliminating special Indian status, which began in the final years of the Spanish colonial
period.
In many ways the developments of the previous decades seemed far away to New
Mexico’s Indian and Mexican population. New Mexico remained one of the most remote
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territories in the Spanish Empire. During the twilight of its power in the Americas, Spain
struggled simultaneously to liberalize and tighten its hold on New World colonies. Despite living
in an independent Mexico with no legal distinctions between Indians and non-Indians, life went
on as it had for New Mexico’s Indians. New Mexicans had not taken an active part in the
independence movement, adopting a “wait and see” attitude. Word of Iturbide’s victory arrived
relatively late, with a mounted courier bringing the news to the Palace of the Governors on 26
December 1821. The courier presented a circular demanding that New Mexico Governor
Facundo Melgares and other officials officially swear their allegiance to the new Mexican nation.
A celebration followed on 31 December, hailing the Tres Garantías.22 It was a relatively somber
affair. New Mexicans held a second celebration on 6 January 1822. This time, they partied into
the wee hours of the morning, and for several days straight. Governor Melgares later wrote an
account of the January festivities for Mexico’s official state newspaper, the Gaceta Imperial. His
description demonstrates that Pueblo Indians participated in the ushering in of a new national
government. Melgares wrote:
Ending the parade which terminated at the main church of the parish, the crowd, which in
spite of the severe inclemency, was very large, and moved to the main plaza: awaiting
them was a magnificent dance, [performed] by the natives of the Pueblo of San Diego de
Tesuque which lasted until one o’clock in the afternoon, and after it ended, the
participants divided up to [go to] the various public games which had been set up around
the plaza.23
An Anglo-American also witnessed the day’s celebration. General Thomas James, a soldier and
frontiersman, was sent from St. Louis in 1821 to open up trade with Mexico. He found himself in
Santa Fe in late 1821 and early 1822, and wrote about what he observed. He was clearly biased
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against Mexicans, asserting that they “abandoned themselves to the most reckless dissipation and
profligacy,” but he also referenced Pueblo Indian participation in the celebration of the new
national political order:
[A] large company of men and women from San Felipe, an Indian town forty miles south
of Santa Fe, marched into the city, displaying the best formed persons I had yet seen in
the country….The Indian company danced very gracefully upon the public square to the
sound of a drum and the singing of the older members of their band…About the same
time the Peccas [sic, Pecos] Indians came into the city, dressed in skins of bulls and
bears.
Interestingly, James also makes a few comments about New Mexico Indians’ fitness for selfgovernment: “I saw enough during this five days revelry to convince me that the republicans of
New Mexico were unfit to govern themselves or anybody else. [But] the Indians acted with more
moderation and reason in their rejoicing than the Spaniards.” He also wrote, referring not just to
Pueblos, but to Utes and Navajos, all of whom he referred to as “Mexican Indians,” were
“generally far in advance of the Spaniards around them, in all the arts of civilized life as well as
the virtues that give value to national character.”24 This was clearly an attempt to discredit New
Mexico’s Hispano population, whose land a U.S. Army officer and other American expansionists
had their eye on, even at this early date. Still, it is noteworthy that more than one source
mentions an Indian presence at the Santa Fe festivities. That more Indians did not participate
may be due to a few reasons: disinterest, trepidation, or perhaps the most plausible, an
unwillingness to travel the long distances to the capital in the dead of winter.
It is extremely difficult to determine how Indians might have viewed these political
changes based solely on brief accounts by non-Natives of the festivities accompanying Mexican
24
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independence. A significant hemispheric geopolitical shift, Mexican independence had
repercussions that continue to reverberate to the present, but what did it mean for Indians? David
Weber, writing about the events of early 1822, concluded, “the reaction [to Mexican
independence] of Pueblo Indians [cannot] be assessed. Although [they] participated in the
Independence festivities, there is no way of knowing what meaning it held for them.”25 Still,
these succinct asides by Melgares and James are significant because they show that Indians at
least took some active part in celebrating Mexican independence in New Mexico. It remained to
be seen what form their political participation in Mexican national politics would take, but their
presence demonstrates at least a passing interest in these developments.

New Mexico’s Indians in the New Republic
That some of New Mexico’s Native peoples participated in the ringing in of an
independent Mexico is without question. But, just how the high ideals of the new Republic of
Mexico filtered down to the Indian villages is an entirely different matter. The most important
change was that Indians were now unquestionably Mexican citizens. This citizenship should
have brought the right to vote and hold office. But, potential changes in civil rights appear to
have been rather slow in coming. Renowned Acoma expert Ward Minge describes the
changeover from colony to independent nation for the Pueblos in the following manner:
On September 16, 1821, Mexico won her independence from Spain, a political change of
some magnitude for America in general, but one so distant that the Ácomas would not be
affected by it. Over the years the pueblos’ mode of living did not change perceptibly.
Mexican authorities accepted the agrarian and peaceful Indians as citizens and with a few
changes to the old Spanish laws, their life went on as before. They continued farming,
hunting, and grazing their own lands. Likewise, there were no apparent changes in
administrative procedures when Mexicans took control of New Mexico in 1821. If there
25
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were changes which affected Pueblo Indians, other than those of citizenship and national
loyalty, they went unrecorded.26
Though referring specifically to Acoma Pueblo in the beginning of this passage, he expands his
assertion to include all Pueblo Indians. His point is clear: though Indians had become citizens of
Mexico, their life did not perceptibly change after 1821.27 As Minge points out, much of our lack
of knowledge regarding changes during the Mexican era, or even how they viewed the republic,
is due to an absence of Indian sources. As such, the only way to make sense of these
developments is to turn again to the documents of the colonizers. Decrees issued during the years
leading up to 1821 illustrate that New Mexico’s Spanish authorities received directives from the
crown regarding the protection of Indian civil liberties. For example, one decree in the name of
Alejo García Conde, writing as “Governador Comandante General y Gefe Superior Politico” of
New Spain (the office which replaced that of viceroy in the final years of Spanish rule), reiterates
the civil rights of Indians throughout New Spain. Conde calls attention to the actions taken in the
Cortes, and states that he “wants to avoid any doubt” about the question of the status of Indians.
The decree contains eight articles, among them that personal servitude by Indians be eliminated,
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that opportunities for Indians to attend religious colleges be provided, that communal work such
as the rebuilding of public houses, road construction, and building of bridges be distributed
among Indians and vecinos of all classes, and that land be given to Indians who are married or
over the age of twenty-five.28
But, we must be careful not to overstate the attention paid to New Mexico’s Indians by
New Mexico officials at this time. When Don Pedro Bautista Pino, New Mexico’s deputy to the
Cortes in the 1810s, for example, received instruction from his superiors at home, none of these
instructions dealt specifically with Indians.29 In his classic Exposition on the Province of New
Mexico, prepared for royal officials in Spain, Pino points to the lack of ayuntamientos in New
Mexico, thus necessitating an alternative electoral system for choosing their deputy.30 Most
interestingly, Pino’s only references to New Mexico’s Indians states: “Spaniards and pure
Indians (that are hardly distinguishable from ourselves) are the ones who make up the total of
[New Mexico’s] 40,000 inhabitants,” and “New Mexico counts 40 thousand [persons], all
citizens.”31 In Pino’s mind, and he must be seen as representing the opinion of New Mexico’s
Hispano leaders, any special status of Indians was a moot point. One can see in his statements
the roots of the pervasive myth of New Mexico’s peaceful race relations. He and others sought to
ignore or gloss over challenges faced by Indians. By flatly stating that Indians were
indistinguishable from Hispanos, and that all were equal citizens, he asserted that New Mexico
28
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had succeeded in the mission of civilizing and incorporating its Indians into the body politic.
This would have come as a surprise to Natives in the province.
Be that as it may, Indians during the period of Mexican independence found themselves
in the throes of frequent and complex political changes, which would, in turn, affect their
exercising the right to vote and to participate in politics beyond the village level. As stated in
chapter one, there was only one official cabildo or ayuntamineto in existence in New Mexico
before the first decades of the nineteenth century. It was naturally located in Santa Fe. However,
as also shown earlier, Indian Pueblos did have unofficial ayuntamientos where the duly
elected/selected civil officials worked in conjunction with village elders and religious leaders to
make important decisions on behalf of the Pueblos. But as Mark Simmons points out, New
Mexico’s only cabildo ceased function around 1725, with local civil authority resting in the
hands of appointed alcades mayores and their assistants through the first decade of the nineteenth
century. This began to change when the Cortes ordered that all towns with 1,000 or more
inhabitants were to have a constitutional ayuntamiento composed of alcaldes constitucionales,
regidores, a procurador-síndaco (attorney), and a secretary. Towns that did not possess the
requisite population, but were economically significant, could also select municipal councils.
During these elections, which were held in December of each year, citizens voted first for
electors, who would then select the magistrates. Alcaldes served for one year and regidores for
two. The only requirements for holding office were that a man be twenty-five years of age and
have resided in his town for five years. But in a strange turn of events, when Ferdinand was
restored to power after Napoleon’s defeat in 1814, he issued a July 20 order that did away with
the newly-established constitutional ayuntamientos and reestablished the old system of town
magistrates. He ordered all existing municipal councils dissolved. But, in the typical seesaw
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action of the late Spanish period and the era of Mexican independence, this decision was
reversed in 1820, thus restoring constitutional ayuntamientos in New Mexico’s towns. The Laws
of the Cortes and the Cádiz Constitution were once again formally recognized.32 These
ayuntamientos adopted local ordinances for the area under their jurisdiction, supervised local
elections, verified land exchanges, and were the court of first resort for both civil and criminal
cases.33
But what of Indian town government in New Mexico? The central question is not
necessarily whether the right to elections and self-government applied to Indians; it did. As
Spicer points out, the Indian program Mexico pursued was based on the fundamental pillar of
Indian citizenship. Adult Indian males were to take part in the election of officials, Indians could
hold public office, and Indian towns were to become participating units of larger municipalities,
municipalities that included Hispano towns as well. Furthermore, Indian citizenship meant the
dividing up of Indian communal lands and subjecting them to taxation. Officials pursued these
ends in Sonora during the Mexican period, but the government of New Mexico was far too weak
to fully enforce such policies.34 Pueblo lands were also under attack during the Mexican period.
In the early years of the Republic of Mexico, New Mexico’s leaders favored policies that
encouraged the privatization of communal Pueblo lands. Through tradition that had evolved over
the centuries, the Pueblos were entitled to “four square leagues” of land, or an area measuring
one league in all four cardinal directions from the central plaza of each Pueblo. When New
Mexico officials sought to privatize these lands in the 1820s, and to distribute the “surplus” lands
to Hispanos, the Pueblos fought back. At Pecos Pueblo, for example, a long dispute between
32
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Indians and Hispanos persisted until 1829. Initially, the administration of Governor Bartolomé
Baca favored the interests of land hungry Hispanos. But, following years of court battles, and the
administrations of several different governors, Pecos secured the rights to its league. As the New
Mexico territorial deputation stated, “since time immemorial the land in question was the
property of the Indians of Pecos.” The Mexican supreme court agreed with the territorial
deputation, leaving such cases of Pueblo land adjudication under the jurisdiction of New Mexico.
As a result, and often thanks to the actions of Pueblo civil officers, the Pueblo league survived
the period of Mexican privatization.35 Sonora’s Indian populations faced a much more dire
situation, as will be seen in the subsequent chapter.
Joe Sando provides an alternative account of Pueblo experiences during the Mexican
period. In his work, Pueblo Nations: Eight Centuries of Pueblo History, he points out that what
some have seen as a lack of meddling by Hispano officials in Pueblo affairs under independent
Mexico was actually quite the opposite: “Mexican influence in Indian life consisted largely of
confusing Indian land title, ignoring illegal taking of Pueblo land, and responding passively
when Indian boundaries were violated. Thus were twenty-five years under the rule of Mexico
spent.” Furthermore, Sando asserts that the Plan of Iguala and Mexican rhetoric of equal rights,
“soon became the right for all equally to take Pueblo land.” Alfonso Ortiz concurs with this
assertion, stating that even before Mexico gained its independence, “[Hispano] officials began to
argue that because of the long decline in the Pueblo population…the leagues were too large to be
needed or advantageously used by the Pueblo villages and should thus be opened up for Spanish
settlement.” Like Sando, he concludes that one of the net results of Mexican independence for
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New Mexico’s Pueblo peoples was “unauthorized encroachment upon Pueblo leagues and the
filing by non-Indians of a number of formal petitions requesting titles to communally held
Pueblo property.”36 Although the Pueblo league persisted during the Mexican period, as Ebright,
Hendricks, and Hughes contend, Sando and Ortiz, two of the foremost Pueblo scholars, do well
to remind us that it rather narrowly survived.
While Pueblo peoples fought to preserve their land grants, Mexico’s preoccupation with
other affairs resulted in the decline of the mission system. By the 1830s, only five missionaries
were still serving among New Mexico’s Pueblo peoples. According to Ortiz, the Pueblos
welcomed this ecclesiastical neglect, as they were now freer than at any other point in the
colonial era “to openly pursue the rich ceremonial life and ways of being that had secretly
sustained them through the long years of persecution and oppression.” Sando summarizes the
religious and cultural flowering of the Mexican period in this way: “The Pueblos received little
attention [under Mexico]. The ceremonies of the people were held, religion was strengthened, the
people planted their corn, harvested their crops, worried about the water supply, and maintained
traditional family life. Clan ties were strengthened, and the ancient customs began to take on new
life.”37 Armed with this more balanced perspective on what Mexican neglect meant to Pueblo
life, we can move on to Native participation in electoral processes and civil governance in the
Mexican era.
Regarding formal governing councils, Simmons asserts that by the time of Mexican
independence, most New Mexico towns, and even Indian Pueblos, had ayuntamientos. He also
states that changes to Spanish law from the 1810s through independence ended the “minority” of
36
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New Mexican Indians, and that they would thereafter be regarded as “Spaniards in all things,
exercising especially their rights to vote and stand as candidates for office.” He concludes
definitively: by late 1821, most of the Pueblos had installed formal municipal governments.38
Simmons employs a rather exclusive definition of municipal government—the Pueblos already
had municipal governments with their governors, lieutenant governors, and other officials. As
Lansing Bloom succinctly stated in his classic study of New Mexico under Mexican rule: “They
[Pueblo Indians] were nominally under the jurisdiction of the federal government as Mexican
citizens, but each pueblo had its own cacique and principales, and also its own ‘governor’ and
other civil officers for each year, who were named by the cacique and approved by the people.”39
Within their Hispano-influenced system of civil government, governors and other civil officers
would continue to carry on their most important work during the Mexican period—that of
protecting Pueblo land. But, it was still unknown how fully the Mexican ayuntamiento system
would be implemented.
Independent Mexico carried on the practice of constitutional ayuntamientos after it had
won independence. The assertion that most Pueblos had ayuntamientos by 1821 is difficult to
verify. For example, historian Daniel Tyler seconds Simmon’s assertion, stating, “Although
ayuntamientos (town councils) had been dissolved in the late colonial period in 1820 the King of
Spain was forced to restore the Constitution of 1812 and recall the Cortes. In so doing, the
ayuntamiento system was reestablished, and by 1821, most New Mexican towns and Indian
Pueblos had their own ayuntamientos.” But, Tyler further points to the problematic nature of
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determining just which Hispano towns and Indian Pueblos had ayuntaminetos during the
Mexican period:
Records of ayuntamiento activities are incomplete. Some collections were destroyed
during the Mexican War and subsequent uprisings, but the general carelessness of
officials in the Mexican and early territorial periods resulted in lost records. In some
places, records were not even kept because of the illiteracy of the officials, the high cost
of paper, or infrequent meetings. Although Governor Armijo listed sixteen ayuntamientos
in 1828, a few years later Antonio Barreiro counted only four and noted that the majority
of towns and pueblos were under the control of an alcalde.40
This meant that a few locations had ayuntamientos, while most had only an alcalde without a
proper governing council, which I will discuss later. Tyler also points to the obvious problems
facing poor, rural jurisdictions in Mexico. New Mexico was Mexico’s most remote province,
with a low population and isolated villages and towns. Compounded by the lack of paper for
proper recordkeeping, it is simply impossible to know whether or not many locales had
functioning ayuntamientos during the Mexican period. Even though he is a biased source, one
must not completely disregard Anglo-American trader Josiah Gregg’s comments about the
Pueblos of New Mexico: “Although they are famous for their hospitality and industry, they still
continue in the rudest state of ignorance, having neither books nor schools among them, as none
of their languages have been reduced to rules and very few of their children are ever taught in
Spanish.”41 Gregg clearly dehumanizes Pueblo Indians, repeating the age-old ignorant savage
trope, but it was certainly true that many Pueblo Indians were unschooled and could not speak
Spanish. Mexico hoped to teach a sense of civic duty in its schools, yet their establishment in
New Mexico was always a difficult proposition, especially among the Pueblos. Taking all of this
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into account, we must more critically examine Simmons’s and Tyler’s assertion that a majority
of New Mexico’s Pueblos had ayuntamientos by 1821.
Ayuntamientos were ephemeral institutions, and the question arises as to how many there
were in New Mexico at any given point during the Mexican era. Govorner Armijo put the
number at sixteen in 1828. Scarcely five years later, the administrador principal de correo (head
postal administrator) of Chihuahua, the location through which all of New Mexico’s mail was
delivered, listed the main cities, villas, Pueblos, missions, mines, ports of mark, presidios, plazas,
haciendas, ranchos, and ayuntamientos in the territory. He reported that there were
ayuntamientos only at Santa Fe, Abiquiú, Bado, Cochití, Belen, San Agustin de la Isleta, San
José de la Laguna, and Socorro, making eight in total. All of the locations listed as
ayuntamientos also received the designation of “Pueblo,” which in this case would mean
“town.”42 Cochití, Isleta, and Laguna were Indian Pueblos, while Abiquiú, Belen, and Socorro
did have many genízaro residents, but were not Indian Pueblos proper. Bado, or San Miguel del
Bado, was located near Pecos Pueblo, but Pecos was almost depopulated by this point. A report
completed by Antonio Narvona in 1829, and subsequently sent to the government office of the
Mexican Republic listed alcaldías (locations with alcaldes, but not necessarily ayuntamientos) at
thirty cities and towns. Among these, Indian Pueblos with alcaldes were: Tesuque, Pecos,
Cochití, Santo Domingo, Xemes, Zia, Santa Ana, Sandia, San Felipe, Isleta, Laguna, Acoma,
Zuñi, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Pojoaque, Nambé, San Juan, Taos, and Pecurís, for a total of
twetnty.43 These Pueblos had an alcalde, but not necessarily a formal ayuntamiento.
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Don Antonio Barreiro wrote a third account of New Mexico in 1832. Barreiro was an
attorney sent from Mexico to serve as asesor, or legal advisor, to New Mexico territorial
authorities. Barreiro, a relatively young and ambitious type, was elected New Mexico’s deputy to
the Mexican congress in 1833, and then re-elected in 1834. He also published New Mexico’s
first newspaper, El Crepúscolo de la Libertad. His short account, or Ojeada sobre Nuevo
Mexico, was published in Puebla in 1832.44 In Barreiro’s summary of New Mexico, he addresses,
among other things, the territory’s ayuntamientos. Barreiro includes a table that shows where
ayuntamientos existed in the early 1830s, and where there were only alcaldes, with no councils.
Furthermore, he states: “The illiteracy which prevails generally in this Territory causes these
bodies, in which the law has deposited a great part of the common happiness, to be null and
insignificant; so it will be evident that this, by no means the least of ills, is curable only by time
and by such protection as the government may give to education.”45 Barreiro thus blames the
absence of functioning ayuntamientos on the lack of literacy among New Mexico’s inhabitants.
He calls the condition of public education in the territory “distressing,” with schools at only
Santa Fé, San Miguel del Vado, Cañada, Taos, Albuquerque, and Belén.46 Problems of illiteracy
in ayuntamientos would certainly have affected the Pueblos, since there were no schools in most
towns at this time. More importantly, he lists only four ayuntamientos in New Mexico in 1832:
Santa Fe, Cañada, Taos, and Albuquerque. Cochití, Jemez, Sandia, San Juan, Isleta, and Laguna
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are listed as having a judge (alcalde) and attorney (procurador-síndaco).47 Barreiro appears to be
a reliable source. He was an attorney involved in the highest levels of government in New
Mexico, and he also served as a congressional deputy. He certainly was familiar with New
Mexico’s governing councils. How do we then account for the discrepancy between Simmon’s
assertion that most of New Mexico’s Pueblos had ayuntamientos by 1821, and Barreiro’s report
that none of them did in 1832? The number of Indian ayuntamientos certainly would have
fluctuated during the chaotic Mexican period, but to proceed from a majority in 1821 to none in
1832 seems strange. The answer is that formal ayuntamientos rarely existed at the Pueblos, nor
did Pueblos dominate ayuntamientos in municipalities where they made up the majority of the
population.
A number of factors would have impeded—or at least complicated—the establishment of
ayuntamientos in the Pueblos. It is clear that the governor system continued in the Pueblos after
Mexico became independent, and it still persists to the present. By 1821, the Pueblos already had
a functioning system of civil government in place. Within the framework of the governor system,
Pueblos chose civil leaders through an electoral process that did not follow Hispanic democratic
principles. The system functioned for the Pueblos and Spanish officials had allowed it, as did the
Mexican leadership after 1821. It is too simplistic to assume that the Pueblos simply accepted
ayuntamientos and implemented them wholesale. Since the governor system persisted, did it
coexist alongside the ayuntamiento structure? Did citizens of Pueblos where there were allegedly
functioning ayuntamientos elect their officers in the proscribed way with balloted votes and
tallies? Or did the village elders select regidores and other administrators as they had the
governors and officers? And what happened at Pueblos where there was only an alcalde and
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procurador-síndaco? Did their power exceed that of the governor and other officials, who had up
to that point been entrusted with overseeing the day-to-day affairs of the villages? All of these
questions force us to examine the existence of Pueblo ayuntamientos more carefully. On the one
hand, the governor system persisted throughout the Mexican era. Due to the lengthy persistence
of the governor system, and the relatively short lifespan of the formal ayuntamiento system
during the Mexican period, I am inclined to believe that formal ayuntamientos never attained a
place of prominence in Pueblo communities.
The fact that the documentary record for Mexican New Mexico refers to ayuntamientos
at locations such as Isleta, Jemez, Santa Clara, and Cochiti, is cause for some confusion.
References to ayuntamientos at such locations does not necessarily mean that said ayuntamientos
were Indian in nature, or even included Indian participation. An ayuntaimiento was, in theory,
the governing council for a geographical area with more than 1,000 residents, but that area could
include several towns or villages. Census figures for the Mexican period display a wide disparity
between Indians and Hispanos in a majority of jurisdictions. For example, a church census of
1821 divides the population in locations where religious are serving into categories of “Indians”
and “Spaniards and people of other classes.”48

Pueblo

Total Indian Population Total Hispano Population Total Population

Pecos

54

738

792

Tesuque

187

300

487

Nambé

231

61

292

48
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Pojoaque

93

286

379

San Juan

232

2482

2714

Picuris

320

1047

1367

Taos

753

1260

2013

Santa Clara

180

1205

1385

Cochití

339

359

698

San Felipe

310

408

718

Santa Anna

471

7

478

Zia

196

3

199

Xemes

330

534

864

Laguna

779

463

1242

Acoma

477

8

485

Zuñi

1597

0

1597

Isleta

511

2313

2824

Sandía

405

406

811

San Yldefonso

527

668

1195

Santo Domingo

726

261

987

Tab. 3.1 Indian and Hispano Population Figures in New Mexico, 182149
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Although closely matched in population in a few locations, and with Indians outnumbering
Hispanos in a handful of locations as well, the disparity between Indians and Hispanos at others
is not surprising, given Indigenous population decline under colonialism. Just one year prior to
this census, Governor Melgares reported a total Hispano population of 28,436, with the total
Indian population at 9,923.50 Even though Indians still outnumbered Hispanos in some
jurisdictions, they were greatly outnumbered in many others. In ayuntamientos representing
areas with large numbers of Hispano residents, it is entirely plausible that the Indian voice was
simply drowned out, or that Indians did not participate at all.
Take, for example, a report sent in 1832 to the Jefe Politico of New Mexico (the position
that replaced the governor for a time in New Mexico, but was essentially a change in name only)
and then forwarded to the Secretary of State in Mexico City. The report brings to light an
election dispute for the ayuntamiento of Isleta. This jurisdiction included the Pueblo of Isleta, but
it also included a number of other towns and villages nearby. In the detailed set of documents,
several individuals bring complaints against the alcalde, don José Chávez, who is described as an
“hombre rico.” Chávez was accused of manipulating the ayuntamiento elections for 1833 so that
individuals to his liking won positions of power.51 The documents provide insight into the
electoral process, clearly demonstrating that votes were cast by ballot, and that residents voted by
manzana, or neighborhood. In the complaint, it is alleged that Agustín Beitia, who was acting as
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president of the ayuntamiento, tore up the ballots when he did not like the results for manzanas
nine and ten. 52
On the surface, the report could be taken as proof of Pueblo participation in the electoral
process, since it refers specifically to the “pueblo de la Isleta.” But examined more critically, it
becomes clear that this is not a reference to the Indian Pueblo per se. First of all, there is the
matter of population referenced earlier. In 1821, the mission at Isleta served 511 Indians and
2,313 Hispanos.53 Indians were outnumbered nearly five to one in this jurisdiction. It would have
been very difficult for them to assert their political voice in the face of such numbers. Second,
part of the complaint references a lack of individuals able to read or write, and thus serve as
suitable voters.54 While many of the Hispanos in the Isleta electorate would have been unable to
read or write, this was more likely the case for the Indians of Isleta Pueblo. Third, although the
documents name the pueblo of Isleta, they reference locations outside of the Pueblo. For
example, the alcalde under complaint, José Chávez, is described as a “vecino de la plaza de los
Padillas.”55 Los Padillas is a neighborhood in Albuquerque’s South Valley, some 4.5 miles from
Isleta Pueblo. In searching for an Indian voice in this report, one finds none. This 1832–33
election dispute at Isleta was between vecinos of the pueblo of Isleta. This is a case of an
ayuntamiento in which Hispanos were firmly in control of the affairs of the council. If Indians
did participate, they did so as a vastly outnumbered minority and were possibly relegated to the
sidelines.
Frequent administrative changes in New Mexico under the Mexican regime further
complicate Indian participation in ayuntamiento elections and politics. The Mexican Constitution
52
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of 1824 demoted New Mexico from provincial to territorial status. The territory was divided into
two distritos (districts)—northern and southern—with these districts further subdivided into
partidos (subdistricts). Taos and San Ildefonso (not the Indian Pueblos, but the Hispano towns
near the Pueblos) were the northern partido capitals, while Albuquerque and Los Padillas were
the southern capitals.56 The Constitution of 1836 then changed the designations from provinces
to departments, and New Mexico was made a department. The departmental junta, or assembly,
was in Santa Fe, with the department divided into two districts, each governed by a prefecto
(prefect). The districts were again subdivided into two precincts each, or partidos, overseen by
subprefects. The northern district was the Río Arriba, while the southern district was the Río
Abajo, with Cochití Pueblo as the dividing line.57 The governor had broad executive powers, and
could suspend common councils in the districts, and was the arbiter of elections in case of
disputed results. He was the deciding vote in case of a tie in an election, and he could accept or
reject resignations of council members. He also responded to personal petitions from New
Mexico’s Hispanos, Indians, and religious officials, who recognized him as the ultimate arbiter
of justice. In spite of all of this, local politics were more “elective” under Mexico, since alcaldes
were elected and worked closely with their ayuntamientos, having been appointed under the
Spanish system. Under this system, the local political system played a greater role in the
administration of judicial matters, local economies, and land distribution.58 As Ward Minge
points out, under political reorganizations that took place in 1837, each Pueblo had a local judge,
who was frequently a member of the Pueblo. Still, all of these judges were the governor’s
appointees, and by 1844, “there were indications of gross incompetence and corruption among
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these local officials.” Further reform came in 1844, when Governor Mariano Martinez created
jueces de barrio (ward justices), with each Pueblo receiving a justice who was from among the
tribal membership.59
With population decline and frequent, complicated changes in political administration
during the decades of Mexican rule in New Mexico, it is understandably difficult to decipher the
extent to which Indians participated in systems of local politics. But even with these
complicating factors, there still was the distinct possibility of an all-Indian formal ayuntamiento.
One ayuntamiento election report from Pecos Pueblo seems to point to this type of town council.
Dated 3 January 1821, the short letter is addressed to Governor Facundo Melgarez and signed by
one Manuel Duranes; it is written in a barely legible hand with significant spelling errors. This
would not necessarily point to an Indian author, but the letter reads “Por parte ha ellos havere
mudado el ayuntamiento que continuaba en el pueblo de pecos los que ocupan el lugar por
elesion es el yaman guanima [sic] de alcalde y regidor el que yaman Rafael.” Essentially, the
author reported that for the ayuntamiento of Pecos Pueblo, those who lived there elected for
alcalde “he whom they call guanima,” and for councilman “he whom they call Rafael.”60 The
informal tone of the document, coupled with the use of first names only for the elected alcalde
and regidor, would seem to point to Indian officials for an Indian ayuntamiento. The fact that
there was an ayuntamiento at Pecos seemingly made up of Indian officials is somewhat
surprising, given the fact that Pecos had 54 Indians to 738 Hispanos in 1821.61 It is also possible
that Guanima and Rafael were Hispanos, but the previous clues in the document lead me to
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believe that it is referring to Indians. All of this points to the difficulty in deciphering where and
how ayuntamientos were established in New Mexico, and who sat on these councils.62
Without question, Indians appealed to their ayuntamientos for redress on many occasions.
There are numerous accounts in the documentary record of Indians appearing before their
ayuntamientos for help in matters large and small. In an example of Pueblo Indians going
through the channel of their ayuntamiento, one that almost seems trivial on the surface, Hispano
official Juan Armijo filed a formal complaint to the governor on behalf of the ayuntamiento for
the Indians of Cochití Pueblo “and the neighborhood.” In his complaint, he spoke of the priest at
the Pueblo mission saying mass without first ringing the bell, stating: “…on one hand it is true
that he says the mass on the Festival days, and even during the week, but he does so without
ringing the bells, as has been the custom, and for this cause they don’t hear it, and nobody goes
[to mass] for two months…he says the mass every day, but he says it to himself…he doesn’t wait
for anyone, and only he who hears it is the one who says it.”63 The episode borders on the
comical, but to those Indians who had converted to Catholicism, the actions of their Franciscan
threatened the welfare of their souls, since they were unable to receive one of the holy
sacraments. The actions of the priest were serious enough for these Indians to take their case to
the ayuntamiento, which then brought the complaint to the attention of higher authorities.64
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One intriguing episode took place at Laguna in 1830 in which the Natives of the Pueblo,
with Vicente Romero speaking on behalf of his fellow Lagunans, complained directly to the
governor of New Mexico about the actions of Alcalde Marcos Baca, and a vecino, Joaquin Pino.
In the complaint, the Indians express their sense of hopelessness after years of mistreatment by
Pino, who with the support of Alcalde Baca (Pino was also Baca’s grandfather-in-law), had
“intended to disturb our tranquility…[and] in the interest of exasperating us and getting us to
abandon, to cede, or renounce the small possessions [of land], which, although with enough
penury, give us moderately the necessary support and also are open so that we may be able to
have our few little animals on them.” They also claimed that “[Pino] has imposed fines, taken
animals, and despoiled as many as show up around those environs of the most value and
usefulness…these injuries received being much greater when under the protection of being
Alcalde, as [Pino also] has been several times.”65 Essentially, the Indians of the Pueblo took the
case directly to the governor of New Mexico, complaining against their highest local authority,
the alcalde, and his vecino ally. This is noteworthy because Laguna was one of those
jurisdictions with an Indian majority. In the 1821 mission census, Indians outnumbered Hispanos
779 to 463.66 Also, Laguna is one of the areas listed in the 1833 report as having an
ayuntamiento.67 The ayuntamiento would have been the court of first resort in this instance, but
perhaps it had come under vecino control and was not responsive to Indian needs. Furthermore,
the ayuntamiento was answerable to the alcalde, who, if we take the Indians at their word, clearly
total population for the alcaldía of 1746, only 372 of whom were Indians from the Pueblo. See
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did not have their best interests at heart. Whatever the particulars of the relationship between
Indians, ayuntamiento, and alcalde at Laguna, there was a broken link between the local elected
council and the Indians it was supposed to represent. Interestingly, Laguna oral history recalled
this dispute between Laguna Pueblo residents and Joaquin Pino, which lasted well into the
American territorial period. Former Laguna Governor Robert Anaya and Mrs. Walter K.
Marmon, interviewed in November 1968, stated, “They [The Pino’s] said they were granted the
land, but they never were; it was just a permit. But they needed a grant, and said it was a grant.
They were there until…say in the 1890s…and they vacated. They had very influential friends in
Santa Fe…who helped them hold onto the place. But finally when research was made, it was
found that their land was only a permit, and not a claim. The Pino’s.”68
The documentary record shows that some Pueblos disputed under which ayuntamiento’s
jurisdiction they fell. In the early 1820s, the Mexican government, under the principle of
privatizing “unused” Pueblo lands, issued the Río de Picurís grant to Hispanos from Santa Cruz
de la Cañada. Citizens of Picuris Pueblo strongly opposed the granting of this land to these
Hispanos, who claimed the “unused” land in order to expand their own agriculture and pasturage.
The Indans stated that the land in question from the new Río de Picurís grant was already in use
as part of their ejido to pasture and water their animals in the summer. What is interesting is that
the original Hispano petition for the grant, which was filed with the territorial deputation, was
referred to the ayuntamiento of Santa Cruz de la Cañada. In addition to arguing that they were
already using the land, the Picurans, along with some Hispano allies, asserted that the land was
under the jurisdiction of the ayuntamiento of Taos, not Santa Cruz. Unfortunately, things did not
end well for Picuris Pueblo, as the grant to the Hispanos was eventually upheld, and they found
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themselves completely surrounded by Hispano settlements and land within their league occupied
by outsiders. Hispanos who hastily moved onto the grant land were never evicted, as was nearly
always the case under Spain and Mexico.69 The case of Picuris Pueblo land during the Mexican
period demonstrates that issues of ayuntamiento jurisdiction were far from clear. The Picuris
response to the ayuntamiento of Santa Cruz de la Cañada’s claim that it had jurisdiction over the
Pueblo shows that Picuris had no part in this ayuntamiento. It is interesting that they claimed,
rather, to be under the jurisdiction of Taos. It is difficult to ascertain their level of participation, if
any, in the Taos ayuntamunto’s politics—the Pueblo had a small population that was clearly
overshadowed by large Hispano populations at Taos and the surrounding communities, and the
more prominent Taos Pueblo. Still, on this occasion Indians raised their voice in matters of
jurisdiction, showing that the ayuntamiento of Taos was at least responsive to their needs.
In a final, and most telling example, the ayuntamiento of Santa Clara included the Pueblo
of Santa Clara and a number of towns in the vicinity. A seemingly mundane document, reporting
the results of an ayuntamiento election on 4 December 1836, gives no mention of Indians or
anything of significance to Indian voting in this jurisdiction. Electors from among the
ayuntamiento members were selected, and that is the end of the document. Jose Miguel Naranjo,
president of the ayuntamiento, signed the report.70 This document only assumes significance
when coupled with another document dated 19 April 1837. In the document, the same Jose
Miguel Naranjo, and another man by the name of Marcos Tafoya, present a formal complaint to
the governor of New Mexico on behalf of Santa Clara Pueblo against Joaquin Castellana, a
member of the Pueblo. Castellana, according to Naranjo and Tafoya, fraudulently sold lands to
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three Hispanos. The lands he sold fell within the league of the Pueblo, and they state that there is
no evidence that the community consented to the sale. They ask that the land be returned to the
community and the guilty part punished “immediately.” This type of document concerning land
disputes between Hispanos and Pueblo Indians occurs frequently in both the Spanish and
Mexican Archives of New Mexico. What makes this particular complaint so important is that
Jose Miguel Naranjo and Marcos Tafoya identify themselves as representatives of Santa Clara
Pueblo speaking on behalf of the principal chiefs, but they also present themselves as “natives of
the pueblo of Santa Clara.”71 This means that Naranjo, who here represented his people in a land
dispute, also served the year prior as the president of the ayuntamiento of Santa Clara. This
jurisdiction included several Hispano communities. Even in 1821, Hispanos outnumbered Santa
Clarans 1205 to 180.72 In an ayuntamiento where Hispanos greatly outnumbered Natives, not
only was an Indian elected to the auntamiento, he also served as its president. This would appear
to be a clear example of an ayuntamiento in which Indians and Hispanos worked side by side,
and Indians, although a small minority, had a voice and some positions of power.
Herein lies definitive proof that in at least one of New Mexico’s ayuntamientos, Indians
not only participated in, but also directed the activities of these democratically-elected councils.73
As Alfonso Ortiz states, the period of isolation and neglect by the central government in Mexico
City “strengthened the cooperative bonds forged between the Pueblo and rural Hispanic
communities. The two groups frequently worked together to maintain and regulate the use of
irrigation ditches. Hispanic families were welcomed visitors at feast days and Pueblo dancers
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performed at Santa Fe in full regalia at the annual independence day celebrations.”74 In some
areas, such as Santa Clara Pueblo, cultural lines were permeable enough to truly allow the Native
voice in New Mexico’s democratic governing bodies. As Mexican law stated, Indians possessed
these rights as citizens. Writing in the spring of 1821, on the eve of Mexican independence,
Governor Melgares noted that Indians “should be considered Spaniards in everything and enjoy
their rights to elect and be elected.”75 But these highly idealistic guiding principles of Mexican
equality and the Tres Garantías were extended to New Mexico’s Indians in an uneven manner. It
would be left to Native peoples to find alternative forms of asserting their political voice during
the Mexican period.

Indian Voting and the Politics of Rebellion in Mexican New Mexico
Despite the murky nature of Indian participation in Mexican constitutional ayuntamientos
from the 1820s to 1840s, there are intriguing examples of Pueblo Indians participating in
alternative forms of voting. When the events of the Río Arriba Rebellion of 1837 are viewed in
the context of Indian electoral participation, they take on added significance. Though ultimately
unsuccessful, during this brief period of violent upheaval New Mexico’s Indians voted with both
their voices and their arms, and greatly influenced the political landscape of the territory.
Hispanos and Indians even selected a Native as the governor of their short-lived state, José
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González of Taos Pueblo. The Río Arriba Rebellion represents a political maturation of the
Pueblo peoples of New Mexico, at least as it pertains to the politics of the Hispano tradition.
As has been stated on so many occasions, the first few decades of Mexican independence
were extremely chaotic. Between 1821 and 1837, the Mexican chief executive changed twentyone times. And yet, in the midst of that chaos, New Mexico remained relatively stable, albeit
neglected. The main threats came from raids by Apaches and other Native groups, particularly in
northern New Mexico, and the province responded to this threat as it had for centuries—with its
militia, comprised of Hispano farmers and Pueblo auxiliaries, who were often poorly armed and
served out of their own pockets. Because of this frontier military service, New Mexican residents
had always been exempted from paying direct taxes to the national government. The residents of
northern New Mexico, as Janet Lecompte puts it, had two fundamental rights: to select their own
town government, and to pay no taxes.76 Yet events combined in the mid 1830s to bring the
Mexican chaos to New Mexico. A worldwide economic crash and depression, which began in
many places in 1836, had spread to much of Europe and the Americas by 1837. Great Britain,
Belgium, Germany, France, Canada, and the United States all experienced the effects of this
depression. Mexico, already in desperate need of money at the onset of the Depression of 1837,
sought new sources of income. In 1835, President Antonio López de Santa Anna, an
authoritarian centralist frustrated with the degree of autonomy afforded to Mexican provinces
and municipalities under the 1824 constitution, implemented a centralized form of government
called the Departmental Plan. Under the Departmental Plan, provinces were changed to
departments. Each department was to have a jefe politico, or governor, who was directly
answerable to the central government, and departments would no longer have legislative
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assemblies. Instead, these were replaced with five-men appointed councils. When a governor’s
term ended, the departmental council would draw up a terna, or list of three candidates, from
which the Supreme Government would choose one. Santa Anna’s plan, also called the Siete
Leyes, aimed to centralize all branches of the Mexican national government at the expense of
local self-government. In addition, President Santa Anna appointed Albino Pérez governor of
New Mexico. Pérez, a military officer from Veracruz in central Mexico, had an autocratic air and
made New Mexicans nervous. Perhaps worst of all, Hispanos had grown accustomed to native
New Mexican governors, which Pérez certainly was not.77
Problems quickly arose when Pérez, though well intentioned, failed to grasp New
Mexico’s customs and the character of its residents. He did not comprehend the importance of
local governing structures to New Mexicans. Furthermore, he was unquestioningly loyal to the
Santa Anna centralist government, and intended to implement the president’s reforms
completely. Pérez hoped to transform New Mexico from an isolated outlier to a department in
Santa Anna’s model. Part of Santa Anna’s Departmental Plan was that all Mexicans in all
departments would pay equal direct taxes to the Supreme Government. In 1835, Pérez began to
implement direct taxes, and dissolved the old provincial assembly, replacing it with a provisional
five-man departmental council in Santa Fe. New Mexicans became truly worried about their
local government and tax-exempt status. Pérez again enraged New Mexicans in 1835–36 when
he took measures to end the lucrative illegal arms trade with Apaches, Navajos, Comanches, and
Utes; required licenses for New Mexicans to trade with Indians or trap beaver; levied taxes on all
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wagons arriving from the United States; implemented taxes for combating raiders; and regulated
the actions of all those involved in the Santa Fe trade.78
New Mexicans chafed under these new policies. They felt, and rightly so, that they had
never received any benefits from the Mexican government, such as schools, hospitals, roads,
bridges, soldiers, and arms. Josiah Gregg, who spent much of the 1830s on the Santa Fe Trail,
wrote of New Mexicans’ response to the new taxation: “it was now found necessary for the
support of the new organization, to introduce a system of direct taxation, with which the people
were wholly unacquainted; and they would sooner have paid a doblon through tariff than a real
in this way.” As galling as economic changes were under the Departmental Plan, it was the threat
posed to self-government that tipped the scale in favor of rebellion in New Mexico. In fact,
Gregg says as much: “Yet, although the conspiracy had been brewing for some time, no
indications of violence were demonstrated, until, on account of some misdemeanor, an alcalde
was imprisoned by the Prefecto of the northern district…” In 1836, the ayuntamiento of La
Cañada in northern New Mexico was made up of seven regidores. The majority of these men
were related, as was the case in many of New Mexico’s municipalities. This was technically
against the law, but the law was rarely enforced since a few select families often made up the
core of leadership in New Mexico’s towns. Governor Pérez dissolved the ayuntamiento of Santa
Cruz de la Cañada and ordered new elections, signaling a threat to centuries of home rule. The
residents of Santa Cruz were incensed. Pérez also had grounds for removing the alcalde, Juan
José Esquibel, who often flaunted his authority and disobeyed orders from superiors, including
the governor. Esquibel was arrested and jailed for bribery and disobedience, but a mob of his
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relations and supporters freed him in July of 1837. Once freed, Esquibel openly proclaimed his
enmity towards New Mexico’s authorities, forming a twelve-man council that he called the
Cantón (district), which then masterminded a rebellion against the governor and other
authorities.79
When Esquibel made overtures to New Mexicans to join him, both Hispanos and Pueblo
Indians flocked to the Cantón. He found his primary Hispano support among the residents of the
Santa Cruz valley, and Indians from Taos and San Ildefonso Pueblos also lent him their support.
Indians were actively involved in such large numbers from the outset that Josiah Gregg
commented, “…the most active agents in this desperate affair were the Pueblo Indians.” Alarmed
by the rapid developments, Governor Pérez mobilized a force to counter the rebels, but he
wasted precious time in doing so. Several weeks passed before his army of a few hundred
militiamen—mostly Indians from Cochití, Santo Domingo, and Sandía Pueblos—moved to
confront the rebels. The two opposing sides met on 7 August 1837. To their horror, Pérez and his
men found a force of 1,500–2,000 rebels, both Hispanos and Indians, waiting for them at La
Mesilla, just north of San Ildefonso. As the rebels mounted their attack, Pérez’s Indian troops
deserted to the rebel side, as did several of his Hispano soldiers and officers. Pérez and twentythree of his men fled south for their lives. They were eventually caught and killed by Indians
from Santo Domingo Pueblo.80
One Nuevo Mexicano account, probably written in the fall of 1837, makes several
interesting points about the rebellion. The author states that Pérez was not able to raise a large
enough force to subdue the rebellion because he moved too slowly, and because the Alcaldes
from the various New Mexico jurisdictions did not help him raise his force. In other words, they
79
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recognized the threat that Pérez’s administration posed to their political power. He also states
that when the fighting began, “all the Indians with their alcaldes passed over to the other side.”
These alcaldes may have been Indians themselves, demonstrating Indian self-government in
military as well as village affairs. And in one final gory detail, the author tells how Pérez “was
killed by two Indians in its suburbs [Santa Fe], and his head carried to the camp and jeered by the
perverted villains.”81
As important as these events at the beginning of Río Arriba Rebellion were, the political
maneuverings that took place after the battle at La Mesilla truly demonstrate the Indian nature of
the revolt, and how Indians took the crucial role in the directing of its affairs. After defeating and
killing Pérez, the rebels transitioned from the Cantón at Santa Cruz to a new departmental
government at Santa Fe. They met on the outskirts of town, and on 10 August, “[held] the
election of governor which devolved on a farmer named José Gonzales whose only talent was
knowing how to kill buffalo.”82 This election included voting by both Hispanos and Indians. The
new government then entered Santa Fe, and what became known as the Junta Popular
proclaimed itself the legitimate governing body of New Mexico. The Junta Popular differed from
New Mexico’s previous departmental, provincial, and territorial assemblies in that its rhetoric
and membership were far more inclusive. The Junta’s minutes are frantically written, with
motions scribbled onto the paper and then scratched out. Writing crowds the margins of the
minutes as well. Whole paragraphs are deleted at times. They made few decisions, but agreed to
send a delegation to Mexico. The Junta declared in plain language that “they are met under the
portal of the palace [of the governors] of our city [as] all of the citizens that compose the
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respectable Junta popular.” The Junta was the governing body for all New Mexicans. As Janet
Lecompte points out, the struggle was not a race or class war; rich, poor, Indian, and Hispano all
participated in government and fought on the battlefield together.83
The Cantón demonstrated by its actions that it was an inclusive entity. It sent letters to the
various Indian Pueblos inviting Pueblo leaders to participate in the Junta Popular. A letter dated
21 August 1837 from leaders of the Cantón to the Indian governor of Cochití Pueblo, Josecito
Archibeque, informed him of threats to the rebellion and invited him to come to Santa Fe. The
letter, signed on behalf of Governor Gonzales by José Esquibel and Juan Vigil, reads, “Let us as
compatriots and good Mexicans purify our native land so that we can live in peace and quiet.” In
another letter dated 31 August 1837, José Gonzales wrote to Tesuque Pueblo, stating “two
Indians from the Pueblo of Tesuque must present themselves…so that they can accompany
[leaders] from other Pueblos and march to…El Paso…and leave…for the Capital of the Republic
with the objective of representing our rights.” Philip Reno makes two correct conclusions in his
short work on the 1837 rebellion: “1) For the rebels, governmental power resided effectively in
the village leaders. 2) The Pueblo Indians were included in councils on government policy.”84
This was the most inclusive government New Mexico has ever seen, past or present. Indians
enthusiastically took part in governing the affairs of New Mexico.
It is important to now turn to the identity of the man chosen to lead the Cantón. Since
1837, much confusion has existed about the identity of this man. First, let us address what is
known about José Gonzales: he was from Taos, he was a buffalo hunter, and he was illiterate.
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Those unsympathetic to the rebellion used his humble background to criticize both Gonzales and
the revolt. For example, a caravan of merchants who were in Santa Fe when the rebellion broke
out traveled to El Paso, bringing news and providing legal testimony about the events of August
1837. Guadalupe Miranda testified that, “José María Gonzales…is an idiot not worthy or capable
of filling the position he has usurped, and even less for having been enthroned over the cadavers
of the true and legitimate authorities.” Josiah Gregg was with this merchant party as well,
testifying that “José Gonzales was in command of the government…a man without civil virtues
and so ignorant that he does not even know how to sign his own name.” Another American
trader who was in Santa Fe during the rebellion wrote that, “The triumphant army having
declared their leader, Jose Gonzales, an inhabitant of Taos, governor, made the entrance into the
town, where he assumed the government.” Writing years later, Gregg elaborated on Gonzales a
bit more. He observed that he was “one of the boldest leaders,” and that he was “a good honest
hunter but a very ignorant man, [and was] elected for governor.”85 Detractors portray him as an
ignorant hunter who was in way over his head.
But Gonzales’s ethnic origin is even more contested. Lecompte argues that he was a
vecino from Taos. Wroth states that Gonzales may have been a Taos Indian, a genízaro, or a
vecino. Padre Don Antonio José Martínez, who served as the parish priest at Taos, was present at
the end of the rebellion when Gonzales was defeated and killed. The man in charge of the army
that finally defeated the Cantón is reported to have said to the father, “Padre Martínez, hear this
genízaro’s confession so that he may be given five bullets.” Lansing Bloom writes that Gonzales
was “reputed to have been a Taos Indian and buffalo hunter by trade.” Reno comments in a
biased manner:
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Named by the Canton as Governor of New Mexico, and confirmed in this office by the
People's Assembly, was José Gonzales of Taos, whose mother was a Taos Pueblo Indian
and whose father was a genízaro of non-Pueblo Indian lineage with some admixture of
white blood…There is no wonder that such a government was brief, or that it achieved
only de facto status. The wonder is that José Gonzales ever became governor at all-a
singular aberration in the long succession of governors of New Mexico from other
geographical areas and other classes of society.
In other words, it was no surprise the rebellion failed. The Cantón foolishly chose an Indian for
their governor, after all. The most definitive work on José Gonzales’s identity is by Fray
Angélico Chávez. He seeks to uncover Gonzales’s identity, which he calls “unimportant but
intriguing.” Using parish records and genealogical sources, Chávez concludes, rather
convincingly, that José Gonzales was the son of a genízaro father and a Taos Pueblo mother, and
that the terms vecino and genízaro were often interchanged. Any of these terms, including
vecino, could have been used to describe a Pueblo Indian who married a Hispano and moved
away from the Pueblo, as Chávez argues Gonzales had. He goes on to say that, “From his close
connections with Taos Pueblo, especially through his mother, we can assume that he was
conversant with the North Tigua language. His arousing of various Pueblos to follow him in his
bloody spree shows his influence, and also sympathies, with the indigenous inhabitants of New
Mexico.” Gonzales proved invaluable to the Río Arriba Rebellion. It could not have succeeded
without widespread Indian support, and such support could not have been garnered without an
Indian at its head. As Chávez concludes: “The upshot of the whole matter is that New Mexico
did have an Indian Governor, even if by savage usurpation, in the same manner that Mexico
[had] an Indian President in Benito Juárez. But neither of these two revolutionaries wore loinclouts and war-bonnets.”86 Chávez’s extensive research and knowledge about New Mexico’s
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Hispanos, Indians, and their marriage practices lends credence to his conclusions. The
significance of Gonzalez’s ethnic identity cannot be understated: for the first and only time in the
history of New Mexico, the duly elected governor was an Indian.
As remarkable as the fact of his governorship is, Gonzales’s leadership was rather
unremarkable, and the rebellion ultimately failed. The Cantón had issued its set of five demands
just prior to Gonzales’s election as governor. Their primary demands were to not follow the
Departmental Plan and to pay no taxes. In response to the rebellion, former governor Manuel
Armijo led the pro-centralist party against the rebels. Armijo’s forces gathered in the Río Abajo,
and they adopted the Plan de Tomé on 8 September 1837. The Plan, which neatly encapsulated
their aims and rhetoric, contained ten points, two of which directly addressed Indians:
5. As it is fitting that the Pueblo [Indians] remain tranquil and do not mix in the affairs of
the Mexicans, they will be instructed to take part in favor of no party, as the war is not,
nor is it directed, against them; and that, until the supreme government name a governor,
they are to govern themselves without regard to any authority which may not eminate
from themselves.
6. In order that the preceding article may take effect, three natives of Isleta who are
present were informed of all the just reasons which exist and which they are to explain to
their fellows.
Armijo clearly saw the important part Indians played in the rebellion, imploring them to sit out
the hostilities and appealing to their desire to self-govern. He also believed using the Isletans to
explain their reasons for opposing the Cantón was a good strategic move.87
Armijo led his force north from the Río Abajo, and met with the rebels. By early
September, the Cantón no longer supported Gonzales as governor. The center of the rebellion
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had shifted to Taos, now under the leadership of Pablo Montoya, the former alcalde of Taos.
Montoya and other rebel leaders met with Armijo, and the rebels signed a treaty in Santa Fe on
21 September 1837. Writing to explain his actions after the treaty had been concluded, Armijo
laid much of the blame for the revolt on the Indians:
[The movers of the rebellion] counting as well on the Pueblo Indian people whom as a
weak, credulous, ignorant people very addicted to the sack and spoils of war, they easily
seduced, persuading them that the departmental laws would take from them a third part of
the fruits of their labor, taxing heavily the common benefits of water, wood, pastures, and
even their own children and wives… [with Nuevo Mexicanos and Pueblos] identifying
themselves with the savage tribes and putting themselves on the same level, making the
same cause with their same interests 88
In keeping with his statements in the Plan de Tomé, he saw the Indians as ignorant victims of
persuasive Hispanos. He failed to recognize the fact that he was denigrating politically mature
Pueblo Indians who knew the Mexican system and desired self-government, just like the Hispano
rebels from La Cañada and Taos.
Despite the treaty, hostilities flared up once more in early 1838. This time the conflict
centered around Truchas, and Armijo wanted to be sure to dissuade any Indians who might
support it. He issued a circular on 19 January 1838, and addressed the Indians specifically:
I want the Indians of the country to know that my aim is none other than to sustain the
law, punishing only the truly culpable, protecting the ignorant even when they have
cooperated with previous revolutions, having been motivated by the seductions and
deceits of the promoters. I want them to suffer no hostile treatment however light, nor
especially do I want their poor families to suffer the terrible scourge of war to which they
are provoked by the rebels of Las Truchas at those reuniones, as criminal as they are
insignificant, so that they forget the clemency and commiseration they have enjoyed until
now; but once they are freed from their obstinacy and backsliding, one must work in
another manner, and therefore I am convinced that the blame always falls on the poor
ignorant Indian who knows not what he does. I am warning them, so that they may not be
deceived, so that they may close their ears to the invitations, and so that they may live in
peace in the confidence that the government values them, but if in spite of this they take
part in the revolution, they may not afterwards complain nor plead ignorance, for then the
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rigor of the law will fall equally on everyone.89
Armijo and his men eventually defeated the rebels. Bolstered by a force of Mexican cavalry
regulars sent from Veracruz, the pro-centralist force finally defeated the Cantón at Pojoaque on
27 January 1838. Though no longer holding power, José Gonzales was present. In the aftermath
of the battle, he presented himself to Armijo at Santa Cruz, asking that no direct taxes be
imposed on the people. Armijo refused to make any guarantees, and then condemned Gonzales
to be shot. Hispano leaders of the rebellion such as Esquibel had also been executed. The
rebellion failed to stop Santa Anna’s dictatorial reforms. Still, within another ten years New
Mexico would be under the control of another colonial power.90

Conclusion
In his circular of 19 January 1838, Manuel Armijo made reference to the “poor ignorant
Indian who knows not what he does.” Yet Armijo pleaded with New Mexico’s Pueblo Indians to
refrain from supporting the Cantón. He asked them to stay at their Pueblos and govern
themselves until a proper New Mexico government could be reestablished. Armijo is at once
belittling and praising the Indians. On the one hand, he depicts them as ignorant children, who
need to behave as good children do. On the other hand, he fears the strength they provide to the
rebellion on the battlefield. But, in the Plan de Tomé, issued four months before Armijo’s
warning to the “ignorant” Indians, he unknowingly affirms the Native tradition of selfgovernment. He requests that they remain in their Pueblos and govern themselves—something
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they had already done for centuries—while he attempted to sort out the chaos in Santa Fe. For
Armijo, politics at the departmental level were the concern of Hispanos, not Indians; better that
they remain at their Pueblos and not concern their allegedly simple minds with these things.
Yet the actions of Pueblo Indians throughout the Río Arriba Rebellion showed that they
were anything but children. In 1837–1838, New Mexico’s Pueblo Indians were a politically
savvy people, well versed in the complexities of Spanish and Mexican electoral politics and town
governance. Indian actions in the rebellion represented a coming of age in the political landscape
of New Mexico. These were Indians who for two hundred years had elected their village officials
each year in a manner each Pueblo saw fit. They had taken part in town ayuntamientos in the late
Spanish period and throughout the Mexican era. In some ayuntamientos, Indians had even held
positions of power. Indians continued to fight through legal channels to protect the land and
rights of their people. And they had formed an important block in the Junta Popular that elected
José Gonzales. Gonzales’s election as governor of the Cantón represents the single most
significant Indian action in the history of New Mexico’s electoral politics. With an Indian
governor at the helm, Natives assumed a large part of the leadership that directed the affairs of
New Mexico during those fateful months in 1837–1838.
Indian electoral participation was, nonetheless, constrained by localized conditions
during the Mexican period, as it had always been in the earlier colonial era. In one area, Indians
and Hispanos could work in an effective, mutually beneficial manner, with Indians even serving
in leadership positions over mixed Indian-Hispano councils. In other areas, Indians viewed
ayuntamientos as bodies that addressed their needs and concerns, even if they did not take an
active part as council members. They petitioned ayuntamientos time and again, occasionally with
favorable results. But in other areas, the Indian presence in ayuntamientos is conspicuously
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absent. This could be due to several factors, not the least of which was that Hispanos
significantly outnumbered Pueblo Indians. Furthermore, Hispano communities only continued to
expand during the Mexican era. And as ever, the effect of the administration in Santa Fe cannot
be overlooked. A favorable or unfavorable governor could greatly affect the degree to which
Indians were secure in the exercising of their rights. On the whole, New Mexican Indians
became more familiar than ever with the politics of Iberian town government from 1821–1846.
This would be both a benefit and a hindrance during the Anglo American colonial administration
that followed.
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Chapter 4
STAGNANT ARIZONA: INDIAN POLITICS IN THE ARIZONA-SONORA
BORDERLANDS DURING THE MEXICAN PERIOD

Introduction
In 1821, officials in Tucson officially swore allegiance to the newly independent
Republic of Mexico. While New Mexico Governor Facundo Melgares in Santa Fe had
orchestrated a celebration that included public revelry and Indian dances, Pimería Alta witnessed
a much simpler affair: “On September 3, the comandante of the half-century-old adobe presidio
of Tucson swore allegiance to the new government [of Mexico].” Aside from their celebrations,
Pimería Alta differed significantly from New Mexico during the late Spanish and Mexican
periods in two significant ways. First, while officials in Mexico City had neglected New Mexico
during this time, the tradition of self-government remained strong in New Mexico’s Indian and
Hispano communities. In his classic study of Arizona under Spanish and Mexican
administration, historian James E. Officer sums up the degree to which residents of Pimería Alta
had grown accustomed to self-government before the region came under the control of the
United States:
Relatively little that the Hispanic residents of the Pimería Alta experienced during the
years of Spanish and Mexican rule prepared them for the participation in the political life
of the region after it became a part of the United States. In this respect, they differed
somewhat from certain of their neighbors in California and New Mexico, where the
Spanish founded towns with civil governments.
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Second, Sonora’s Indian affairs in its northern frontier had severely deteriorated by the Mexican
period, where “missions and military posts decayed for lack of support.”1
The decay of the missions and presidios had a direct effect on the Indians of the ArizonaSonora Borderlands. For example, when independent Mexico inherited control over Hopi
territory from an expiring colonial Spain, Hopis were only nominally under the control of the
Republic of Mexico. Isolation and increased raids on their territory only exacerbated their
tenuous plight. Farther south, Yaqui town government continued to evolve, with Yaquis
controlling much of their internal affairs. They pushed against colonial control, and again turned
to revolt in the 1820s under the leadership of a charismatic Yaqui known as Juan Banderas.
Elections of officials again played a part in this rebellion, though not as prominent a role as in
the Yaqui Revolt of 1740. Still, at the heart of their grievances was control of Yaqui internal
affairs. Much like Yaquis, the Piman peoples of Pimería Alta saw more Hispanos encroach on
their territory, while simultaneously receiving fewer protections from these encroachments.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries who ministered to them were
among their best defenders, for all of their other flaws. The system of Indian civil government in
Pimería Alta, which had been so unevenly instituted and rarely under the control of Indians
themselves, continued into the Mexican period. As the Catholic Church abandoned its northern
Sonora missions, the selection of Indian officers fell completely to Indians themselves. But the
system bore little resemblance to the Spanish town municipal model, as Indians reverted to
traditional methods of selection and the cadre of officers shrank to only a governor in many
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locations. While the governor system persisted among the Yaquis during the Mexican era, it was
nonexistent at Hopi and weakened in Pimería Alta.
No single summary of Indian voting during the Mexican era can be easily applied to
Arizona. Indian participation in electoral politics varied greatly from group to group. In some
areas, Indians saw the Hispano presence diminish significantly, resulting in greater control of
internal affairs and selecting community leaders. But in other areas, Mexican officials sought to
exert greater control over highly independent Indian villages, resulting in significant pushback
from Indians. For the Native peoples of the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands, the brief decades of
Mexican control were chaotic and unpredictable.

Hopis Under Mexican Rule
It would not be inaccurate to state that Mexico had little or nothing to do with Hopis from
1821–1846. The early contacts between Hopis and Spaniards in the seventeenth century slowed
significantly after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 and destruction of Awatovi in 1700. Spaniards
made infrequent attempts to reestablish missionary work among the Hopis, such as that
undertaken by Father Francisco Silvestre Vélez de Escalante, along with the occasional military
foray into Hopi territory. By Mexican independence, contacts between Hopis and outsiders were
nearly nonexistent. A long distance separated Hopis from the Rio Grande Pueblos and the
government at Santa Fe. In addition, raids by outside tribes such as Apaches and Navajos
markedly increased during the late Spanish period and Mexican era. After significant human and
material losses in the particularly violent 1810s, Hopis sent a delegation to Santa Fe in 1818 to
request military assistance against the Navajos. Spaniards recognized the urgency of the
situation, and that it represented an opportunity to reestablish contacts with Hopis.
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Unfortunately, Santa Fe could do nothing, lacking the manpower and money to invest in a large
military operation for its most distant Indian charges. Athabascan raids and warfare proved to be
a larger impediment to Hopi-Mexican relations than distance. As Edward Spicer summarizes
succinctly: “the widespread warfare which took place with increasing frequency during those
years between the settled Pueblos and the far-ranging, marauding Navajos and Apaches—and
which the Mexican troops were unable to prevent—virtually stopped all travel in the northern
area….Hopis [did not feel] the touch of Mexican political authority.”2
The raiding and warfare in the region had grown to a level not previously seen under
Spain. The introduction of increasing numbers of firearms to non-Pueblo Indians through the
Santa Fe trade amplified the violence. Increasingly brazen Navajos penetrated deeper than ever
before into the Hopi homeland. A massive Navajo raid on Oraibi in 1837, at the time the largest
of the Hopi villages, killed or scattered “virtually its entire population.” But Hopi troubles were
not limited to bloody encounters with Navajos. Apaches, Comanches, and Utes all ventured into
Hopi territory, taking livestock and captives. Since Hopis commanded a premium on the
Southwestern Indian slave market, they were prime targets for captivity.3
With little support from Spanish missionaries, civil authorities, and soldiers, Hopis were
left to fend for themselves in a world of violence created by the Spanish imperial presence. The
upside to this was that Hopis essentially remained in a state of complete political independence.
This political situation continued after 1821. Hopis paid no taxes to Mexico and the Mexican
republic did not count them in its censuses. Commenting on the Hopis during the Mexican
period, American trader Josiah Gregg wrote: “The ‘seven pueblos of the Moqui’ (as they are
called)…formerly acknowledged the government and religion of the Spaniards, but have long
2
3

Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 196–197.
C. James, Pages from Hopi History, 71–72.

197
since rejected both, and live in a state of independence and paganism….[But] they
are…industrious and agricultural, and…ingenious in their manufacturing.” Gregg contended that
the Hopis “still retain their independence.” This meant that just as the Spanish administration
that came before, the Mexican government was unable to place Hopis under its jurisdiction.
Hopis remained citizens of their own virtually independent Indian nation, and participated in
none of the Mexican political developments of the 1820s–1840s.4
One oral account perfectly encapsulates the Hopi experience under Mexico. Edmund
Nequatewa, who heard the story from one of his elders, relates that in1846, a party of Mexican
traders—or raiders—visited Oraibi. Hopis feared such visits “because they were never sure but
that the Mexicans were coming to take revenge on them for killing the Spanish priests in 1680.”5
At the same time that the Mexicans arrived, three Hopi men from Oraibi were troubled with their
own personal lives to the point of desiring to die. But, a Hopi man could not kill himself, “for he
would lose his reputation of being a brave man.” The arrival of the Mexicans came at a fortuitous
moment, and the three Hopis made arrangements with the Mexicans to kill them so that their
reputations would not be tarnished. The arrangement was that the Mexicans would shoot the
three men while they were in a kiva for a ceremony. But the plan was in serious jeopardy when
the Mexicans could not distinguish the three men from the others inside the crowded kiva. The
three Hopi men, not wanting to be responsible for disgracing the kiva, exited the chamber one by
one. The Mexicans shot each man after he exited. By this time a large number of Hopis had
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gathered on their rooftops and saw what had happened. After the third Hopi was killed, a shot
rang out from the distance, and one of the Mexicans fell wounded. A Hopi, unaware of the
arrangements, had shot the Mexican.6
The Mexicans were then forced to flee for their lives as a melee ensued. While they fled,
the killers grabbed a Hopi woman and several Hopi children.7 They tied the children to their
bodies to use as human shields. The Mexicans killed more Hopis while attempting to escape, and
also stole a number of Hopi sheep. They also raped the Hopi woman nightly, to the horror of the
children. A first party of Hopis attempted to track the Mexicans, but turned back after three
fruitless days. The captive woman’s husband, Wikvaya, set out on his own, determined to find
his wife and the children or die trying. He eventually made his way to one of the Rio Grande
Pueblos, where a Hopi living there took him to the village chief. The chief insisted that
Wikvaya’s story be written down, and so they located a literate Indian, who recorded the
account. The chief also insisted that they travel to Albuquerque, where “they found someone
who had the authority to look into the matter.”8 The officer heard Wikvaya’s story, and sent him
on his way with some sort of document to see the governor in Santa Fe. The governor listened
intently to Wikvaya’s story, and to his surprise, sent a large group of men to locate the children
and his wife. It took some time, since the children had all been sold as genízaros to Hispano
families. The governor’s men found the children and Wikvaya’s wife, who all made their way
back to Oraibi. The governor also had the Mexican raiders executed. They had lied by saying
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that their captives were Navajos, about which no one had cared “because the Navajos were
enemies of most everyone at that time.”9
This episode illustrates the tenuous nature of Hopi-Mexican relations during the period of
Mexican administration. Hopi territory was susceptible to attack, and not just by Navajo,
Apache, Comanche, and Ute raiders. Mexicans also made clandestine forays to Hopiland, killing
Hopis, kidnapping women and children, and stealing their property. If Hopis wanted redress of
these wrongs, they had to make their own way to Santa Fe, which was a long and dangerous
journey. In at least one instance they treated with Mexican authorities, both on the local level and
with the governor in Santa Fe. When their complaints were adjudged to be legitimate, these
Mexican authorities meted out swift and severe punishments. But the virtually independent
Hopis had to seek this justice in Santa Fe themselves. It would not come to them, since they had
no elected alcaldes, governors, regidores, or justices of the peace in their own communities. The
Hopi villages remained independent, autonomous Indian nations.

Sonoran Electoral Politics and the Breaking of the Colonial Compact
Electoral politics came to the far northern towns of the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands later
than their New Mexican counterparts. For example, civil government in the ayuntamiento model
arrived in Tubac and Tucson in early 1825, when elected officials took office. These officials
had been duly elected a few weeks prior. In the beginning, both towns had only an alcalde de
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policía (essentially a mayor) and a síndaco procurador (a sort of treasurer-attorney). The title of
the main officer was changed in December 1831 to a primer juez de paz (first justice of the
peace). What is interesting is that neither Tucson nor Tubac had the necessary 1,000 residents for
an ayuntamiento constitucional. Tucson met the requirement only when it included Apaches de
Paz living there and nearby Piman peoples in the tally.10
The first ayuntamiento elections were held on 19 December 1824. José de León became
the first alcalde of Tucson, while León Herreros served in the same office for Tubac. Both men
took office on 1 January 1825.11 Since Indians were included in population counts for Tucson
(and possibly Tubac), the question is whether Indians took part in these elections, or served in
office at either location. First let us address the latter question. James Officer states that, “Record
keeping was a responsibility of the first justice of the peace and the treasurer-attorney, meaning
they had to be literate, a requirement that severely limited the pool of candidates.” This would
have precluded large numbers of both Hispanos and Indians. He goes on to conclude, “The result
was circulation of these offices among a handful of individuals from elite families of the region.
Such persons were closely bound by kinship and the godparent system, or compadrazco, to the
comandantes and to civil and military officials at higher levels.” This does not leave out the
possibility of an individual of Indian origin rising to a position of prominence. Both soldiers and
settlers served as godparents to Indians baptized at the missions. In 1818, the Pima lieutenant of
the Tubac presidio even married his commander’s daughter, who was strictly considered a
Spaniard.12 These would have been what were referred to at the time as “indios ladinos,” what

10

Officer, Hispanic Arizona, 17, 88.
Ibid., 103.
12
Officer, 17; Thomas Sheridan, Landscapes of Fraud: Mission Tumacácori, the Baca Float,
and the Betrayal of the O’odham (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2006), 60. When he
passed through Tucson in 1848, Cave Couts commented that Tucson was “Indians and Mexicans
11

201
scholars have termed “Hispanicized” Indians, or those fluent in Spanish and familiar with
Hispano customs, often having intermarried with vecinos. While the chances of Indians serving
in positions of power were small, it is possible that at least some Indians participated in the
elections of ayuntamiento officials.
The Mexican national government mandated such electoral developments in the republic,
and these filtered down to the state assemblies, which instituted guidelines for voting
qualifications. In the liberal traditions of independent Mexico, the Estado de Occidente, which
consisted of the previous states of Sinaloa and Sonora, adopted its constitution in 1825. The
Constitution of Occidente defined citizenship and set voting guidelines. To be considered a
citizen of the state, Section Three, Article 13 states: “Sonorans are: 1. All those born in the
territory of the state.” This meant that Indians were citizens, since the wording of the article
made no differentiation between Hispanos and Indians. Citizenship was granted to all who were
over the age of eighteen, if married, and over twenty-one if unmarried. Furthermore, Section
Three, Article 21 reads: “Sonorans are equal before the law…all citizens may obtain
employment by the state with no other motive of preference than merit, virtue, the aptitude for
the discharge of office, and the talents required by each one.” As with Mexican national law,
Indians who qualified for employment or office on merit had that right. The rights of citizens
could only be taken away for specific reasons, only one of which was Indian-specific. Section
Four, Article 28, No. 6 states that the rights of Indian citizens could be taken away “For having
the custom of going about shamefully nude; however, this clause is to have no effect on the
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indigenous citizens until the year 1850.”13 In theory at least, Indians were granted citizenship
rights in Occidente and could participate in all political activity there.
Mexican liberalism and legal developments paid lip service to equality and inclusion, but
something more sinister was clearly afoot. As Cynthia Radding, one of the foremost historians of
colonial Latin America, summarizes, in the wake of Mexican independence:
Sonoran oligarchs [and those of Occidente] changed the terms of negotiation with the
ethnic communities in their province and, in so doing, altered irretrievably the operative
legal definition of property and the relations between the state and these Serrano
naciones. The new regime pushed aggressively to privatize the land and to change both
the civic status of Indians and the internal governance of their pueblos.
Between 1825 and 1835, leaders in Occidente and Sonora (Sonora became its own state in 1831)
enacted legislation that, on paper, made Indians and Hispanos equal before the law. But Mexican
leaders sought to extend their jurisdiction over Indian towns through municipal government and
the dividing up of Indian communal lands. The State of Occidente implemented legal protections
for Indian lands, but moved to sell off “vacant lands” for the benefit of Indians. Whether Indians
actually saw any of the proceeds of these sales is unknown. Indians saw their communal lands
severely depleted, hemmed in on every side by Hispanos. This was strengthened by the
expulsion of Iberian priests from the missions in Pimería Alta.14 Occidente and Sonora also
passed laws that subordinated Indian towns to local municipal governments. Since Indians no
longer had any special status, they were included in municipal governing bodies dominated by
Hispanos. As Mexican historian José Refugio de la Torre Curiel points out:
[Changes that culminated in the 1820s–1830s occurred] in the context of secularization of
that society, the consolidation of Spanish settlement, and, above all, the demographic
changes that resulted in the progressive Hispanization of the old missions. By 1831, most
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towns of Pimería Alta were predominantly mestizo, and their forms of community
organization had come under serious attack by interests favoring privatizing land and
doing away with the corporative character of local social organizations.
The powers of Indian governors diminished significantly as Indian landholdings in Sonora
shrank and municipal government was transformed.15 Many recognized the threats that the new
system posed to Indian town autonomy, and resisted when the system became untenable.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, Mexico attempted to solve the Indian problem by
essentially ignoring it. Indians were to be citizens under the law, with the mere mention of
“Indian” dropped from official documents. In the case of laws in which it was absolutely
necessary to refer to Indians, the term “indigene” was used instead. As will be discussed in
greater depth shortly, Mexican officials made some efforts to insure that Indians were treated
fairly under Mexican law. Mexican officials were to insure that democratic elections of
municipal officers began immediately (although this had been going on for some time already in
many Indian towns), thereby establishing an Indian electorate. Regarding the question of
communal lands, officials were to implement new reforms with the awareness that lands had
been illegally taken from Indians in the past. Officials were to administer the public lands in
partnership with commissions composed of Indians themselves. Finally, disputes over land
between Indians and non-Indians were to be decided in favor of Indians. Justice and equality
were supposed to be the guiding principles, with slight preference given to Indians.16
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The Yaqui Response
What policymakers failed to realize was that their actions, however well intentioned,
attacked the foundations of a system to which Indians had long been accustomed. By the first
decades of the nineteenth century, Yaquis in particular had already developed a system of town
government loosely based on the Spanish model, with elections of local officers and definite
ideas of political sovereignty and corporate land control. Evelyn Hu-DeHart states that Yaqui
village sovereignty was a keystone of their political system: “Each [village elected] its own set of
gobernadores in the tradition of local village autonomy, they retained the position of captain
general as an overall military leader and as spokesman with the outside world.” When Yaquis
were pushed—as in the previous century—they pushed back. Mexican reforms brought a return
of Yaqui violence, and, once again, the two sides again were unable to see eye to eye. Mexicans
viewed Yaqui attempts to maintain well-established methods of local governance and land
control as the mere actions of spoiled children, too long accustomed to a privileged status as
Indians. As Spicer points out, Mexicans saw the Yaqui and other Indian opposition to reform as
“resistance to a loss of special privilege—the exemption from citizenship responsibilities.”17
Putting aside the issues of land, taxation, and military service for a moment, it is
important to understand that the Yaqui system of civil governance was highly sophisticated and
firmly established by the nineteenth century. Although, as Spicer points out, the Yaqui political
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system did not reach its full development until the latter decades of the nineteenth century, it is
safe to assume that some or many of the elements found in Yaqui town government in the late
1800s were present in 1825. In the first place, the office of governor was prominent in the Yaqui
towns. These governors carried the customary varas de justicia, and community members elected
them by popular vote. Governors were inducted on 4 January of each year, and their powers
included the ability to settle family disputes and manage land boundaries within the
communities. Mexican officials had only a nominal presence in the governing of Yaqui
communities through the office of captain-general. Mexicans appointed the captain-general,
whom they regarded as a liaison officer between the government of Occidente and the Yaquis.
But the role of captain-general was never well defined. At times, upstart individuals sought to
use the office to mobilize Yaqui resistance, while at other times sympathetic captains-general
aligned with vecino interests.
Outside of these and other civil offices dating back to the Spanish period, Yaqui political
institutions had evolved to the point that by the late 1800s Yaqui town government included five
branches or authorities. Many pages could be dedicated to these authorities and their complicated
structures, but in simplified form they were the civil government, Military Society, the church,
the Kohtumbre, who oversaw important rituals in the towns, and the Pahkome, who buried the
dead and maintained the town’s obligations to the patron saint. Spicer points to five principles as
guiding Yaqui government in the nineteenth century: “(1) unity of civil, military, and religious
organization, (2) necessity for unanimity as a basis for action, (3) importance of seniority in all

206
governmental participation, (4) constant review of executive and judicial activity by the total
community, and (5) interdependence of all specialized arms of government.”18
I again urge caution when applying Yaqui government as it appeared in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century to the 1820s, but many of these elements must
have been present. It is not overreaching to assert that Yaquis had a sophisticated form of town
government with some elements of Spanish-style civil and religious government, and many
traditional Yaqui elements. The net result was a set of institutions and governing principals
perfectly suited to Yaqui life. Yaqui voting, and the obligation of all community members to
participate in the town political sphere (which included the civil, military, and religious), were
central to this system. With this knowledge, it is easy to understand why Yaquis resisted
violently to Mexican incursions in the 1820s–1830s. They were not simply resisting taxation and
the division of land, they were insuring their own sovereignty and survival as a people.
When the Constitution of Occidente (1825) declared all Indians citizens, it finally made
Indians subject to direct taxation by the state, which had never been the case. Yaquis, who had
played no part in the independence movement, were now called upon to pay taxes to the
Republic of Mexico and serve as soldiers in its armies. Yaquis balked at the idea of paying taxes
and fighting for Mexico, on the grounds that they had never done it before, and had no desire to
do so now. Furthermore, when Occidente officials began entering Yaqui territory in 1824–1825
in order to survey Yaqui lands for purposes of taxation and to set up new municipal
governments, Yaquis went on high alert. The Occidente Constitution and the actions of state
officials represented a threat not only to Yaqui political sovereignty, but also to the territorial
integrity of the Yaqui homeland. After Yaquis simply ignored calls to pay taxes and raise troops,
18
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Mexico decided to take more serious measures. Mexico intended to deal with Apaches living to
the north of Yaquis, who had long been seen as a threat to Sonoran towns. In September 1825,
the federal commander general of Occiente, José Figueroa, ordered Yaqui Captain General
Nicolás María Alvarez to mobilize Yaqui auxiliaries to fight Apaches to the north along the
Colorado River. Although Yaquis had provided auxiliary soldiers on past occasions—always at
their own discretion—on this occasion they decided to take a stand and refused to mobilize the
troops. Not only this, but they deposed Alvarez as captain general, placing Juan Buitemea,
Huírivis’s militia commander, in his place. To complicate matters even further, the priest of
Huírivis, Father José María Melquiades Villaseñor, had actually encouraged the Yaui to depose
Captain General Alvarez in favor of Buitemea. Mexicans were interested in taxation and Yaqui
lands, but also in access to Yaqui labor, since Yaquis had a large population that could be put to
use in the growing economy of northern Sonora.19 The Mexican response to these initial Yaqui
actions precipitated a major Yaqui rebellion that would persist into the 1830s.
Commander General Figueroa, enraged at Father Villaseñor interference in Yaqui affairs
and the Yaqui refusal to participate in an Apache campaign, sent Captain Ramón Mier to the
Yaqui River to arrest both Villaseñor and Buitemea. On 25 October 1825, Captian Mier’s
soldiers entered the Yaqui town of Ráum.20 Defiant Yaquis met the soldiers, and in the resulting
clash a number of Mexican soldiers, vecinos, and Yaquis were killed. Panic quickly spread in the
wake of this encounter, aided by Mexican fears of a pan-Indian alliance of Yaquis, Opatas, and
Pimas, and the rumor that Yaquis indiscriminately killed any Mexicans they encountered.21 This
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came to be the common Mexican characterization of the Yaqui-Mexican conflict of the 1820s–
1830s, one that has persisted. For example, eminent Mexican historian of the Indian wars in
Sonora, Francisco P. Troncoso, wrote in his classic work, Las Guerras con las Yaquis y Mayos
del Estado de Sonora, that “los indios perpetraron horrorosos asesinatos de mujeres y niños”
(Indians perpetrated horrific murders of women and children), and made no attempt to
understand Yaqui motivations, thus reinforcing the savage Yaqui trope.22 On 27 October 1825,
only two days after the initial encounter, the governor of Occidente offered a pardon to Yaquis if
they gave back stolen goods, returned to their villages, assisted in hunting down any Yaquis who
continued armed resistance, and reinstated Alvarez as captain general. In their counter-demands,
Yaquis insisted all troops leave the Yaqui River Valley, that vecinos who had fled the fighting
not return, and that Mexico recognize Yaquis as the sole owners of their land.23
Mexican civil and military officials disagreed on how to handle the situation. Governor
Elías González favored amnesty and meeting the Yaqui demands, while General Figueroa
favored decisive action to subdue the warlike Yaqui once and for all. Mexican officials decided
on a diplomatic solution, and the elected Yaqui governors, along with the Yaqui captains,
traveled to Guaymas where they met with Governor González on Christmas Day, 1825. The
Mexican governor lectured the Yaqui leaders on their new responsibilities to the government of
Occidente, while Figueroa secretly hedged his bets by sending 200 Mexican soldiers to Belém on
8 January 1826. Yaquis there were generally peaceful, but he knew that the more resistant
Yaquis were still hiding in the hills. As a precautionary measure he left three detachments of
seventy men each at Tórin, Guaymas, and Buenavista to monitor the situation and visit the Yaqui
villages with some frequency. General Figueroa believed that he had suppressed Yaqui
22
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resistance, but he was gravely mistaken on several counts. First, he wrongly believed that Yaquis
were motivated by race hatred and wanted to kill all Mexicans. Second, he believed Yaquis had
neither morals nor politics, and refused to recognize their right to self-govern.24 Figueroa and
other Mexican officials failed to see Yaqui resistance for what it was: a struggle to maintain
sovereignty and an ordered system of town government adapted to Yaqui needs. Taxes, land, and
the Mexican system of town government fit into this, since taxation, the division of lands, and a
new system of town government eroded Yaqui sovereignty and the ability to govern themselves
according to the well-established model that had been in place for two centuries.
The figure at the head of Yaqui resistance in the 1820s–1830s was Juan Ignacio
Jusacamea,25 commonly known as Juan de la Cruz Banderas, or simply Juan Banderas. Banderas
had initially led only a few hundred Yaqui holdouts. The group hid in the forested areas and
canyons, and raided for subsistence, but Banderas soon attracted more Yaqui adherents, and even
some Mayos. General Figueroa, who had set up his headquarters at Buenavista by June 1826,
offered amnesty to Yaquis who turned themselves in. He distributed passports to those who came
in from the hills and valleys, certifying that these were friendly Yaquis. But Figueroa’s forces
had a difficult time hunting down the resistant Yaqui bands, and Mexicans living in the
countryside began to panic at the possibility of another Yaqui, or even pan-Indian, uprising.
Figueroa made some headway in June and July 1826, when his forces defeated Yaquis in a few
engagements and a number of Yaquis turned themselves in.26
It was at this point that Banderas’s unique leadership style emerged. Very little is known
about Banderas before his war with Mexico. What is known is that he served in the position of
24
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alférez, or flag bearer, of the military organization of Ráum. He carried the flag bearing the
image of the Virgin of Guadalupe; thus the name “Banderas.”27 The flag was to assume special
significance in his message, which will be discussed shortly. Alférez was an important position
in the village military organization, but it did not entitle one to a position of village leadership.
Although Banderas was the most important Yaqui leader since Muni and Bernabe, he was not a
governor or a traditional religious leader. It would seem that he attained his status through his
leadership skills and charisma. Primary accounts from the period corroborate this theory. For
example, Lieutenant R. W. H. Hardy, an officer in the British Royal Navy who was in Sonora in
the 1820s during the Yaqui War, wrote his impressions. Although he clearly harbored an antiMexican bias, Hardy had much to say about Banderas and the events surrounding the conflict.
He spoke highly of Banderas, calling him “a man of extraordinary talent and character; nor is it
easy to foresee how his career will terminate, or where the revolution, which he so ably manages,
will stop.” Hardy, who made several trips to Sonora in the latter half of the 1820s, wondered how
long the protracted struggle would continue with Banderas at the head of the Indians: “[Banderas
is] endowed with a natural flow of eloquence quite extraordinary, and with a talent and activity
which have kept up the revolution for two years, in spite of every effort of General Figueroa to
subdue it.” Hardy believed that Banderas was a leader who exercised restraint, seeking only to
protect the sovereignty of the Yaqui Nation and the rights of his people:
It cannot be denied that he [Banderas] might have captured Fuerte, Alamos, and Pitic [all
major towns in the region], if he had chosen so to have done; but his object seems
thoroughly merely to obtain redress for his suffering nation, by convincing the Mexican
government that although unarmed and undisciplined, the Yaqui is not so impotent as he
has always been supposed. Indeed, he sent delegates to remonstrate with the President,
General Victoria, and the government, with orders to state the grievances of the nation,
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and with assurances, that as soon as they should be redressed, he would immediately
disband his warriors, and they should all return to their homes on the instant.28
For Hardy, Banderas provided a stark contrast to Mexican leaders, with his strong leadership and
personality.
Even Mexican commentators of the time grudgingly admired Banderas’s gifts as a leader,
and Yaqui characteristics in general. Ignacio Zuñiga, who traveled to the Arizona-Sonora
Borderlands in the 1830s, was concerned with consolidating a defensive frontier line from New
Mexico to Arizona that would provide a bulwark against both Apaches and the expansionist
United States. He also believed that the definitive integration of “pacified” Indians would help
guarantee peace and internal security. While Zuñiga wrote disparagingly of Pimas, calling them
“phlegmatic and lazy,” he was complimentary of Yaquis, stating that they possessed “a lively
and vigorous imagination: they are men of ideas and clear powers.” But Zuñiga also fell into the
warlike Yaqui trope when he characterized them as “fierce in war, audacious and intrepid.”
Zuñiga clearly felt a begrudging sense of admiration for Banderas, whom he referred to as “a
genius at managing and exciting his followers, blessed with spirited imagination, eloquence, and
a rare talent, with which he could have done a lot more bad.” But, like other Mexicans, he did
not understand Yaqui motivations for resisting the Mexican Indian program: “This people has
28
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thus far perpetrated bloody and disastrous uprisings…due to the extraordinary genius displayed
by their bosses.” He failed to see that Yaquis had a governing structure in place, and chose their
leaders through indigenized democratic processes—he did not recognize the enterprising Yaqui
spirit reflected in their highly developed political institutions and system of land tenure. He
urged an increase in Mexican colonization of Yaqui territory, and the division of their lands,
while lamenting that, “At no time has the Yaqui nation been governed by anyone other than their
own governors and captain general.”29 While he offered some praise for Yaquis and their leaders,
Zuñiga fell in line with Mexican political thinkers of the day who argued for an end to Indian
status, the division of Indian lands, and the mainstreaming of Indian political institutions. With
Yaquis in particular, the security of Mexico’s vulnerable north depended on their full political
incorporation.
While Banderas’s rise to prominence outside of the traditional Yaqui channels of power
was somewhat unique, his political ideology was nothing short of singular. A report from 1827
asserted that Banderas was illiterate, but fortunately someone in his inner circle could read and
write. This individual was most likely another Yaqui. We are thus fortunate to have four of
Banderas’s manifestos, one of his purported religious visions, and several letters written to him
by other Yaqui leaders. Yaqui linguistics expert John M. Dedrick transcribed these manifestos
and letters in an article titled “Las Cartas en Yaqui de Juan ‘Bandera.’”30 The letters and
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manifestos shed great light on Yaqui thought from the period, and how Yaquis viewed
Banderas’s leadership. For example, a letter written to Banderas by José de Jesús and Juan Felipe
de Jesús of Ráum, dated 18 August 1832, states, “People! Yaqui Nation! The time has arrived in
which we must mutually help one another. Great harm is coming to us. We who are all brothers,
who are of the brotherhood of Yaquis, we must join together for our mutual defense…United we
will cry our war cry, launching the attack against our enemies. God will help us.” The ideology
adopted by Banderas’s supporters, calling on Yaquis and other Indians to join the struggle
against the Mexicans, often invokes God, and we will soon see that Banderas did the same.
Banderas and his followers believed that they would have divine help in their fight. Still, Yaquis
were by no means unified behind Banderas, and many supporters felt that those who did not
follow him completely simply lacked the necessary faith to throw themselves wholeheartedly
into the cause.31
Other letters from Yaqui supporters demonstrate that Banderas, though he was primarily
a military leader, also wielded significant influence in civil matters. This influence even
extended outside the Yaqui villages, when Mayos and other groups joined in the war. In a letter
dated 28 September 1832, Govorner Manuel Ozuna of the Mayo village of Tesia wrote to
Banderas in an obvious attempt to assuage Banderas’s anger with him. Governor Ozuna refered
to complaints that had reached Banderas of how he, Ozuna, had whipped his people (something
well within his power as an Indian governor). Ozuna admitted to punishing some individuals, but
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insisted that he took no pleasure in it. He was quite worried about what Banderas had heard, and
insisted that those who had spread rumors about his severity as a governor were simply
troublemakers. He asserted his loyalty to the cause, and said that he was ever at Banderas’s
service. He went so far as to state that he respected and loved Banderas, and that he kissed his
hand three times.32 Governor Ozuna’s fear of Banderas is evident in this letter. While Banderas’s
appeal as a leader must have motivated many supporters to join his side, others clearly feared
him and were not as dedicated to the cause. One letter, signed by Alcalde Juan Gerónimo
Marquín, Síndico Ysidro Juan Maria Jusacamea, and Juan Zacaria Armenta, all Yaqui civil
leaders, describes complaints by a number of Yaquis, stating that these Yaquis “nos han hablado
del mal y de la miseria que Bandera y sus soldados les han causado” (they told us of the bad and
misery that Banderas and his soldiers had caused them).33 Infighting among Yaquis, including a
lack of unity in the Yaqui leadership, ultimately proved disastrous to Banderas’s efforts.
Each of Banderas’s four existing manifestos is rather brief, and is written in a simple,
phonetic manner. Along with the account of Banderas’s vision, all were written in the same
hand, which Dedrick insists is “characteristic of a manuscript of the seventeenth or early
eighteenth century rather than one of the nineteenth century.” Although they are not dated, they
were submitted with other documents to the central government, and are believed to date from
approximately1826.34 More than the letters to and about Banderas, his own statements in the
manifestos and visions provide an intriguing lens into the mind of the influential Yaqui. They
indicate how he viewed Yaqui leadership, and from whence power ultimately derived. In the first
manifesto, he begins by referring to himself as “the flag of our sovereign Montesuma [sic]…I
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come sent by my Lady of Guadalupe to win this crown.” He goes on to state that it is she who
bade “all of the Governors of the Towns, to win this crown of Our King Montesuma that they
have inherited from our Lady of Guadalupe.” He assures the people that he has not come to harm
Indians or criollos. He states that he now has one thousand men under arms from the Yaqui and
Mayo Nations, and even twenty men of razón (vecinos) under his flag.35 A few items in this
manifesto are noteworthy. First, Banderas asserts that his power comes through the Aztec
emperor Moctezuma. Further, he combines this with la Virgen de Guadalupe. Banderas’s power
is both hereditary and otherworldly, since it comes through the important line of Aztec kings and
the Mother of God. We must remember that Banderas did not come through typical Yaqui
avenues of power—he was neither an elected town official nor part of the religious leadership,
thus he had neither civil nor religious authority. His only position prior to this war was that of
flag bearer. But, he ingeniously satisfies both needs by appealing to Moctezuma (civil authority)
and the Virgin (religious authority). Furthermore, he covers all of the necessary bases by
enlisting the support of “the Governors of the Pueblos.” Banderas must have realized the tenuous
nature of his position as a leader, unlike Muni and Bernabé, who both came through “proper”
leadership channels, as he took great care to affirm his own legitimacy.
The second manifesto echoes many of these statements, but he closes by stating that, “all
that which the Gachupines [Mexicans] had will be for those who will help me win this crown of
King Montesuma.” In his third manifesto, Banderas offers little variation, except that this time he
explicitly calls upon other Indian nations to join what has been primarily a rebellion of Yaquis
and Mayos. He implores Yaquis, Mayos, Opatas, Eulaves, Apaches, Papagos, and Seris to join
his band, which he asserts is now over two thousand strong. General Figueroa himself sent the
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manifesto to the central government in Mexico City, along with his own thoughts on what it
contained. Figueroa sees nothing of value in Banderas’s message and cause, calling his
proclamation “bastante ridiculo” (rather ridiculous), but he still wants to bring it to the attention
of authorities because it is circulating among the Indian towns and fanning fires of discontent.36
In the fourth and final manifesto, which also contains Banderas’s vision, we see the
solidifying of his leadership rhetoric. In the last manifesto he refers to himself as “Yo el Rey y
Emperador” (I the King and Emperor). He calls on various Indian nations to “get themselves
ready” to support him and enter under his flag.37 Banderas was also a visionary, though only one
reliable account of a vision exists, as it was written in the same hand as the manifestos, and on
the reverse side of the paper containing the fourth manifesto. In his vision, which differs from the
manifestos in that it is written in third person, Banderas tells of lying as if dead for an entire day.
He revives at a certain point, and then goes up to a mountain, staying there with no food or drink.
Jesus of Nazareth, the Virgin Mary, St. Bartholomew, St. John, and other angels then visit
Banderas. The angels lift him by his armpits, and carry him back to his own land so that buzzards
or foxes do not eat him. One of his relatives finds him three days later, and nurses him back to
health in his home for an entire month. At the end of this period, Banderas leads the people in a
festival for the Apostles, and then they begin their war against the Mexicans.38 This vision has
clear similarities to the visions of Native revivalists such as the Lenni Lenape prophet Neolin, the
Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa, and the Seneca visionary Handsome Lake. Unlike these other
visionaries, who usually functioned as the religious leaders in conjunction with a military arm of
their movements (such as Pontiac and Tecumseh), Banderas is both civil-military and religious
36

“Manifesto B,” in Dedrick, 180; “Manifesto C,” 180–181.
The flag was an obvious symbol that served Banderas well as a rallying tool, since his name
meant “flags,” and he had carried the flag of the Virgen de Guadalupe.
38
“Vision,” in Dedrick, 184.
37

217
leader. His power is ultimate because it comes from God and from a hereditary line of Indian
kings. But it was his assumption of power outside proper channels that would ultimately prove
his undoing.
As for the war itself, Banderas met mixed results in his calls for followers, especially
among tribes outside of the Yaquis and Mayos. His movement never gained the traction with
other Indian nations that he would have liked. Even among his own people and his closest Mayo
allies, support was tenuous. Lieutenant Hardy relates events surrounding raids by Banderas’s
band, and the looting they undertook in these attacks:
…a great deal of plunder was taken, of which Bandéras made division. He would give a
portion to his present followers; another part he sent into the Yáqui and Mayo country,
for the purpose not only of raising recruits, but of also keeping up the spirits of the old
men of the different towns which had elected him for their Generalissimo.39
Hardy, who we must recall admired Banderas and his leadership, indicates with his statement
that Banderas gained at least some of his adherents, and maintained the confidence of influential
elders, through the goods that he sent to them. And while Banderas may have had some support
among Yaqui and Mayo elders, he did not have a mandate from the Yaqui people, a people
characterized by government based on popular support. Nor did he have the widespread support
of other Indian groups. As Spicer summarizes: “…Juan Banderas’s authority had foundations
outside the traditional Yaqui governmental system.”40
The fighting was by no means continuous from the time of Banderas’s emergence in
1826 to his capture in 1832. Episodes of intense warfare were followed by periodic truces.
Banderas’s actions during rebellion are very illuminating. By late 1827, the manifestos ceased
and he no longer declared himself the heir of Moctezuma, empowered by the Virgin of

39
40

Hu-DeHart, 26–27; Hardy, Travels in the Interior of Mexico, 394.
Spicer, The Yaquis, 213.

218
Guadalupe, nor did he refer to himself as emperor and king. In fact, on 13 April 1827, Banderas
made one of his surrenders to the priest of Pótam. In return for his capitulation and assurance of
peace, Banderas was promised the position of captain general of the Yaqui Nation, or in other
words, leadership power through a recognized channel, although this office was appointed by
Mexican officials and not achieved through popular election. Furthermore, as Banderas resisted
Mexican incursion, Mexican officials redoubled their efforts to control Yaqui civil affairs. For
example, after Yaqui villages surrendered to Mexican soldiers in late 1826, Lieutenant Colonel
Romero appointed captains and governors in these towns. Yaqui captains were placed in
command of twenty-five men each and ordered to hunt down rebels.41 This followed the wellestablished Hispano tradition of appointing agreeable Indians to positions of leadership.
In the midst of these developments, the government of Occidente sought to address
Indian discontent by issuing a series of decrees. These decrees concerned the issues central to
Yaqui grievances: citizenship, taxes, land, and voting. The decrees show a certain degree of
naiveté on the part of the state government, as if legislation alone could solve the problems
manifesting themselves in an alarming number of Indian rebellions flaring up during this time.42
Decree 44, issued 6 February 1828, addressed Occidente’s desire to regain control over Yaqui
territory. Article one of the decree states that a new partido (subdistrict) would be formed out of
the eight Yaqui villages under the control of the presidio of Buenavista. Occidente intended to
remove Yaqui independence by placing their villages within a political jurisdiction coming under
the control of a military presidio. Article four called for the immediate elections of alcaldes de
policía (mayors) and síndacos procuradores (attorneys) for the towns, who would report to the
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state government on any abuses and “jealously seek the unity and equality of those called whites
and indigenes.” Article six encouraged Hispano settlement on Yaqui lands by exempting vecinos
who settled on Yaqui lands from taxes for a period of six years. But the government also sought
to appease Yaquis by declaring in article seven that the ayuntamientos of Buenavista and other
towns in this new subdistrict “will very scrupulously watch over the integral conservation of the
common lands of the pueblos and the private properties of the Indians.” The ayuntamientos were
also to oversee the restitution of any Indian lands or goods lost to outside parties, “whether
through sale, exchange or donation.”43 The government of Occidente was thus attempting to
pursue contradictory ends in its dealings with Yaquis. It simultaneously encouraged Hispano
settlements in the area, while calling for the restitution of Yaqui lands and goods. In addition,
Occidente placed control over lands and issues of governance squarely in the hands of the
ayuntamiento of Buenavista and Mexican officials. Yaquis had enjoyed a great deal of political
autonomy up to this point, particularly in electoral matters. Through these decrees, the state
government stripped them of control over their own national affairs.
More decrees followed. Decrees 88 and 89, both dated 30 September 1828, sought to
clarify once and for all the status of Indian towns, addressing how they were to be governed, and
how their lands were to be administered. One can clearly see the motives of Occidente officials
in these decrees. For example, Decree 88 states in its introduction that it is “Law for the
particular government of Indian towns.”44 The very first article reaffirms that Indians be
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protected in their rights of “equality, liberty, property and security.” After this generic
pronouncement of Indian rights, it very specifically states, “that in every popular election they be
called on to vote and be voted for, both for council jobs, or for any other they be capable of
performing.” The language of this decree as it pertains to Indian voting is very telling. It affirms
that the “rights” associated with citizenship are, in reality, obligations. Indians are not
encouraged to vote; they are called upon to vote and hold office. This referred to being part of
ayuntamientos that were inclusive, and not simply composed of Indians. In addition to the voting
obligation, the decree specifies that Indian militias are now a thing of the past. From this point,
the “civil Militia” is to be comprised of all citizens in common. This eroded another aspect of
Indian sovereignty, this time over military affairs. The motivation for this action was obvious.
With Indian militias, Mexicans found an established, experienced, disciplined enemy under
Indigenous leadership. Yaquis in particular had fielded large companies of soldiers. By
integrating Yaqui soldiers into Mexican militia units, Occidente hoped to eliminate potential
sources of organized resistance.45
Decree 88 also addressed the issue of Indian lands, which was of particular interest to
Yaquis. Article five reaffirms that land distribution was to proceed, but that lands and goods
subject to the new redistribution laws were to be “administered with the knowledge of the
indigenes, under the inspection of the ayuntamientos and alcaldes.” Article six states that both
Indians and vecinos have the same obligation to cultivate their lands and partake in the fruits of
these labors with equality. Article seven establishes an administrative position to oversee the
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communal lands. This administrator was to serve for a five-year term, and Indians were
“preferred” for the position. Regarding how funds were to be used from the sales of “excess”
lands, article eight lists the appropriate expenditures: pay for teachers of Indian children; the
creation and encouragement of schools; repair of churches, jails, and municipal houses;
beautification and cleaning of churches and municipal houses; and any expenditures conducive
to public education. The final portion of the Decree 88 takes the previous articles one step
further, addressing questions of Indian education. Articles ten through fifteen call for the
establishment of schools, for both boys and girls, where Indians will be taught “to read, write and
count, [and] they will be instructed in the principles of our religion and their civil and political
rights.”46
Decree 88 was a calculated and comprehensive plan for Indian towns that would attack
the pillars of Indian sovereignty. First, Indians would be obligated to perform their civic duty in
voting and holding office through elections that would replace the established Indian town
democratic practices. Second, Indians would no longer muster their own militia units, a measure
that would weaken their ability to offer organized military resistance to Mexican soldiers and
policies. Third, lands would be distributed and the excess sold off. Only the absolute minimum
care would be taken to insure that Indians were part of the process. Vecinos would be
encouraged to occupy excess lands, thereby hemming in Indian communities on all sides. Lastly,
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Indian children would be removed from traditional teachings and educated in the Mexican way,
with special emphasis on their duties as citizens. If all went according to plan, the evertroublesome Yaqui would be incorporated into the political mainstream once and for all.
But these measures were not acceptable to Yaqui resisters. With Bandaras and his
supporters still offering armed resistance, Mexican leaders found their ideal candidate for a
Yaqui leader and intermediary in Juan María Jusacamea.47 Throughout the late 1820s and early
1830s, Banderas and Jusacamea were mired in a power struggle for Yaqui leadership. When
more Apache threats flared up in 1831, Sonora, which by now had become a separate state once
again, accepted a political solution to the Yaqui War in May of that year. The Yaqui demands
were threefold: first, that a single civil official, an alcalde, be made the chief governing figure
over the Yaqui Nation, and that he be popularly elected; second, that each Yaqui pueblo be
allowed to elect its own regidor, or gobernador, answerable to only the Yaqui alcalde; and third,
that a captain general and lieutenant general of the Yaqui Nation be elected as well. The Sonora
government accepted these three measures, but added a few items to the agreement. Sonora
granted parish priests direct supervisory power over the alcalde and village governors. Sonora
officials clearly saw that Mexican military and civil officers had failed in attempting to subdue
and administer Yaquis. They hoped that the priests would have better luck in keeping the peace.
In addition, the Yaqui alcalde and town governors were to serve one-year terms. They had
charge over civil matters, but could only punish minor crimes. All other jurisdiction reverted to
the Buenavista ayuntamiento.48 This system, though it represented a compromise, was rather
similar to the old república system. Their demands indicated that Yaquis clearly desired popular
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democracy. All three of their major demands aimed at securing the right to choose their own
officials on both the town and national level. But, in a final measure, the Sonora state
government established a director position for Yaqui affairs. This director, who was to be a nonIndain, was above the Yaqui alcalde, and reported directly to the governor of Sonora. His job
was to insure that Yaqui leaders did not exercise too much autonomy and sovereignty.49
Regardless of the fact that these developments held some promise for allowing for Yaqui
sovereignty, they ultimately failed to satisfy Banderas and his followers. When the non-Indian
director oversaw Yaqui elections for alcalde and town governors on 1 July 1831, Banderas did
not run for office. Instead, at a general meeting held at Bácum on 30 August, Banderas deposed
the newly elected alcade and governors, and proclaimed himself in possession of sole power over
the Yaqui Nation. Banderas pursued one final campaign in the countryside, attempting to rally
Yaquis and Mayos to his cause. These were the last actions of Banderas’s political and military
career. On 6 December 1832, soldiers captured Banderas and a number of his men. Sonora
officials took Banderas to Arizpe, where he was tried by a military tribunal and put to death on 7
January 1833. Mexican reports claimed that Banderas spoke to a confessor in his last days,
imploring Yaquis not to follow his bad example, but instead live in peace with non-Indians. He
begged forgiveness for his crimes against Hispanos and left his family in the care of a priest.50
With Banderas gone, Mexican authorities seized the opportunity to prop up their man in
the Yaqui government. Juan María Jusacamea, who had been Banderas’s fiercest Yaqui
opponent over the course of several years, was elected to the position of captain general of the
Yaqui. From the Mexican point of view, Jusacamea was the perfect captain general. He was
content to allow Mexican authorities to control Yaqui affairs. Jusacamea did not have the support
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of the Yaqui people, nor did he seem particularly fond of his own people. In a report to the
governor of Sonora in 1833, he stated, “[Yaquis] are resentful against me for having been
obedient to the government and to the laws.” He was correct in his observation. But, he went a
step further to characterize the Yaqui spirit as “generally inclined toward evil.” By the summer
of 1836, four Yaqui villages had come out in open opposition to Captain General Jusacamea.
The governor of Sonora refursed to hold new elections, even though Jusacamea had been in
office for several years, a condition expressly prohibited in the Indian election laws of 1831. A
full-fledged rebellion did not follow in this case, but Yaquis continued to resist efforts by
Mexican authorities to make them full citizens of Mexico and subject them to civil and military
jurisdiction.51
In the words of Edward Spicer, “The Mexicans had not foreseen the depth of the Indian
devotion to the institutions which had developed out of the fusion of Spanish and native
forms.”52 In other words, they had not foreseen the fierce Yaqui loyalty to the old república
system that had developed over the course of two centuries. It is difficult to assess Banderas’s
contribution in defending an autonomous Yaqui Nation that maintained its own electoral and
political systems. On the one hand, there is no doubting Banderas’s commitment to Yaqui
autonomy. He envisioned a Yaqui Nation free from Mexican meddling. On the other hand, when
Yaquis and Mexicans reached a compromise in 1831, allowing Yaquis to elect their own
officials—a compromise Banderas supported at the time—he seemed unwilling to leave power
quietly and let those elected serve in their offices. This was Banderas’s undoing. Banderas was a
chameleon of sorts. His power came from the Virgin of Guadalupe, from Moctezuma, or from
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his right to rule as the sole leader of the Yaqui Nation. But his power never came from popular
elections and national consensus, principles crucial to Yaqui electoral politics. Banderas, a man
whom Yaquis and outsiders admired and praised for his eloquence, forcefulness, resoluteness,
and even restraint in some instances, failed his people because he could not fully reconcile
himself to Yaqui electoral practices, practices that potentially threatened his power.53

Pima Governors, Mexican Administration, and the Decline of Pimería Alta
The decline of the mission system in Pimería Alta before and after Mexico became an
independent republic affected Indian voting and civil governance in the region more than any
other factor. Historian David Weber characterizes the Mexican era as a time of complete collapse
for the missions of northern Mexico.54 The Indian population of Pimería Alta had been in steady
decline for decades. According to census information from 1820, the total population of all
Indians at the eight missions of Pimería Alta was 1,127. The Hispano population of the same
area was 2,291. Vecino population had doubled since 1800. By 1820, only the missions of San
Xavier del Bac, Tumacácori, and Caborca had more Indians than gente de razón. The only reason
significant Indian populations remained at the missions was because Franciscan missionaries had
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actively recruited desert Pimas, or Tohono O’odhams, to take the place of Pimas who had
steadily died off.55 The story of Indian decline in Pimería Alta, and the weakening of Indian
colonial electoral politics, is closely linked to the atrophy of the mission system, shrinking Indian
populations, and the growth of vecino communities.
Since the establishment of the northern missions, whether they were under Jesuit or
Franciscan control, their ultimate goal was to transform Indians into tax-paying citizens. But this
was always a painfully slow process. Following Mexican independence, conditions seemingly
combined to expedite this process. The political incorporation of Indians required the
secularization of missions. For this to occur, the state-supported friars from the orders would
have to be replaced with parish-supported priests, or curas (secular clergy). Further, Indians
would no longer be under the care of missionaries; they would become parishioners and tax
payers. Indian parishioners would support the priest through diezmos (tithes) and other fees, thus
ending the government’s responsibility to provide financial support for the missions. With
treasuries severely depleted from years of instability, in the 1820s and 1830s Mexican officials
turned to secularization as a revenue source. They sorely needed the moneys that could be
gathered from Indian taxation. Vecinos also favored secularization because the protected
communal mission lands, or the fondo legal, would be converted to private property for
individual Indians. “Excess” lands reverted back to the public domain, making them available to
vecinos.56
The liberal humanistic ideology of the late Spanish colonial period and independent
Mexico also called for secularization. Liberal thinkers agued against the inferiority of Indians
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and in favor of their inclusion as equal citizens. Franciscans, who in theory wanted Indians to
achieve the status of “civilized” persons, proved the most resistant voices against secularization.
They argued that Indians did not understand private property, thrift, and hard work well enough
to protect themselves from greedy vecinos, who would steal their land once the Indians were
liberated. They found it difficult to imagine that their neophytes were ready to be full citizens,
and it is questionable whether they believed this would ever happen. Indians, government
officials, missionaries, and vecinos were locked in a difficult situation, summed up by one
Franciscan serving in the California missions in 1833:
The [government] wants the Indians to be private owners of lands and of other property;
this is just. The Indians, however, want the freedom of vagabonds. The [non-Indians]
want the absolute liberation and emancipation of the neophytes…in order that they may
avail themselves of their lands and other property as well as of their persons. I do not see
how these opposing interests can be harmonized.57
But secularization did proceed in Arizona’s mission communities, due as much to circumstance
as to conscious policy.
As Indian populations declined in Pimería Alta, so too did the number of priests in the
region. The College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro, which supplied the Franciscans for Pimería
Alta, had persistent difficulties manning the missions. The vast majority of these fathers were
Iberian-born Spaniards. While the war for independence raged in Mexico, and after Mexico
gained its independence, it was nearly impossible to find Spaniards willing to serve in the
Mexican missions. The Church was unable to replace the old, infirm, and dying priests in the
northern missions. The Mexican government’s actions of 20 December 1827 compounded the
situation. On this date, Mexico ordered all Spaniards to leave Mexico. This measure had a drastic
effect on the missions of Pimería Alta. Some scholars refer to the expulsion of Spaniards from
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Mexico as “Armageddon in the Missions.”58 Southern Arizona, which had been nearly devoid of
priests, became completely devoid of them.
In addition, in 1828 the Church divided the Pimería Alta missions into northern and
southern, with missions at Cocóspera, Tumacácori, and Bac, while Santa Cruz, Tubac, and
Tucson served as presidios. Civil leaders were hesitant to enforce an expulsion order that would
leave Indians and vecinos without priets, but military leaders stepped in with a decisive voice.
Padre Ramón Liberós of Tumacácori was given his marching orders the second week of April
1828. He was given only three days to get mission affairs in order. He was concerned about the
mission goods, livestock, stores, books, and the Indians. Civil officials informed him that these
were no longer his concern. Father Rafael Díaz was similarly expelled form San Xavier del Bac.
Fray Rafael was a bit more fortunate in that he had become a naturalized Mexican citizen. He
waited out the wave of anti-peninsular hatred, and managed to return to Pimería Alta in the
summer of 1828, serving as the chaplain at the presidial town of Tucson. Father Díaz rode the
circuit in the Santa Cruz Valley over the ensuing years, administering sacraments to the Indians
at the priest-less missions. Much like Kino, Díaz visited Bac and Tumacácori, “where a few
Indians hung on.” When he died in 1841 at age forty-six, he proved to be the last Spanish
Franciscan to serve in Pimería Alta. Neither Tumacácori nor Bac had resident priests after 1828
and through the duration of the Mexican period.59 In the absence of priests, mission buildings
deteriorated, mission fields lay fallow, orchards became overgrown, and livestock herds
diminished or dispersed.
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Still, some Indians remained at the missions. The old Spanish system of village governors
and other officers, which had been in place for over one hundred years, persisted even in the
absence of priests. Ruth Underhill asserts that O’odhams continued to select governors during
the Spanish and Mexican periods, but “[made] no distinction between Spaniards and Mexicans
and [knew] nothing of Mexico’s war of independence.”60 The system did not include democratic
elections with ballots or votes, and as was the case in New Mexico, individual tribal
communities had their own methods for selection. Interestingly, one of Father Liberós’s final
actions as the missionary at Tumacácori was to instruct his namesake, Ramón Pamplona, the
longtime governor of the village, to pay off the mission debts still owed to workers who had
labored on the unfinished church. He would have preferred that mission affairs be placed
squarely in the hands of the Indians. But with the missions no longer under Church control, an
Hispano overseer administered mission lands and properties. This overseer was known as a
mayordomo. When Commissioner General of Pimería Alta Fernando Grande went to
Tumacácori in late summer 1828, he found that Governor Pamplona had performed respectably
in administering the affairs of the mission. He begged Pamplona to remain in office as governor
and continue in charge of the mission, but Pamplona refused, even after he was offered a salary.
A vecino was put in his place to oversee the mission, and Pamplona shared control of mission
affairs with the Mexican civil administrator.
Grande continued on to Cocóspera, where he deposed the Native governor, Nicolás
Martínez, who apparently had not been as adept as Pamplona at administering a mission. But,
vecino mission administrators were notoriously corrupt, and vecinos made every effort to steal
mission lands and goods. For example, the Indians of Tumacácori saw their vecino overseer, a
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resident of the Tubac presidio, as a “no-good white.” Commissioner General Grande wrote on 1
November 1828:
The friars continually and consistently impressed upon the Pimas that all mission
properties are the legal and rightful possession of the Indians alone. Three centuries of
Spanish domination and the degrading and dehumanizing exemptions granted the Indians
have made these people incapable of ever accepting our present system of government.
They are irremediably prejudiced in favor of monarchy, and their lack of intelligence will
always prevent them from understanding anything else…At this very moment the native
governors of Tubutama and Saric are here in Magdalena complaining against my civil
subcommissioners at those missions and demanding the right to control their own mission
properties…I am insisting now on only one central administration for the wealth of all the
missions, instead of an individual civil commissioner in each mission, precisely to delay
reaction on the part of the Pimas. Only this way can we gain time to sell off gradually the
effects of these missions. Only in this way can we ever refill the depleted treasury of our
state.
While Grande lamented the actions of civil administrators, his primary goal was to fill up the
state treasury with money and goods from Pima missions. Civil administration of Indian lands
was an unqualified debacle. On 13 January 1830, Grande wrote to the governor of Occidente,
Francisco Iriarte, that, even though only four Franciscans remained in Pimería Alta, mission
lands must be returned to them “before the totality of mission wealth is either squandered by the
civil commissioners or destroyed by the Apaches.” In January 1830, mission lands in Pimería
Alta were again placed under the control of Franciscans. But, this solution also fell short in the
absence of resident missionaries.61
In such chaotic circumstances, Native governors and officers in Pimería Alta, even those
outside of the missions, continued governing their communities as best they could, often with
“assistance” from vecino civil authorities. Ever faithful in recording the condition of the Pimería
Alta missions, Grande wrote about the condition of San Xavier del Bac to the Father Superior of
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Pimería Alta, José María Pérez Llera. In his letter dated 25 May 1830, he described the fertility
of the fields around the mission, and how Indians from other locations frequently came to Bac,
with its imposing mission church, during harvest and at other festive times, only to return to their
own villages. He discussed how the furnishings for the priest’s quarters and tools were handed
over to the Native governor, Juan Ignacio Zapata. He observed that, “Justice is exercised in this
village by a representative of the mayor of law and order of Tucson.” But, the key to the priest’s
quarters were entrusted to Governor Zapata.62 It would appear from this example that at Bac,
Native governors retained some power, such as administering some of the mission properties, but
power ultimately resided in the hands of vecino authorities.
As vecino power over Indian affairs in Pimería Alta grew, the absence of missionaries
became quite troubling to many Indians. The Native governor of Caborca, Francisco Neblina,
commented on the decline of the missions, even after they were returned to the control of
Franciscan missionaries in 1830. Governor Neblina’s 28 February 1835 letter, which he penned
in own hand, retains a rather nostalgic tone regarding the old mission days. He notes that the
missionary father sold their crops at a higher price than they themselves could attain, and with
the profits he “was able to maintain schools in our three villages and care for the widows, the
sick, and the neophytes among the baptized, as well as giving something to the unbaptized.” It is
difficult to know what to make of the section of his letter in which he describes vecino
encroachments on mission Indian lands and denial of Indian civil rights: “Often we have wanted
to go ourselves and present our problems personally before these higher superiors. Our
missionary himself, however, has stopped us. Being a Spaniard, he is sure they would blame him
for our action [ie, blame him for sending Indians to complain].” He goes on to lament the influx
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of O’odhams to the missions. While many wanted to come in from dispersed rancherías, be
baptized, and settle on mission lands, they are unable to do so, since so much of the land had
been snatched up and privatized. With no place for them, O’odhams wandered around, “free
from the controls of mission regulations, and free from guidance by their native governors.”63
Neblina’s position—and that of other duly-chosen Native leaders—was rather
complicated. On the one hand, administration of the missions by civil authorities, which
officially ended in 1830 but still continued after that date,64 depleted the missions of lands and
goods. Vecinos continued to encroach on former Indian communal lands as more and more of
the fondo legal became private property. And while the Franciscans had oppressed the Indians in
many ways and enriched the church at their expense, Neblina and others could point to schools
and care for the needy in villages under Franciscan control, and some protection of communal
land. The Franciscans’ refusal to allow the Indians to travel to seats of Mexican government to
air legal complaints was not universal, as there are many records of Indians using the colonizers’
legal system to attempt to protect their rights and lands. As for the issue with O’odhams, vecino
encroachment prevented their incorporation into mission communities. More importantly for
Neblina, vecino land grabs inhibited the ability of Native governors to incorporate O’odhams
into the mission Indian body politic, where they might have had a say in the governing of the
villages and the selection of Indian officers. Neblina surely recognized that the mission system
had its weaknesses, but to the mission Indians of Pimería Alta, the secularization of missions and
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the administration of mission lands and goods by civil administrators was the worst possible
option.
The Native governors, a couple of Franciscan missionaries, and a few sympathetic
vecinos could not stem the tide of mission decay, secularization, abandonment, and the loss of
lands by Pimas in Pimería Alta. A report dated 11 May 1843 depicts the bleak condition at San
Xavier del Bac and its sub-mission at Tucson:
[At Bac] The communal agricultural lands of the mission are no longer cultivated and lie
barren. Only about an eighth part of these lands and of the garden are kept up by the
native governor. The rest of the planting land is used by the natives of this village and
those of Santa Ana, a remote village subject to the authority of the missionary at San
Xavier. No non-Indians are involved. The majority of even the native residents are
without sustenance and unable to farm.
The sub-mission at Tucson fared no better:
Our native governor sold the door to the sacristy and the door to an upper room of the
missionary’s residence for a yoke of oxen. The missionary himself sold the door to the
baptistery to a settler for a saddletree…The mission agricultural fields, both communal
and those apportioned to the Indian families individually, and the plentiful water
corresponding, are maintained by only six Indians, who are all that are left. The abundant
land left over is farmed by the settlers of this presidio.
The mission at Bac and sub-mission at Tucson saw none of the products or profits from their
produce. Settlers farmed on Indian lands without paying any rents. The anonymous author of the
report pleaded for a missionary to come to Bac, which was an ideal location with ample land and
water. Plus, “many unbaptized Papagos would come in from the desert and settle here” if there
were a priest. Most alarming to the author was the fact that “For lack of religious attention, many
Indians have abandoned religious practice, left the missions, and returned to the open desert.”65
American travelers commented on the complete decline of the Pima missions, yet made
very little, if any, mention of Native civil governance. Cave Couts, who traveled through
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southern Arizona in the late 1840s, wrote of Tumacácori: “Today we passed quite a nice indian
village 2 ½ miles from Tubac. The church looked very well.” He was relatively impressed by the
Pimas at Tumacácori and Bac:
The churches in this [Santa Cruz] valley are remarkable. At Tumacacori is a very large
and fine church standing in the midst of a few common conical Indian huts, made of
brushes, thatched with grass, huts of most common and primitive kind….This church is
now taken care of by the Indians, Pimas, most of whom are off attending a jubilee, or
fair, on the other side of the mountain.
No Priest has been in attendance for many years, though all its images, figures &c remain
unmolested, and in good keeping. No Mexicans live with them at all.
The Church at Xavier del Bac, which we left this morning is said to be the finest in
Sonora. ’Tis truly a noble and stupendous building. Its domes and spires which projected
above the thick mesquite growth as we approached was of itself sufficient to guarantee a
City with many churches and other large fine buildings. But when we came up, found it
standing solitary and alone, not another building nearer to it than Tucson, save the few
old Indian huts of the most rude description, whose inmates (Pimas) had charge of the
fine old church….It is kept by the Pimas with incredible care and neatness.
Couts summed up the condition of the Indians of Pimería Alta with these words: “The
unfortunate redman! unsuspicious and unsuspecting of the cunning and politic white flatterer,
little thought of their days being numbered! of the day when the white man would see the last red
warrior drowning in the Pacific, and rejoice when his rifle ball took the last breath of life from
him!”66 John Russell Bartlett was far less admiring than Couts in his own travel narrative.
Traveling through the same region in the early 1850s, he referred to Tumacácori and Guevavi as
“two depopulated towns, in both of which were churches.” He admired the church at Bac, but
wrote disparagingly of its Indian inhabitants:
[It was] truly a miserable place, consisting of from eighty to one hundred huts, or
wigwams, made or mud or straw, the sole occupants of which are Pimo Indians, though
generally called Papagos. In the midst of these hovels stands the largest and most
beautiful church in the State of Sonora…[one building adjacent to the church] is occupied
by the only Mexican family in the place.
He even insulted the Indians who took care of the beautiful church and worshiped there:
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The poor Indian doubtless believed them all to be saints, and made his offerings
accordingly, although about one half are statues of old Spanish cavaliers and figures of
Chinese mandarins…This church was built towards the close of the last century from the
produce of the Mission lands, and it is throughout in a good state of preservation.
Bartlett’s final piece of soliloquy is reserved for the failure of Mexican colonial policy, and how
Mexico had much to learn from United States Indian policy: “A more thoroughly lazy set of
people, I never saw…. Whether a proximity to the church and the worthless half-civilized
Mexicans has reduced them to this state of indolence and poverty, I know not; but if so, they
would better have remained in their native valleys, and never seen the faces of white men.”67
What Bartlett and Couts failed to recognize was the destructive power of the upheavals of the
period of Mexican independence, depopulation through disease and warfare, and struggles
between Native civil leaders, vecinos, and Franciscans that precipitated this mission decay.
Even in the face of these chaotic circumstances, Natives continued to select their
governors under the old Spanish model. Kino and Manje began the tradition of designating
Indian governors and other officials at the Native settlements of Pimería Alta. But, in most cases
no friar or civil official lived in close proximity to these communities. As Ruth Underhill
demonstrated, the selection of civil officials at O’odham communities in the absence of Spanish
civil or religious authority fell to the Natives themselves, and these selections varied on a villageto-village basis. Nevertheless, the practice of selecting town governors did persist, and these
officials proved their worth by navigating the increasingly complicated lines between
missionaries, vecinos, and other Indians during the Mexican period. As Spicer points out, PimaMexican relations took several forms as more Hispanos poured into Pimería Alta. As Mexican
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landholdings increased, they began to depend on O’odhams in particular as a labor source.
Indians provided the much needed labor, and took a larger part in an evolving cash economy.
They often traveled some distance from their villages to engage in this work, keeping their
homes and families at arm’s length. But in other locations, Pimas found it difficult to stem the
tide of increasing encroachment by Mexican settlers. In particular, Mexican cattlemen
encroached on Pima lands, and disputes arose over water and grazing land.68
In addition to farmers and ranchers, miners contributed significantly to Pima-Mexican
disputes. The late Spanish and Mexican periods marked an era of economic growth in the region.
When gold was discovered on O’odham lands in the 1830s, Mexican gold seekers poured into
the area. Around the town of Altar, violence nearly erupted between miners and O’odhams.
Santiago Redondo, the Mexican political chief of the Altar district, wrote on 12 May 1812 that,
“we were saved from further incident through the good graces of Tónolic, governor of Cubó and
a prominent O’odham leader.”69 The picture that emerges is one of Mexican settlers and
O’odhams on the brink of war in the late 1830s, with only O’odham governors standing in the
way of full-scale conflict on several occasions. Tónolic demonstrated masterful diplomacy
throughout this entire episode, as many O’odhams agitated for armed conflict with the Mexicans
and the forceful repossession of O’odham lands. Tónolic acted as the head of Indian civil
officials, fulfilling their duties of office. Redondo and other Mexicans were met at Soñi on 27
April 1838 by “Tónolic, the Papago governor of Cubó, and the governors of Carricito, Ayoma,
and Tac, all accompanied by constables, alcaldes, and other officials of their government.” As
68

Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 133.
John P. Wilson, foreword by Patricia M. Spoerl, Islands in the Desert: A History of the
Uplands of Southeastern Arizona (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, published in
cooperation with the Historical Society of New Mexico, 1995), 59; Santiago Redondo, 12 May
1838, in A Frontier Documentary, 62; see p. 60 for general description of mining incursions by
Mexicans and the resultant hostilities.
69

237
Tónolic and others voiced their complaints, “through Francisco Carro, our state-appointed
captain general of the Papagos, [we] tried to make him understand that there are legal procedures
he can follow when others try to steal Papago lands. More important, these procedures would
avoid armed invasions to seek out dissident Papagos and even enlist the powerful aid of our state
governor against the enemies of the Papagos”70 Despite the enormous pressures on these
O’odham leaders, their diplomatic relations with Mexicans did not completely collapse at this
time.
Unfortunately, conflicts between Mexicans and O’odhams did not cease in the late 1830s,
despite the heroic efforts of Native governors such as Tónolic. Mexicans had made various
attempts to ease the pressures in the region during the 1830s as well. Mexican officials believed
that the establishment of more civil officials for Pimas would solve some of the problems created
by Mexican land incursions and Apache raids. For example, the Sonoran congress issued Decree
19 in 1831, mandating that each major Indian settlement in Pimería Alta have two civil officials
(besides governors and previous officials). These two officers were a juez económico (economic
judge), who was a tribal judge and overseer of communal property. The other was the alguacil, a
constable who enforced law and order. In addition, on 1 April 1832 the ayuntamiento of the
Mexican town Altar petitioned for the establishment of a Pima Captain General for all of Pimería
Alta. In the end, they created two captains general—one for the northern region and one for the
southern.71 The aforementioned Francisco Carro was one of these, referred to as “our stateappointed captain general of the Papagos.” The fact that the Mexicans referred to the captain
general as “our” official, and that he attempted to persuade O’odhams to seek redress through
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legal channels, indicates that he grappled with a difficult intermediary relationship between
O’odhams and Mexicans, much as the Yaqui captain general, Juan María Jusacamea, found
himself at odds with Yaquis in the 1830s.
In spite of these efforts, an O’odham revolt was in full swing by 1840, spreading all the
way to San Xavier del Bac and its village of El Pueblito. O’odham auxiliaries stationed in the
Tucson presidio even clashed violently with Pinal Apaches living there, the so-called Apaches de
paz (peace Apaches). The long-expected Mexican military campaign arrived in April 1843, with
O’odhams suing for peace that summer. The two sides met to negotiate the peace in June 1843.
Pedro, the Native governor of Santa Rosa, led the O’odham party. Mexican officials offered
pardons to the O’odhams, for which Pedro expressed thanks on behalf of the all of the villages he
represented. The governors of Gácac and Pirigua joined Pedro as well. Antonio Comadurán
wrote the official Mexican account of proceedings that day:
[The three governors asked the Mexican official to] present them once again with the
wands of office that they had brought with them and reappoint them as governors of their
respective villages. They vowed to respect in the future only those communications
channeled through the presidio so as forever to avoid the grief brought upon the, recently
by lying to emissaries from elsewhere…I then collected their wands of office, which I
adorned with new ribbons, and requested that they prepare to receive them in the
accustomed fashion. They immediately knelt down, and as I presented each with his and I
reminded them of their obligations to both their own villages and our government. Each
made a profound bow with his head and kissed the wand of office. Their interpreter
explained to me that this meant that they would hold my present action forever sacred in
memory.
Finally I gave each of the three a certificate of temporary reappointment as village
governor. I urgently request that your office issue a certificate of permanent appointment
for each as soon as possible so that I can recall the temporary certificates: for Pedro as
governor of Santa Rosa, for José as governor of Pirigua, and for Juan Cuate as governor
of Gácac. In recognition of the special services of Pedro as your emissary to the western
Papago villages, I rewarded him with eight yards of broadcloth.72
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This telling account demonstrates the importance of O’odham civil governors, who made
peace with Mexican officials in the wake of armed conflict. They retained the power to govern
their villages, but they also had the power to represent and speak for their people, and to
negotiate peace between Indian villages and the government of Sonora. Mexican officials
recognized their power to govern and represent their people, and followed the custom dating
back to Spanish times of distributing varas with ribbon. In addition to varas and official
certificates, the ceremony also included gift giving, one of the ubiquitous hallmarks of Indian
diplomacy. That the Mexican official asked for permanent appointments for these Native
governors demonstrates the adaptability of the system within Pimería Alta, where exigency
proved more important than the letter of the law. Clearly, these governors were not chosen for
office after a formal election in the Iberian model, rather, the process reflected localized tradition
that had evolved since the days of Kino.
Although open hostilities of the early 1840s between Mexicans and O’odhams subsided,
the same issue of vecino encroachment persisted. The mid to late 1840s signaled the end of
Indian authority in the mission towns of Pimería Alta. In a letter dated 18 October 1846, Indian
governors from the towns of Oquitoa, Átil, and Tubutama complained to the Sonoran
departmental assembly about vecinos taking Indian lands. Hearkening back to pleas from
previous Pimas that Franciscan authority to administer Indian communal landholdings be upheld,
they asked that the sale of Indians lands be handled by their priest, and that the proceeds from
such sales be used for “the repair of our churches, the material needs of divine worship,
compensation for the religious instruction of our children, and with even more reason, the repair
and reconstruction of the residential rooms within the mission buildings themselves.” They were
angered that “all these benefits are [instead] going to the private citizens usurping the rights to
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our own lands. Justice demands that these lands immediately be returned to the administration of
our missionary.”73
The reply from the departmental assembly, which was addressed “to the native governors
of Oquitoa, Átil, and Tubutama,” made it clear that the priest no longer had the power to
administer Indian lands in former mission communities. The letter stated that the departmental
assembly had decided to place the proceeds from the sales of all Indian lands into a fund for an
Indian school and teacher. It further cited a Mexican national decree of 5 March 1845 that
relieved all missionaries of their jurisdiction over mission lands “and their emoluments.”74 This
exchange between Indian governors and Sonora officials demonstrated that priests were
powerless in administering Indian lands. Furthermore, the political climate after the late 1840s
no longer favored Native governors and officials. Changes had taken place within the framework
of Sonoran politics that had eroded the power of these officials. Pima town governors and civil
officials continued to handle some local affairs, but found themselves powerless to regulate the
sale of their common lands. This condition persisted until the United States took control of the
region after the Gadsden Purchase in 1854.
Political change, economic developments, and changes in the mission system all
combined from the late 1820s to produce a framework in which Pima autonomy came under
significant threat. Pointing specifically to the weakening of the mission system, Fontana
summarizes this period by stating:
The dismemberment of mission properties that occurred in the Pimería Alta after 1828
led to the privatization of lands, undermined the native tradition of communal
subsistence, and led to an increased demand for Indian labor in a cash economy. This
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foreordained that Indians would mix more readily with Spanish, mestizo, and mulatto
settlers who by then comprised the majority population. The movement toward
Mexicanization, with entry at the bottom rung of the socioeconomic ladder, became an
inevitability.75
Piman peoples in the region faced some of their darkest times within the framework of the
decline of the mission system and growth of the cash economy.
In addition to this mission decay, the central government in Mexico City completely
neglected the Indian towns of Pimería Alta from the 1820s through the Gadsden Purchase.76
Piman populations also decreased through outmarriage, relocation for economic opportunities,
and disease, eventually leading to what ethnohistorian of Pimería Alta Henry F. Dobyns refers to
as “Indian Extinction in the Middle Santa Cruz River Valley, Arizona.” Raids and depopulation
compelled the last 100 or so Indians at Tumacácori to flee to San Xavier del Bac in 1848. This
small group “constituted the entire surviving native Indian population in the Middle Santa Cruz
River Valley and beyond.” By the 1800s, this region of the Santa Cruz in particular had
experienced a depopulation ratio of 23/24ths of the 1700 population. This depopulation was
certainly not limited to the Santa Cruz Valley. At the mission town of San Ignacio, further to the
south, by the mid 1820s there were only a few dozen Indians left, compared to 1,500 vecinos.77
Such a loss is staggering, and it demonstrates how Indian civil leadership in such areas simply
could not continue; there was nobody left to govern.
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As a final note on Indian electoral participation in Mexican Pimería Alta, it is important
to point out that Indians participated in some forms of alternative voting outside of the setting of
village civil governance. For example, Hispano residents at the presidial town of Tubac and Pima
residents from Tumacácori shared close relations. Tubaqueños and Pimas from Tumacácori
shared the same irrigation water and ran their livestock herds together. Soldiers and settlers
served as godparents for the Indians baptized at the mission. In the words of historian of Pimería
Alta, Thomas Sheridan, “Cultural differences blurred between O’odham and non-O’odham as
Spanish Sonora leapfrogged north.” Pimas began serving as auxiliaries (non-professional Indian
militia) and as professional soldiers during the late Spanish period through Mexicans times.
Pimas of the Compañía de Pimas, or the Compañía de San Rafael de Buenavista, were
professional soldiers. Furthermore, from the first establishment of military outposts in the
Arizona-Sonora frontier, soldiers were encouraged to fraternize and intermarry with Piman
peoples, and settle at nearby presidios. This helped to maintain the peace to some degree. These
relationships aided Mexico in holding the frontier line.78
More importantly, Indians who served in military capacities participated in military
democracy, such as the electing of officers and other activities. In 1832, vecino and Indian forces
campaigned against Apaches in Pimería Alta, the same military forays in which Yaquis were so
hesitant to participate. In May of that year, leaders from the so-called “patriotic pueblos” of
Cucurpe, Tuape, San Ignacio, Magdalena, Ímuris, Cocóspera, Tumacácori, San Xavier del Bac,
and Tucson met at Cocóspera as the guests of Father Rafael Díaz, while they readied for the
military campaign. They formed La Sección Patriótica, and elected don Ignacio Elías to preside
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over their meeting. They then named Joaquín Vicente Elías as chief of their organization. Next,
they drew up military articles, with Father Díaz signing the pact on behalf of the O’odham leader
Francisco Carros, who was serving as Lieutenant General of the Pima Nation. They defeated an
Apache war party on 4 June 1832, with La Sección Patriótica killing seventy-one Apache
fighters, as well as capturing thirteen Apache children, while suffering only a single death in
their own ranks. The battle was a resounding success, but it also engendered the resentment of
some Mexican regulars, who saw La Sección Patriótica as “a bunch of farmers and breeds.”79 As
substantial as the victory was, the activities prior to the battle were a significant moment of
Indian democratic participation, as Indian soldiers elected leaders and contributed to the planning
of their military activities. Their civil counterparts in the villages would not fare as well by the
close of Mexican rule in Pimería Alta.

Conclusion
Indian peoples in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands found themselves at a crossroads with
the ushering in of an independent Mexican republic. Independence could have signaled a new era
in Indian affairs. The rhetoric of the Tres Garantías promised Indian political and social equality,
with Indians to be finally incorporated into the political mainstream. But things did not pan out
as Mexican policymakers had intended. The Mexican era left Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas with no
more access to the franchise and political equality than they had enjoyed under Spain. Hopis felt
increasing pressures within their position on the extreme edge of Mexican territory. They were
subjected to warfare and raids with other more mobile Indian nations. While this presented the
possibility of strengthening Hopi-Mexican ties, and perhaps even bringing the Hopi back into the
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Hispano political sphere, this opportunity passed without coming to fruition. Mexico was
stretched too thin, and the young nation did not have the men or the resources to dedicate to
Hopis, their overtures for assistance notwithstanding. Under these circumstances, Hopis
remained politically independent, with no established electoral system based on an Iberian
model. It would be left to United States policymakers to take up the cause of Hopi political
inclusion, and Anglo-Americans would face similar challenges in dealing with these isolated and
independent peoples.
Yaquis found themselves at the other extreme. After reduction and missionization during
the seventeenth century, Yaquis developed a complex system of civil government, complete with
annual elections and varas de justicia. Their incorporation of this system seems so thorough that
attempts by Hispano religious, civil, and military authorities to limit Yaqui electoral freedom,
among other rights guaranteed to Indians, led to violent conflict on several occasions. In the
wake of the 1740 revolt, Yaquis continued to develop a town governing system based on
consensus and popular sovereignty over the course of the second half of the eighteenth century
and the first decades of the nineteenth. By the time of Mexican independence, Yaquis had
created a system that went far beyond governors, lieutenant governors, sheriffs, and the like. The
Yaqui town was governed by complex system of civil governance in which numerous branches
formed an integrated whole. The Yaqui vote was paramount in this system.
When Mexico declared Yaquis citizens of the republic, this meant an end to Yaqui
communal land tenure practices and tax exemptions. But more important than the allotment of
land to individual Yaqui families or taxation was the issue of Yaqui autonomy in governing their
internal affairs. Division of land and the sale of excess lands to vecinos meant that Mexico
considered the Yaquis as part of the larger municipalities in which their voice would be only one
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of many. To Yaquis, the idea of outsiders having the final say in their governance was
insufferable. So the Yaqui flag bearer, Juan Banderas, took up the mantle of Muni and Bernabé.
Eloquent and charismatic though he was, Banderas’s frenetic leadership failed to unite Yaquis
and surrounding Indian nations in a manner that would decisively push the Mexicans out of their
territory. Further, Banderas failed to abide by the central Yaqui principles of unity and popular
sovereignty. At the very moment when Yaquis had won concessions that would preserve some
degree of autonomy in internal affairs, Banderas chose to stand on his own, rather than behind
elected Yaqui officials. This decision would lead to the end of his power, and to his own capture
and execution. Although Yaquis had failed, as in 1740, Mexico would still have to confront
issues of Yaqui autonomy in the future. Yaquis had once again demonstrated their fierce
commitment to self-government and Indian democracy.
Pimas experienced significant population decline over the course of missionization. With
shrinking—or even vanishing—populations, a number of the Pima missions were closed, and
community members relocated to other missions or returned to a more mobile life in the
rancherías. In communities outside Mexican control, Pimas continued to select governors and
other authorities who dealt with vecinos and their leaders. But in the Pimería Alta of the 1820s
and 1830s, as the secular impulse attacked the foundations of the mission system, Pimas saw the
delicate repúblicas they had constructed over the course of decades erode away as well. As
Sonoran authorities pursued a policy of Hispano settlement on former mission lands, while
claiming to insure that lands were equitably administered to Indians, Indian governors and civil
authorities saw their power eroded, while mission priests experienced a similar diminution of
power. Surrounded on all sides by Hispano encroachment, and without the backing of Jesuits or
Franciscans, Indian authorities were left in worrisome positions. In some mission communities
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where priests no longer served, the power to administer mission lands, moneys, and goods fell to
Indian governors, which was an unprecedented development in their colonial experience. In
other areas outside of Mexican control, Indian governors and civil leaders continued to exercise
diplomatic authority and sought to protect the land and sovereignty of their people. But in many
areas, Pima civil leaders were simply overlooked by Mexican administrators, whose primary
concerns were the division of communal Indian lands and Hispano settlement on “excess” lands.
It must also be recalled that Indian elections and civil governance had always been varied and
uneven in Pimería Alta. In some areas, Natives continued to choose their civil leaders according
to established tribal democratic processes, but in other areas friars and Mexican officials took it
upon themselves to exercise this power.
Hopis represented one extreme on the spectrum of civil power and civil governance. For
them, the idea of separation of the secular and sacred was nonexistent. While Hopis avoided
administrative change, their political independence came at a high price as they were constantly
under threat from Indian and Hispano raiders, with no protection from the Mexican republic.
Yaqius, living in organized mission communities with highly developed models of governance,
reflected the other extreme. Mexico felt they profited too much from their special status and
protections as Indians. The time had come for their incorporation, no matter the cost to their
system of government. For Yaquis clinging to the entrenched pillars of the Indian franchise and
the division of power in the Iberian model, Hispano attempts to alter these pillars once again
resulted in bloodshed and upheaval. Pimas lived in a sort of middle ground, where a variety of
forces prevented the full establishment of the Indian franchise and deeply rooted civil
institutions. All three of these peoples, situated as they were on at different points on the
spectrum of political incorporation, found themselves on dangerous ground during the Mexican
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era. Life would only grow more complicated under the United States administration.
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Chapter 5
REFUSING CITIZENSHIP: PUEBLO INDIANS AND VOTING DURING THE UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL PERIOD

Introduction
When Stephen Watts Kearny’s Army of the West entered Santa Fe on 15 August 1846,
the Native population of New Mexico could not have imagined the incredible pressures that the
Anglo-Americans would bring to bear on the Native political systems that had been in place for
nearly two and one-half centuries. During the Spanish period, New Mexico’s Pueblo peoples had
enjoyed a relative degree of autonomy in the selection of their own civil officials and internal
governance. Although Spaniards had imposed their will on Pueblo civil and religious affairs at
various times during the Spanish period, Spain viewed Indians as citizens of repúblicas de indios
with distinct political rights. Still, Indians were not considered citizens of Spain until the final
days of Spanish rule, and even then their status as citizens was far from secure.
When Augustín de Iturbide ushered in an independent Mexico with his Plan de Iguala, it
looked as if the new nation was poised to finally complete the job of politically incorporating the
millions of Native peoples who resided within its boundaries. While the Republic of Mexico
embraced the rhetoric of equality of political rights for all Mexicans, chaos plagued the national
government for several decades. As a result, the government in Mexico City virtually ignored the
Pueblos, even though they were technically Mexican citizens. The Pueblos continued to practice
village electoral politics, but now with the added potential element of participation in political
affairs alongside Hispanos. When Mexico City did seek to flex its muscle in New Mexican
affairs, a revolt in Río Arriba saw unprecedented cooperation between Pueblos and Hispanos,
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resulting in the overthrow and death of the centrally appointed governor. Still, Pueblo peoples in
the 1840s lived a life very similar to that of a century or more before. They followed the cycles
of nature, saw to their ceremonial obligations, and farmed the land that had sustained them since
time immemorial. They did not know what to expect when the United States took over their
territory. If past experience were any indicator, the change of power would be in name only, with
very little substantive change in their everyday lives.
But the reality was that Natives in New Mexico were confronting a colonial power with
an altogether different conception of Indian status and political rights. From its inception, the
United States had never considered Indians as citizens, and the right of an Indian to vote in an
election, municipal or otherwise, would have been practically unthinkable. During the first half
of the nineteenth century, the United States had exterminated or removed the numerous Native
groups it had encountered in its march toward a “manifest destiny.” But it had little to no
experience with Southwestern Native peoples whose rights had been established under the
Spanish regime. As the U.S. pursued successive waves of Indian policies—treaties with
Indigenous nations, Indian reservations, the Peace Policy, an influx of Christian reformers,
assimilation, allotment in severalty, boarding school education1—the Pueblos never neatly fit
into these plans. Many difficult questions arose. Principal among these was the citizenship status
of the Pueblo Indians. Would they be citizens as they had been under Mexico (even if this
citizenship was nominal)? Would they become wards of the federal government like other Native
peoples in United States territory? Would the system of virtually independent village government
1
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continue? There were no easy answers to these issues, and federal, territorial, local, and Pueblo
officials would all grapple with these questions. Indian suffrage would become a central part of
this debate. Soon after the transition to United States rule, the Pueblos would realize that they
were confronting an entirely different character of colonial overlord. During New Mexico’s
lengthy territorial period, from 1846 to 1912, the Pueblos saw their lands, political rights, and
very existence threatened by numerous foes.
Throughout the territorial period, United States and New Mexico officials engaged in a
fierce power struggle, with the Pueblos caught in the middle. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
offered United States citizenship to citizens of the Republic of Mexico; this included Indians.
Territorial officials wanted to grant citizenship to Indians so that they could be alienated from
their lands. Under such an arrangement, Pueblo Indians, Anglo-Americans, and Hispanos would
form New Mexico’s citizenry. Pueblo Indians would also be under the political jurisdiction of
the larger municipalities in which they resided. They would no longer be deemed “Indians,” with
special rights or protections. As agents of the federal government, Indian Service employees
opposed Pueblo Indian citizenship and campaigned for the Pueblos to become wards of the
federal government. They saw this designation as the best way to protect Pueblo lands and insure
the survival of these communities. Indian agents recognized in the Pueblos many of the traits that
indicated a “civilized” people, but they were still distinctly Indian.
While territorial officials labored to secure Pueblo Indian citizenship in order to open up
Pueblo lands to alienation, and federal officials argued for Pueblo inclusion as wards of the
federal government, it was the Pueblos themselves who exercised their agency, limited though it
was within the confines of the U.S. colonial system, and took the necessary steps to preserve
their political rights. They chose to reject United States citizenship. They repeatedly expressed
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their desire to become wards of the federal government and live under its protection. As difficult
as this decision must have been, wardship insured the form of citizenship they valued above all
else: citizenship in the individual Pueblo. As wards of the federal government, Pueblo Indians
could continue to select their local governors and civil officers as they had for hundreds of years,
and exercise autonomy on the local level. In this way, they protected the Native vote in their own
communities, while rejecting the vote and participation in external affairs. Internal sovereignty
trumped Indian citizenship in the larger nation.

Pueblo Status During the U.S.-Mexico War and After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
After leading the army that seized New Mexico in the summer of 1846, Stephen Watts
Kearny issued the so-called “Kearny Code” for the governing of the territory. The code begins
with a Bill of Rights based loosely on that of the United States Constitution, guaranteeing such
rights as peaceable assembly, jury trial, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press. The code
also establishes laws for governing New Mexico, including laws relating to property, criminal
offenses, and the elections of officials. But, the Kearny Code makes no mention of Indians,
Pueblo or otherwise.2 This is not to say that Kearny and his men were unconcerned with the
Pueblos; they clearly were. And Pueblo Indians were equally interested in assessing the character
of the invaders. The two sides enjoyed somewhat tense initial encounters. As Alfonso Ortiz
relates, an episode unfolded in which Pueblo leaders came to Santa Fe to meet with United States
officials. In a scene reminiscent of the one that took place in early January 1822, when Pueblo
leaders had sworn allegiance to an independent Mexico, Pueblo leaders again traveled to Santa
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Fe to meet with another new government. On the morning of 14 August 1846, these leaders
pledged their allegiance to the United States. But, as Ortiz points out, they also traveled to the
capital to “gauge what the transition would mean for them.”3 William H. Emory, an American
military officer in Kearny’s army,4 recorded observations in his journal. When the Army of the
West arrived in Santa Fe, they feared an attack by a combined force of Mexican and Pueblo
Indian soldiers. Interestingly, he relates that, “the Mexicans, to a man, were anxious for a fight,
but that half the Pueblo Indians were indifferent on the subject, but would be made to fight.” The
Pueblos had no desire to fight for the Republic of Mexico. He also highlights the meeting
between American military officials and Pueblo leaders:
The next day, the chiefs and head men of the Pueblo Indians came to give in their
adhesion and express their great satisfaction at our arrival. This large and formidable tribe
are amongst the best and most peaceable citizens of New Mexico [Anglo-Americans
repeatedly mistook the nineteen separate New Mexico Pueblos for a single tribe]. They,
early after the Spanish conquest, embraced the forms of religion, and the manners and
customs of their then more civilized masters, the Spaniards. Their interview was long and
interesting. They narrated, what is tradition with them, that the white man would come
from the far east and release them from the bonds and shackles which the Spaniards had
imposed, not in the name, but in a worse form than slavery.
They and the numerous half-breeds are our fast friends now and forever. Three hundred
years of oppression and injustice have failed to extinguish in this race the recollection
that they were once the peaceable and inoffensive masters of the country.5
These seemingly innocuous encounters would be the first in a long and troubled relationship
between Anglo-Americans and Pueblo Indians.
3
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At the aforementioned meeting, representatives from Santo Domingo Pueblo invited the
Americans to visit their village. The Americans agreed, and Emory again provides our account
for this visit. The American party traveled to Santo Domingo early the next month, and Emory’s
narration of events offers a perfect description of the Indian political status quo in 1846:
September 3.—This has been a great day. An invitation was received, some days since,
from the Pueblo Indians to visit their town of Santo Domingo….we met ten or fifteen
sachemic looking old Indians, well mounted, and two of them carrying gold-headed canes
with tassels [varas de justicia], the emblems of office in New Mexico.
Salutations over…the alcalde [governor perhaps], a grave and majestic old Indian, said,
as if casually, “We shall meet some Indians presently, mounted, and dressed for war, but
they are the young men of my town, friends come to receive you, and I wish you to
caution your men not to fire upon them when they ride towards them.”…[After a colorful
display by mounted Santo Domingo warriors,] we were joined by the priest, a fat old
white gentleman. We were escorted first to the padre’s, of course; for here, as every
where, these men are the most intelligent, and the best to do in the world, and when the
good people wish to put their best foot foremost, the padre’s wines, beds, and couches
have to suffer. The entrance to the portal was lined with the women of the village, all
dressed alike, and ranged in treble files; they looked fat and stupid….[After being hosted
in the priest’s residence,] the general went forward on the portal and delivered a speech to
the assembled people of the town, which was first interpreted into Spanish, and then into
Pueblo.6
The Domingueños interacted with the American officials in the manner to which they were
accustomed, with duly chosen leaders of the autonomous Pueblo wielding their staffs of office
and treating with the Americans on a government-to-government basis.
But such encounters were also complicated by darker incidents, such as the violent
uprising of Taos Pueblo Indians and Hispanos against the American military government of New
Mexico in 1847, which resulted in the death of New Mexico’s first governor, Charles Bent.
Officials recognized that they had to determine the political status of Indians, especially the
Pueblos. The territorial government, now under Governor Donaciano Vigil,7 took its first
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substantive action in this regard when it enacted a law in December 1847 that formally
incorporated the Pueblos as legal entities. The law reads:
The inhabitants within the Territory of New Mexico, known by the name of the Pueblo
Indians, and living in towns or villages built on lands granted to such Indians by the laws
of Spain and Mexico, and conceding to such inhabitants certain lands and privileges, to
be used for the common benefit, are severally hereby created and constituted bodies
politic and corporate, and shall be known in the law by the name of the Pueblo de
_______, (naming it) and by that name they and their successors, shall have perpetual
succession, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, bring and defend in any court of
law or equity, all such actions, pleas and matters whatsoever, proper to recover, protect,
reclaim, demand or assert the right of such inhabitants, or any individual thereof, to any
lands, tenements or hereditaments, possessed, occupied or claimed contrary to law, by
any person whatsoever, and to bring and defend all such actions, and to resist any
encroachment, claim or trespass made upon such lands, tenements or hereditaments,
belonging to said inhabitants, or to any individual.8
This law was to have far-reaching consequences. It opened up Pueblo communities to all sorts of
lawsuits from the outside, especially lawsuits involving land.9
The United States and Mexican governments then took up the matter of the political status
of those Mexican citizens who resided in the conquered territory with the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. Article VIII of the treaty reads:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain
for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be
free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic,
retaining the property which they possess in the said territories, or disposing thereof, and
removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their being subjected, on this account,
to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever.
Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories may either retain the title and rights
advisory in nature, it marked serious efforts by Vigil and others to establish a functioning civil
government in the wake of the U.S-Mexico War. See Joseph P. Sánchez, Robert L. Spude, and
Art Gómez, New Mexico: A History, 110–111.
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of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States. But they shall be
under the obligation to make their election within one year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in the said territories after the
expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of
Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States.
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not established
there, shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans
who may hereafter acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it
guarantees equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United States.
In other words, all Mexicans who chose to remain in the newly conquered territory could either
“retain” Mexican citizenship or “acquire” United States citizenship. This applied to Indians as
well as Hispanos, since all were Mexican citizens. Article IX goes on to stipulate that:
The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of citizens
of the Mexican Republic, conformably with what is stipulated in the preceding article,
shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States. and be admitted at the proper
time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the
rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the Constitution; and
in the mean time, shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty
and property.10
The wording of these articles could not be more clear: Mexicans—a designation that included
Indians—who remained in New Mexico, and did not declare their intentions to retain Mexican
citizenship, would then become citizens of the United States, with their rights and properties
secured to them. As Joe Sando puts it, “Clarity of purpose is certainly expressed in the language
of the treaty.” Regarding whether the Pueblos desired to remain citizens of Mexico, he is equally
unequivocal: “Not a single Pueblo Indian elected to retain Mexican citizenship.”11
Although the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was clear enough, and Mexico had declared
all Indians citizens of the republic decades prior, Anglo-Americans quickly made a mess of the
issue. According to Sando, the central questions were these:
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Are the Pueblo people Indians? Do the Pueblo people have the right to protection under
United States law, as Indians? These questions plagued both the Congress and the Pueblo
people, as they were shuttled from one lawsuit to another in their persistent struggle to
endure as the oldest continuous native inhabitants of North America. During the process
of these lawsuits, there were some descriptions of Pueblo life and culture that bear
repeating. Indeed, these statements express the strange climate of those years, as the
Pueblos won respect and admiration but were deprived of rights accorded other tribes in
the United States.12
In the decades following the treaty this issue came to be tied directly to voting. Before the late
1840s, the Pueblos had participated almost exclusively in electoral processes on the village level.
Even during the Mexican period, when the Pueblos were legally given the right to vote and to
hold office, relatively few cases have been recorded in which they went beyond the limits of
their own communities to vote in elections. Further, governors and lieutenant governors had the
job of dealing with outsiders, thus diminishing interactions between common Pueblo people and
Hispano officials. Pueblo Indians did not generally seek the vote or to hold office.13 As such, the
Pueblos were mostly left to themselves through the 1840s, tending mostly to internal affairs. This
served as a stark contrast to the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands, where the Occidente/Sonora
government sought to forcibly bring groups such as the Yaquis into the political mainstream.
In the years following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the right of Pueblo Indians to
vote occupied the attention of Indian Service and territorial officials. Concern over voting rights

12

Sando, Pueblo Nations, 86–88; see also Mary Childers Mangusso, “A Study of the Citizenship
Provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” (master’s thesis, University of New Mexico,
1966), 77. Mangusso also demonstrates that Pueblos were not the only Indians in ceded Mexican
territory that confronted issues of citizenship. A small number of Indians and people of Indian
descent living in Upper California had also been considered Mexican citizens. The California
Constitutional Convention in 1849 engaged in a debate on whether or not to extend citizenship to
these Indians. Delegates grappled with how to grant citizenship to “civilized Indians” who
“deserved” it while simultaneously withholding it from “wild Indians.” The convention
eventually decided that the state would grant citizenship to Indians on a case-by-case basis, when
they deemed it proper to do so. See Mangusso pp. 77–79.
13
An exception would have been those Pueblo Indians who moved out of the Pueblos and into
Hispano communities, becoming “indios ladinos” and living as Hispanos did.

257
was tied to the larger questions of civilization, land, and citizenship. James S. Calhoun, whom
President Zachary Taylor appointed Indian Agent at Santa Fe in April 1849, framed much of the
early debate around the Indian vote in the territory. His policies would profoundly affect the
Indian vote and citizenship through the duration of the territorial period. In one of his earliest
letters as Indian Agent, Calhoun wrote to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Medill on 29
July 1849:
The Pueblo Indians…are entitled to the early, and especial consideration of the
government of the United States. They are the only tribe in perfect amity with the
government, and are an industrious, agricultural, and pastoral people, living principally in
villages, ranging North and West of Taos South, on both sides of the Rio Grande, more
than two hundred and fifty miles. By a Mexican statute these people…were constituted
citizens of the Republic of Mexico, granting to all of mature age, who could read and
write the privilege of voting. But this statute has no practical operation.14
As Calhoun gained more experience with the Pueblos, he began to see the pressing problems
they faced. After undertaking an expedition against the Navajos with fifty-four Pueblo soldiers,
Calhoun commented that the Pueblo Indians “are, in every sense of the word, excellent people,
and ought to be immediately protected.” He met with leaders from twelve Pueblos—Jemez,
Laguna, Acoma, Santo Domingo, San Juan, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, Nambé, Pojoaque, Zia,
Santa Ana, and Sandia—and he began to understand how local Hispano officials such as alcaldes
and prefects did not “use their authority, whatever it may be, without abusing it. Contributions
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upon their labor, and property, are frequently made by the law, or laws, which Alcaldes and
Prefects manufacture to suit the occasion.”15
In fact, the Pueblos needed protection from a number of groups. First of all, they required
military protection from Navajos and other Indian nations who raided their communities.
Calhoun noted that under Spain and Mexico, Pueblos had been permitted to make reprisals
against such raiders, but the United States turned down requests to continue this practice: “it has
not been deemed advisable to accede to this request.”16 More important, they needed protection
from encroachment by land hungry Hispanos and Anglo-Americans. Corrupt local officials
supported the spurious actions of greedy outliers to Pueblo communities. The question of land
was the single most important one for the Pueblos. They had labored mightily over the centuries
to protect their lands against Spanish and Mexican encroachments, and had often seen their
efforts fail. But, they had managed to protect portions of the lands granted to them by Spain until
the territorial period. As corporate communities who could now sue and be sued, and whose land
could be alienated, they were particularly vulnerable. Indian leaders and delegations visited
Calhoun in an almost unending stream, complaining of these encroachments and begging
Calhoun for relief from both settlers and local officials. For example, Calhoun wrote of a visit by
the “Governor, Lt. Governor, and an Indian of less repute, of the Pueblo of Santo Domingo,”
who had come to him “to enter a formal complaint in reference to encroachments upon their
planting grounds, and asking for a redress of grievances.” Aware of the crucial importance the
Pueblos placed on their lands, Calhoun saw the foolishness of attempting to remove them or
consolidate them onto reservations:
15
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To remove and consolidate the Indians of the various Pueblos at a common point is out of
the question—the general character of their houses are superior to those of Santa Fe—
they have rich valleys to cultivate—grow quantities of corn and wheat, and raise vast
herds of horses, mules, sheep and goats…they are a valuable, and available people, and
as firmly fixed in their homes, as any one can be in the United States.
Their lands are held by Spanish and Mexican grants—to what extent is unknown—and in
their religion, they are Catholics, with a certain admixture of an early superstition, with
its ceremonials; all of which attaches them to the soil of their fathers—the soil upon
which they came into existence, and the soil upon which they have been reared—and
their concentration is not advisable.17
Calhoun was confronting something outside the experience of Indian Service administrators up
to that point. As Marc Simmons explains:
Wholly foreign was the idea underlying Spanish and Mexican administration of the
Indians—that the native people when ready should be incorporated as full citizens and
allowed unrestricted participation in provincial life. Almost at once those responsible for
Indian affairs in New Mexico realized that relations with the Pueblos would have to be
founded, not upon any civilizing mission, but rather upon a program of government
protection that extended them aid in maintaining their self-sufficiency and peaceful
habits.18
Even though it would be a long and difficult process, Calhoun seemed particularly interested and
even empathetic concerning the plight of the Pueblos.
It soon became clear to territorial officials that Indian voting and Indian citizenship were
inextricably linked. According to the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which became
the law of the United States upon ratification by the Senate, Pueblo Indians were U. S. citizens
17
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and entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens. Calhoun realized as much when he wrote
to Commissioner Medill on 15 October 1849: “…one born in Mexico, was a Mexican Citizen,
and, as such, is a voter; and therefore, all the Pueblo Indians are voters.” But Calhoun was also
aware that the Pueblos had not generally been in the practice of exercising the right to vote
outside their own village boundaries: “But, still, the exercise of this privilege was not known.”
He also felt some ambivalence about the status of the Pueblos as citizens and voters. Calhoun
recognized that they had been citizens of Mexico by law and should, therefore, be United States
citizens. But he did not view them as American citizens yet:
They must become Citizens, sooner or later, of the United States; and if there was a State
or territory to be found immediately west of the Rio Grande, I should not hesitate to say,
these Pueblos are entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States,
as mere voters—As to the rights which it may have been designed to confer upon them
under the 9th. Art. of the late treaty, I venture not an opinion…If the Pueblo Indians are
to be taxed, they are from their general intelligence, and probity as much entitled to
select their agents, as the mass of New Mexico…it is easier to dispose of the tribes of
roving Indians, than the better, and more civilized Pueblo Indians.19
Calhoun believed that the Pueblos were advanced enough to be “mere voters.” But, whether they
qualified for all of the citizenship rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, he would “venture not an opinion.” Calhoun frequently qualified his assessments of the
Pueblos with statements like the following: “…that a more upright and useful people are no
where to be found; fit to be associated with, and to have—all the rights and privileges of the
body politic, at least, so far as the right of suffrage is concerned; or, if it should be preferable,
you may colonize them, without risking convulsion.”20 He found himself in a tricky situation,
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and yet, it is difficult to feel a great deal of sympathy for his position. Calhoun essentially wished
that the Pueblos were more like the savage Indians, whom the United States simply removed
from their lands and forced onto reservations, without the added worry of citizenship and voting
rights.
From this early point in his tenure, Calhoun began developing his own conception of
Pueblo political status in New Mexico, one that favored wardship and protection by the federal
government over citizenship. While today we may view these concepts as not mutually
exclusive, Calhoun and other authorities were unable to reconcile them. Either the Pueblos were
wards of the federal government, subject to special protections stemming from that status, or
they were citizens of the United States, subject to all the laws and obligations of non-Indians.
From Calhoun’s perspective, the issue of encroachment and abuse of power by petty officials
would only continue if the Pueblos were declared full citizens. In late 1849, he began advocating
that the Pueblos be brought under the care of the federal government under the provisions of the
Nonintercourse Act of 1834. This act aimed to protect tribes from non-Indian trespassing; it
prohibited settlers from entering or settling on Indian lands.21 But inclusion under the protections
offered through the Nonintercourse Act also meant that the Pueblos would be considered Indians
in the same vein as other, “less civilized” groups. This possibility was not particularly
concerning to Calhoun, or to the Pueblos themselves for that matter, but opponents would later
cite the degree to which the Pueblos had become civilized as an argument against wardship.
The inspiration for the warship concept came from decisions relating to the Cherokees
handed down by the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall. In
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), Marshall wrote that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct
political society separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself…” But, while the court ruled that the Cherokee Nation, and other Indian nations, were
indeed states unto themselves, they must be considered “domestic dependant nations.”
Furthermore, they were “in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian.”22 Over the coming decades, agents attempted to apply this principle to
the Pueblos. They were independent political entities capable of governing themselves, but their
incomplete state of civilization, coupled with the need for protection from Hispano and AngloAmerican land grabs, entitled them to federal protection as wards.
If the federal government were to consider the Pueblos wards and offer them protection
under the Nonintercourse Act, the question of voting in municipal, state, and federal elections
would have to be resolved. To Calhoun the solution was simple: Pueblo Indians would forego
voting in such elections. He set to work in early 1850, attempting to convince the Pueblos that
wardship was preferable to citizenship and civil rights. In addition to the issue of land theft by
non-Indians, Calhoun also recognized that full citizenship would pose a threat to the system of
internal government that the Pueblos had enjoyed for over two centuries. Writing in midNovember 1849, Calhoun argued that wardship would protect indigenous civil government for
the Pueblos:
There are a few, at the present, but few, who advise the immediate blending of these
Indians with the mass of the people of this territory, with common laws, and institutions
for the government of all alike—The execution of this plan would in my opinion produce
terrible results—….The localities of these Indians, are chequered by their own Pueblos,
and old Spanish, and Mexican Villages—The former Government of this territory, having
never interfered with their peculiar form of governments, each Pueblo has had, from time
immemorial, a separate and distinct political existence—Instances are now occurring of
Prefects and Alcaldes extending the operation of some of the laws of this territory over
22
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these people—a matter they can not comprehend, and of which, they daily complain, and
beg for relief [plus the matter of reprisals for Apache and Comanche and such tribes
raids]…I, by no means, deem it an impracticable matter, to make these people as worthy
and useful Citizens as will be found in this territory; but, this is not the labor of a day.23
This statement was the most astute of Calhoun’s observations about the Pueblos. Certainly, the
Pueblos were concerned first and foremost with encroachments on their lands by Hispano and
Anglo-American settlers. But, they were also extremely alarmed by interference from outside
petty officials in matters of Pueblo government, which had been relatively rare under the
successive república and Mexican systems. These Indians could not comprehend the sudden
change they were encountering, and they complained “daily” to Calhoun. If he could redefine the
Pueblos as wards of the federal government, he believed he could solve the twin problems of
land encroachments and interference in internal Pueblo governments.
Taos Pueblo provides a fitting example of the importance of land and local autonomy for
the Pueblos. In January 1850, Calhoun traveled north from Santa Fe. That he made the trip in
January, when conditions can be quite treacherous in the northern New Mexico mountains,
demonstrates the increasing severity of the Pueblo political situation. At Taos, he found the
Indians in a “moody and dissatisfied state.” For one thing, there had been an election for
delegates to a territorial convention the previous fall, accompanied by accusations that Taos
Indians had been “brought to the polls and induced to vote.” They also complained of “Mexican”
encroachments on their lands. But, they also lamented that Hispano authorities had “subverted”
the laws of the Pueblo, “laws by which they had been governed from time immemorial.” Worst
of all, outside officials had meddled in the process of selecting local officers:
Alcaldes were now being appointed by the Governor at Santa Fe, instead of the annual
elections to which they had been accustomed. They pray for protection, and the extension
of the United States Indian laws over them….Mexican Alcaldes, sheriffs &c &c.
23
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appointed by American authority, are demanding just such contributions as they may
desire, for their own use—and many of the Pueblos have yielded to these unjust
demands, and for which there is not the shadow of a law.24
Calhoun could see no solution to such problems other than moving these Indians outside of New
Mexico’s jurisdiction and under the watchful eye of the federal government. He made the case
for wardship to the Taoseños, “explain[ing] to [them] the character of the laws of the U. S.
regulating trade and intercourse with Indians, and made them understand how such laws might
affect them.” But he also made it clear that they could advocate for their rights as American
citizens: “I also, told them, if they preferred to be a part of all the people of New Mexico, they
might have the right of voting for Governors, Members of Congress, and all of the officers of a
State, or territory.” But, if they chose this condition, then they would lose their status as an
autonomous community. Calhoun went on to explain:
…if they should determine to ask the President of the United State to secure them in an
independent government, and to extend to them the benefits of the laws regulating trade
and intercourse with Indians under the protection of the Government, they ought not to
allow themselves to be used by Americans or Mexicans in voting at elections for officers
out of their Pueblo—that in said elections they should take no part, but quietly attend to
their own business. [Other American officials present echoed what he said], and closed
with a full endorsement of my advice as to voting, unless they preferred to yield their
identity as a distinct people.25
This letter is extremely revealing regarding the evolution of Calhoun’s views on Indian voting.
Initially, Calhoun had been of the opinion that the Pueblos qualified for voting rights. And while
he allowed for the possibility of a Pueblo push for citizenship and voting rights in territorial,
state, congressional, and national elections, he realized that he would be unable to offer them any
protection from further encroachments and abuses. Furthermore, Calhoun recognized that New
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Mexico’s courts offered no support for the embattled Pueblos.26 He repeatedly called for the
settling of Pueblo land claims, but this process failed to gather the requisite steam. He warned
that if these developments went unchecked, the end result would be a loss of their status as a
distinct people.
For the Taos Pueblo Indians, this was an unthinkable result. According to Calhoun, their
identity, culture, government, and religion—everything that they were—was at stake. The
Indians met at council for some time, and then returned with their reply. The governor and
principales asked Calhoun if the Nonintercourse Act could be extended over them immediately.
He told them that he did not have the power to do so, but that he would lobby the “great Father”
to extend these laws over them as soon as possible. After returning to Santa Fe, Calhoun wrote a
letter to the Taos Indians reiterating what they had discussed in council. In his clearest statement
of the dangers of citizenship and voting, he states:
…if you prefer to be mixed up with the laws, and the people of New Mexico, and take
your chance to become citizens like them, and to be governed, not by your own laws, but
by such as the Americans and Mexicans here may make for you, I do not think your great
Father will object to it, But it is my duty to tell you, I do not think that course would be
the best for you, and my advice to you is, be quiet, attend to your own business pursuit,
and dont [sic] listen to the talk of bad men, and in due time, your great Father, the
President of all the Indians, and all the people, of the United States, will take care to order
his agents here, so as to act as to secure, to you happiness and prosperity.
He even reminded them that they “told me you understood it, that you did not wish to be New
Mexicans, that you wished to live as a separate community, and to make your own laws, and to
execute them in your own way, and to select your own Officers, all in the same way that you,
26
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and your fathers, and your fathers fathers have done, since the Great Spirit sent you into this
country.”27
The episode at Taos Pueblo was not an isolated exchange between James C. Calhoun and
the Pueblos of New Mexico. Calhoun made the case for wardship to all of the Pueblos, whether
in person at their villages, to their governors and representatives who came to see him, or in
letters. He reported in late 1849 that, “Of the twenty two Pueblos, east of the Mochies [sic, ie
Hopis], sixteen have asked for the extension of the laws which regulated the intercourse with the
Indian tribes of the United States prior to the late treaty with Mexico.” In the same letter, he
related that the Indians of Santa Clara Pueblo had reminded him “they were permitted, each, a
separate government for every Pueblo—a separate and undisturbed political existence.”28 Next to
retaining their sacred lands, this separate and undisturbed political existence was important
above all else.
To summarize, prior to the 1840s, the Pueblos did not have a strong tradition of electoral
participation beyond the village level. In the wake of the United States takeover of New Mexico
during the U.S.-Mexico War, Hispanos—and Anglo-Americans to some extent—made a
conscious effort to dispossess Pueblos of their land. They also sought to bring Pueblo Indians
under their jurisdiction and control, similar to the actions of Sonora officials during the Mexican
period, subjecting the Pueblos to outside laws and taking away internal control. Such a condition
had not existed before 1846. Further, Calhoun spearheaded an effort to remove the Indian right
to vote, not necessarily because he felt that it was misplaced in Pueblo hands, but because he
believed that in so doing he would offer the surest protection to continued Pueblo existence.
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Finally, the Pueblos themselves chose to forego suffrage in territorial New Mexico. This is not to
say that Pueblo Indians did not attempt to vote in New Mexico elections from time to time; they
did. But, as they understood it, and as it was put to them, their greatest chance of preserving their
existence as distinct communities, with ancient (and some not so ancient) customs and practices,
rested in becoming wards of the federal government. When viewed in this manner, it becomes
much more clear that Indians did not truly “fight” for voting rights in territorial New Mexico.29
Pueblo Indians exercised their agency, limited though it was, to preserve their Indigenous
electoral institutions and processes, and internal control of Pueblo affairs.30 In other words, they
chose to preserve and maintain citizenship in the individual Pueblo community. It was a tradeoff
that the Pueblo people were willing to accept, given the circumstances and Calhoun’s persuasive
argument in favor of this arrangement.

Electoral Developments After 1850
Although Calhoun had suggested the inclusion of Pueblo Indians in the Nonintercourse
Act of 1834, and the Pueblos had largely accepted this idea, he did not actually have the power to
effect this change on his own. Calhoun awaited further instructions from federal officials while
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seeking to put out fires in New Mexico. A convention in 1850 to decide the immediate political
future of New Mexico severely tested his resolve. The question was whether it would be
admitted to the Union as a state, with its own elections for governor, congressmen, and other
officials, or whether it would be a territory, with federal appointments of territorial officials.
New Mexico had been under military administration since 1846, but in 1849 Hispanos began
agitating for statehood.31 Hispanos favored statehood because it allowed for greater home rule,
and, as the majority population in New Mexico, they would enjoy the lion’s share of power. The
territorial party consisted mainly of Anglo-Americans who sought to preserve their tenuous grip
on New Mexico affairs through official appointments from Washington.32 Both sides sought to
enlist the support of Pueblo Indians, and reports of questionable dealings began to stream in.
Cyrus Choice, Indian Agent at the Albiquin Agency, wrote to Calhoun on 8 May 1850 that a
Pueblo Indian had come to him to report that an Hispano constable by the name of Pedro Solisair
(likely a misspelling) “had been all around the Pueblo, requesting the Mexicans to meet at his
house, on the day of the Election for Deligates [sic] to the Convention.” Apparently, Solisair had
warned the Indians and others that a large Mexican army was on the march from “Old Mexico,”
and he wanted to know if the Indians would support them or the Anglo-Americans.33 Rumors of
a Mexican reconquest circulated at various times after the U.S.-Mexico War, but on this occasion
the rumor was clearly calculated to scare the Indians into supporting the Hispano for fear of
being punished when the imaginary Mexican army arrived.
Calhoun wrote to Commissioner Brown on 19 June 1850, the day before the vote on
statehood. He reported that, “The Pueblo Indians are excited, the Mexicans are excited, and a
31
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certain class of Americans are greatly excited….The contest is extremely violent. The Pueblo
Indians have been called upon by both parties, and during the week past, various deputations
have called upon me for advice.” Calhoun felt that it was the “general disposition, upon the part
of the Indians, to have nothing to do with the elections, and I approved, most heartily, their
determination.” In fact, Calhoun had advised the Pueblos the previous month, urging them not to
vote in the election. His letter, written in Spanish, reads, in part: “…as your Agent and friend
sent to you by the President of the United States I advise you that you not take part in the
elections…for delegates to form a state constitution for New Mexico, if you do not want to lose
your character as a separate people and abandon your old customs and your own laws and
become citizens of New Mexico, subject to its laws.” If they voted, then they were taking the
actions of citizens, and he could not offer them federal protections.34
Remarkably, the sitting military governor of New Mexico, John Munroe, sent a
proclamation to the Pueblos, telling them that they could not be prevented from voting. This
directly contradicted what their Indian agent had told them; the Pueblo Indians were
understandably confused, as Calhoun had indicated in his letter. In Governor Munroe’s Spanish
language document, dated 6 June 1850 and addressed “To the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico,”
he states that his purpose is to avoid a situation where any Indian was being pressured to vote a
certain way in the upcoming election. He declares that Indians can vote or stay in their homes; it
is up to them. Furthermore, he asserts that, “no official agent of the government is authorized to
attack, govern, direct, or in any other manner influence you in the free and independent exercise
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of this right.”35 Pueblo Indians had participated to some extent in this convention, which
overwhelmingly approved a constitution and statehood. Despite the efforts of Calhoun and
Munroe, some New Mexicans enticed Indians to vote, while others threatened to take away their
property if they did vote, which was likely the real reason for Munroe’s letter.
In the wake of this election, the Pueblos retained fears that their participation would have
negative consequences. Calhoun and Munroe apparently put their differences aside, coauthoring
a letter to the Pueblos in late June. The letter represents a clear attempt to ease Pueblo fears after
heavy solicitation of their votes in the statehood debate:
We having learned, that, malicious representations have been made to you. In order that
you may not be deceived [we think] it proper to say; That neither are you abandoned or
ruined. We say to you, that you and your people are in the same position and security that
you had prior to the election, and the same protection to your persons and right of
possession of your houses, lands and all other property, will be maintained as formerly.
And until other news be Agency made, or until the President of the United States
provides otherwise, the internal affairs of your Pueblos shall be governed by your laws
and customs and by the same authorities which each Pueblo has elected as their
Governors and other officials.
Calhoun obviously found himself in a difficult situation. As he had told the Pueblos on so many
occasions, if they voted, and thereby acted like citizens, then they would be treated like citizens.
As citizens, they would no longer have any special protection and would be subject to outside
civil control. Since some Pueblo Indians had voted in 1850, he and the governor would have to
perform some damage control. He assured the Pueblos that all was not lost. He still advocated
that they abstain from voting and see to their own internal affairs. Ironically, these events turned
out to be much ado about nothing. As Marc Simmons points out, “In the end the constitutional
election was without meaning since Congress ignored it and created a territorial government for
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New Mexico….Their brief participation in the new political structure had…soured [the Pueblos]
on the democratic process.”36
Although the Pueblos may have “soured” on the democratic process after the convention
debacle in 1850, the question of their political status had not been resolved. Calhoun and other
Indian Office employees continued to push for inclusion of the Pueblos under the Nonintercourse
Act of 1834. New Mexico Indian Agent E. H. Wingfield, who wrote to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Luke Lea on 6 Febraury 1852, succinctly encapsulated the complexity of the debate over
Pueblo citizenship and voting rights. He wrote that the “Pueblo Indians [are] a very interesting
tribe, possessing many of the amiable elements of character, without the savage features of other
races—and well worthy the consideration of the Government of the United States.” He went on
to state that, “They approach nearer to civilization, than any of the Indian Races.” They were
“virtuous,” “intelligent,” “honest,” and “industrious,” and they hold their lands by virtue of
Spanish land grants. He felt that it was “evident” that the Pueblos “should be regarded by us
either as Indians, or like ourselves as citizens of the United States--& entitled to all the privileges
springing from that relation.” But, Wingfield believed that “as the latter position would be
obnoxious to their own wishes—the Government should view them as Indians in all future
legislation.”37
Evidently, all of the lobbying by Calhoun and others paid off in 1851, when the United
States Congress officially included all territory conquered in the U.S.-Mexico War under the
terms of the Nonintercourse Act. The Nonintercourse Act, which was actually a series of acts to
regulate Indian trade and intercourse passed over several decades and culminating in the statute
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of 1834, provided a number of specific protections for Indians and their lands. While it made
them wards of the federal government, it also forbade the sale of alcohol to Indians and
prevented all non-Indians from purchasing Indian lands. It strictly forbade encroachments on
Indian lands, and named the federal government as the sole entity with the right to purchase or
regulate these lands. In essence, the Nonintercourse Act was a powerful measure that made any
unauthorized settlement or seizure of Indian lands a federal offense.38 In the words of preeminent
historian of federal Indian policy Francis Paul Prucha, measures to regulate trade and intercourse
with Indians were the actions of a young, expanding republic, seeking “conciliation of the
Indians by negotiation, a show of liberality, express guarantees of protection from encroachment
beyond certain set boundaries, and a fostered and developed trade.” The federal government
hoped these laws would “prevent the steady eating away of the Indian country by individuals
who privately acquired lands from the Indians.”39
If the Nonintercourse Act had been strictly enforced in New Mexico, then future
encroachments by Hispanos and Anglo-Americans would have ended or slowed down
significantly. Furthermore, the previous law of 1847 that declared Pueblos’ corporate bodies
were subject to lawsuits would be ineffectual, since such suits could not be brought against the
Pueblos under the Nonintercourse Act. Calhoun also asserted that Indians had a hand in this
lobbying, and had expressed their desire to be placed under the act. Writing to Lea on 30 June
1851, he reported that a “Council” had been held at his office, which continued for three days.
Representatives came from the Pueblos of Sandia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Zia, Santo Domingo,
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Cochiti, San Ildefonso, Santa Clara, Tesuque, Nambé, San Juan, and Taos. These Pueblo leaders
drafted a report that was subsequently forwarded to Washington. The governor of Sandia Pueblo
acted as voice for the group. Calhoun characterized him as an “exceedingly clever Indian.” The
delegation was clear: “Not one of the Pueblos, at this time, desire to abandon their old customs
as usages.”40
Unfortunately, the trade and intercourse law was not strictly enforced, and questions
about the status of the Pueblos persisted. Calhoun wrote in desperation to Commissioner Lea on
29 February 1852, stating, “differences between the Pueblos and the Mexicans will continue
until the end of time unless the Government of the United States shall provide for their
adjustment.”41 Later that year, President Fillmore appointed Calhoun as governor of New
Mexico. For a brief time he served both as governor and New Mexico Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, where he was continually dogged by New Mexicans with an interest in Pueblo land and
resources who simply ignored the law. During the coming decades, Hispanos and AngloAmericans would continue their encroachments, and find support in the New Mexico and United
States courts.
Calhoun’s health deteriorated steadily in 1852, and he soon left New Mexico for
Washington, D.C. Extremely ill with scurvy, he died on 6 May 1852, near Independence,
Missouri.42 William Carr Lane, who replaced Calhoun as governor, served for a relatively brief
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period. Governor Lane was not as sympathetic to the Pueblo cause as his predecessor. Writing to
his son-in-law, William Glasgow, on 26 February 1852, Lane mocked Pueblos and Hispanos for
their ongoing disputes and visits to his office:
And the ‘Dignitat’ consists in one eternal round of appeals, written & verbal, from
Mexicans & Indians, & sometimes from Americans, for reparations, of every description
of wrongs, - in which you hear, or read – ‘Governor,’ or ‘Gobernador,’ every 5 minutes, besides getting at least 50 embraces, from Indians & sometimes from Mexicans, daily.
I’ll tell you all about it by & by. These people embrace, with much grace & dignity; but
the custom does not suit the taste of one of us.
Lane obviously had no patience for Indian diplomacy, and from his letter it is clear that he was
not responsive to Indian complaints of Hispano aggressions. But Lane’s poor qualities did not
end there. In addition to his lack of sympathy for the Indian cause, he also had no idea what his
powers were, and how they related to civil, military, and Indian affairs. An exasperated Lane
wrote to Glasgow: “There is such a strange state of things, in every Dept of the Govt. of this Ter.
– civil, military & Indn; & so ill-defined [regarding] the line of offl. duties, in both the civil &
Indn. Dept., that we are compelled to grope in the dark, in discharging our duties.”43 Lane faced
many of the same difficulties Calhoun had, but he seemed less inclined to confront Indian
problems head on.
Governor Lane left office in 1853 to campaign for the position of congressional territorial
delegate for New Mexico. Lane’s opponent was a prominent Hispano, José Manuel Gallegos.
Gallegos, a Catholic priest who had served in the legislative assembly of New Mexico during the
Mexican departmental period, did not speak English. He chiefly represented New Mexico
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Hispanos. Lane had his campaign work cut out for him, and he recognized as much. Writing to
his wife on 30 August 1853, he lamented:
I am thus far, upon an Electioneering tour, & am in the midst of a Rabidity infected
District. In point of fact, the opposition, to every thing American, is so uncompromising,
that if this county should turn the scale against me, you must not be surprised. But “all is
not lost, that is in danger.” They say, they have no personal objection to me, but they are
determined to elect one of their own race: that I am the most acceptable, of all the
Americans; but that they must try a Mexican. God bless them. If you knew how very little
the very best informed know, you would be amazed at their conceitedness.44
While he recognized his uphill battle against the Hispano majority in the territory, Lane
could not have imagined the source of his eventual undoing. Gallegos won the election, but Lane
and his supporters claimed that it was only because Pueblo Indian votes in Lane’s favor had not
been counted. In fact, sixty Taos Indians had attempted to vote in the election, but had been
turned away. Farther south, 202 Laguna Pueblo Indians had succeeded in voting. Lane believed
that the Indian vote had swayed the election in his favor, and he should have been declared the
rightful winner. He sent a memorial to Congress laying his case before the body. In response, the
House Committee on Elections issued a report declaring Gallegos the winner. Congress declared
that Indians were not citizens and could not vote in New Mexico. The New Mexico election
judge who had initially handled the case was criticized for accepting “illegal” Indian votes.
According to the House Report on the contested election, the 202 Laguna votes should be
discounted because the election was held at the Pueblo under the direction of the “chiefs” and
“without authority from the probate judge.” Laguna cast all 202 votes for Lane. Declaring these
votes illegal, the House sided with Gallegos. The irony was that Lane, who was obviously
prejudiced against Indians, as evidenced by his personal letters, lost his bid for congress due to
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the Indian vote. Dejected, he penned these words to his son-in-law after his unsuccessful protest
to congress: “My contest has ended, this day, adversely.”45
David Meriwether, who succeeded Lane as governor and superintendent, entered office
rather oblivious to the seriousness of the situation. In his annual report for 1853 to Commissioner
of Indian Affairs George W. Manypenny, Meriwether asserted:
The Pueblo, or half-civilized Indians of this Territory, are in a satisfactory condition in
every respect. They reside in villages situated upon grants made to them by the
governments of Spain and Mexico, and subsist themselves comfortably by cultivating the
soil and rearing herds and flocks of various kinds. Each tribe has a separately-organized
government of its own, though all fashioned after the same model. They annually elect
their respective governor, lieutenant governor, and various other minor officers….When
disputes arise between two pueblos, or between them and their more civilized neighbors,
the matter is invariably laid before the territorial governor, and his decision is invariably
regarded as final.46
Meriwether’s comments must be deconstructed to understand the situation of Indian civil rights
and voting in New Mexico in the 1850s. First of all, Meriwether naively believed that the
Pueblos were “in a satisfactory condition in every respect.” They were not. Second, Meriwether
understood the basic political organization of the Pueblos, and seemed to understand the
importance of these governing structures and officers. Finally, he refers to the Pueblos as “halfcivilized Indians,” who engaged in disputes with their “more civilized neighbors.” While
Calhoun had implied that the Pueblos were slightly less civilized than Anglo-Americans and
45
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Hispanos, Meriwether was explicit in his view. It was a stance that could then be used for a
variety of purposes, both good and bad. On some occasions officials denied the vote to Pueblo
Indians because they were not civilized enough. On other occasions a lack of Pueblo civilization
was used to support wardship and federal protection. This also meant the vote was withheld, but
wardship offered important legal protections for Pueblo land. On still other occasions this view
was employed to support Indian citizenship. While not as civilized as whites, the Pueblos had
achieved a level of civilization sufficient to be granted citizenship. This would open up their
lands to sale, alienation, encroachment, and a host of unfair legal apparatuses. In a letter
contained in the same 1853 annual report in which Meriwether characterized Pueblo Indians as
half-civilized, Indian Agent E. A. Graves complained of the non-implementation of the
Nonintercurse Act of 1834, “which was adopted and applied to this Territory by an act of
Congress of 27th February, 1851.” He reported having visited the Río Arriba region and Taos,
and found them to be “friendly, and well disposed towards the government and the citizens of
this Territory.” But, he also stated that the Pueblos “merit the attention of the government, and
should receive its fostering care and watchfulness,” which obviously was not happening.47
Within a short time, Governor Meriwether began to realize the contradictions embedded
in official policy, if indeed there was an official policy. On the one hand, the Pueblos were
corporate bodies that could sue and be sued. On the other hand, they were under the protection of
the federal government and immune from lawsuits. Some felt that they could and should vote, as
in the case of William Carr Lane’s failed election. On 5 December 1853, Governor Meriwether
rose before the New Mexico legislative assembly and proposed that the question of the status of
Pueblo Indians be settled once and for all. In his address, he told lawmakers that, “The right of
47
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suffrage is a privilege held dear by every American freeman, and great care should be had that
this inestimable right be not abused or trenched upon by such as are not legally entitled to its
exercise.” He went on to lament the fact that New Mexico voting laws were not clear enough on
who was entitled to the vote. Referring to the Lane-Gallegos debacle, he stated, “It appears that
in some parts of the Territory the Pueblo Indians were permitted to vote at the late election whilst
in other parts they were excluded. And I would recommend express legislative actions upon this
point.”48
In 1854, the New Mexico legislature acted on the issue of Indian voting. On 16 February
1854, the body passed an act with exceedingly clear language that could not be misinterpreted:
That the Pueblo Indians of this Territory, for the present, and until they shall be declared,
by the Congress of the United States, to have the right, are excluded from the privilege of
voting at the popular elections of the Territory, except in the elections for overseers of
ditches to which they belong, and in the elections proper to their own pueblos, to elect
their officers according to their ancient customs.49
From this point forward, Indians could only vote in two circumstances: they would continue to
elect their own Pueblo officers; and they could vote for mayordomos of ditches shared with
Hispano communities. After this date, Indians rarely attempted to vote outside of their own
Pueblos, although there were occasional cases after 1854, such as a contested election between
José Manuel Gallegos (again) and Miguel A. Otero for congressional delegate for New Mexico
in 1855. On this occasion, Gallegos alleged that, “in the precinct of Los Lentes, in the county of
Valencia, fifty Pueblo Indians voted for [Otero], and that said fifty votes were counted for you.”
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These Indians would have been from Isleta Pueblo.50 But the 1854 law essentially closed the
book on Pueblo Indian voting in New Mexico elections for nearly a century. The next order of
business was an assault on the protected status of Pueblo Indians.

Judicial Assaults on Pueblo Status
Despite the passage of voting restrictions on the Pueblos, their citizenship status still
remained in question. Part of the “problem” was that they were unlike Indians whom Indian
Service employees had previously encountered. For example, in his annual report to the
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for 1854, Governor Meriwether pointed out that, on the one
hand, the Pueblos acted like independent nations: “The Pueblo of Nambe in March last actually
executed several of their own people, who were charged with being witches.” Meriwether was
appalled by these actions, and prevented further executions. But, he failed to see these actions for
what they were: an independent community carrying out its own form of criminal justice. He
also stressed the importance of the annual elections of a “governor, war captain, and various
other minor officials.” He recognized their independent forms of justice and government, and
even conceded, “It has been contended that the Pueblo Indians were recognized as citizens by the
Mexican government, and hence are citizens of the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.” But, Meriwether concluded, “…on a full investigation I am clearly of the opinion that
this is not the case. Having visited several of these pueblos…[I believe] that these people differ
in some respects from any other Indians to be found on this continent....I can but recommend
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them and their possessions to the protection and fostering hand of the government.”51
Meriwether acknowledged the elements that made the Pueblos autonomous, self-governing
communities, but was unable to reconcile the tribal, communal elements of Pueblo Indian life
with nineteenth-century American conceptions of civilization. From this perspective, Pueblo
Indians did not fully meet the civilization requirement for citizenship, and thus they remained in
a state of political limbo.
This same idea plagued the Indian administrators who followed in the 1850s and 1860s.
As Hispanos and Anglo-Americans continued their assaults on Pueblo lands, administrators
blamed these problems precisely on their “partially civilized” state. In his 1855 annual report,
Meriwether writes, “These Indians are ignorant, and but little removed from a savage state, and
interested persons stir up litigation between the different pueblos and between the Mexican
population and the pueblos.”52 In the Anglo-American view, the Pueblos’ loss of land was due to
their own ignorance. In actuality, the Pueblos had been using the courts to protect their lands for
centuries. In the territorial era, with control of the courts in the hands of corrupt Hispanos in
many instances, coupled with an erosion of legal protections for Indians, Pueblo Indians could
not secure their lands and rights in the courts. New Mexico Superintendent of Indian Affairs J. L.
Collins, who had replaced Meriwether, wrote in 1857 that, “These Indians [Pueblos] can, at no
distant day, be made useful and intelligent citizens.” But in order for that to happen, they needed
schools, vocational training, and a “speedy” resolution of Pueblo land grant disputes.53 As
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Pueblo Indian Agent Samuel M. Yost wrote in his 1857 annual report, the competing agendas of
the territory and the federal government exacerbated the situation with the Pueblos:
It would facilitate me much in the discharge of my duties were the Hon. Commissioner of
Indians Affairs to instruct me, when the territorial laws and regulations of the Indians
department conflict, as to my duty. Questions legitimate, ordinarily, for an agent to
decide, under the existing relations of the Pueblo Indians, become matter of reference to a
legal tribunal. Must the territorial laws have precedence over the laws and regulations of
your department, or must I carry out the instructions embraced in those
regulations?…They are in a state of civilization too far advanced to be recognized as
Indians, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, and not sufficiently civilized to assume
the responsibilities of bona fide citizens. Their position is anomalous, and the sooner it is
properly defined the better; until them, there are likely to be embarrassing questions
constantly presented to the agent for adjustment, when he is not empowered, as he
conceives, to act in the premises….Each of the pueblos has its separate government,
which partakes more of the aristocratic form than the democratic.54
Yost highlighted the crux of the problem: New Mexico wanted to treat the Pueblos as non-Indian
citizens (non-voting citizens), while the Indian Office viewed them as semi-civilized Indians
under federal protection. Unfortunately, the federal government provided insufficient direction
on the matter.
By 1858, Superintendent Collins had come to the conclusion that the Pueblos’ status in
political limbo could not be solved by the current policies of the Indian Service. In his annual
report, he contends:
I deem it proper to mention that the laws and regulations of the Indian department are not
suited to the conditions of these Pueblos, and would specifically suggest, that in the
revision of the laws and regulations, which it is greatly desired should be done at the
approaching session of Congress, some special enactment be inserted, suited to the
condition of these Indians. They are not citizens in the true sense of the term, and yet are
too far advanced in civilization to some under the laws and regulations that are intended
for the government of the wild tribes…A [central school for the Pueblos] would in a few
years qualify teachers for all the Pueblos, and would in the end lead to a general system
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of education among them, which is all that is wanted to make them useful and obedient
citizens.55
It is remarkable that the New Mexico Superintendent of Indian Affairs was calling for a new set
of policy guidelines, designed specifically for the Pueblos. The call for education also became a
rallying cry for Indian agents and others; they viewed schooling as the means for accomplishing
full citizenship for these “partially civilized” Indians.56
While Indian Service employees grappled with questions of Pueblo legal status,
Superintendent Collins astutely recognized the factions that were then emerging within the
Pueblo internal elections. These disputes were the latest incarnation of the factionalism that had
flared up from time to time during the Spanish and Mexican periods. They can best be described
as battles between “traditionalists” and “progressives.” As Collins writes in 1859, “The officers
are elected annually, by a vote of the people. In these elections, party divisions not unfrequently
create much excitement among the Indians, and questions arise that have to be referred to this
office for settlement. They are always submissive, and acquiesce without further trouble.” As
Isleta Pueblo informant Juan Abeita told anthropologist Elsie Clews Parsons in the early
twentieth century, “Smart young boys who know more than old people in some ways” came into
positions of power. These new leaders would have been those educated in American schools and
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trained in American culture and ways, a culmination of the factionalism that began to surface in
the 1850s.57
The United States confirmed the Pueblos’ status as sovereign communities in 1864 when
Dr. Michael Steck, serving as Superintendent of Indian Affairs for New Mexico, issued nineteen
silver tipped canes to Pueblo leaders. The canes, which had Lincoln’s signature engraved in the
silver, were integrated into the existing Spanish and Mexican varas carried by Pueblo leaders,
thus also becoming important symbols of Pueblo civil authority. The arrival of the Lincoln canes
also coincided with long-promised confirmation of Pueblo land patents from Washington, D.C.58
But, the Lincoln canes alone did little to change the political situation of the Pueblos vis-à-vis the
territorial government. Viewed in this manner, Steck’s actions only highlight the impasse
between Indian Service employees, who viewed Pueblo Indians as under protective wardship,
and territorial officials, who hoped to further alienate Pueblo lands and deny Pueblo rights.
Territorial courts and officials continued their assaults on Pueblo lands and sovereignty after
1864.
On the eve of an important case involving Hispano encroachments on Pueblo lands that
would ultimately prove detrimental to Pueblo Indian status, New Mexico Superintendent of
Indian Affairs A. B. Norton wrote to the commissioner, suggesting that Congress act so that “all
suits against these Indians [Pueblos] shall be brought only in the United States district court.”
The Pueblos were “continually imposed upon and harassed by vexatious prosecutions brought
before said alcaldes, who always decide in favor of the Mexican and against the Indian, no
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matter how meritorious may be the case of the latter.” He asked further that Congress act so that
“the sale of the lands granted to these Pueblo Indians be absolutely forbidden, and that all sales
heretofore made be declared null and void.” He proposed that Hispanos and Anglo-Americans
living on Pueblo lands gained from such sales be made to vacate these lands.59 It was an
ambitious proposition, and one that non-Indians in New Mexico would never support.
But Collins and the Pueblos had the proverbial rug pulled out from under them beginning
in 1867. Pueblo Agent John Ward summarized the events surrounding an 1867 case over
Hispano encroachment on Pueblo lands. According to Ward, in June of 1866 he had received a
letter from Stephen B. Elkins, district attorney for New Mexico, with a request for a list of “all
persons occupying lands belonging to the Pueblo Indians.” Agent Ward went to Tesuque, San
Ildefonso, Nambe, and Pojoaque, and made a list of over 200 names of persons illegally residing
on Pueblo lands. Ward reported that, “most of [them] were indicted and brought before the
district court.” United States District Attorney Elkins initiated around thirty lawsuits against
these individuals, one of who was Benigno Ortiz, an Hispano squatter on Cochiti Pueblo land.
Elkins attempted to have Ortiz pay a $1,000 fine for settling on Cochiti land. Ward asserted that,
“The case, it was supposed, would settle and decide all the other cases.” The United States used
the terms of the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 as the basis for its argument.
Unfortunately, the District Court of the First Judicial District of New Mexico disagreed,
ruling in 1867 that the act did not apply to the Pueblos of New Mexico. Justice John P. Slough,
who was murdered by a political opponent later that year, ruled that the Pueblos were citizens of
the United States and not entitled to the protections of the Nonintercourse Act. In his decision,
Justice Slough argued that “The Pueblo Indians… were recognized as citizens of Mexico…[and]
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as late as the year 1851, the Pueblo Indians of this territory, without question or interruption, not
only voted, but held both civil and military offices…. They should be treated not as under the
pupilage of government, but as citizens, not of a State or Territory, but of the United States of
America.” William Arny, Indian Agent for New Mexico, vehemently disagreed with Slough’s
conclusions. The decision, he argued, “will open the door for the despoiling of the Pueblo
Indians of their property…they will soon be swindled our of their lands by designing men, and
7,000 pauper Indians will be thrown upon the government to be fed and clothed, who for years
have supported themselves upon the lands granted them, without any appropriations from the
government.” He concludes, “These Indians have never claimed citizenship.” In addition to
losing their land, Ward believed the Pueblos would ultimately lose all faith in the United States
government, toward which they had acted fairly and amicably up to that point.60
The Ortiz decision was devastating to Pueblo status and rights. In affirming Pueblo
citizenship, Justice Slough gave official sanction to encroachments on Pueblo lands, forcing
Pueblos to seek redress in New Mexico courts, courts controlled by non-Indians in which Pueblo
peoples had little to no chance of receiving justice. But even more sinister was the fact that
Slough affirmed Pueblo citizenship when the laws of New Mexico said otherwise. By judicial
action, they were citizens, yet legislative actions had taken away the cardinal right of citizens:
the vote. The only right they now possessed was the right to lose their land. Slough went to great
lengths to praise the Pueblos, stating that crime was practically unknown in the Pueblos: “The

60

“Annual report of John Ward, special agent, Pueblos agency,” 2 August 1867 (Ward to
Norton), 207–208; “Letter of Agent Arny relative to the opinion of the chief justice of New
Mexico, respecting the status of the Pueblo Indians,” 11 March 1867 (W. F. M. Arny, United
States Indian Agent for New Mexico to Charles E. Mix, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs),
215–216; “Opinion on Chief Justice Slough,” The United States vs. Benigno Ortiz, 219–222, all
in Annual Report, 1867; Deborah A. Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race,
and Citizenship, 1790–1880 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 189–190.

286
criminal records of the courts of the Territory scarcely contain the name of a Pueblo Indian.” As
such, the 1851 extension of the Nonintercourse Act over Indians in the Mexican Cession could
not apply to them; they were not “wild Indians.”61
Another case of a similar nature followed in January 1869. The United States again
brought suit against an Hispano, one Juan José Lucero, who had moved onto Cochiti Pueblo
land. The New Mexico Supreme Court handed down a decision very similar to that of two years
before, agreeing with Justice Slough that Indians were citizens, and not entitled to any special
protections under the Nonintercourse Act of 1834. The long decision, which reads partly like a
biased history lesson, states, “[Indians] were as much and fully citizens of the republic of Mexico
as Europeans and Africans.” The same argument is presented that through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Pueblos are United States citizens. Citizens are supposed to possess the
right to vote, Watts concedes, but he writes:
Whether the right to vote shall be…given to the pueblo Indian or taken away from him [is
a question] not properly before us, and [is] to be judged of by the congress of the United
States. It is to be presumed that congress has the right, if congress thinks proper to
exercise it, to…disfranchise all the citizens…but it is the right and duty of the courts to
see that every citizen of the territory of New Mexico, in conformity with the ninth article
of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, “shall be maintained and protected in the free
enjoyment of their liberty and property.”62
In other words, the Pueblos were not entitled to any special protections; the Nonintercourse Act
did not apply to them. Pueblo Indians were citizens and should be allowed to vote, but it was up
to congress to see to it that this right was upheld. It was a completely hollow victory that opened
up the Pueblos to more land grabs.
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Indian Agents were quick to criticize the Lucero decision. Pueblo Special Agent
Lieutenant George E. Ford wrote on 8 September 1869:
The decision...by Chief Justice Watts of the supreme court, has given rise to much
uneasiness if not dissatisfaction among the Pueblos, and opens a way by which much
injustice is done to them. By deciding that they are citizens under the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, no action can be taken by their agent against parties for violation of the
‘intercourse act’ in locating upon the Pueblo grants, of which trespass several instances
have been brought to my notice by the Indians themselves, while I am unable to give
them the assistance it is their right to expect.
Pueblo Agent Charles L. Cooper wrote that, “in placing these Indians on the footing of citizens,
and allowing them to sue and be sued, vote, hold office, &c. they are continually imposed upon
and harassed by vexations [sic] prosecutions brought before the [Hispano] alcales, (justices of
the peace,) who generally decide in favor of the Mexicans.” The Pueblos were “not being
allowed to vote,” and they “do not want to become or be considered as citizens.” Pueblo Special
Agent Ford concluded by reaffirming the importance of Pueblo citizenship and civil government,
which trumped all other forms of citizenship in importance to the Pueblo peoples: “These people
have their own laws and form of government. When any question arises among them it is
decided by their own governor and head men, to the satisfaction of all parties.”63
As Ford pointed out, the Pueblos were growing particularly concerned about the state of
affairs. The right to vote was no longer of primary importance. Judicial decisions had gone
beyond that right. As the Pueblos now saw it, they were engaged in a life or death battle for their
survival. If they were to retain the status of United States citizens, they had little to no chance of
being able to protect their distinctive communities, cultures, religion, and Indigenous forms of
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government. The vote could do very little to change that, even if they did exercise the right. A
delegation of Pueblo leaders traveled to Washington in 1868. Special Agent Ward accompanied
two Pueblo leaders, Alejandro Padilla and Ambrosio Abeita, to the capital, where they logged an
official complaint with the Indian Office about a recent court decision that they feared would
“unmake [the word they use is desaser, which essentially means to unmake] them as a distinct
and separate people, and dispossess them of their ancient customs and rights, and will also
deprive them of their land.” A letter recounting the visit of this Pueblo delegation, written by
Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. Mix, was addressed to New Mexico
Superintendent of Indian Affairs L. E. Webb, who likely then forwarded a copy to Pueblo leaders
from Isleta.64 Mix instructed Webb to tell the Pueblos that even though the court had decided in
an unfavorable manner, in the meantime the office would do what it could to protect Pueblo
property and customs. Mix also ordered Superintendent Webb to instruct Special Agent Ward to
inform the Pueblo delegates that their grievances and requests “will receive the attention they
deserve in regards to this office all will be done to increase your happiness.”65
Eventually, Commissioner of Indian Affairs under President Ulysses S. Grant, Ely S.
Parker, took it upon himself to write to Juan Andres Abeita and Juan Rey Lucero of Isleta Pueblo
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in order to reassure them that the federal government still cared about them. Parker, who was
Seneca, told them that he wanted to help them “to advance [their] material and intellectual
prosperity.” How and when would this be accomplished? “In a day not too distant they will be
put in a position so that they can exercise all of their pertinent Rights and privileges.” He desired
that all Indians “progress to agriculture and other trades and literacy, so that they can be qualified
to be citizens of the Unites States. And have an equal voice with Whites in the making of laws
for the benefit of the entire country.”66
While Commissioner Parker can be forgiven for stating his desire to help the Pueblos
progress to agriculture, his other statements are very interesting. The courts in New Mexico
Territory had declared the Pueblo Indians citizens over the past few years, but he and the Indian
Office apparently did not view them in this way. Furthermore, he placed conditions on the
granting of citizenship to the Pueblos—they must first progress in agriculture, the mechanical
arts, and literacy. Then, they would be “ready” for citizenship and the full enjoyment of their
rights, and be able to take their place alongside whites in framing laws for the benefit of the
nation. Besides being incredibly condescending, his letter also shows no real understanding of
what the Pueblos truly needed at that moment. Full citizenship was a disastrous step backwards.
These besieged Indians needed the protection of the Indian Service, and for their laws and
customs to be respected. The Pueblos clearly understood this fact, and so did the Indian agents.
But, we can come to no other conclusion than Commissioner Parker did not truly grasp the
seriousness of the Pueblos’ plight. It must be remembered that although Parker was the highest
official in the Indian Service, he was familiar with the struggles of non-citizen Indians. He had
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trained as a lawyer, but was unable to sit before the bar because he was not a U.S. citizen.67
Parker cut quite the complicated figure as he firmly supported assimilation and the allotment of
Indian lands. While there is a distinct tone of paternalism and misunderstanding in his statements
to the Pueblos, on some level he must have also empathized with their plight.
The Ortiz and Lucero decisions did little to clear up the citizenship status of Pueblo
Indians, even if Justices Slough and Watts clearly stated that they were citizens of the United
States. New Mexico Superintendent of Indian Affairs Nathanial Pope wrote in 1871, two years
after Lucero, that, “A vexed question in this superintendency is, whether or not the Pueblo
Indians are citizens of the United States.” He mentioned the regular issues of land, but also made
reference to electoral problems that resulted from encroachments, and competing authorities:
In several of their villages the greater portion of the inhabitants are Mexicans, who elect
their own alcalde and other officers, and insist upon controlling the affairs of the village;
whereas it is the custom of the Indians, in each village, to choose from their number a
governor, lieutenant governor, war captain, and an assistant, to serve for one year, whose
duty it is to consult with their agent and superintendent in the management of the affairs
of the village. In consequence of this conflict of authority, differences often arise, and
street fights are not uncommon.
Superintendent Pope also asked that schools be established among the Pueblos, and concluded by
stating, “I will simply characterize them [the Publos] as law-abiding, industrious, and selfsustaining.” Pope also wrote in his 1872 report that, “The question of citizenship, I regret to say,
has not yet been satisfactorily settled, and every year renders it more difficult to solve. The
courts of this Territory have decided upon several occasions that the Pueblo Indians are citizens
of the United States.” He also indicated that, “during last summer two Pueblo Indians were
placed on a United States jury at Albuquerque, in this Territory, in accordance with these
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decisions, but it is doubtful of this action will be sustained till their status is finally and definitely
fixed by the Supreme Court of the United States”68 Again, they had all of the characteristics of
“good” citizens and civilized people, but were they or were they not citizens? There were token
actions such as occasional jury participation by Indians, but Hispano and Anglo-American
encroachments continued to severely threaten the Pueblo right to self govern.
The 1871 report also contains Pueblo Agent William Arny’s fascinating in-depth report
on the condition of the Pueblos at that time. He provides a glimpse into the disputes between
Pueblos and outsiders. Early in his report, he points to a Pueblo characteristic that outsiders have
noted throughout centuries of contact: “they do not like to be questioned on subjects which they
believe to concern none but themselves.” While the Pueblos were seen as mostly civilized and
self-sustaining, they were also viewed as backwards and tribal. Non-Indians failed to recognize
that they were, and ever remain, a very private people with an acute sense of propriety with
regards to internal matters. When Arny’s findings are considered, the precarious nature of the
Pueblos’ existence in territorial New Mexico becomes apparent. For example, at San Ildefonso,
he counted 156 Indians and 373 non-Indians, while at Nambé there were 78 Indians and 175
non-Indians. In total, he put the number of non-Indians living on Pueblo lands at 5,543, with a
total property value of $434,677. Realistically, “This is too much for the government to pay for
the breaking up of some of the best settlements of citizens [non-Indians] within the Territory of
New Mexico.” Arny believed that non-Indians should be allowed to stay on Pueblo lands, thus

68

“Annual report of N. Pope, superintendent of Indian affairs,” 25 September 1871 (Pope to the
Honorable Committee on Indian Affairs), Annual Report, 1871, 371–372; “Nathaniel Pope, New
Mexico Superintendency, Santa Fé, New Mexico,” 10 October 1872 (Pope to Honorable Francis
A. Walker, Commissioner of Indian Affairs), Annual Report, 1872, 300.

292
foreshadowing the Bursum Bill of 1922,69 and claimed that the overwhelming majority of Pueblo
Indians were willing to let the squatters stay on their land. In one of the more prescient
summaries of Pueblo political status, Arny wrote:
What shall be done with them in reference to our body politic? They are in the midst of
and surrounded by our population, without any authority to mingle in our political affairs.
They are independent sovereignties in the midst of one of the Territories of the United
States; and these people have never received until now any aid from the Government of
the United States to qualify them to become citizens. They have always been selfsustaining, and are a living evidence that Indians can sustain themselves in spite of
opposition and frequent raids against them. They, however, must have, and are entitled
to, the same protection that is afforded to the most favored. The faith of the Government
was pledged to give it to them when they were acquired from Old Mexico with the
territory upon which they live….the improvement of their moral and political
condition…[and their transition to full citizenship,] can only be done by a system of
industrial education.70
The Pueblos were “independent sovereignties” within the United States who had sustained
themselves from time immemorial. Although such statements ring of the Indian selfdetermination and sovereignty of the modern era, at this particular moment, more than anything
else the Pueblos needed protection. The United States had to live up to its treaty obligations and
provide for the welfare of these people.
Important cases involving Pueblo land, political status, and citizenship would be decided
in the mid-1870s. In the lead-up to these cases, New Mexico Superintendent of Indian Affairs L.
Edwin Dudley reported that the attempts by non-Indians to solicit Indian votes had continued
into the 1870s, after New Mexico court decisions had declared the Pueblos non-voting citizens:
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“they have often been solicited by aspiring candidates to exercise the right of suffrage, but in
every instance they have refused, preferring to remain as wards of the Government.”71
Superintendent Dudley asserted that the Pueblos had exercised their agency and refused the vote.
This was the only way to protect their status as distinct, sovereign peoples. The year after
Dudley’s report, another case involving encroachment on Pueblo land made its way to the New
Mexico Supreme Court. United States v. Santistevan was a familiar scenario: an Hispano had
moved onto Taos Pueblo land. With the help of the Indian Office, Taos Pueblo attempted to evict
him under the terms of the Nonintercourse Act. The New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed the
case, reaffirming the Ortiz and Lucero decisions. Once again, the Pueblos were at a state too far
advanced to be grouped with the other “wild Indians” under the Nonintercourse Act.72
While the New Mexico courts repeated themselves with regularity, the Supreme Court of
the United States finally heard a case involving Pueblo land. In United States v. Joseph (1876),
the nation’s highest court reaffirmed what the New Mexico courts had repeated on so many
occasions. On one hand, the court held that the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 did not apply to the
Pueblos. The decision reads:
At the time the act of 1834 was passed there were no such Indians as these in the United
States…The Pueblo Indians, if, indeed, they can be called Indians, had nothing in
common with this class [“wild” Indians]. The degree of civilization which they had
attained centuries before, their willing submission to all the laws of the Mexican
government, the full recognition by that government of all their civil rights, including that
of voting and holding office, and their absorption into the general mass of the population
(except that they held their lands in common), all forbid the idea that they should be
classed with the Indian tribes for whom the intercourse acts were made, or that in the
intent of the act of 1851 its provisions were applicable to them.
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The court repeated the faux history lessons of Ortiz, Lucero, and Santistevan, and declared that
the Pueblos had complete title to their lands. With said title, they could dispose of their lands at
will. The court did not question the right of Pueblos to petition for redress on land issues in the
courts, but it was quite clear that this was the responsibility of the Pueblos themselves, and not
the federal government. What complicated this case and others like it even more was that they
often involved non-Indians who had obtained some sort of title to the land they occupied. The
Pueblos claimed that such sales and transfers of title were done without proper approval from
Pueblo leadership, and were illegal under the Nonintercourse Act.
Unfortunately, since the 1834 act did not apply to the Pueblos, they could not eject
individuals living on their lands if they produced some sort of title (and even if they did not): “If
the defendant is on the lands of the pueblo, without the consent of the inhabitants, he may be
ejected, or punished civilly by a suit for trespass, according to the laws regulating such matters in
the Territory. If he is there with their consent or license, we know of no injury which the United
States suffers by his presence, not any statute which he violates in that regard.” In a puzzling
move, the court declared, “We have been urged…to declare that they are citizens of the United
States and New Mexico. But…we leave that question until it shall be made in some case where
the rights of citizenship are necessarily involved.” But in summarizing all of the rights of citizens
that the Pueblos enjoyed under Mexico, and the United States’ obligation to extend the same
rights, the court did declare them de facto citizens. As historian Richard N. Ellis summarizes, the
net result of all of these developments, from the entry of Kearny’s Army of the West through the
Joseph decision, was that “in practice…Pueblo people were denied suffrage because they were
Indians [under the 1854 New Mexico law] and…they were also denied protection that the federal
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government provided other Indian people [because they were too far advanced for such
protections].”73

Pueblo Political Status after Joseph
With the sanction of the U. S. Supreme Court, Hispanos and Anglo-Americans continued
their Pueblo land grabs. The Pueblos took their place alongside African Americans and women
as the United States’ non-voting citizens, and saw their lands under attack for the coming
decades. While these negative court decisions eroded Pueblo status as Indians, and excluded
them from federal protection, Indian agents undertook a conscious effort to bring the Pueblo
Indians from their “half-civilized” state to full civilization and citizenship. Pueblo Agent B. M.
Thomas wrote in August 1876, “The Pueblo Indians are worthy of every effort that can be
bestowed upon them to lead them to citizenship.”74 For the agents, “every effort” mainly meant
schooling, with agriculture also forming an important component of the civilizing mission.
Writing in September 1865, Superintendent Felipe Delgado wrote to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs William P. Dole: “But few of them can read, and the number is growing less every year
from deaths. I regret to say that there is not a school in the Territory for the education of the
Indians…[which would] prepare them to become useful and worthy citizens.” As historian Brian
Dippie points out, for African Americans “agriculture would define a humble role in life as a
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member of a permanent American peasant class; for the landed Indian, it would facilitate
eventual mergence with white society.” Through agriculture—which the Pueblos already
practiced—and education, “yesterday’s savages” would become “tomorrow’s citizens.”75 While
allotment in severalty was deemed impracticable for the Pueblos, education was pursued in
earnest. As the United States embarked on the era of assimilationist Indian policy, it employed
schools and vocational training to meet these goals. In their annual reports, the Indian Agents
speak constantly of education and training in the industrial arts such as farming, carpentry, and
blacksmithing. In addition to establishing schools at the Pueblos, agents began sending Pueblo
children to off-reservation boarding schools. Agent B. H. Thomas reported in 1880 that he had
“collected ten Pueblo children to be taken to the ‘Carlisle Indian training-school.’”76
Progress in establishing schools was rather slow, and met with considerable resistance
from the Pueblos. Pueblo Agent Pedro Sanchez’s 1884 report oozes with disdain for Pueblo
resistance to the civilizing project: “I am, indeed, extremely sorry to state that these
75

Brian Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1982), 108.
76
“Report of F. Delgado, superintendent,” 10 September 1865 (Felipe Delgado to Dole), Annual
Report, 1865, 164; “Report of B. H. Thomas, Pueblo Agent,” 1 September 1880 (Thomas to
Commissioner), Annual Report, 1880, 133. In the same report, Agent Thomas recounts
comments made to him by some Pueblo officers regarding their unprotected status: “Some of the
Pueblo Indian officers have remarked that if they were to stop struggling to improve their
condition and begin to murder and steal in all directions they would receive as much
consideration from the ‘great father’ as the other tribes do” (p. 134). There was by no means
agreement among the agents in New Mexico regarding Pueblo citizenship. Special Agent to the
Pueblos J. K. Graves wrote in 1866 that compared to “other tribes,” the Pueblos were “as distinct
in all their habits and customs as light and darkness.” While they added to the numerical totals of
Indians, he felt that they “should be included with the citizenry rather than the Indians.” See
“Report of J. K. Graves, special agent,” no date (J. K. Graves, United States Indian Agent for
New Mexico to D. N. Cooley, Commissioner of Indian Affairs), Annual Report, 1866, 132. The
Carlisle Indian Industrial School, established in 1879 by Colonel Richard Henry Pratt in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, served as the model boarding school for Indian children. Colonel Pratt had led
Buffalo Soldiers and Indian scouts during military campaigns in the 1860s and 1870s, and had
began educating Indian prisoners of war from Ft. Sill, Oklahoma at Ft. Marion in St. Augustine,
Florida. He was convinced of the power of education to transform Indians into citizens.

297
Pueblos…are debased and idiotized by the effects of ignorance, indolence, and superstition, to
which they abandon themselves to excess.” They had not taken upon themselves the uplifting
traits of “white society…instead of identifying themselves with it, they hate and fear it, because
it attacks their superstition, loathes their vices, and punishes them for, their crimes. To this
indigenous race the conquests of civilization are unknown and the law of progress utterly void.”
Agent Sanchez believed that mandatory education of their youths was the only way to combat
Pueblo “superstition.” He blamed their elected leaders for their state, and attacked those agents
who argued that the Pueblos were “independent,” and that their “governing councils for the
administration of justice are composed of wise men.” In his opinion, “It is only the civilized,
educated, and energetic man that is independent. What wisdom is there in men who for centuries
have lived among civilized people and are not yet ashamed to go naked?”77 It is likely that
Sanchez’s background as a New Mexico Hispano during the period of fierce Pueblo-Hispano
land disputes colored his opinions.
As Richard Henry Pratt had envisioned the boarding school program, Indian children
would be separated from their tribal environments, but they would also be forced to interact with
mainstream white society through working on white farms and in white businesses—the “outing
program.” In this manner, Indian pupils would receive industrial training, and also interact with
whites in close quarters, thereby learning the superiority of mainstream culture.78 The Pueblos
offered staunch resistance to the project of assimilation through education. Understandably, the
Pueblos did not like having their children taken away to boarding schools far from home, and
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especially feared the influence such an arrangement would have on traditional culture. They had
worked far too long and hard to allow outside influences to creep in. In 1897, Acting Pueblo
Agent C. E. Nordstrom reported extensively on Pueblo school attendance, noting that many of
the Pueblos now had day schools. But even the day schools attracted few pupils. At Santa Clara,
for example, there were 78 children, of whom only 38 were enrolled with an average attendance
of 7 boys and 10 girls. At Ohkay Owingeh, there were 84 children with 23 enrolled and an
average attendance of 7 boys and 5 girls. Taos had 76 children, with only 31 enrolled and an
average attendance of 11 boys and 5 girls. Laguna Pueblo fiercely opposed children being taken
off-reservation for education. In their efforts, they even had the support of a rather progressive
missionary stationed there, about whom Nordstrom complained: “According to his dictum the
Indian should be taught in his own language [Keres] and children should never be separated from
their parents; the transfer of children to nonreservation schools is therefore a ‘cruelty’.” When
the agent reported that ten pupils had been found “eligible for transfer from this school…not a
single case of ‘consent’ was recorded. And Laguna is considered as being among the foremost in
‘advancement’ of all the pueblos.”79
Agent Nordstrom also reported an almost comical episode at Santo Domingo Pueblo.
Santo Domingo—which today remains one of the most conservative Pueblos in New Mexico—
turned away a female headmaster sent by the government. Pueblo leaders eventually allowed a
male teacher to come to the Pueblo, but the governor refused to turn over the key to the
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schoolhouse and bring the children to school. The governor told Nordstrom that he could not
send the children since “this was a feast week.” Nordstrom remarked that, “there is always a
feast or a fast among these people.” The agent eventually threatened to bring in a cavalry troop
and arrest the governor and headmen and bring them to Fort Wingate if the children were not
sent to school. The governor relented, but sent only the boys to school. When asked why he had
not sent the girls, the governor replied, “education might be all very well for the boys, but it
wouldn’t do for the girls, who as soon as they got educated wanted to run off.” In the end,
Nordstrom reported feeling powerless and “humiliated,” since he could not compel the governor
of Santo Domingo Pueblo.80
Pueblo agents also reported disputes between Pueblo Indians supporting education and
those opposed to its introduction. Indian Agent John H. Robertson wrote in 1892 that there were
instances in which “for one year a progressive man (Indian) has been elected governor, favoring
all the modern ideas of improvement.” But, with the yearly elections of the governor system,
“The following year a man of totally different ideas succeeds, and by his influence and position
he undoes to a very great extent the work of progression previously started, in the way
[es]pecially of education.” Agent Robertson proposed empowering Indian Agents to remove any
governors who “prove to be a stumbling block in the way of his people’s improvement.”
Robertson wanted to tie Pueblo citizenship directly to education:
I would recommend that all graduates, on attaining their majority and passing a
satisfactory examination, such as may be prescribed by the Indian office, shall have the
privilege offered them of becoming citizens of the United States. There is a feeling
amongst returned graduates that they are still Indians and that they are in duty bound to
return to their pueblos, whereas were they given citizenship they would be on an equality
in this regard with the outer world, and would be more likely to act independently of their
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tribal relations and government, and to mix among the general population and follow the
avocations they have acquired at school.81
As Indian policy in New Mexico evolved, Indian Service officials pointed to three conditions for
Pueblo citizenship: 1. Pueblo Indians had to be educated in the American way; 2. “Progressive”
Pueblo leaders who favored education and assimilation must be elected; and 3. Indian Agents
must exercise more control of Pueblo internal affairs to insure that the requisite progress was
made. Underscoring all of this was the belief of OIA officials that the Pueblos had to “earn”
citizenship and the vote. While the most ignorant and uneducated white was a citizen by birth, a
Pueblo Indian, who was legally a citizen under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
had to become “educated” and shake off centuries of “superstition” and “backwardness” in order
to take his place as a citizen of the United States.
Acoma Pueblo seemingly met all of these conditions in the late 1880s–early 1890s. In
1885, the people of Acoma elected Solomon Bibo governor of the Pueblo. Bibo, a GermanJewish entrepreneur, first secured a license to trade at Acoma and then married into a prominent
Acoma family. Bibo, who was the only non-Indian to ever be chosen as governor of a Pueblo,
supported education and progressive policies for the Pueblo. After his term in office, Bibo
retained a great deal of influence at the Pueblo. The governor who followed Bibo strongly
opposed sending Acoma children to off-reservation boarding schools. He came into conflict with
Bibo and the progressive faction. The dispute escalated quickly, and, according to Bibo’s
account, which he wrote about in a letter to Richard Henry Pratt, the governor had men and boys
horsewhipped and left hanging from whipping posts on September 2, the Feast of San Estevan,
the Pueblo’s patron saint. Pratt wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, urging him to take
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immediate action to break the power of the governor. As long as such men were in office,
Acoma children would not be educated, the tribe would not become civilized, and they would
never take their place as American citizens. The commissioner ordered the governor arrested and
held by an Albuquerque sheriff, and the Pueblo Indian Agency placed Juan Rey, a young,
progressive Indian, as interim governor until the elections of January 1890.82 These events
demonstrated that if the Pueblos would not accept education, civilization, and citizenship
willingly, the Indian Service would take drastic steps to force them to do so.
At the same time, economic and other external forces began to converge on the Pueblos,
speeding up the pace of Pueblo life to some extent. For example, in 1880 the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railroad extended its line though five Pueblos, while the Denver and Rio Grande
completed its grading through four others. The Atlantic and Pacific had begun grading its line,
which would cross through three more Pueblos. While many Pueblo Indians viewed the railroads
with suspicion and apprehension, some Pueblo men found employment with the railroad
companies. They worked the rails at the Pueblos of Acoma, Laguna, and Zuñi in particular.
Acting Pueblo Agent C. E. Nordstrom used Laguna as an example of how the railroad and
schooling aided in the work of civilization:
[Laguna has] made more rapid strides on the road to civilization than any of the Pueblos.
This condition is entirely due to the advantages which inevitably come in the train of
education. Between 125 and 150 of the young men have been educated at Carlisle and
other industrial institutions provided by the Government, and these, almost without
exception, are profiting by what they have learned. Nearly all of them are employed in
some capacity or other by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, which runs through the
village, the authorities of the road informing me that they prefer Indian labor to that
furnished by the native Mexican.83
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In this regard, Anglo-Americans believed the work of assimilation could be viewed as a success
in some select cases. Some Pueblo Indians even demanded their citizenship rights during the
territorial period. One such Indian was a Laguna man by the name of Charles Kie, who worked
as a car inspector for the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. Over a several-year period,
Kie wrote numerous letters to Special Attorney for the Pueblo Indians A. J. Abbott. In his letters,
Kie pointed to the injustice of New Mexico’s denial of his right to vote, since he was a citizen of
New Mexico and the United States. Abbott wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on Kie’s
behalf, and even initiated a lawsuit for Kie. Kie reported mixed results in his voting attempts—
he succeeded on some occasions, while on others he was denied suffrage and even arrested at the
polls.84 But Kie, and the handful of other Pueblo Indians who voted or attempted to vote during
the territorial period, were certainly the exception. As Superintendent C. J. Crandall wrote in
1904, “…the Pueblo have never been permitted to vote or exercise the right of citizenship.
Neither have the Pueblo demanded this nor asked for it.”85

United States Citizenship and Pueblo Refusal
The developments in Pueblo citizenship and voting in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries took place within a framework of national calls for citizenship by Indian
reformers. These reformers and their allies viewed citizenship as the logical and necessary next
step in the progression of the nation’s Native peoples. The Friends of the Indian who met at Lake
Mohonk, for example, adopted Indian citizenship and legal equality with whites as one of their
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principal proposals.86 Organizations that mobilized on behalf of Indian rights in the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, such as the Indian Rights Association and the Women’s National
Indian Association, were composed of evangelical Protestants from comfortable economic
backgrounds. They hoped to Christianize Indian men, grant them citizenship, and transform them
into Jeffersonian yeoman farmers. Through missionary work and education, they would hasten
civilization, Christianization, and enfranchisement.87 But it was extremely difficult for an Indian
to attain citizenship during this period. John Elk, an Omaha who had abandoned his tribal
membership and farmed on his own land, sued for his citizenship rights in 1884. A Nebraska
voting registrar, Charles Wilkins, refused to allow Elk to vote since he was an Indian, and
therefore not a citizen. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Elk v. Wilkins that Elk had not
become a citizens simply because he had left a tribal way of life and farmed his own land.
According to John Wunder, Indians were defined as “noncitizen nationals.” The only way
to overcome this status was for an Indian to receive a special certificate from the Secretary of the
Interior that stated he was a citizen.88 Some federal policies aimed, at least in part, to grant Indian
citizenship. Under the terms of the Dawes Act, for example, those Indians who received
allotments, and eventually, titles in fee simple, became citizens of the United States.89 Still, the
process of transforming Indians into citizens proved extremely bulky and complicated. The
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question of U. S. citizenship for Indians would not be resolved until the Indian Citizenship Act of
1924, and even then Indians in New Mexico and Arizona would not be allowed to vote.
When Carlos Montezuma (Yavapai), Charles Eastman (Santee Dakota), Thomas Sloan
(Omaha), Laura Cornelius (Oneida), Henry Standing Bear (Oglala Lakota), and Charles Dagenett
(Peoria) gathered in Columbus, Ohio in the spring of 1911 to establish the Society of American
Indians (SAI), they represented the most progressive, educated, and influential Indians of their
day. Not surprisingly, they made citizenship for the Indian their prime objective. According to
historian Frederick Hoxie, they believed that citizenship would “empower their members to
become forceful actors in the nation’s democracy.” As an organization, they declared, “The open
plan is to develop race leaders, to give hope, to inspire, to lead outward and upward….We ask
every Indian to speak, to voice his wrongs, to tell of injustice.” The organization solicited, and
received, the support of Richard Henry Pratt, who applauded their call for citizenship, referring
to it as “your good citizenship gun.” SAI’s founders believed that citizenship could be a powerful
tool, or gun, which they could wield to help them live outside of the control of the Indian Office
and turn back the constant assaults of their white neighbors.90
Pueblo Indians had been conspicuously absent from meetings of Indian activists. While
Pueblo Indians certainly wanted to secure their rights vis-á-vis their position in the face of
ongoing legal assaults and land encroachments, they displayed little desire to make their political
mark on the national scene. There was no Pueblo Eastman, Montezuma, or Cornelius. Instead,
elected Pueblo officers filed petitions, traveled to Santa Fe to meet with New Mexico governors,
and even made the long trek to Washington, D.C. to lobby the Great Father and his
representatives. The Pueblos had survived nearly four centuries of invasion and colonization
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through adaptability and legal efforts, on the one hand, but more so through maintaining fiercely
proscribed and closed societies. When James Calhoun wrote to the Pueblos in May 1850, on the
eve of the ratification vote for a state constitution, he had offered them a choice: vote and
become citizens of New Mexico and the Unites States, or refrain from voting and remain a
separate and distinct people, governed by your own laws, customs, traditions, and leaders. It is
hardly surprising that the Pueblos chose the latter.
From the late 1840s through the 1910s, Indian agents, superintendents, and others
reconfirmed the Pueblo stance: the Pueblos controlled their own internal affairs and did not want
to become part of mainstream society. Indian Service representatives and the Pueblos had
worked out an arrangement whereby in exchange for largely staying out of New Mexico and
United States politics, including elections, the federal government would protect the Pueblo right
to self govern. As Pueblo Agent Silas F. Kendrick wrote in 1860, “Each village, or ‘Pueblo,’ as it
is called, is a political community of itself, has its own complete organization; its own laws; its
own tribunals; and its own officers for their enforcement. Probably there is no people,
enlightened or otherwise, among whom the laws are enforced with greater regularity and
efficiency.” In 1859 New Mexico Superintendent of Indian Affairs J. L. Collins summarized this
arrangement with this terse statement: “The internal government of these Pueblos is left entirely
to themselves.”91
While an element of coercive power certainly lurked in this arrangement, with the federal
government implicit as the colonizer, the Pueblos clearly sought their own ends within this
framework. The system of village government, which had evolved and adapted over the
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centuries, remained essentially the same república system instituted by the Spaniards in the early
seventeenth century. Deeply ingrained in Pueblo political organization, it had attained a status as
an almost “traditional” element of Pueblo society.92 The Pueblos fiercely clung to the governor
system throughout the territorial period; Indian agents and others noted their resentment
regarding any outside meddling in internal Pueblo affairs. On the list of Pueblo grievances,
outside meddling in internal affairs was second only to land encroachment. As Pueblo Agent
William Arny reported in 1871, “[The Pueblos] do not [even] like to be questioned on subjects
which they believe to concern none but themselves.”93 Superintendent Crandall summarized the
Pueblos’ desire for complete village autonomy: “…the spirit of the Pueblo is to retain Indian
customs and to live apart from the the [sic] state as much as possible.” He wrote further, “This
is…one…of the traits of the Pueblo. They desire to be independent of all white people, to have
nothing to do with them…There is a greater desire among the Pueblo to live apart and be
independent and have nothing to do with the white race than among any other Indians with
whom I have worked.”94 The governor system, and relatively unobtrusive Indian agents, allowed
for such autonomy in internal Pueblo affairs.
What, then, did Pueblo “internal control” look like during the U.S. territorial period? It
bore a very close resemblance to the Spanish and Mexican eras. Each Pueblo elected its own
officials on an annual basis, and these officials exercised the duties of their office. In addition,
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the Pueblos continued to administer internal justice in the traditional way. Pueblo Agent José
Segura reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1890:
…each Pueblo has some kind of tribunal in which they try offenders against their
customs, rules, and regulations and mete out punishment to the convicted; and if reports
are to be believed the punishment is sometimes quite severe. But these matters are never
officially reported to the agent; he only hears of them incidentally. I can not possibly
estimate the number so tried and punished. Some offenses that to civilized man is very
trivial are considered heinous crimes by them, and the guilty party is severely punished.95
Coupled with yearly elections, the administration of internal justice was the most prominent
display of Pueblo autonomy.
A few specific examples are illustrative. Anthropologist Elsie Clews Parsons, who wrote
extensively on Isleta Pueblo during the first half of the twentieth century, relates events that took
place at the Pueblo in 1904. One night, an intoxicated Isleta man was “being baited by some
boys.” The man became angry, and “took a strap and then grabbed [one of the boys] to choke
him.” The boy grabbed a rock with which to defend himself, and struck the intoxicated man in
the head. The man died from the blow. The boys panicked and fled from the scene. Someone in
the village saw the body later that night, and reported it to the dead man’s father. The man’s
father alerted Isleta’s sheriffs, who combed the village and arrested all men who were outdoors.
The next day, they found the man’s killer hiding in a bush. The governor, acting within his
powers to dispense justice, had the young man fined $350 and a team of oxen. These items then
went to the deceased man’s wife. Some time later the Indian agent found out about the events.
He could have insisted that the killer brought up on charges in a New Mexico court. But, he

95

“Report of José Segura, Pueblo Agent,” 25 August 1890 (Segura to Commissioner), Annual
Report, 1890, 174.

308
agreed with the Isletans that the decision was fair, and did not pursue the matter any further.96
This internal handling of justice had satisfied all involved, and it was in line with the agreement
to allow the Pueblos to see to their own internal government, even, as in this case, in a serious
capital offence.
Another case also comes from Isleta Pueblo. In an account originally related by Father
Anton Docher, the French Franciscan who labored at Isleta for several decades, as he traveled by
wagon performing his priestly duties, a severe sandstorm arose. Docher came across Vicente, the
governor of Isleta, traveling alone in the storm. Docher tells of giving Vicente a ride, and also
recalls the governor’s words at his installation as governor: “I want no one to say when I
surrender the Lincoln Cane of Authority, that I failed to lead the…People [of the sixteen clans]
in the right direction.” In the conversation between Docher and Vicente that followed, the
governor asked the father if he had heard anything of a certain Isleta man in the village of
Peralta, where Docher had been earlier to minister. The man in question had been gone for three
days, and his wife had come to the governor because she was concerned. The governor feared the
man might be dead. Vicente planned to employ the “Town Crier, the War Captain, the First and
Second Lieutenant-Governors, and the two sheriffs on the job of hunting for the missing Isletan,
after consulting of course, the cacique and the Business Council of Twelve.”97
When the missing man, one Pedro Lucero, did not turn up, the people Isleta Pueblo
searched for him for several days. The governor eventually announced that they had found a man
by the name of Juan Montoya, who had last been seen riding with Pedro. Montoya was suspected
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of foul play. Apparently, villagers had seen him by the river bridge “looking at the water in a
very suspicious manner.” After Docher traveled to Peralta again for a funeral of a tribal member,
he returned to Isleta to find the governor and other secular officials, along with some AngloAmerican surveyors who had been surveying for a new bridge, standing along the bank of the
river. Nearby was an object on the ground covered in canvas. The governor said, “It is the body
of Pedro Lucero. The white men found it in the river this morning. His head was smashed, and
his hands and feet tied. We will have to lock up Juan Montoya again. I think he is the only one
who has something to do with Pedro’s death.” They did not discipline him, though, and when
Docher later saw Governor Vicente supervising men cleaning the acequia, Juan Montoya was
among the workers. The governor said to the father, “You see we let him out of jail. Some one
has to support Pedro’s family. We might just as well let Juan do it.”98 Once again, Pueblo
leadership had administered traditional justice to the approval of all involved. The Territory of
New Mexico dispensed no justice; there was no trial in a New Mexico court, imprisonment of
the accused, or eventual hanging.
In fact, these accounts contradict a short article penned by Father Docher himself for The
Santa Fe Magazine in 1913 titled “The Quaint Indian Pueblo of Isleta.” In his article, Docher
summarizes systems of power then in place at Isleta: “The village of Isleta, like all other Indian
pueblos, has a special administration which is recognized by the United States government. A
cacique, appointed for life, has supreme power over his subjects. A governor, elected yearly by
the people, is the judge in civil cases only. He has two assists, and, if the occasion demands, a
grand council.” But it is Docher’s final statement regarding the administration of justice that
belies the previous summary: “All criminal cases are turned over to the district courts, but
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criminality is almost unknown among the Indians of Isleta.”99 According to the letter of the law,
Pueblo officials were to have jurisdiction over civil cases only. But in practice, as in the Spanish
and Mexican periods, they exercised jurisdiction in criminal cases as well. They did so with the
tacit approval of federal officials, who had ultimate authority at the Pueblos. In these instances,
the Pueblos exemplified independent Indigenous nations.
An episode that culminated during the term of Pueblo Agent Leo Crane, who served in
New Mexico for most of the 1920s, provides a final example of how the Pueblos exercised
sovereignty in internal electoral affairs with the support of Indian Service employees at the
expense of territorial and state power. According to Crane, during Harold F. Coggeshall’s time
as Superintendent of Pueblo Day Schools during the early 1910s, factionalism had developed at
Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo. The “worth-while Governor was deposed [so] that a very doubtful one
should reign in his stead.” The deposed Ohkay Owingeh governor complained to the
superintendent that “the election had not been conducted in strict accordance with the customs of
the people.” The governor also “refused to yield the symbols of his office.” An intriguing
situation developed in which the “pretender” governor filed suit in the New Mexico Territorial
Court to force the deposed governor to give up his Lincoln cane, Mexican cane,100 Ohkay
Owingeh’s land grant patent, and the archives of the Pueblo. Before the territorial court’s writ to
deliver the items could be served, the governor deposited them with Coggeshall, who passed
them on to his successor, Phillip T. Lonergan, who then gave them to his successor, Leo Crane.
The case lasted until 1919, during which time the state court also decided in favor of the
pretender governor. Lonergan had refused to comply with the state court, citing its lack of
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jurisdiction over a federal official, and he was even jailed for a time before resigning. Eventually,
the federal court sided with the Indian Service employees in the case of the deposed Ohkay
Owingeh governor. Crane observed, “Naturally, the Federal Court decided that the State Courts
[and Territorial Court before them] had no jurisdiction over questions of internal government of
the Pueblo Indians, and the state did not appeal the case.”101 Federal law protected Pueblo
internal sovereignty in the late territorial period through the late 1910s, and territorial and state
courts could not interfere in such matters.

Conclusion
In their numerous statements and actions, federal authorities recognized that Pueblo
communities were ordered, efficiently run political entities with systems in place for establishing
leadership and administering justice. In some cases, Indian agents intervened in internal Pueblo
affairs, especially as factionalism expanded during the territorial period. They also stepped in
when there were serious criminal offenses. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, the
Pueblos resolved their own disputes, administered justice themselves, and saw to their own
internal affairs. They had made their decision on citizenship. They would not focus on the
acquisition of United States or New Mexico citizenship, but on the citizenship most important to
themselves: Pueblo citizenship. By maintaining their culture, religion, and institutions against an
almost overwhelming tide of encroachment, competing jurisdictions, and unfavorable courts, the
Pueblos were continuing the same persistent struggle that had begun under Spanish domination.
Armed not with the weapon of the “good citizenship gun,” but with stable, proscribed systems of

101

Leo Crane, Desert Drums: The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, 1540–1928 (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1928), 293–294.

312
electoral politics and civil governance, Pueblo communities did all they could to maintain
autonomy and sovereignty. Considering the obstacles, they succeeded to a relatively high degree.
In the decades preceding New Mexico’s admission to the Union as a state, New Mexico
attempted to implement taxes on Pueblo lands, since court decisions from the previous decades
had classified Pueblos as citizens with titles to their lands. This proved the final test of the
Pueblos’ citizenship status during the territorial period. The Territory of New Mexico attempted
to collect taxes on Pueblo property—lands in particular—and took the Pueblos, collectively, to
court in 1900. The Territory of New Mexico v. Delinquent Taxpayers case reached the New
Mexico Supreme Court in 1904. In his ruling, the Associate Justice J. W. Crumpacker stated,
“Among other property on which taxes were delinquent, were the land grants…” The decision
contains another lengthy summary of Pueblo rights and history; a history always told from the
conqueror’s point of view. Invoking the Lucero decision, the court held that “it seems clear that
[the Pueblos] have…[the] right” to alienate their lands. Furthermore, “The right of alienation is
one of the chief elements of property values, and is possessed by all citizens.” As citizens, “they
are subject to taxation.” The defendants attempted to argue that the Pueblos were in a state of
wardship, especially since “they have been deprived of the elective franchise.” The court
overlooked this lack of voting rights, asserting, “never has congress assumed to reduce them to a
state of tutelage and their status has never been attempted to be changed by any act of the
government.” In terms of Pueblo property, the court pointed out that, “The United States has
never assumed to take control of their property…it has quitclaimed to them and issued its patent
for all their lands.” The Pueblos were delinquent on their property taxes “for fifty years.” In its
conclusion, the court felt perfectly comfortable arguing two contradictory sides. While Indian
agents and others had for decades pointed out that even though the Pueblos were “civilized” or
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“semi-civilized,” they were still Indians in need of the protections granted to the Indian peoples
of the United States. The court, on the other hand, stated:
It is true, no doubt, that the fact that these people live in communities, separate from the
rest of the people, and have local self-government, and thus preserve, in a large measure,
the characteristics of their ancient civilization, is the fact which appeals most strongly to
the mind and causes it to rebel against the conclusion reached here; but when their history
is seen and understood and their legal status examined, they are found to possess all the
qualifications and rights of citizenship. They are not unlike, in this respect, the Shakers
and other communistic societies in other parts of the country.
Having considered all of these points, the court ruled “that the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico are
citizens of New Mexico and of the United States, hold their lands with full power of alienation,
and are, as such, subject to taxation.”102
The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled affirmatively on the citizenship status of the
Pueblos, supporting all of the previous decisions. Furthermore, Justice Crumpacker reaffirmed
the status of the Pueblos as non-voting citizens. The fact that Pueblo lands and property were
deemed taxable only underscored the unfair position of the Pueblos. The supreme irony was that
over three hundred years of colonization had eventually ended in the goal with which the
Spaniards had embarked: to turn Indians into taxpaying citizens. But, these taxpaying citizen
Pueblo Indians did not possess the gold standard of citizenship: the franchise. American
policymakers had found a way to legally deny full citizenship rights, while still preserving the
right of Hispanos and Anglo-American access to Pueblo lands. Pueblo Indians had little or no
legal recourse in the adversarial courts, as evidenced by one negative decision after another.
The next year, the U. S. Congress took action on the issue of taxation. In its
Appropriation Act of 3 March 1905, which covered the year 1906, Congress definitively
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excluded the Pueblos from property taxes. In fact, the act excluded “lands now held by the
various villages or pueblos…or by individual members,” as well as “all personal property
furnished said Indians by the United States, or used in cultivating said lands, and any cattle and
sheep now possessed or that may hereafter be acquired by said Indians shall be free and exempt
from taxation of any sort whatsoever, including taxes hereafter levied, if any, until Congress shall
otherwise provide.”103 This resolved neither the citizenship nor the voting issues, but at least it
provided some relief from territorial officials attempting to collect taxes on Pueblo property.
While this congressional action protected Pueblo Indians from property taxes, it opened
the door for continued disenfranchisement of Indians when New Mexico entered the Union.
Perhaps stinging from Congress’s move to exempt the Pueblos from taxation, delegates to the
New Mexico Constitutional Convention in 1910104 moved to prohibit Indian voting once again.
Article 7, Section 1 of the constitution reads:
Every male citizen of the United States, who is over the age of twenty-one years, and has
resided in New Mexico twelve months, in the county ninety days, and in the precinct in
which he offers to vote thirty days, next preceding the election, except idiots, insane
persons, persons convicted of a felonious or infamous crime, unless restored political
rights, and Indians not taxed, shall be qualified to vote at all elections for public
officers.105
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For decades, the Territory of New Mexico had battled to legally designate Pueblo Indians citizens
of New Mexico and the United States, while also denying their voting rights. Now Indians were
kept from the franchise because of their tax status. The New Mexico Constitution also grouped
Indians in the same class as “idiots, insane persons, [and] persons convicted of a felonious or
infamous crime.” Delegates ratified the constitution 21 November 1910, and the male voters of
the territory—Indians not included—approved the document on 21 January 1911. President Taft
signed New Mexico’s admission document early the next year, and New Mexico officially
became the forty-seventh state on 6 January 1912.106
The inclusion of the “Indians not taxed” clause in the New Mexico State Constitution
would prove extremely important over the next nearly four decades, as Indians were completely
barred from voting. And while there had been periodic efforts by individual Indians or small
groups of Indians to vote during the territorial period, by 1912 the issue of Indian voting was
essentially moot. Framing the years from 1846 to 1912 as a struggle to secure the Indian vote
would be a mischaracterization. Rather, we should view the period as a continuing struggle by the
Pueblos to retain their autonomy, sovereignty, and control of internal affairs. Pueblo Indians
actively rejected citizenship, telling their Indian agents repeatedly that they did not desire to
become citizens. They were already citizens of internal Indian nations, and this citizenship
mattered most to them. They were already voters as well, participating in the annual elections for
Pueblo officials. For them, citizenship in New Mexico and the United States held no appeal, as it
would endanger their sacred land, their religion, and their institutions. A statement from Pueblo
representatives dated 24 March 1904 best summarizes the Pueblo position. The New Mexico
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Supreme Court had just handed down the Delinquent Taxpayer decision, and the Pueblos were
alarmed at the prospect of heavy property taxes. Representatives from the Eight Northern Indian
Pueblos Council107 met at the office of Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo Governor José Ramon Archuleta,
and drafted a letter, in Spanish, to the Southern Pueblos to enlist their support in opposition to
this decision. They were absolutely opposed to taxation of their lands, but they carried it a step
further. The representatives stated, “It was decided that all of the pueblos that were there
represented were opposed to participating as citizens in the public affairs of the Territory, and
that we want to protest against the taxation of our lands.” They concluded definitively with the
following statement: “We ask all the Pueblos of the Territory to join together and consider these
matters and take some action to make known to officials in Washington, and in this Territory,
and to Congress that is now in session, that we do not want to be citizens and that we protest
against the taxation of our lands.”108 The document lists the participating officers—governor,
lieutenant governor, and war chief—from Taos, Ohkay Owingeh, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso,
Nambé, Pojoaque, Tesuque, and Picuris. We can only assume that the ten Southern Pueblos, and
Zuñi, were in agreement. The Pueblos had no desire to become citizens, and exercise the
associated franchise; it offered no protection of their rights. The overwhelming majority of
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Pueblo Indians chose to forego the vote and participation in public affairs outside of their villages
in order to preserve their stable, traditional, and ordered way of life.
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Chapter 6
DISPERATE DESIGNS: INDIAN VOTING IN TERRITORIAL ARIZONA

Introduction
Unlike New Mexico, where Pueblo nations faced similar challenges during the
assimilationist United States territorial period, Arizona’s Native peoples confronted differing
dilemmas from one Indigenous nation to the next. The inroads made by Spanish and Mexican
culture and systems of government varied, sometimes drastically, from group to group. To the
far north, Hopis had evaded colonial control since 1700. When United States officials entered the
scene, they encountered a people whose life was still dictated by strict ceremonial cycles,
traditional leadership, and a reluctance to accept any changes brought by the colonizers. The
Hopi would prove a worthy adversary to the panoply of Americans—Indian Service employees,
military officers, missionaries, educators, and reformers—who came to Tusayan after the late
1840s. These outsiders eventually focused their assimilationist agenda on schooling for Hopi
children and land allotment for individual Hopi farmers in an effort to prepare them for
citizenship and voting. Many Anglo-Americans who labored at Hopi reported enthusiastically
about progress made by the “peaceful” and “tractable” Hopi. One went so far as to suggest that
progressive, young Hopi men who had received allotments—thus qualifying for citizenship
under the Dawes Act—were on the cusp of claiming their right to the franchise as United States
citizens. But such pronouncements and progress proved a mirage. Hopis resisted United States
influence just as they had that of Spain and Mexico. The much-anticipated Hopi citizen voter did
not materialize before Arizona statehood in 1912. Hopi villages continued to operate as
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sovereign, Indigenous nations, only allowing the degree of Americanization with which they
were comfortable.
To the south in Sonora, the Yaqui endured the most violent period of their colonial
existence during the decades following Mexican independence. The eight Yaqui villages, once
the wellspring of Yaqui cultural and political development, suffered serious depopulation.
Mexico resorted to wholesale extermination or deportation of Yaquis to the plantations of
Yucatan, hundreds of miles from their homeland. Under these intolerable circumstances, many
Yaquis moved to the cities of Sonora, where they changed their names to protect their identity
and their lives. Others began a trek to safety in Arizona, and the resulting Yaqui exhodus saw
thousands of Yaqui refuges cross the porous Mexico-U.S. border. Yaquis found refuge in their
newly formed communities in southern Arizona, but the horrors of Mexico were still too fresh to
forget. Yaquis did not transplant the governor system and complex pillars of village civil
government from the eight villages. Fearful of deportation, Yaquis kept a low profile. In
addition, Arizona officials did not view Yaquis as Indians; they were unlike Hopis, Navajos, or
Apaches. They had no reservation, no trust land, no Indian agent, and no Indian status. Their
only protection came from their status as refugees. A tragedy of their experience was that the
intricate systems of government that existed in the Yaqui Valley were not to be found in southern
Arizona; and neither was the right to the franchise in municipal elections.
Spain began colonizing the Piman peoples of the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands as early as
1687, the year of Eusebio Kino’s first mission to the area. And while the region had experienced
significant ebbs and flows in the degree of missionization and Hispanic presence, when the U.S.
period began, Pimans had already dealt intimately with colonizers for nearly two hundred years.
The governor system had declined sharply during the Mexican era, which meant that most Piman
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communities had restored traditional modes of leadership; the United States would not find wellorganized cadres of Spanish-style officers with varas de justicia and sharply defined duties. Even
though these Piman peoples had not retained Spanish systems of government, federal officials
still viewed them as “civilized” or “half-civilized,” as they had the Rio Grande Pueblo peoples.
The United States believed it could transform the Tohono O’odham of San Xavier del Bac, in
particular, into civilized, voting, citizens who farmed land in severalty. But the allotment of
O’odham lands at San Xavier did not produce O’odham voters. The farmer who served as the
federal agent at San Xavier reported year after year that allotted O’odhams, who qualified for
voting under the terms of the General Allotment Act, had failed to do so. Thus for Hopis,
Yaquis, and Odhams in Arizona, the franchise remained a right unclaimed or undesired. Change
would only come on the wings of the post-World War I and World War II political climate, when
these Native peoples would actively pursue citizenship and voting.

The United States and the Hopi
When the United States assumed control of Hopi homelands in 1846, the area, as well as
all of the current state of Arizona, was then designated as part of the Territory of New Mexico.
Arizona did not become a territory until 1863. Not only did Arizona remain under New Mexican
control for nearly twenty years, but Anglo-American contacts were delayed as well. According
to historian Peter Iverson, Bill Williams was probably the first U.S. trapper to visit Hopi lands in
1827, and it is likely Williams guided Captain Joseph Walker’s 1834 exploration which led to
the deaths of twenty Hopis shot dead in the so-called “cornfield incident.”1 Governor James
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Calhoun was the first U.S. administrator of Hopiland. While Calhoun met frequently with the
governors and other representatives of the Rio Grande Pueblos, he had difficulty negotiating with
the Hopi. What made meeting with the Hopi so difficult was the fact that both Navajo and
Apache territory lay between Santa Fe and Hopiland, and the military was reluctant to provide
Calhoun with the protective escort he deemed essential to safely visit Tusayan.2 United States
authorities and Hopis thus experienced infrequent early contacts.
Calhoun had every intention of visiting the Hopi, and establishing political ties with
them, but he simply was unable to do so during his brief tenure in office. Arizona territorial
officials also failed, and there is an easily discernable pattern in the relationship between colonial
powers and Hopis: both Spain and Mexico had fallen short in their efforts to incorporate Hopis
as well. Calhoun voiced his desires to establish contacts in 1850—and the inherent difficulties in
doing so—stating:
Beyond Zuñi…the Moqui country is reached—These Indians live in Pueblos, cultivate
the soil to a limited extent, and raise horses, Mules, Sheep and goats, and, I am informed,
manufacture various articles—
I am extremely anxious to visit these Indians; but it would be unsafe to do so, without
sufficient escort, as the Apaches are upon the left, and the Navajos on the right in
traveling…to the Moquies…My information concerning the Moqui Indians is not of a
character to justify me in making suggestions in reference to an Agent, or agents, further
than to say, without an absolute examination by some one deputed for that purpose,
information, precise and reliable, may not be looked for.3
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In other words, Calhoun felt unsafe visiting the Hopi villages without a military escort, and he
was desperately short on information relating to Hopi customs and political protocol. He felt that
he could not recommend an Indian agent be sent to them without first visiting in person to
ascertain their condition and disposition.
It was the Hopi who inaugurated first contact when they came to visit Calhoun. The New
Mexico governor received the first official Hopi delegation to United States officials in October
of 1850:
The Seven Moqui Pueblos sent me a deputation who presented themselves on the 6th day
of this month. Their object, as announced, was to ascertain the purposes and views of the
Government of the United States towards them. They complained, bitterly, of the
depredations of the Navajos—The deputation consisted of the Cacique of all the Pueblos,
and a chief of the largest Pueblo, accompanied by two who were not officials. From what
I could learn from the Cacique, I came to the conclusion, that each of the seven Pueblos,
was an independent Republic, having confederated for mutual protection.4
Calhoun’s report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs contains a number of telling statements.
First of all, the Hopi were still smarting from Navajo raids and depredations, a situation that had
persisted since at least the Mexican period. According to Iverson, Navajo raids and aggressions
remained the foremost Hopi concern.5 Second, in sending a cacique, chief, and two other leaders,
Hopis demonstrated they were still governed by traditional religious leadership alone. Unlike the
Rio Grande Pueblos, Hopis had no religious-secular division of government, and this had likely
been the case since the destruction of Awatovi. Third, Calhoun described the seven Hopi villages
represented by the delegation as “independent Republic[s].” Whether this was a nod to the earlier
designation of the Pueblos as repúblicas de indios is impossible to say, but Calhoun and other
New Mexico officials certainly had access to, and poured over, Spanish and Mexican records at
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the Palace of the Governors.6 It is a tantalizing idea nonetheless, and demonstrates that in the
early territorial period United States officials viewed the Hopi Pueblos as independent political
units. Despite his failure to visit the Hopi villages, James Calhoun wrote to Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Luke Lea in 1851, “These Indians seem to be innocent, and very poor, and should
be taken care of.”7 In the absence of firm political ties between the United States and Hopis, a
status that persisted for several decades after the 1840s, issues of Hopi voting would not trouble
Calhoun or several of his successors. While federal and territorial officials focused on issues of
Rio Grande Pueblo citizenship and voting during this era, such concerns did not surface at Hopi
until a later date. Instead, the Hopi Pueblos functioned as independent nations at this time.
By the time the Indian Office had established an agency among the Hopis in 1869,8 a
number of visitors had entered their territory. One important visitor, United States Army
Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives, directed a party dispatched to explore the Colorado River by
steamboat in 1857–58. Despite the ugly cornfield incident and the lack of United States response
to Hopi pleas for assistance against the Navajos, when Ives’s party reached the outskirts of the
Hopi villages on 11 May 1857, they were met by two mounted Hopis “arrayed…in their best
attire.” The two Hopis were extremely friendly, “each insisting upon shaking hands with the
whole company.” Ives identified one of the pair as the leader, recalling that, in spite of his
friendliness, his “pleasant, intelligent face…expressed, however, misgivings as to our character
and object in coming into that unvisited region.” After the group was directed to the first Hopi
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village, a “pleasant looking middle-aged man” approached the Americans. Aside from being
adorned with a “handsome shell” around his neck, Ives noted astutely that he had “a kind of
baton in his hand.” Ives surmised that he was a “chief.”9 It is difficult to say whether the baton
was solely traditional Hopi practice for leaders, or some remnant of the varas de justicia tradition
the Spaniards must surely have initiated over two hundred years earlier. Hopi chiefs wielded
some sort of traditional ceremonial club or staff, as had the Rio Grande Pueblo leaders in the precontact period, but the term “baton” has a certain connotation, one that lends itself well to the
idea of the varas de justicia. Unfortunately, Ives makes no comment on the physical appearance
of the baton.
Ives held long conversations with his chiefly host, who, among other things, indicated
that, “Comanches and Navajoes had driven off a great deal of their stock during the previous
year. The Moquis do not look warlike, and but for their natural and artificial defences [sic] would
doubtless long ago have been exterminated by their powerful and aggressive neighbors.”10 Ives
also encountered the more resistant group of Hopis at Oraibe, whose chief he described as “the
senior of all,” “out of humor,” and “ill temper[ed].” The chief refused to allow any of his people
to guide the party on its trip north toward to Colorado, and when one of the junior Hopi leaders
expressed a desire to accompany the Americans, the man, who “was friendly in his
9
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manner…said that he could not go while his superior objected.” Ives was pointing to the
unanimous nature of Hopi leadership. Even though he might have disagreed with his superior,
the junior leader stood aside in favor of group unity. Surprisingly, when the Americans left
unaccompanied the next morning, the Oraibe chief sent a guide after them; without his help they
would not have found a trail north leading to the next watering hole. Ives commented, “we began
to think the old fellow less churlish than he appeared, and gladly availed ourselves of his civility
and the new-comer’s knowledge.”11
Although Ives observed few details of Hopi government, he indicated how Americans
viewed Hopi power structures in these early encounters. In addition to his narration of the need
for unanimity in community matters and the use of a baton by the Hopi leader, Ives also referred
on several occasions to Hopis as “citizens” of their various villages.12 Surprisingly (or perhaps
not), despite the fact that the Hopis had fed, watered, accommodated, and guided Ives, his party,
and their numerous animals, he concluded that Hopis were quick to “lounge and gossip.”
Although they were honest and did not steal, “their promises are not to be relied upon. They
want force of character and the courageous qualities which the Zuñians and some other Pueblo
Indians have the credit of possessing.” Like the Spaniards and Mexicans who preceded him, Ives
failed to grasp the complex structure of Hopi government and the machinations of their
governance: “Their chiefs exercise a good deal of authority, but by what tenure they hold their
power, or how many there are, we could not learn.”13 The many-layered nature of Hopi
government would remain a mystery to Anglo-Americans for decades.
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Another U.S. visitor to the Hopi arrived at the very moment of the agency’s
establishment. Thomas Edwin Farish, who penned the eight-volume History of Arizona from
1915–1918, included quotes from one Dr. Edward Palmer, who visited Oraibi in May of 1869.14
Dr. Palmer stated that during his visit, “The Governor [of Oraibi] invited Mr. Colyer, Lieut.
Crouse and myself to dine with him at his house. He received us cordially, showing us a silver
headed ebony cane, a gift from President Lincoln.” The Hopi headman was in possession of one
of the famous Lincoln canes. Farish was also of the opinion that Hopis were American citizens.
Quoting Thomas Donaldson from the Eleventh Census of the United States (1893), “The Moqui
Pueblos of Arizona and Pueblos of New Mexico are citizens of the United States by virtue of the
laws of the Mexican republic.”15 This was the opinion of one commentator in 1893, and Farish
agreed, but this was not the common view of Hopi in the early decades of the United States
period. The most interesting takeaways from the 1869 encounter reported in Farish’s History of
Arizona was that Dr. Palmer referred to the leader at Oraibi as a governor, and that he was in
possession of a Lincoln cane. Perhaps his reference to a Hopi governor was colored by
experiences with the Rio Grande Pueblos, but there can be no mistaking a Hopi leader possessing
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a Lincoln cane—either the cane was fake, Palmer had made up the story, or the village chief at
Oraibe somehow had received a Lincoln cane.16
When an agency for the Hopis finally opened in 1869, federal officials chose Fort
Wingate for its location. Special Agent A. D. Palmer, writing to Commissioner Ely Parker in
1870, reported that the Hopi were anxious to receive smallpox vaccinations upon his visit to the
villages. He duly vaccinated some four hundred and seventy-eight Hopis, and revaccinated three
hundred and forty more. Special Agent Palmer also commented, as many before him had noted,
that, “the Moquis are not progressive in their work, clinging strongly to their traditional customs
in everything they do. They are much attached to their villages and country, and extremely
jealous of innovation.” Palmer surmised that a general lack of Hopi enthusiasm at his arrival was
due to the fact that “several Americans, who formerly visited them, counted their people and
promised them aid, [but] failed to fulfil [sic] their promise.” He summarized the American stance
on Hopis with the following statement: “They are the most ignorant and superstitious tribe I have
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ever seen, due, I believe, to their isolated position.”17 What Palmer had actually noted was a
longstanding resistance to colonial control, and, like his predecessors, Palmer discerned nothing
regarding traditional patterns of Hopi governance and power structures.
From the 1870s on, agents began to speak of a strategy for civilizing the Hopi. Just as
agents were attempting to establish schools among the Rio Grande Pueblos during the era of
federal expansion in Indian schooling, the Indian Office moved forward with similar plans for
the Hopi. Unfortunately, the singularity of village locations proved a constant concern. Writing
in 1872, Agent W. D. Crothers commented, “Their locality is so remote from civilization, that in
order to make much progress in civilization there must be a greater number of schools
established among them…” He also noted the reluctance on the part of Hopis at Oraibi to
cooperate with American officials, a problem that would persist for decades.18 Crothers held firm
to the American belief that education would do the work of civilizing. From the U.S. perspective,
this would eventually lead to Hopi citizenship, and, potentially, Hopi voters.
Initially the Hopi Agency had an exceedingly high turnover, but by 1875, Agent W. B.
Traux became perhaps the first United States Indian official to make specific references to Hopi
citizenship. By this time the agency had a boarding school, which had finally been moved close
to Hopi lands (“some fifteen miles from the nearest Indian [Hopi] village”). According to Agent
Traux, “All of the pupils were boarded, clothed, and furnished lodgings here.” He reported
enthusiastically that parents had requested more schools at the villages, since a boarding school
proved to be an inconvenience for many of them. He also recommended two additional teachers
for a school “located as to be within convenient reach of six of the villages…[which] would
17
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afford facilities to almost the whole tribe for educating their children.” Truax believed that if
such measures were implemented, “These Indians, living in permanent abodes, far removed from
all disturbing causes, and to some extent civilized, furnish a most hopeful field for missionary
and educational effort.” But, he cautioned, “The Bible and the common school must be given
them, if they would ever rise to the true position of citizens. I believe that no nation or people
ever will, by their own efforts, lift themselves out of a state of degradation and barbarism into a
permanent civilization.”19 Traux believed that Hopis could “rise to the true position of citizens,”
but, repeating the mantra of his cohorts, he inserted the common claim that only schools and the
Bible would accomplish this goal. The agents who followed would carry Traux’s ideas to the
next step, suggesting that Hopis become voters as well.
In the middle of the 1870s a number of conditions challenged the Indian Service’s work
among the Hopi. First, the Hopi had never received a land grant from the Spanish or Mexican
governments. Further, they did not possess a reservation. As Agent Traux indicated in his 1876
report, with “no reservation or title to the country they are now occupying, consequently they
are…liable to be imposed upon in various ways.” The agent also believed that the soil near the
mesas was approaching the critical point of exhaustion, and he recommended Hopis farm a river
valley fifteen miles from their villages. He even supported the idea of possible Hopi removal to
Indian Territory, but conceded, “They told me emphatically they would never leave their present
abodes, unless forced to do so.” He suggested that in order to solve the issues of encroachment,
and to avoid further degradation, a reservation for them should be set aside. The school was

19

“Report of W. B. Traux, Moquis Pueblos Agent,” 31 August 1875 (Traux to Smith), in Annual
Report, 1875, 212, emphasis added by author.

330
already proving successful, and “A good portion of the scholars have a strong desire to obtain
education ‘that they may be like Americans.’”20
But the Hopi school closed down in September of 1876 after only a few years of
operation. The agency turnover continued, and Agent William R. Mateer reported in 1878 that
the Hopis were “an exceedingly superstitious people.” Frustrated with the failures of Hopi
schooling to that point, Agent Mateer suggested that “six of the brightest Moquis boys, sixteen
years of age, be sent to a State normal school for four or five years…These young men upon
their return would make competent teachers…[and] certainly do much toward educating,
civilizing, and christianizing these Indians.”21 In spite of the recommendations of the Hopi
agents, Americans saw little Hopi progress toward “civilization” as the 1880s began. In a
positive development, on 16 December 1882 President Chester A. Arthur finally set aside a Hopi
Reservation through the means of an Executive Order.22 A reservation provided some degree of
protection for Hopi lands. While Americans had viewed the Rio Grande Pueblos as “civilized” or
“half-civilized,” they did not consider Hopis in the same class. Neither Spain nor Mexico had
granted the Hopi their land. Their lack of civilization and land grant meant that there was no
question as to their citizenship status. As uncivilized reservation Indians, Hopis were firmly
wards of the federal government.
Beginning in the early 1880s, the Hopi endured a rather rocky relationship with the
Indian Office. By 1882, the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions had opened a day school with
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a staff of two teachers, but it was sorely underfunded and supplied.23 In addition, the OIA
abandoned the Hopi Agency for five years: 1882–1887. Furthermore, from 1882 to 1889, the
Indian Service jointly administered Hopis and Navajos. It was an administrative mess, to put it
lightly. The United States finally sent James Gallaher to serve as Hopi Agent in 1887. Based at
Keams Canyon, where the agency had been moved in 1873, Gallaher and his staff ushered in the
opening of a school at Keams Canyon on 1 October 1887, with an initial enrollment of fifty-two
pupils.24 The work at Hopi would take on a decidedly different air after the late 1880s. Agents
would ramp up their efforts to civilize the Hopis and transform them into citizen voters.
While earlier agents had largely failed in their civilizing efforts, the redoubled effort by
those who followed had dire consequences. The Indian Service touted its successes at Hopi,
failing to see, or ignoring, the negative consequences of its work there. Historian Harry C. James
notes that beginning in the late 1880s, Hopi agents worked “with a determined dedication to do
everything within their power to make the Hopi over into an imitation and second-class white
man, rather than the best type of Hopi citizen.” Furthermore, officials actively sought to
undermine or sidestep traditional patterns of Hopi leadership and governance: “It is only too
evident that the men who came out as representatives of the BIA did not even consider the ageold indigenous system of government the Hopi had worked out for their villages. Certainly, no
attempt was made by these government officials to work through the traditional leaders of the
villages.”25 The Indian Office began to employ numerous tactics in its attempt to civilize the
Hopi villages: schooling, allotment and private property, employment, and religion. All four
were intertwined in some way or another, and, as E. Charles Adams and M. Nieves Zedeño point
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out, these tools would function to bring Hopis, who were perceived as being “in a much lower
stage of social development,” into the American mainstream. With these measures successfully
employed, “Indian citizenship would be, in evolutionary terms, the inevitable consequence of
progress and civilization.”26
With the passage of the General Allotment (Dawes) Act in 1887, which corresponded to
the reopening of the Hopi Agency, the Indian Service saw a perfect opportunity to change the
people they perceived as superstitious and overly communal. The Hopi allotment plan, which
aimed to break up the communal villages and their social and political structures, began to
crystallize in 1891. The Indian Office contracted an outsider to survey Hopi lands for individual
allotments. Indian Service officials promised lumber and other supplies to those Hopis who
accepted allotments. They hoped to move the Hopi off of the mesas and into the valley floors to
farm.27 Hopis had practiced agriculture for centuries, but Indian Office bureaucrats reasoned if
Hopi farming communities could be modeled after Anglo-American patterns, Hopis could be
much more easily educated, surveilled, and controlled. American officials succeeded in
surveying one hundred and twenty thousand acres of land, and made individual allotments to
Hopis who would accept such parcels. Agents reported enthusiastically that they had equipped
twenty houses upon individual land allotments with stoves, beds, and other modern
conveniences. Unfortunately, they also pointed out that even allotted Hopis continued with
traditional subsistence patterns, moving from their new valley homes to the mesas during certain
parts of the year. Hopis considered their allotments as seasonal abodes. 28
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The allotment work was completed by 1894, but all had not proceeded as planned.
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Daniel N. Browning reported to the Secretary of the Interior:
The work of allotting lands in severalty to the Indians of this [Hopi] reservation has been
discontinued. All but a few of the Indians had made their selections…but a small number
continued their opposition to the allotment work. This opposition together with formal
objections to the approval of any of the allotments presented to this office by friends of
the Indians, led to a discontinuance of the work in February last.29
Agent E. H. Plummer, who was Navajo Agent at that time, administering both groups once
again, wrote flatly to the commissioner: “There is little, indeed no, improvement in the condition
of the Moquis in the past year.” The plan to move the villagers off the mesas had simply not
worked. They had no desire to move, and resisted all efforts to that end. While they were “very
friendly to the whites and appear anxious to learn and have their children educated”—except at
Oraibi, of course30—enrollment at the Keams Canyon boarding school was down, and the day
schools averaged only around thirty pupils in attendance. Plummer concluded that allotment was
not feasible. The Friends of the Indians had petitioned for an end to Hopi allotment, and
Plummer favored this action.31 This episode effectively closed the book on Hopi allotment,
which had been a complete failure. Allotment might have accomplished the U.S. goal of
citizenship for Hopis, as allotted Indians at this time automatically became citizens, but Hopis
fought valiantly in favor of their traditional village structures and way of life. Since there were
no allotted Hopi citizens, there were also no Hopi voters for the time being.
Not only had allotment failed, schooling also struggled at Hopi. Reporting in 1897, Agent
Constant Williams wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “There are not sufficient school
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accommodations for the Moqui children…”32 Williams elaborated during the following year:
“The school plant at Keam’s Canyon is old and the buildings are in bad order.” He suggested that
a new school be built.33 The following year, Williams’s replacement, Agent G. W. Hayzlett, was
a bit more positive about the situation. He commented: “The Moqui is quite provident….They
are industrious and appear to be a very quiet and peaceful people.” Hayzlett concluded using a
familiar measuring stick of civilization: “All dress mostly in citizens’ clothing.”34 The arrival of
School Superintendent Charles E. Burton would signal a significant change at Hopi. Burton
pursued a forceful policy with the Hopi, one that earned him a great deal of infamy in Hopi
history. But, he was the first American official at Hopi to take seriously the prospect of Hopi
citizen voters at the turn of the twentieth century.
When Superintendent Burton reported to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A.
Jones in 1902, he proudly listed the schools at Hopi: Moqui Training School at Keams Canyon,
Polacca Day School, Second Mesa Day School, and Oraibi Day School. More Hopi children
were being educated in American schools than at any time in the past. But, as pleased as he was
with the schooling, Burton was more enthusiastic about Hopi involvement in the operation of
trading posts and other establishments. He reported:
There are now five stores on the reservation run entirely by Indian young men on their
own capital….No other features of my work here has had better tendencies toward
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civilization. These young men are learning to be keen traders and to compete successfully
with the white man instead of cowering in servile obedience to him.35
The civilizing work of federal and denominational representatives had stretched for several
decades. By 1902, officials could count some successes as measured by American standards. But
Burton was categorical that nothing had worked more toward civilizing Hopis than young Hopi
men working in the trading posts and stores located at Hopi. Two years later, when Burton wrote
his annual report, he again referred enthusiastically to Hopis engaged in trading and business
pursuits. In these young Hopi men, School Superintendent Burton believed he had finally found
the ideal Hopi candidates for citizenship and voting: “Several young Indians [Hopis] will vote
this coming election, being able to fulfill every requirement of the law. They can read and speak
well in the English language, they can hold their own in commercial pursuits, they can make a
good living for themselves and their families, and why should they not vote?”36 Burton believed
these Hopis were worthy of the vote because they could read and speak English, displayed
commercial savvy, and could successfully provide for their families. These young men were
likely boarding school graduates, or at the very least had attended day school at Hopi. They
might also be allottees, since this would have fulfilled the citizenship requirement. If they were
not allottees, Burton was offering his opinion on the matter; they qualified for the franchise as far
as he was concerned, regardless of their allotment status.37
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Fortunately for the Hopi, the OIA replaced Burton the following year.38 Unfortunately for
a study of Hopi citizenship and voting rights, Burton’s successors make no reference to the
potential Hopi voters who had so excited Burton. In his 1905 annual report, Hopi Superintendent
Theo. G. Lemmon wrote that, “Progress has necessarily been slow as these Indians are loath to
part from old tribal customs.”39 But Lemmon was a bit more insightful than his cursory first
report suggested. The following year, he addressed the seemingly never-ending issue of how
Hopi religious practice and culture interfered with the civilizing of these Indians:
The Hopi’s religion, ceremonies, dances, and other customs pertaining to his final and
future salvation are, I maintain, not of political nature or of Government concern except
as any of these may interfere with good citizenship….When the Hopi quits the earth he
goes beyond the jurisdiction of the United States and beyond Government concern, and
may as well belong to the missionary as to another. The Government deals with him as
present or prospective citizen and while the best Christian is probably the best citizen, his
religious belief and practise [sic] is sacred so long as it does not lead him to violate a
reasonable standard of public morals or personal decency….I have faith in my ability to
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work to good results along lines of good citizenship, with the support of the Office, and
without that no man may succeed.40
Much has been written about the Hopis’ fierce maintenance of religious practice. Lemmon did
not particularly care about this matter, though he certainly preferred Hopi Christians. It was more
important to him that Hopis be made into good United States citizens, and he believed he could
accomplish this work.
On the eve of Arizona statehood, many concurred with assessments by Lummis and
Lemmon that Hopis were of good character and could be led to citizenship peacefully. Some
even argued that the Hopi were already citizens of the United States. Thomas Donaldson, writing
in the Eleventh Census of the United States in 1893, argued that, “The Moqui Pueblos of Arizona
and Pueblos of New Mexico are citizens of the United States by virtue of the laws of the
Mexican republic.” He referenced the citizenship arguments made regarding the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. But, in terms of Hopi voting, he stated:
Neither the Moqui Pueblos nor the Pueblos have exercised the right of suffrage to any
extent since they became citizens of the United States. This fact should have no weight
against their right of citizenship, especially in the case of the Pueblos of New Mexico.
Suffrage is not a natural right; it is a privilege, and is conferred by the state. The citizen
need not vote; there is no law to force him to vote; neither does he lose any rights or
remedies for wrong by not voting. He can vote or not, as he likes. Thousands of
American citizens do not vote, but they are citizens nevertheless.41
In Donaldson’s estimation, Hopis were citizens of the United States since they had been classed
with the Rio Grande Pueblos during Spanish and Mexican times. Although they had not voted,
this record had no bearing on their citizenship. Furthermore, the right to vote was conferred by
the state, not by citizenship status alone.
40

“Report of Superintendent of Moqui School,” Theo. G. Lemmon, 3 September 1906 (Lemmon
to Commissioner) in Annual Report, 1906, 180, 181.
41
Thomas Donaldson, in Eleventh Census of the United States, Extra Census Bulletin: Moqui
Pueblo Indians of Arizona and Pueblo Indians of New Mexico (Washington, D.C.: United States
Census Printing Office, 1893), 9.

338
Joseph A. Munk, an Arizona doctor, rancher, and collector of books who amassed a large
and important collection on Arizona history, which he later donated to the University of Arizona
Library, wrote on Hopi status in 1905:
Some years ago the government, through its agents, began to civilize and Christianize
these Indians and established a school at Keam’s Cañon…When the school was opened
the requisition for a specified number of children from each pueblo was not filled until
secured by force. As free citizens of the United States, being such by the treaty made with
Mexico in 1848 and, indeed, already so under a system of self-government superior to
our own and established long before Columbus discovered America, they naturally
resented any interference in their affairs but, being in the minority and overpowered, had
to submit.42
In Munk’s view, Hopis were “free citizens of the United States” under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo with inherent rights of sovereignty and self-government, who had been forced to submit
to the United States government. He did not comment on whether or not they were entitled to
vote, but they certainly had the right to self-govern.
Charles Francis Saunders, a botanist who traveled through New Mexico and Arizona
around the turn of the twentieth century, wrote in his classic study, The Indians of the Terraced
Houses, that Hopis were citizens of the United States just like the Rio Grande Pueblos. He
believed that Hopis had been incorrectly considered as separate from the Rio Grande Pueblo
group, and that this had damaged their rights and citizenship status:
The Arizona Pueblos—the Hopis—have been less fortunate in the recognition of their
political status. Their lands are theirs only by grace of an Executive order of December
16, 1882, creating the Moqui Reservation, and judging by past Indian history, the Hopi
Pueblos of Moqui may…“move on” whenever enough white people of necessary
influence, who want the land, say so. At present, there is a Government allotting agent at
work there, seeking to apportion lands to individuals under the terms of the general
Allotment Act of Congress. There seems also a curious disposition on the part of the
Office of Indian Affairs to exclude the Hopis from the class of Pueblo Indians. They
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were, up to 1896, designated in the reports of the Indian Office as Moqui Pueblos; but
since that, they figure therein shorn of their Pueblo appendage. The Government's
treatment of them is practically as of any Reservation Indians and their decadence is
correspondingly progressing.
Since they were not considered Pueblo Indians, Hopis and their land received no special
protection. They were simply considered reservation Indians like other tribes. Commenting on
Pueblo Indians in general, Saunders asserted that they were “already as good citizens as their
neighbour whites.”43
Thus the Hopi had their allies among Indian advocates, but they still occupied a difficult
physical and political terrain in terms of citizenship and voting. Decades of efforts to civilize the
Hopis had met with mixed results. In many cases, such as Oraibi, officials dragged Hopi children
to school kicking and screaming in the cold winter snow. In other cases, educated young Hopi
men engaged in business and commerce, appearing to Indian Bureau employees to be on the very
cusp of voting in outside elections. Still others saw in the Hopi an inherent right to self-govern,
much like their Pueblo neighbors to the east, a fact that would have been supported by the
presence of a Lincoln cane at Hopi, a symbol of Indigenous rights to land and sovereignty. A few
individuals saw Hopis as United States citizens. Whether this meant they were entitled to vote is
not clear, but as citizens of the United States they would certainly have been on the path to
voting, if not already there. Whether Hopis themselves expressed any desire to claim voting and
citizenship rights is an entirely different matter, and extremely difficult to determine. Certainly a
small core of “progressive” Hopis subscribed to the American plan of civilization and
assimilation, just as there had been along the Rio Grande. But, this would have been a distinct
minority, since even those Hopis who supported schooling would likely have seen its potential as
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a tool to protect Hopi rights, sovereignty, and culture. That the Hopi maintained their ancient
forms of governance and traditional lifeways throughout the territorial period and into statehood
is without question.
In their struggle with the invasive forces of assimilation within their homeland, Hopis
still managed to keep much of their traditional territory intact and their culture viable. Yaquis, on
the other hand, confronted an enemy determined to wipe them off the map. At a time when
Hopis rejected citizenship and voting, Yaquis had to flee for their lives to the north, forming
expatriate communities in southern Arizona. For Yaquis, the struggle for survival would mean
the demise of the town governing system in these Arizona communities. The loss of a defining
feature of Yaqui political organization would have far-reaching consequences.

Yaqui Refugees in the Time of Terror
In 1909–1910, Norwegian explorer and ethnographer Carl Lumholtz undertook one of his
many expeditions to Pimería Alta. Like the many like-minded explorer/ethnographers of this era,
Lumholtz was fascinated with “primitive” cultures. During this particular expedition, funded by
the American Museum of Natural History, Lumholtz wrote briefly about his encounters with
Yaquis in northern Sonora:
The State of Sonora is, as is well-known, the home of the Yaqui Indians and the scene of
war for, more or less, one hundred and sixty years between these extraordinary ablebodied and very intelligent Indians and the masters of Mexico on the other hand. It is the
old question occurring all over the world, whether the country belongs to the native of the
soil or to the conqueror… The Yaqui, besides their own language, speak Spanish and are
Roman Catholic, although they keep up many aboriginal customs and beliefs. As miners
and laborers they are preferred by Americans to Caucasians or other races. They have,
which for Indians is a singular gift, great mechanical ability and learn to work machines
quicker than the whites.44
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In this relatively brief passage, Lumholtz outlines some of the major impressions of Yaquis that
were in wide circulation during the territorial period: their protracted, bloody struggle with
Mexican forces; their adoption of many Spanish cultural and religious elements; their
maintenance of traditional Yaqui elements as well; and their reputation as skilled laborers. All of
these factors played a part in Yaqui political status from the 1840s through the 1910s. More than
ever, in the late nineteenth century Yaquis would become a people without a homeland in their
native Sonora. Many of them would eventually find safety in southern Arizona, where they
formed communities and revived some elements of traditional Yaqui culture. But, since they
remained visitors in a foreign land, U.S. officials came to view Yaquis as members of a distinct
group that was separate from other Indians. They were neither citizens of the United States, nor
wards of the federal government. Yaquis were more akin to refugees, and in their attempt to
maintain safety and anonymity in their new home they would necessarily abandon their fierce
political independence and systems of village governance and elections. Yaquis did not
transplant the sophisticated system of civil government of the eight villages along the Río Yaqui
to southern Arizona. They were, in the words of historian Erik Meeks, “border citizens,” or
“people whose rights of belonging were in question, leaving them on the margins of the national
territory and of American society and culture.”45
In the decades following the death of Yaqui leader Juan Banderas in 1833, large
landholders dominated Sonora under a hacienda system. These hacendados controlled the land
Scribner’s Sons, 1912), 136, 137. For the purpose of this chapter, my focus will be more on the
communities of Yaquis in southern Arizona, as opposed to the Yaquis who remained in Sonora.
The two stories are intertwined, obviously, but I will refrain form delving too much into events
in Mexico, save to give pertinent historical context. Numerous volumes have already been
written about the history of Yaqui-Mexican relations during this time.
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and politics of the region, and Yaquis bitterly opposed their policies. This hacendado politicoeconomic system eventually broke down in 1910 with the onset of the Mexican Revolution, but
not before these powerful hacendados had succeeded in killing countless Yaquis and forcing
thousands of others to flee the region.46 In particular, during the reign Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911),
state officials from Sonora and federal leaders teamed up to implement the Porfirian policy that
favored the pacification of any dissenting groups, economic development (in the north
especially), and the establishment of law and order. Evelyn Hu-Dehart refers to the men who
controlled Sonora state politics as a “closely-knit clique of federal generals and local civilians.
The state and national power structures were so intertwined at times that it was difficult to
separate the two.” Prominent among this civilian ruling class was Ramón Corral. He served as
governor of Sonora several times, and also rose to become Porfiro Díaz’s vice president. Two
other important leaders in this clique included General Luis E. Torres and his relative, General
Lorenzo Torres. They came to Sonora from neighboring Sinaloa in 1879 to help institute the
Díaz government. Corral, the two Torres’s, and the civilian leader Rafael Izábel took turns
occupying the governor’s seat during most of the Porfiriato. They effectively monopolized
Sonoran political power.47
These leaders pursued goals that directly intersected with Yaqui interests. They brought
the railroad to Sonora and opened up the state for economic exploitation by both foreign firms
and governments. The new railroads naturally passed through Yaqui lands. They also reopened
the region to mining, which had lain somewhat dormant for a number of years. Historically, there
had been many mines on Yaqui lands worked by Yaqui miners. Much of the investment capital
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for these railroad and mining ventures came from the United States, as Díaz desperately sought
to inject foreign investments into the heavily indebted Mexican economy. Furthermore, they
pushed for agricultural and land development in Sonora. Yaquis lived on the best potential
farmland in Sonora, and would need to be dispossessed or brushed aside so that their farmland
could be utilized.48 In order to subdue the Yaqui, the Sonoran and federal governments tried
legal maneuvers, military campaigns, offers of land, and finally, extermination and deportation.
Scholars have written numerous volumes in both English and Spanish about the various
developments of this period, and so the present summary will be relatively brief. I refer to the
words of Evelyn Hu-DeHart, who aptly describes it in the following way:
For three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the chaotic, divisive and problem-torn state
of Sonora was unable to dominate the Yaquis. In a series of civil wars in Sonora, they
became the allies of any side that would promise them autonomy and independence in the
Yaqui Valley. Thus they were found fighting alongside the Federalists, the Centralists,
the Liberals and even the French Imperialists. Although they were merely used by these
various political factions as a fighting force, their active participation contributed to the
instability and impotency of the state government. For most of this period the Yaquis
enjoyed a de facto independence, and were able to keep incursions into the Yaqui
territory at a minimum.49
The second half of the nineteenth century saw a number of prominent Yaqui leaders in the
tradition of Muni, Bernabé, and Banderas. One such leader was José María Leyva, commonly
known by his Yaqui name, Cajeme (he who does not drink water). Cajeme, who was born in
Hermosillo in 1837, spent part of his youth in California, where his family unsuccessfully sought
their fortune in the gold fields. Cajeme later became a professional soldier, and he fought in a
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number of conflicts against enemies that included French filibusterers, both for and against
Emperor Maximilian von Hapsburg, and he even took up arms against other Yaquis.50
By 1872, federal officials had appointed Cajeme, who had distinguished himself as a
soldier in the service of the state, first alcalde of the eight Yaqui villages, or the chief Mexican
official in the zone. They saw Cajeme as an important piece in finally solving the “Yaqui
problem.” But, in 1875 Cajeme murdered the Yaqui Captain General Julio Mayoroqui (“El
Jaguali” or the hare lip), and declared himself Captain General. He initiated a revolt against the
Mexicans, proclaiming himself “head of the Yaqui nation.”51 Spicer credits this as one of
Cajeme’s early flaws, in that he violated the traditional basis of power in the eight villages—the
governors, civil leaders, and religious society heads—and tried to consolidate political and
military power with himself as head, much as Banderas had done. Cajeme was accused of selfinterest and nepotism, but Spicer states, “Once he learned that he had to accept a position
subordinate to the civil government, he began to develop an effective working relationship, and
his enthusiasm spread among young and old. [By 1884] Cajeme’s reorganization of Yaqui
military was developing rapidly.”52 Ramon Corral, Sonora governor turned Mexican vice
president, became Cajeme’s biographer while the defeated Yaqui leader awaited trail and
execution in his last days. He linked Cajeme’s success to his political reorientation:
He organized the towns with their Governors, Alcaldes, Captains and Temastians…For
resolutions that affected the common interests of the tribe, he established a system of
popular assemblies that met every time he believed it necessary to consult them on some
matter. These assemblies were composed of all of the Indians in general, and they had no
50
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fixed meeting place; the chief, through the town governors, convened the meeting at a
determined location, and exposed the business which needed to be addressed and put it
before the resolution of the crowd.
Cajeme thus cultivated a sense of Yaqui nationhood, but one that was contingent upon the civil
governing structure. Corral states very clearly, “The administration of justice in each town was in
the hands of the alcaldes and governors.” Power remained firmly with the civil leaders.53 Yaquis
flocked back from cities such as Hermosillo and Guaymas to Cajeme’s flag, hoping that the
decades of Yaqui dispersal were at an end, and that they would finally achieve their dream of
complete autonomy and nationhood. From his rise to power until his capture and execution in
1887, Cajeme defeated numerous Mexican forces, including officers under whom he had
previously fought.54
Far from crushing Yaqui resistance, Cajeme’s demise led other Yaqui leaders to step in to
fill the void, while Yaqui resistance fighters carried on a protracted guerilla campaign. The
Yaqui Juan Maldonado, known as Tetabiate, led guerilla forces after Cajeme’s death. Yaquis hid
in the mountains—particularly their sacred Becatete Mountains—and surrounding countryside,
mixing with peaceful Yaqui ranchers and farmers. They were extremely adept at guerilla
warfare, and eluded detection and capture time and again. But, after a decade of fighting, in 1897
Tetabiate decided to negotiate with Luis E. Torres’s Sonoran state government. The “Peace of
Ortiz,” as it was called, included quite a bit of pomp and circumstance, calling to memory the
incident at the Pótam jail in 1736.55 Four hundred Yaquis reportedly turned up for the ceremony.
The official Act of Submission, drawn up by Torres, included a number of guarantees for the
Yaquis. Mexican officials promised Tetabiate and his companions that both they and their
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property would be protected, and the government offered those who had been displaced in the
hostilities new lands on the Río Yaqui. The government also promised to supply these men and
their families with some animals and provisions for a period of two months, while they
readjusted to life in the villages.56 Díaz had expressed his desire to see every Yaqui behind a
plow, and Mexican officials believed that this peace would help make that vision a reality.
Yaquis understood the peace very differently. They believed that the document guaranteed their
autonomy, and that federal soldiers would finally leave the Yaqui River Valley.57
What is perhaps most interesting is that at no point does the Act of Submission mention
village politics or elections. Unlike Muni and Bernabé, who had traveled to Mexico City for,
among other things, express guarantees of autonomy in town politics, by this time Tetabiate and
his followers were fighting for their very survival. They certainly attempted to keep their town
structures intact, but one can only imagine the disruptions caused by the constant warfare. Still,
Spicer asserts that the annual elections of town officers continued, and while town life “may
have been constricted and even choked off at the peak of the conflict...the Yaquis’ memories of
what town life had been like were not far in the background.” This was one of the great ironies of
the Yaqui-Mexican conflict. Yaquis fully believed in the superiority of their system of town
governance. But, as Spicer expertly points out:
Their town governments to which they were deeply devoted were characterized by a type
of political succession which was widespread among nation-states participating in
Western civilization, namely, popular election geared to the transfer of office without
resort to military force. In short, even though by the end of the century Yaqui leaders had
become very rigid in their belief in the superiority of their form of community and
political life as against that of…Mexican society, they appeared to be as open as they had
ever been to the adoption of selected items from that same Mexican society.58
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Yaquis were thus battling fiercely for a democratic electoral system, but it was a system in which
they were completely unwilling to participate outside of the confines of the eight villages. While
Mexican control certainly meant Yaqui land dispossession, it also could have potentially led to
wider Yaqui participation in politics beyond the town level. As had often been the case with the
Indigenous peoples of New Mexico and Arizona, Yaquis flatly rejected such participation.
Through continued resistance to Mexican control, and their maintenance of town politics—even
if just by keeping the memory alive—Yaquis actively resisted Sonoran or Mexican citizenship.
Instead, they focused on the citizenship most important to Yaquis, just as the Pueblos of New
Mexico had during the same period: citizenship within the independent Indian town.
Unfortunately, Tetabiate’s peace was very short-lived. Since both sides had
misunderstood the other’s intentions form the very beginning, fighting resumed in 1899–1900.
Mexican soldiers relentlessly pursued Yaqui holdouts into the Becatete Mountains, and at the
battle of Mazocoba on 18 January 1900 Tetabiate’s army suffered a crushing defeat. Federal
troops killed more than 400 Yaquis and took 800 prisoners. The Díaz government considered the
Yaqui campaign to be closed by the summer of 1901.59 Although Tetabiate survived the Battle of
Mazocaba, he was eventually killed in the summer of 1901. Even United States news outlets
took note of Tetabiate’s death, as it signaled a shift in the Yaqui wars. The Los Angeles Herald
from 31 July 1901 reported:
Tetabiate, the formidable warrior chief of the Yaquis, was ambushed and slain several
days ago near Potam, Mexico. The victory of the Mexican troops has caused general
rejoicing throughout that portion of Mexico lying east of Guaymas, and it is considered
by all that the Yaquis, the bravest and most intelligent race of Indians that ever trod on
Mexican soil, have made their last stand.
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Another portion of the short article pointed to a change in policy in Mexican dealings with
Yaquis: “…all [Yaquis], whether peaceful or hostile, who have been captured since the
commencement of the rebellion, have been sent to Yucatan, on the east coast of Mexico…The
general policy is to get the Yaquis out of their native country.”60 While pockets of Yaqui
resisters still remained in the mountains, the government undertook what it considered the final
solution to the Yaqui problem. Governor Rafael Isábel, with federal support, spearheaded a
policy of deportation during the first decade of the twentieth century. In the simplest of terms,
Yaquis were made to pay for their desire for autonomy and decades of resistance.61
Before turning to Yaqui deportation, it is important to note that even when the war
against the Yaquis raged at its most violent point, as alluded to in Spicer’s comments, Yaquis
showed remarkable fortitude in their fight to protect their sovereign rights. Manuel Balbás, a
Mexican medical doctor who had served as an army surgeon in the Yaqui campaigns of 1899–
1901 and lived among the Yaquis during that time, recorded many of his observations on Yaqui
life on the eve of the mass deportations. He wrote that many Yaquis still remained outside
Mexican control, stating, “These Yaqui towns remain at present in the same state of
abandonment and backwardness in which they must have been before the conquest. One meets in
them not a single detail of civilization.” Furthermore, he commented that barely any of these
Yaquis spoke Spanish, and, “Among them there exist no schools and the few which there are in
the region have been established by the government, which has not concerned itself sufficiently
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with this point the most important among all the problems of the Yaqui.” Still, he conceded that,
“The intelligence of the Yaquis is perhaps superior to that of all the other Indians of the
country…” His most revealing comments, though, refer to Yaqui self-government at that time:
The from of government of the tribe is very rudimentary; it reduces itself to arming
among themselves with no more formula than the opinion of whatever group (meets
together) a chief who almost always has the double character of governor and military
[officer].
This chief remains in his post the whole time [during] which his ascendancy among the
Indian lasts. If the dominance which he exercises is great, either for his bravery, for his
strength, or for his audacity, he can remain many years [in office]. But if he shows the
slightest weakness, they remove him immediately.
They have various chiefs or “governors,” according to the towns that they live in,
although among all these chiefs they always recognize one as the superior.
The “governors” dispense justice, aided by a council formed of he eldest men of the
people.
The decisions of this council are final, conforming with true religiosity, from punishment
by whipping to the penalty of death. Generally the sentences of the council are just.62
Remarkably, Yaquis had still retained their democratic system of town government. Even at the
turn of the twentieth century, they still held elections and met in councils. Unfortunately, the
deportations and disruptions of the first decade of the twentieth century were so severe that these
tried and tested institutions would finally break for a time, and would not be revived in the Yaqui
communities of southern Arizona.
In the words of Edward Spicer, the military campaigns suffered by the Yaquis, and the
subsequent Yaqui diaspora, resulted in “the most widely scattered native people in North
America.”63 The preferred destination for Yaquis was the henequen plantations of Yucatán, far to
the south. The deportation figures differ depending on the source. One source puts the number of
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Yaquis deported to Yucatán between 1903 and 1908 at two thousand,64 while a more
contemporary source posits a much higher number. The American John Kenneth Turner traveled
to Yucatán and published an exposé on the Yaqui deportations in 1910. Posing as a rich investor,
he found the conditions there deplorable, with rich landowners controlling huge numbers of
laborers. Turner claimed that there were “8,000 Yaqui Indians imported from Sonora, 3,000
Chinese (Koreans), and between 100,000 and 125,000 native Mayans, who formerly owned the
lands that the henequen kings now own.” He claimed that planters paid the government $65
apiece for Yaquis. He summarized his findings with these scathing words regarding “President
Diaz’s sweeping order of deprtation”: “The Yaquis are being exterminated and exterminated fast.
There is no room for controversy as to that; the only controversy relates to whether or not the
Yaquis deserve to be exterminated….The extermination of the Yaquis began in war; its finish is
being accomplished in deportation and slavery.”65 While the number of deportees may be
debatable, what is not debatable is that the government pursued the policy with gusto. General
Torres concluded, “I don’t see any other solution for these indios.” While many Yaquis had been
forced into work camps on the haciendas of Sonora in a form of peonage, numerous Yaquis still
held out in the remote mountain hideouts. Any Yaqui under the slightest suspicion of aiding the
fighters or showing sympathies for the cause was rounded up and deported. Whole families were
shipped south.66 This represented the worst time in the history of the Yaqui: extermination,
deportation, and slavery.
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By 1910, the Yaqui diaspora was so widespread that the types of Yaqui communities that
had once dotted the Rio Yaqui until the latter part of the nineteenth century no longer existed.
The Yaqiu’s international population was still perhaps as high as 15,000, but they were dispersed
widely over Mexico and the United States. Many were in Yucatán, while others were in barrios
in southern California. Some even took up residence at Zuñi Pueblo. But the most famous Yaqui
refugees were those who formed communities in southern Arizona. By 1887, when Cajeme was
executed, a group of Yaquis had already established a community across the international border
on the outskirts of Nogales. They worked on the railroads linking the mines with Tucson. They
also passed through the Altar Valley and into the Baboquivari Mountains. It was not uncommon
for Yaquis to sojourn with O’odhams as they migrated to southern Arizona, and a high degree of
cultural exchange and even some intermarriage took place between these two peoples.67 Since
the United States did not patrol the border during the first decade of the twentieth century, there
are no official Yaqui immigration numbers. But, by 1910 there were at least five Yaqui
communities in southern Arizona: Nogalitos (on the outskirts of Nogales), Mezquital (south of
Tucson on the east bank of the Santa Cruz River), Barrio Anita (on the Santa Cruz in the
northern part of Tucson), Tierra Floja (a large farming area north of Tucson), and Guadalupe
(south of Phoenix in present-day Tempe on the Salt River).68
The Yaqui who came to Arizona did so out of necessity. Their lives were no longer safe
in Mexico, and crossing into the United States offered relative protection from death,
deportation, slavery, and peonage. Former chairwoman of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe Octaviana
Valenzuela Trujillo states that many Yaquis were forced “clandestinely across the U.S. border
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into Arizona and into a life of self-imposed exile…[which at least saved them] from the threat of
annihilation.” She also comments that the cultural adaptations that had characterized Yaqui life
in Mexico continued in Arizona: “By the time the Yaqui began to migrate across the border into
the United States in the late 1800s, their lifeways had undergone drastic changes from earlier
times. Cultural adaptations continued as small Yaqui communities were established in Arizona.”
While Yaqui oral tradition tells of their presence in Arizona since “time immemorial…The major
migration of the historical era came during the years 1900 to 1910.”69 Yaquis would thus come
to inhabit a unique place in Arizona’s cultural landscape.
Fearing the same violence that Mexicans had perpetrated against them in Sonora and
elsewhere, Yaquis acted with caution in Arizona. Many Yaquis had changed their surnames
while still in hiding in Mexico. The common Yaqui surname Husacamea became Valenzuela, for
example.70 As Trujillo points out, fear led Yaquis in Arizona to operate “primarily within their
own microcosmic cultural enclave as a defense mechanism to the perceived threat of
deportation.” Part of this defense mechanism included the outward suppression of Yaqui identity,
language, and religious practices. Continuing the lessons they had learned in Mexico, “They had
as little contact as possible with government officials so that nearly fifteen years passed before
the Yaquis became aware that they had been afforded political asylum, and that in the United
States religious freedom was upheld regardless of political or social status.”71 This is an
important point because it underscores the fact that Yaquis were not politically organized during
the first decades of their Arizona residency, a point to which I will return shortly.
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There are a number of primary accounts by Yaqui refugees who crossed over into
Arizona in the late 1800s and early 1900s. One such Yaqui was Rosalio Moisés, whose
grandfather had fought by Cajeme’s side, and whose father crossed over into Arizona in 1904,
and then brought the family into Arizona the following year. In his autobiography, he told of
how many of his mother’s relatives were killed at the massacre that followed Tetabiate’s defeat
at Mazocaba. His family was working at the Colorada Mine in Sonora, when “Mexican soldiers
came from Hermosillo to tell all Yaqui men they had to register with the government [for work
at the haciendas]. From this time on, our lives changed.” When young Rosalio finally crossed
over into Arizona with his family, an “American inspector” questioned the group. He asked for
letters of recommendation, but they had none. Rosalio’s grandmother told the inspector that she
was taking them to her son, who was already in Tucson. He asked the name, and they told him
Miguel Valenzuela. He had changed the family name while still in Mexico to avoid detection and
identification as a Yaqui.72 Fortunately, Rosalio and his family found a relative degree of safety
and anonymity in the United States.
Some of Rosalio’s more interesting comments refer to relations between Yaquis and
other groups, particularly American authorities. As Trujillo stated, Yaquis avoided contact with
government officials at all costs, and one episode in particular illustrates this fear. Rosalio tells
the story of a Yaqui man who caught his sixteen-year-old daughter talking to a boy by the river.
The man, one Juan Buichileme, was so angry at his daughter’s impropriety that he beat her
severely. She died one week later. Rosalio states, “No one ever reported this to the American
police because no one spoke English.” A fear of government officials, coupled with the language
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barrier, caused Yaquis to refrain even from reporting murders. Rosalio’s family lived in Barrio
Anita on the outskirts of Tucson, on land owned by a certain “Mr. Nash.” On a number of
occasions, Rosalio’s family provided assistance to Yaqui guerillas in Sonora, even participating
in military actions. They received frequent visits from a Yaqui general from the Sierra who
stayed for sometimes months at a time. It was a truly transnational setting, with Yaquis from
Sonora coming to buy arms, ammunition, and supplies in Tucson, and then transporting them
back to Mexico on horseback. At one point in 1912 Rosalio’s father bought a .30-.30 rifle, three
ammunition belts, and returned to Sonora to fight. In Rosalio’s words, “He was very happy.”73
Refugio Savala was another of the Arizona Yaqui refugees. Around 1900, before
Refugio’s birth, his family, accompanying a donkey cart, slowly plodded north through Sonora
to safety. Refugio was born in 1904 in the historically O’odham (and Yaqui to a lesser extent)
town of Magdalena south of the U.S. border. His grandparents had fled to the mountains to
escape deportation to Yucatán, and his father “drifted to Arizona to work on the Benson-Nogales
branch of the Southern Pacific Railroad.” As in the case of Rosalio Moisés, Refurgio’s father
came back from Arizona to Sonora to retrieve the family: “He brought good news to our people
about himself and other Yaquis who had accompanied him on his first trip and about the
opportunities to work freely for a good wage. Many Yaquis, learning of this, started making their
way north.” More than any other commentators on the Yaqui refugees, Refugio, who was a poet
by trade, eloquently encapsulates Yaqui motivations: “The Yaquis did not go to Arizona because
of ambition or to seek riches, but went in search of peace and freedom and to escape from
heartless killers. We hail the Southern Pacific for having provided all these Yaqui refugees
shelter, wage work, and food.” Refugio Savala’s life is a testament to the resilient, transient
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nature of Yaqui existence at that time: he worked in Tucson, Yuma, California, Deming, New
Mexico, and a number of other locations.74
Rosalio Moisés, Refugio Savala, their familes, and other Yaqui refugees inhabited some
of the most unique towns then in existence in the United States. Armed with this understanding
of how thousands of Yaquis eventually ended up in the United States in the first years of the
twentieth century, it is much easier to understand their political status approaching statehood in
1912. The deportation policy officially ended in 1910, when the Mexican Revolution
commenced. Yaquis participated in this struggle, with many fighting for Obregón. By this time
Yaquis could again live a relatively secure life in Mexico, and many returned. But the Yaqui
communities in southern Arizona were there to stay.75 The two main Yaqui communities, and
those upon which I will focus particular attention, are Pasqua on the outskirts of Tucson, and
Guadalupe in Tempe (Phoenix area). It is important to recognize that Yaquis were encountering
a non-Hispanic culture and form of government for the first time in their history. They had been
under Hispanic influence since the early 1600s. While they certainly had to adjust to this new
culture and government, their tendency was to turn inward, seeking to preserve their SpanishIndian lifeways that had developed in Sonora over the centuries.
Edward Spicer, who spent many years living and researching in the Yaqui village of
Pascau in the middle of the twentieth century, and remains the foremost expert on Arizona
Yaquis, summed up their political status with these words:
The Yaqui population of Arizona consists of immigrants from the Mexican state of
Sonora and their descendants. Other than those born in the United States, there are few, if
any, citizens of the United States. The immigrant basis of the population has entered this
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country at various times from 1882 to the present. As early as 1904 there was a
settlement of Yaquis at a place called Guadalupe, about seven miles east of Phoenix.76
In other words, except for those Yaquis born in the United States,77 the majority of Yaquis in
southern Arizona were not American citizens. Spicer elaborated that Yaquis did not behave as
citizens: “It is a rare Yaqui who has the sort of stake in his community that goes with the
ownership of immovable property. Yaquis do not ordinarily own the land they live on, nor do
they have even the well-established connection with it that comes from paying rent. The typical
Yaqui is a squatter.” Yaquis were not landowners; they were squatters. But, Yaquis also did not
have a reservation, and were not viewed as Indians similar to Apaches or O’odhams or Hopis:
“…they are marked off thus from other Indians in their own and in Anglo-American eyes.”
When Spicer conducted his research at Pascua, he estimated that, “90 percent of the heads of
Yaqui families are not citizens of the United States. This means that this proportion has been
born in Mexico and has not become or signified intention of becoming citizens.” Had they
expressed a desire to become citizens, the process would have been extremely complicated.
According to immigration guidelines enforced in Arizona during the first half of the twentieth
century, all persons who entered from Mexico before 1924 and had no papers were in the United
States illegally. But, they could not be deported because “there is no legal provision for starting
deportation charges.” They needed to first return to Mexico and reenter the United States legally
in order to become citizens.78
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As if this were not complicated enough, Spicer acknowledged the presence of “A large
proportion of Yaquis in Arizona who are citizens of the U.S. by virtue of being born here.” In
addition, there was the issue of Yaquis born in Mexico, who entered the United States, and
applied for citizenship. If they declared that they were Yaqui Indians, then they were denied
citizenship because the Arizona constitution denied citizenship rights, namely voting, to all
persons “under guardianship, non compos mentis or insane…” Indians living on reservations in
Arizona were considered wards under the guardianship of the federal government, and thus could
not vote.79 But, since Yaquis had no reservation, were they truly wards? Furthermore, if upon
entering the United States they simply declared themselves Mexicans, then theoretically they
could have become citizens and voted. Spicer asserts rather unequivocally:
Up to 1940 there had been no record of a Yaqui attempting to register for the purpose of
voting in an election, at least a Yaqui who called himself a Yaqui in his registration.
There seem as yet no evident advantages as recognized by Yaquis in citizenship except
that of freedom from fear of deportation, which is one of the ever-recurring fears among
Arizona Yaquis.80
Spicer is rather bold in his assertion no Yaquis attempted to vote before 1940, at least not
without passing themselves off as ethnic Mexicans instead of Indians, but the theme of Yaqui
political non-participation motivated by fear is also supported by former Pascua Yaqui
chairwoman Octaviana Valenzuela Trujillo.81 As anthropologist George Pierre Castile succinctly

79

Spicer, People of Pascua, 44–45; Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson,
Native Vote: American Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15. The quoted portion of the Arizona Constitution is Article
7, Section 2, quoted in McCool et al.
80
Spicer, People of Pascua, 45.
81
Even if they were not citizens and could not/did not vote, Yaquis still acted like citizens in
some ways. According to Spicer, Yaquis in Tucson made use of the justice system as far back as
at least 1918 (and perhaps earlier). The cases brought before Tucson courts or peace officials
included adoption of children, bootlegging, assault and battery, adultery, and even witchcraft.
Also, he commented, “Yaquis do and have had for some time a political life involving
participation in the various political institutions of the state of Arizona.” See People of Pascua,

358
states, “Fearing deportarion, few Yaquis appear to have put their status to the test by attempting
to claim civil rights, such as the vote, which was not granted to Indians in Arizona until 1948.”82
Shifting from Yaqui poltical status in Arizona to the Yaqui communities, Yaqui refugees
found work in the United States wherever they could: railroads, smelters, mines, and irrigated
farms. They made permanent settlements largely according to the work patterns they established.
These settlements were constructed around a plaza with a church, a communal kitchen for
preparing food for religious celebrations, and a ramada for Pascola and Deer dances. Leadership
in these early communities fell to officers in the religious organizations of the Yaqui
communities that predated the diaspora.83 This point is of the utmost importance: in the towns of
southern Arizona, Yaquis did not transplant the Yaqui-Hispanic governor system. Yaquis did not
transplant the annual elections, civil officers, and systems of civil government. There are several
reasons for this. For one, as Trujillo points out, the town that refugees established at Guadalupe
by around the turn of the century was a “small one-square-mile desert settlement” that was more
akin to a “refugee camp, an innocuous cluster of extremely humble dwellings on the lightly
populated Valley’s periphery.” Their location on the periphery “was…symbolic of the Yaquis’
lack of cultural and social integration in their new homeland.”84 These refugees, worn out from
years of fighting, hiding, and a long journey to a new and unfamiliar land, focused primarily on
survival. Complex, strident political institutions were simply out of the question. Furthermore, as
Trujillo points out:
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Most Yaquis came to the United States as individuals without any kin or social grouping
to help them survive. Usually they were unrelated individuals who had fallen in with one
another. During the early years in Arizona, they gradually developed new family
groupings through reunion of separated families and the starting of new families. Ritual
kin groups, based on baptismal godparents and ceremonial sponsors, further extended the
basic family organization.85
This is another crucial point. At various points in their history Yaquis felt a strong sense of
nationhood and a collective struggle for a Yaqui Nation. But, Yaqui political identity was much
more closely tied to village identity. Yaquis identified as citizens of Bácum, or Ráum, or Cócorit,
and they tied their allegiance to local, elected civil officials. Since the Yaqui who fled to the U.S.
were “without kin or social grouping,” that sense of village identity would have been lost.
Yaquis would have remembered their individual villages, but reconstituting the traditional
village civil government would have been very difficult among refugees from many different
villages. Finally, many residents of Arizona Yaqui settlements did not reside there full time.
They worked on railroad lines or at mines far away from their settlements and families, returning
for special ceremonies or to visit families.86 A stable leadership corps of elected men would have
been nearly impossible to achieve under such transitory employment and settlement patterns.
These three factors, among others, combined to stymie the reestablishment of Yaqui democratic
civil government in Arizona.
At Guadalupe, for example, we can observe these issues at play in its early history.
Around the turn of the twentieth century Yaquis established a community in Tempe when
railroads first began connecting the area’s farms to larger markets. Railroad companies and large
farming enterprises needed cheap, reliable labor, and Yaquis ably filled this need. Canals made
fields in this area particularly fertile, and the railroads brought these crops to market. After their
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arrival in the area in the 1880s in the wake of the Cajeme wars, some thirty Yaquis established
ties with Franciscans, who helped secure five acres of homestead land for the Indians in 1898 for
a payment of one dollar. They named their newborn village after their homeland’s patron saint,
Our Lady of Guadalupe. Initially Guadalupe’s Yaquis considered themselves temporary, but by
1906, they realized they were refugees. This meant that the United States had no plans to
extradite them, and they initiated a cultural revival. But, at this time they revived only portions of
their culture, all of which revolved around the church and religious celebrations and dances. As
historian Leah S. Glaser, who wrote extensively on the history of Guadalupe, states, “Yaqui
communities did not develop the same types of social or political institutions as other immigrant
groups, including Mexicans.”87 Writing in 1940 after prolonged fieldwork, Spicer once again
summarized the lack of political development among the Arizona Yaquis:
Although at least two of the villages have within the past twenty years attempted to set up
village organizations, it can be said now that none has any purely political government.
There is no chief in the sense that whites think of such an official. Village organization is
entirely in terms of the ceremonial groups. In addition to such groups, those based on
kinship and others best described as godparental groups constitute the fabric of the social
organization.88
Yaquis engaged in discussions about village government in the 1920s and after, and some
favored recreating the structures of civil government from the Yaqui Valley. But Yaquis
eventually concluded that since there was no actual Yaqui land to manage, and since federal and
state officials already fulfilled the functions of the old officers, they should not try to reestablish
their traditional officers.89 From the first Yaqui refugees in the 1880s through statehood, Yaquis

87

Leah S. Glaser, “The Story of Guadalupe, Arizona,” 20–22, 15.
Eward H. Spicer, “The Yaqui Indians of Arizona,” Kiva, vol. 5, no. 6 (March 1940), 23.
89
Spicer, The Yaquis, 244. There were a few abortive attempts at electing officials, such as one
in which “judges” were elected at Pascua in 1923. But these attempts failed to take root.
However, to the south in Sonora, Yaquis who reoccupied their traditional homelands after 1910
did reconstitute their systems of government. Several works describe these structures in detail,
88

361
remained non-citizens in Arizona. But in addition to their non-citizen status, Yaquis also did not
have a reservation. They lacked the Indian status of other Indian nations in both Arizona and
New Mexico. Not only could they not vote in municipal and territorial elections like other
Indians, through disruptions caused by decades of warfare and forced diaspora, they no longer
possessed their traditional governing structures.90 Among all of the Indian groups of Arizona and
New Mexico, the Yaqui right to vote had perhaps seen the most interruptions, culminating in a
lack of sovereignty on the village level for the Yaqui of southern Arizona. The Tohono
O’odham, with whom the Yaquis had shared cultural ties, would face challenges to their
sovereignty as well. But the O’odham, much like the Hopi and Pueblo Indians, failed to embrace
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the franchise, preferring instead to participate in their own internal forms of governance. It was a
luxury the Yaqui did not possess.

Piman Peoples of Southern Arizona in the Territorial Period
Before delving into Pima electoral politics during the territorial period, I must first
identify my Piman subjects. Various groups in Southern Arizona speak some variant of the Pima
language and can be classed as Pimans. Two groups in particular stand out because of their long
history of interaction with the United States government and its agents: the Tohono O’odham
and Gila River Pimas. A wealth of primary sources, some of which even come from Pimans
themselves, relate to interactions between the federal government and these Natives. Because of
the impossibility of addressing Indian voting and citizenship for all of the Pimans during the
territorial period, I have selected the Tohono O’odhams of San Xavier del Bac as my primary
group for the present section. Descended from the Sobairuris who originally inhabited the
mission, and the later “desert Pimas” or so-called Papagos who increasingly moved to the
mission in the late Spanish and Mexican periods, O’odhams endured some the longest and most
sustained interaction with government officials during the territorial period. I will thus refer
almost exclusively to the San Xavier O’odham, with occasional references to Gila River Pimas
and Maricopas, and how they interacted with the government officials who largely dictated the
development of Piman political incorporation.91 More than Hopis and Yaquis, San Xavier
O’odhams came closer to the ideal of voting American citizens, and yet, they would ultimately
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fall short in this regard, as the United States on one side and O’odhams on the other failed to
connect the dots of the elusive scheme of Indian voters.
The instability and turmoil of the Mexican period resulted in extreme neglect of O’odham
lands. A number of Catholic missions had once dotted O’odham territory. But as has been amply
shown, as an independent Mexico focused on internal problems, it could no longer fully fund the
presidios and missions of Pimería Alta. This drastically affected those O’odhams who had
previously been attached to the missions, and they found themselves at the front line of the war
against surging Apaches. Even so, as Winston P. Erickson stated in his important work on the
Tohono O’odham, “The O’odham were not concerned with the problems of Mexican politicians
most of the time.”92 The abandonment of the missions during the Mexican period adversely
affected O’odhams because the missions, in spite of their troubled history, had often served to
protect Indian rights guaranteed under Spanish and Mexican law. When the Church placed the
missions in the hands of civilian administrators in the 1830s:
…the civilian managers sold much of the valuable land and either consumed the animals
or sold them for their own profit. They also abused the O’odham, took away their
privileges, and drove many of them away from the mission lands.
These actions destroyed the missions and imperiled the towns that had developed around
them. No longer could the missions attract the O’odham, who tried to avoid the intruding
settlers.93
Thus, when the United States began to exert control over O’odham lands in the 1840s and 1850s,
they encountered a people who had for centuries dealt with government and church officials.
But, for reasons listed above, O’odhams had seen these dealings diminish significantly over the
course of the previous decades, while experiencing a simultaneous increase in encroachments by
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Hispano settlers. O’odhams had essentially been forced to hold their own against squatters,
Apaches, and other threats, both foreign and domestic.
With the ratification of the Gadsden Treaty in 1854, the United States gained the
homelands of thousands of Pimans. The treaty also split the O’odham in the southern part of this
territory into two groups living on different sides of the border. But, several decades passed
before the revised U.S.-Mexico border was strictly enforced, and O’odhams on both sides
maintained strong ties into the early twentieth century. In addition, many of the Mexican
O’odham, who probably numbered no more than one thousand individuals, began moving north
as more Mexicans moved onto the best lands along the Altar River, much as they had done along
the Yaqui River. As Erickson summarizes, “…life for the O’odham continued much as it had. A
new government meant little to them.” Furthermore, “For the most part, the O’odham remained
at peace with whatever government they had to deal with.”94 While Mexico considered the
Indigenous peoples of Pimería Alta nominal citizens of the republic with all of the rights of
citizens, their attempts to incorporate these Pimans were halting and had never truly gained
traction. After the U.S.-Mexico War and the Gadsden Purchase, Anglo-American influence grew
in Papaguería (the O’odham homeland), but unlike other Natives groups, they never received the
protection of their land and rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. As
Erickson points out, “the O’odham had few or no rights as the intruding Anglos took whatever
they wanted and ignored the rights of native peoples.” Since ownership of land had remained
largely a foreign concept, intruding settlers and government officials assumed that any O’odham
land without proper documentation was ripe for settlement. Since the O’odham were not hostile,
did not fight against the U.S. Army, and did not raid American settlements, the United States saw
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no need to send troops in order to protect their land, interests, or rights. Quite simply, “the
federal government basically ignored the O’odham and their rights.”95
Thus, agents of the federal government began their dealings with the O’odham in a
subdued manner. During the early years of U.S. administration of Pimería Alta, the two sides
tried to feel one another out, as it were, and to understand one another’s characteristics and
intentions. Pimans first appear in official reports sent from New Mexico Territory to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1856. New Mexico Governor David Meriwether, who now
oversaw dealings with these Pimans, sent what sparse information he had gathered to the
commissioner:
From the most reliable information in my possession, we have acquired, by the Gadsden
treaty with Mexico, about five thousand Indians in addition to those heretofore under the
charge of this superintendency. A large portion of this accession to our Indian population
consists of Pueblos, situated near Tucson…These recently acquired Pueblo Indians are
represented to me as being in a similar state of civilization as the other Pueblos of this
Territory. They reside in permanent villages, have comfortable houses built of adobes,
have flocks and herds around them, and rely upon the cultivation of the soil for a
subsistence—raising wheat, corn, cotton, and other vegetables. They are divided into six
pueblos, or villages, but whether or not they hold their lands under grants from the former
governments of their country I am not informed; but presume that they do, as they have
been permanently settled for a great number of years.96
Since Meriwether had never visited Pimería Alta, he based his information on accounts from
military officers and others who had traveled through southern Arizona. He described O’odhams
in terms that he understood: as another type of Pueblo Indians. Officials commonly used this
designation during the early years of U.S.-O’odham interactions, but it would fade as the
territorial period progressed.
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Official reports to the commissioner in the next few years described the O’odham in more
detail.97 Reporting in 1857, Lieutenant Sylvester Mowry described the Indians of the Gadsden
Purchase as having “extensive buildings, irrigating canals, and broad cultivated domain.” In
particular, he singled out Pimas and Maricopas of the Gila River as “undoubtedly the most
interesting and docile tribes of Indians on the continent.” He asserted that they possessed Spanish
title to their lands, and that their territory “is intersected in all directions by ‘acequis,’ or
irrigating canals, through which water from the Gila is drawn for purposes of cultivation.” He
concluded that they were living on lands that were already like reservations, and that, “By proper
management, the conditions of these Indians may be much improved, and their villages be made
of great service to the Territory by supplying large quantities of breadstuffs.” But, he warned,
“Injudicious management would bring on contact with the white population, and cause infinite
trouble. They are at present extremely anxious about the tenure of their lands, and inquire of all
Americans who have visited their villages whether they will be allowed to remain.”98 To
American observers the Indians of this newly acquired territory seemed to fall under the category
of more “civilized” Indians; they lived in permanent adobe dwellings, farmed, used irrigation,
and were peaceful.
Other Army officers who interacted with Pimans in the area in the 1850s echoed these
high estimations. Lieutenant A. B. Chapman of the First Dragoons reported that, “About ninety
miles from Tucson, and directly on the route from Fort Buchanan to Fort Yuma, are the Pima
97
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villages, occupied by the Pima and Maricopa Indians…These Indians, even before their country
came into possession of the United States, were exceedingly friendly to the Americans.”
Referring to O’odham and Pima support for the Mormon Battalion, which traversed their
territory in 1846–47, he wrote, “From the time they refused to assist the Mexicans in cutting off
Colonel Cooke’s comman, in 1847, they have ever been loyal to us…Their chief recently
boasted that ‘the Maricopas had not yet learned the color of the white man’s blood.” He
recommended that their lands be secured for them “at once” so as to maintain the longstanding
peaceful relations between them and the United States. In additon to reporting on the PimaMaricopa settlements, he also reported on the O’odham of San Xavier del Bac: “They occupy a
unproductive tract of country lying west and southwest of Tucson, their principal village being in
the vicinity of San Xavier del Bac…They are represented as being very poor, and indeed
destitute.”99 These tropes would be repeated frequently: Pimas were agricultural, peaceful, and
industrious, while O’odhams were also peaceful, but destitute.
By 1859, Indian Agent John Walker had been in Tucson for two years, administering the
affairs of both O’odhams and Pimas. He reported enthusiastically that all was well, and that the
Indians were busy with agricultural pursuits. But, he stated that the O’odham in his agency
needed more tools. He made no comment on government or the rights of these Indians,
concluding simply that, “I find the condition of these people very much improved since I first
came among them, two years since: now their confidence being established in the kind intentions
of government towards them, I consequently have no fear of their future conduct towards all
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good Americans, and in their success and prosperity in a pecuniary point.”100 Lieutenant Mowry
submitted another report in 1859 after meeting with a large group of Pima and Maricopa leaders.
Mowry feared the possibility of war with the Pimas, and went so far as to consult with Governor
Alberto Cubillas of Sonora, who confirmed, along with “the archives of the State and of the
capital of Mexico, that they Pimos and Maricopas were entitled to fifty leagues of land by actual
grant.” Ironically, even though he referred to them as a “friendly and semi-civilized people,” he
did not believe in the civilization project for them:
The idea of civilizing and christianizing them, exposed as they are to all the influences of
a frontier people, is the idle dream of a pseudo-philanthropist. The rapid development of
the mineral resources of Arizona and the settlement of the Territory will bring them soon
enough in contact with the “humanizing and civilizing influence of the white man,” and
the result will be the same inevitable one that has followed its contact with other tribes:
the men will become drunkards, the women prostitutes, and disease will soon leave only
the name of their race.101
Fortunately, Lieutenant Mowry’s vision of Pima-Maricopa doom did not pan out. Unfortunately
for Pimas and O’odhams, the civilization program would move forward in future years.
As the 1860s began, representatives of the United States continued to work among Pimas,
Maricopas, and O’odhams. Agent Walker, ever enthusiastic, reported that there was “a very
perceivable advance in civilization among [the Pimas].” He again noted the need for farming
implements and tools for the San Xavier O’odham, and observed that they were “the best Indians
in the Territory…as easily managed as the Pimos.”102 While Arizona moved into its final year as
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part of the New Mexico Superintendency, Superintendent Michael Steck reported in 1863 that
many O’odhams of southern Arizona had participated in the emerging economy of the region as
shepherds. He also commented that, “A number were educated at the mission of San Xavier.”103
American agents soon began to understand what this “education” entailed. New Superintendent
of Indian Affairs for Arizona Charles D. Poston noted that O’odhams had been baptized, cut
their hair short, wore Western-style clothing, and generally were “modified by civilization.” He
began to discern a system of government at San Xavier, with a “captain” by the name of José
Victoriano Solorse, a “highly intelligent Indian…exercising beneficial influence on the tribe.”
Superintendent Poston also designated a reservation of two square leagues, and called for
additional aid so that they could “colonize the struggling members of the tribe within this
reservation.”104 J. Ross Browne, the nineteenth-century author, journalist, traveler, and
government employee who traveled to Arizona with Poston, wrote about the O’odham he
encountered at San Xavier in his 1863 visit. He described the O’odham there as a “peaceable,
industrious, and friendly race. They live here, as they lived two centuries ago, by cultivating the
low grounds in the vicinity, which they make wonderfully productive by a system of irrigation.”
He also commented: “They profess the Catholic faith, and are apparently sincere converts. The
Jesuit missionaries taught them those simple forms which they retain to this day, though of late
years they have been utterly neglected. The women sing in the church with a degree of sweetness
and harmony that quite surprised me.” Brown also mentioned the governor, José, and stated that
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he and his people had been intruded upon by Mexicans living nearby. They entreated Poston for
assistance, and he “ordered the Mexicans to leave.”105
In 1865, Papago Agent M. O. Davidson wrote at length to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs William P. Dole about the conditions of the O’odham around San Xavier. While he
echoed Superintendent Poston’s praise of the O’odham “‘gobernador’ or head chief, Don José
Victoriano Solesse…an intelligent and worthy man,” Davidson did not agree that O’odhams
should be congregated at San Xavier. He did not believe that such a measure would “contribute
most to their welfare,” owing to their “local attachment to their homes, nor could they be made
readily to understand why such a measure should be proposed. So far as I can learn, they will be
better pleased to retain possession of their own little valleys and villages.” What Davidson
proposed was the formation of an O’odham republic, with San Xavier at the center. Davidson’s
treatise on potential O’odham democratic government is lengthy, but portions of it bear repeating
to show that one agent, as early as 1865, envisioned an O’odham electorate and functioning
representative government. He advised that the federal government “unite [them] in forming a
central government at San Xavier, to which each community will send delegates yearly, to
deliberate upon the common welfare, and pass such laws and ordinances as the condition of the
people may require.” This sounded very much like an O’odham national council with delegates
elected annually. But, Agent Davidson felt that O’odhams should be given the choice between
remaining in their dispersed communities or congregating at San Xavier, and that this should
take place in a national referendum:
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Before acting upon any policy, I would suggest that a convention of the people be called
to deliberate, and give expression to their wishes by a decisive vote. They are disposed to
agriculture and the arts of peace. Again, it may be reasonably doubted whether the limits
of the proposed reservation will embrace sufficient arable land to sustain the whole
people. If it should not be the case, and the voice of the people shall be in favor of
concentration, then the surplus population that cannot be advantageously located ay San
Xavier, may be allotted a reservation not far distant, and selected from the tillable lands
now in the power of the hostile Apaches, when the latter shall be conquered and
removed.
Davidson did not stop there. He believed that these O’odham should be considered citizens of the
United States with all of the appertaining rights:
In my opinion, we must regard them as American citizens, and under certain conditions
entitled to all their privileges. Many are sufficiently advanced to understand their duties
and exercise their rights as such. It is my humble opinion that it is the duty of the
government to educate the remainder to a degree that will qualify them also to fulfil [sic]
all the obligations and perform all the duties of citizenship. I will venture to say that these
people, from their intelligence, their morality, and the manifestation of all the requisite
qualifications, are quite as much entitled to the privileges referred to as the majority of
the Mexican population… In a few words, confirm their possession to the lands they
occupy, by the title of pre-emption, establishing suitable metes and bounds thereto, not
interfering with the white settlements or mining claims; and it may be confidently
asserted that, with the aid of schools, the rising generation of Papagos will not discredit
the country of the institutions by which they are allowed to profit.106
These were remarkably enlightened and measured statements for an Indian agent, considering
the year (1865), and the prevailing U.S. attitudes about Indians and their advancement. Had
Davidson’s recommendations been implemented, it would have signaled U.S. recognition of a
sovereign O’odham republic within southern Arizona; able to elect representatives to a national
council and choose whether to remain in small communities stretched throughout Papaguería or
concentrate at the mission. These plans obviously did not take into account O’odham goals and
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ideas of governance, but they did convey a clear sense of O’odhams as deserving the franchise
rights of United States citizens.
Agent Davidson’s suggestions did catch the attention of the Indian Bureau. Writing in
response to Davidson’s recommendations in the fall of 1865, Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Rober B. Van Valkenburgh107 instructed Davidson to “convene the Papagos at the
earliest convenient day, and setting before them the advantages which will accrue to them from a
settlement upon certain defined reservations within which their rights will be exclusive.” If they
accepted, Davidson was to “make selection for them of one or more reservations of reasonable
extent for their wants.” Davidson was also empowered to employ a teacher for the Indians, “who
must read and speak both the English and Spanish languages.” Finally, he notified Davidson that,
“Provision will be made for the payment of a salary of $500 per annum to the duly elected head
chief of the Papagos, and to three subordinate chiefs of $350 each per annum, to be paid so long
as they shall continue friendly and efficient in aiding the United States authorities in preserving
the peace and in the improvement of their people.” Acting Commissioner Van Valkenburgh
made no mention of whether he shared Davidson’s intention of allowing the O’odham to choose
whether or not they wanted to be concentrated on the reservation. But he hoped that the
reservation and a steady advancement in “education, civilization, and the arts of self-sustaining
industry” would cause them, “as citizens of the United States, [to] lose their separate tribal
character and become merged in the general population of the Territory.”108 Still, that the acting
commissioner viewed O’odhams nearing citizenship, under the leadership of a duly elected chief,
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demonstrates the lofty goals the United States held for the political incorporation of this
Indigenous nation.
The proposed elections and meetings did not materialize. Seemingly constant turnover at
the Indian Office must surely have hindered any stability in policy for southern Arizona. The
agents who followed Davidson spoke frequently of establishing schools among the Pima,
Maricopa, and O’odham. Schooling became the main focus of the assimilationist goal of turning
these Indians into self-sufficient farmers in the Anglo-American mold. Levi Ruggles, for
example, was special agent for the Pima and Maricopa in the late 1870s. As part of this office, he
also administered for the O’odham. He commented on the benefits of schooling, and a perceived
willingness among Pimas and Maricopas to embrace it: “They desire to have a school established
here, where a few of their youths can be taught the English language. I think that they fully
appreciate the advantages to be gained by education, and would cause a portion of their children
to attend school constantly; and there is no doubt of their capacity to learn.” He believed that
O’odhams would benefit as well: “Critics might doubt that great good had been derived from
[their] conversion [to Catholicism], but without doubt these people are capable of receiving and
are anxious to obtain moral, religious, and scientific authors. A school for the education of a few
of these youths in the elementary branches of an English education should be established at the
Old Mission church of San Haver del Bec [sic].”109 As was par for the course in late-nineteenth
century federal Indian policy, southern Arizona administrators believed Indian education would
accomplish the goal of civilizing Piman peoples.
By 1869 officials had begun to distinguish between Pimas and Maricopas and O’odhams.
Pimas and Maricopas, who received annuities and other assistance, were “cared for to a greater
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or less extent by the government, are located on reservations, or who live in their own villages,
receiving clothing, seeds, and agricultural implements from Indian agents or superintendents.”
O’odhams, on the other hand, “live in pueblos or villages, and cultivate the soil, or otherwise
support themselves by their own labor exclusively, receiving no support from the government,
but who are at peace with the whites.” The author of this report, Lieutenant Colonel R. Jones,
also observed:
Of late years this industrious tribe has been utterly ignored by the Indian department, and
it is not known that any reservation has ever been designated for them, though a former
agent, named Lyon, assigned them to the country in the vicinity of San Xavier del Bac,
and while they remained under his charge he protected them in their rights, but since then
the Whites and Mexicans have been encroaching on and taking up their best lands, and
the Papagos are being gradually crowded across the line into Mexican Territory.
Jones, whose report was endorsed by none other than General William Tecumseh Sherman, felt
strongly that Levi Ruggles should be removed as the Pima-Maricopa agent: “In a word, he is a
mere nullity, for whom the Indians have no respect.” He felt that Ruggles only took an interest in
these Natives when it came time to distribute goods.110 On the other extreme, O’odhams were in
a situation similar to the Pueblos of New Mexico. Their peaceful, agricultural characteristics led
federal agents to ignore them, believing that all was well.
In the 1870s, various groups opened schools among the Pima, Maricopa, and O’odham.
For example, renowned Presbyterian missionary Charles Cook began his work ministering
among Gila Pimas in 1870, and soon opened a school among them.111 This work would continue
well into the twentieth century. Among the Pima, Maricopa, and O’odham, Presbyterians,
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Catholics, and Indian Service employees operated several day schools, as well as industrial
boarding schools in Tucson and Phoenix. Agents grappled with the common conundrum of the
benefits and drawbacks of day schools as opposed to boarding schools, and the relative merits of
schooling under the various denominations. While it is not my intention to gloss over this
important history of the education of Piman children in southern Arizona, it is a history that
would require a separate volume entirely. I have made a strategic choice, therefore, to focus on
important events surrounding allotment, citizenship, and voting among the Tohono O’odham of
San Xavier del Bac.
By the early 1870s, federal officials had failed to establish a reservation at San Xavier.
They had discussed the issue ad nauseam, but had not taken the necessary actions for an
O’odham reservation. Special Agent R. A. Wilbur reported in 1871 that O’odhams at San Xavier
were “peaceful, comparatively intelligent, and very industrious, being of great assistance to the
farmers of the Santa Cruz Valley in harvesting and as herders.” Referring to the years of neglect
and many broken promises, he pleaded for action in their behalf:
They are ready and willing to conform to any proposition the Government may wish to
extend them. They complain, and with reason, perhaps, that they have been neglected,
while other Indians, who in no respect could compare with them in fealty to the
Government, have yearly been provided for, and they only occasionally. They want
something permanent, some assistance continued, until they are so established that they
can feel able to take care of themselves under an improved and civilized organization.
They say they have been promised schools, agricultural implements, and improved
breeds of stock; but the promise has been fulfilled only to a very limited extent.
Furthermore, he pointed to the fact that many O’odhams worked in Tucson and participated in
the cash economy: “From their employment and associations they have become more intelligent
in regard to these matters than any other Indians.”112
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The situation was exacerbated by settler encroachments around San Xavier. Papago
Agent R. A. Wilbur reported in 1872: “Little by little settlers are hedging them in, using the
water for irrigating their own fields, until now they are so crowded they come continually with
complaints.” Wilbur had seven suggestions: 1. Put them on a reservation; 2. Give them
agricultural implements, seeds, carts and oxen, and breeding-stock; 3. Establish schools and
provide instructors; 4. Increase the salary of the physician there and give him enough supplies; 5.
Give them clothing, blankets, and shoes; 6. Provide the agent with a light wagon and team of
horses for traveling to their dispersed villages; 7. Consider sinking artesian wells for them.113
Agent Wilbur believed these would all mitigate the situation, but establishing a reservation was
the most pressing issue.114 The long awaited reservation finally materialized through an
Executive Order issued on 1 July 1874. Encroachments by outsiders had brought O’odhams
almost to the breaking point, when the Executive Order set aside 69,200 acres.
The San Xavier Reservation was primarily under the jurisdiction of the Pima-Maricopa
Agent, save for a few years when there was a Papago Agency.115 Papago Agent John W. Cornyn
reported in 1875 that the O’odham at San Xavier were very happy to finally have a reservation.
He also reported that education among them had been a “great success,” and that he found them
to be a “civilized, moral, and virtuous people.” While other agents had urged they be moved
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north to the Gila River Reservation he strongly protested such a course; Pimas would corrupt the
“gentle, virtuous Papagos.”116
With the San Xavier Reservation established, agents turned to what they believed was the
next logical step in their development: individual land ownership and title. O’odhams had gained
a reservation, but no agent. In 1876 Pima-Maricopa Agent Charles Hudson administered the San
Xavier Reservation from Gila River. He found O’odham affairs “somewhat complicated.” While
many O’odhams secured “considerable employment among the settlers,” he reported that,
“Mexicans are occupying farms and using the water-privileges belonging to and absolutely
necessary to the Indians, without a shadow of title except occupancy.” As a solution, Hudson
proposed 160 acres to each family and inalienable title: “Such action would encourage them to
renewed efforts, allow them to assume a position by the side of their civilized brethren, and to
join in the march of progress.”117 This is one of the earliest mentions of an allotment-style
arrangement for O’odhams. Hudson likely based his vision on the Homestead Act of 1862,
which provided for 160-acre grants to homesteaders. The Homestead Act had opened O’odham
lands to Anglo-American settlement in 1866,118 but what is remarkable is that he was
encouraging O’odhams to take up homesteads under the act, on their own traditional lands. His
thinking also preceded the Dawes Act by more than ten years. By the following year, 1877,
Pima-Maricopa Agent J. H. Stout updated the Pima Agency’s recommendation. He suggested
giving heads of family forty acres minimum in severalty, and as much as eighty acres if forty did
not suffice. The government would retain title until they “become somewhat familiar with their
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responsibilities as citizens.” He also regretted to report that the Hispano encroachments he had
mentioned the previous year had not abated, and that they continued to use O’odham water and
cut down all of the trees.119 Individual land ownership may have been the goal, but it would be
over a decade in coming to the O’odham, and it would have decidedly mixed results.
By 1885, Pima Agent Roswell G. Wheeler reported that O’odhams on the San Xavier
Reservation had been “harassed, cheated, bulldozed, by lawless whites and Mexicans. Troubles
about land and water have continually called for the interference of the agent. The intruders have
finally been ejected and temporary quietness prevails.” Still, he feared that the ejected parties
would not hesitate to “create a disturbance” and seek O’odham land once again.120 In 1886,
Agent Wheeler actively “endeavored so far as possible to arouse an interest in and to induce
them to avail themselves of the homestead law…many of them have gladly embraced this
opportunity and roughly outlined their homesteads.” He also stated, “The Papagos need an agent
badly…No better Indians than these there are known, and a great field is open and waiting for
the harvest.”121 Although the Dawes Act debate was then raging in Washington, there was no
other “homestead law” on the books besides the Homestead Act. Wheeler was clearly trying to
get O’odhams to take up homesteads under this law, in a sort of proto-Dawes Act Indian policy.
While O’odhams did not take up homesteads under the Homestead Act, the passage of the
Dawes Act in 1887 paved the way for O’odham allotment. Agents were anxious to begin
allotment at San Xavier, but Pima Agent Claude M. Johnson reported in 1889 that, “No land has
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been allotted in severalty to them.”122 This would all change in 1890, when the government
began allotting land to O’odhams at San Xavier. Agent Cornerlius W. Crouse mentions allotment
almost in passing: “During the year the Papago Reservation was allotted to 363 Indians.”123 In
the end, ninety-four heads of family each received 160-acre allotments. They were all men, as
married women shared their husbands’ allotments. A single 160-acre allotment contained 20
acres of farmland, 50 to 80 acres of mesquite timberland, and the rest mesa fit for grazing only.
All single adults—male and female—received forty or eighty acres of mesa. When the allotting
at San Xavier was complete, 42,000 acres of the 71,090-acre reservation was in individual
plots.124 Unfortunatelt, on average, each allottee received only ten acres of irrigated land.125
Crouse’s casual approach and the seemingly tidy allotment work belie the complexity of
allotment at San Xavier. For one thing, O’odhams had long practiced seasonal migrations, even
those who had permanent homes at San Xavier. When the allotting agent counted resident
O’odhams, he put the number at 363. He considered all of them residents. Some of them were
descendents of the original Sobaipuris who had lived at the mission and its vicinity for centuries.
Others were only visitors to the region, there to visit family members or for economic reasons.
Carl Lunholtz reported on San Xavier at the end of the 1910s: “The church is at present
surrounded by a reservation of the Papago Indians….owing to the half nomadic habits of the
tribe, natives of the interior districts are constantly to be found there.”126 It made no difference;
all received allotments. Many O’odham residents of San Xavier were away at the time for
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various reasons and did not receive allotments. O’odham Peter Blaine, Sr., whose biography,
Papagos and Politics remains one of the best O’odham accounts of life in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, reported that his aunt had married an allotee, but that the man was
originally from Caborca, on the Sonora side towards the Gulf of California. His allotment was
one of these San Xavier allotments made in the early 1890s, very near the mission church. He
reported that some people who lived there had been away and missed being allotted, while others
who were clearly non-residents were. Blaine commented, “I really didn’t understand how the
Papago lands were allotted to just certain people. I never could get that straight.” He also related
that his father-in-law had an allotment at San Xavier. What he had done was choose a plot of
land he liked, cleared it, and begun farming it. When the allotting agent came, “he got that piece
of land.”127 Also, the O’odham initially ignored the new allotment boundaries, continuing with
traditional agricultural practices. But as time wore on, more O’odhams moved onto individual
plots. These allottees seldom made wills, nor did they understand Arizona land inheritance laws.
When allottees died, their lands were divided among heirs. Because of this, land ownership at
San Xavier became fragmented and confusing over the years. Amazingly, OIA officials asserted
some O’odham alloottees had “progressed” enough after the twenty-five year trust period, and
gave them fee-simple title.128
As historian Eric Meeks points out, “One of the central tools of the assimilation policy
was allotment….Any Indian who received an allotment would become a U.S. citizen with ‘equal
protection under the law,’ echoing the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” San Xavier was
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the only reservation allotted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Arizona during the nineteenth
century (since allotment at Hopi was never completed).129 While Indian agents considered the
O’odham of San Xavier to be civilized or half-civilized, and well on their way to citizenship in
many cases, the dream of voting O’odham citizens did not materialize in the 1890s or early
1900s. A key figure in these developments was John M. Berger, the Indian Service farmer in
charge of the San Xavier Reservation. Berger, a Swiss-born naturalized U.S. citizen, had worked
initially as a jeweler in Tucson. After he married an Hispana woman, he took up ranching on
traditional O’odham land. Agent Wheeler forcibly removed Berger and his wife from the ranch
in 1875, when it was included in the San Xavier Reservation boundaries of 1874.
Somehow, Berger later became deeply ingrained in the Indian Service bureaucracy at San
Xavier, serving variously as farmer, agent, and sub-agent for over twenty-five years.130 Berger
began his work among the O’odham in 1890. In 1893, Pima Agent Crouse was already regretting
allotment at San Xavier, which he felt was a mistake. He stated, “so many nonreservation,
nomadic, homeless Papagos were and are yet needing it [allotment].” He felt that it had been
done hastily and did not extend to enough O’odhams.131 In his report of that same year, Berger
painted a rosy picture of an allotted, civilized people, stating that, “All the Indians on this
reservation without a single exception, wear citizen’s dress and the greater part of them live in
more or less comfortable houses built of sun-dried bricks of large size (here called adobes).” He
also commented that, “About three-fourths of the allottees are devout Catholics and attend
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regularly the mass held in the church every two weeks by a priest of that denomination.” Most
interesting of all, he reported:
With the exception of a few malcontents, found in every community, all the allottees
appreciate fully the privilege they enjoy in the ownership of land in severalty. It gives
them a greater inclination toward farming and especially toward a more careful clearing
and cultivating of their land than they ever had before, a fact clearly shown by the
increase in the number of farmers among them.132
Berger had obviously exaggerated in his description of O’odham enthusiasm for allotment, but
his report for that first year clearly enunciated the government’s plan for O’odham civilization
and citizenship, one that Berger hoped would culminate in O’odham voting.
The following year, Berger reported at length on the O’odham under his care. First, he
noted two different classes of O’odhams at San Xavier. One consisted of those who descended
from Sobaipuris, and had “always lived upon this reservation. They are a better kind of Indian,
more advanced in civilization, live in better houses, dress better, are more honest, and generally
more amenable to good advice than others. They send their children to school.” The other class
consisted of more recent O’odham immigrants from the desert rancherías. They had a more
“nomadic disposition,” and were, “as a rule, opposed to civilization in any manner, and will not
send their children to school.” In a critical insight in his report, Berger stated:
The Papago allottees have not yet claimed any of their rights as citizens, but at the same
time they have done their duty as citizens in this respect, that they have worked on the
public roads under the supervision of the county road overseer from the village of San
Xavier to Tucson, 125 allottees having each given one day’s work for that purpose. This
was done to comply with the Territorial law exacting this duty from every male citizen
between the ages of 21 and 50 years, or in default of said labor a payment of $2.133
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In other words, the O’odham had not claimed any of their rights as citizens—voting, namely—
but they behaved as good citizens, even participating in public works projects.
After some eight years of service at San Xavier, Berger maintained his positive attitude,
attesting that, “The Indians of this reservation live much better than they did formerly. They have
better houses, wear better clothing, have more to eat and of a better quality, and they are more
cleanly in their habits, consequently their sanitary condition has improved.” He was the proud
patriarch in his paternalistic little empire. Returning to the idea of citizenship: “In making a
review of the year’s work I can see much to encourage, for in many things that go to make up a
prosperous people and good citizens, great progress has been made.”134 Such grand statements of
great progress toward civilization by Indians under any given agent’s care were common, as I
have shown on numerous occasions, but in this case Berger had a valid point, at least in the
world of assimilationist Arizona Indian policy. Here were of hundreds allotted Indians.135 They
farmed, dressed like citizens, were civilized, sent their children to school, could lease their land
to outside parties, and by law were entitled to all of the rights of citizens, including voting rights.
Berger must have been frustrated to report in 1899 that, “As yet no land has been leased, nor has
any application to that effect been made, nor has any allottee exercised his right to suffrage.”136
It is difficult to understand fully the mind of this government employee, but he was obviously
consumed with ideas of progress and civilization. He clearly measured his own success by the
degree to which he was able to “lift” the O’odham to the status of good American citizens. And
the pinnacle of citizenship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was suffrage.
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When viewed from this perspective, Berger’s repetitive assertions, such as the one that follows,
are much easier to understand:
I am pleased to state that reasonable progress has been made in civilization among the
Papagoes under my charge during the past year. Every step made by them has been a step
forward. On the whole there has been manifested a better appreciation of the value of the
occupations pertaining to civilized life and a greater earnestness and persistence in
pursuit of them. They are getting more progressive and self-sustaining every day and
many of them are abundantly able to manage their own affairs. The allottee plainly shows
that he is proud to be the owner of a piece of land which he knows belongs to him and his
family, by the many improvements he is continually making thereon.137
Berger saw what he wanted to see. What were longstanding O’odham traditions of participation
in the labor and cash economy appeared to him as examples of progress in “the occupations
pertaining to civilized life.” The O’odham had long been self-sustaining, a fact noted by the
earliest Ango-American observers, so again, Berger’s point is moot. Further, it is difficult to
ascertain the level of enthusiasm the allottee truly displayed for land in severalty. What is clear is
that Berger was trying to justify his own work, and to show in every way possible that the
O’odham were truly on the cusp of citizenship and suffrage. It was so close that he could almost
taste it.
Berger summed up his eleven years of service at San Xavier by asserting that they had
been filled with progress, and that there was still room for more: “They have not only
considerably advanced in civilization, but they are also in a far more prosperous condition than
they ever have been.”138 Berger must have been extremely disappointed when his charges, who
qualified for citizenship in every way, apparently never undertook that culminating step of
exercising their right to suffrage. His disgust is apparent in his 1902 report, when he was
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removed from his position for a short time and then reinstated. The O’odham misunderstood this
action, believing that they were no longer under federal control: “the subsequent behavior of a
great number of them fully demonstrated that they were not yet ready for self-government.” He
laid the blame on the traditional O’odham leadership, who thwarted the actions of true
civilization:
A few old Indians and medicine men, all of whom have always been more or less
troublesome and opposed to civilization and progress, thought their time had come again,
They called meetings, selected new chiefs of their own kind and sentiment, and informed
the actual chiefs (both of them very good and progressive Indians) that they had no
further use for them, etc. The announcement of my reappointment was a great relief to
the good Indians, as it suddenly stopped all further injurious proceedings from and by the
bad element.
The O’odham, jubilant at the prospect of actual self-government, gathered together and selected
new leadership in the traditional manner, ridding themselves of the “very good and progressive”
O’odham leadership supported by the Indian Service. In actuality, this episode demonstrated that
the O’odham were more ready than ever for self-government. Berger concluded this 1902 report
with the familiar statement, “As yet no land has been leased by the allottees, nor has any allottee
exercised his right of suffrage.”139
The same rang true in 1904: “As yet no land has been leased by the allottees to whites,
nor has any application to that effect been made, nor has any allottee exercised his right to
suffrage.” No contrary report surfaces in the remaining years of Berger’s tenure, which
terminated with his death in 1910. Although he noted the progress made by the O’odham during
his years of service, he failed in the final goal of fashioning them into citizen voters. His report
from 1902 speaks volumes about the O’odham vision of leadership and citizenship, at least at
San Xavier. They wanted to select their own leaders in the traditional way, and they did not
139
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exercise the right to suffrage because they did not desire to. As with the Pueblos of New Mexico,
citizenship in the O’odham community was far more important than United States citizenship,
and the allure of gaining alleged “rights” could not convince them otherwise. Furthermore, the
Burke Act of 1906 largely closed the door to O’odham citizenship and voting. According to the
terms of the Burke Act, which amended the Dawes Act, allottees must receive fee-simple title in
order to become citizens. They either had to pass the twenty-five-year trust period, or be
individually assessed by the Secretary of the Interior as competent and capable of managing their
own affairs.140 No O’odham had voted as of Berger’s 1904 report, and there is no reason to
believe that any did in the years immediately following. The federal government did not deem
O’odham allottees at San Xavier competent and grant them citizenship. While some O’odham
qualified for citizenship before the Burke Act, they had not voted, making them citizens by law
but not in deed. When allotment and citizenship laws were amended, O’odhams had not passed
through the mandatory twenty-five years, and no longer qualified for citizenship. Writing about
the Tohono O’odham in the 1940s, after they had organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act, a group of authors commented, “The Papago tribe as a political unit has existed for less than
ten years. Before this time, each village handled its own affairs, and related villages cooperated
economically and socially, but there was no tribal government as such.”141 San Xavier del Bac
had handled its own affairs for decades, even while federal officials there focused their efforts on
securing O’odham citizenship. These O’odham had repeatedly resisted Anglo-American
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concepts of citizenship, such as the franchise; the project to transform the O’odham into citizen
voters had failed.142

Conclusion
In 1928, Peter Porter, a citizen of the Gila River Indian Community, tried to register to
vote in Pinal County. The county registrar denied his registration. Porter took his case to court,
and the Arizona Supreme Court eventually decided against him in Porter v. Hall (1928). In
Arizona, those opposed to Indian voting argued that Indians could not vote because state
jurisdiction did not fall within the political and governmental boundaries of the state.
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Peter Blaine’s philosophy perfectly encapsulates this view of O’odham governance and
politics, one that resisted change by the BIA. Although he became politically active in the 1920s,
this idea had guided O’odham thought throughout the territorial period. He stated: “I started
working more closely with the old San Xavier people. I had already been an interpreter for them
to the Agency, so when my godfather went to the San Xavier village council meetings, I went
along. Most all of the council were older men, some young, but most were old. Being young, I
never wanted to fail my people” (Blaine, 40). As his biographer summarizes, he was “committed
to the traditional concept of leadership: a head man, chief or chairman must always go to the
people and ask what they want done before making a decision. This is ‘the Papago way’” (2–3).
There was also the rise of the Good Government League (GGL) in the last year of the territorial
period. Formed in 1911, the GGL supported Progressive Era reform, and campaigned forcefully,
among other things, for more day schools in O’odham country, stating, “We want to become
good and useful citizens of our great country, but how are we to become so if means for securing
an education is not provided?” They were supported by the Indian Rights Association, and
wanted more federal involvement in O’odham affairs. The Indian Rights Association
vociferously called for schools and the federal government to give the O’odham “at least a white
man’s chance” (see The Thirty-First Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Indian
Rights Association, for the Year Ending December 10, 1913 [Philadelphia: Office of the Indian
Rights Association, 1914], 26, 28). GGL members were mostly Presbyterian O’odham who were
graduates of the Tucson Indian Training School, a Presbyterian-run boarding school. Their main
opposition was the League of Papago Chiefs, who were Catholics dedicated to more traditional
concepts of O’odham governance (see Meeks, 100–101 and Daniel Bruce Ferguson, “The
Escuela Experience: The Tucson Indian School in Perspective.” Master’s thesis, University of
Arizona, 1997, 38, 43–44). Blaine fell squarely with the latter group, and the two battled long
and hard over control of O’odham leadership. This conflict precipitated O’odham political
realignment during the Indian Reorganization period, but it occurred in the 1930s, and thus falls
outside of the present study.
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Furthermore they were wards of the federal government. But, while New Mexicans denied
voting through constitutional means by way of the “Indians not taxed” clause, Arizona opponents
of Indian voting used wardship in a new way. Article 7, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution
read: “No person under guardianship, non campos entis or insane, shall be qualified to vote at
any election.”143 Indians in Arizona were thus classed with the institutionalized and denied the
franchise.
But, the Arizona Constitution of 1912 did not mention Indians in its sections on voting.
And that it took nearly twenty years for a legal challenge to the right of Indians to vote in the
state is a testament to the failure of OIA employees, missionaries, and reformers to bring the vote
to Arizona’s Indians. Indians did not vote in Arizona during the U.S. territorial period largely
because they had no desire to do so. Indian agents were willing to extend this right, and
seemingly encouraged those Indians they deemed “civilized” enough to exercise this right. But
Hopis did not embrace citizenship and voting, turning instead to internal affairs as they had done
for so many centuries. As fearful refugees in a foreign country, Yaquis tried to stay away from
any situation that would potentially lead to trouble and the horrors of deportation. Furthermore,
their reconstituted communities in southern Arizona did not possess the town electoral system
for which Yaquis had fought so valiantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For the
Yaqui, voting was simply out of the question. The Tohono O’odham of San Xavier del Bac, who
seemed the perfect subjects for the civilizing project, also did not exercise their right to the
franchise. Although they had been allotted land in severalty, and met the qualifications for
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citizenship and voting under the law, they showed no interest in doing so. O’odhams participated
in the regional economy and interacted with Anglo-Americans, Mexicans, and HispanoAmericans, but they also labored to keep their communities solvent, basing leadership on
traditional structures that had existed for centuries. Within the colonial context, the effort to
transform Indians into voters in territorial Arizona bore no fruit.
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CONCLUSION

In 1948, Frank Harrison and Harry Austin, both citizens of the Fort McDowell Yavapai
Nation,1 attempted to register to vote in Maricopa County. Frank Harrison had served honorably
in the United States Marine Corps in World War II, but found that his family and other tribal
members lived as second-class citizens in the country he had served. Harrison recalled that when
he and Austin, who was the tribal chairman at the time, went to fill out their voter registrations,
Roger Laveen, the young county registrar, refused, telling them, “You’re under the ward[ship] of
[the] government.”2 The state denied Indians the right to vote under Article 7, Section 2, of the
Arizona Constitution, which read, “No person under guardianship, non compos mentis or insane,
shall be qualified to vote in any election.” Indians were thus classed with those under
institutionalization or otherwise mentally incompetent. Harrison and Austin first sued in
Maricopa County Superior Court, where they lost. They persisted, appealing to the Arizona
Supreme Court. With the help of an amicus brief filed on their behalf by the National Congress
of American Indians and the American Civil Liberties Union, they eventually won a favorable
decision in Harrison v. Laveen on 15 July 1948.3 Yavapais from Fort McDowell retell this story
and commemorate this event each July. The poster from the 2014 edition of this celebration
reads, “Celebrating the 66th Annual American Indian Right to Vote,” and, “Exercise Your Right

1

At the time it was known as the Fort McDowell Mohave Apache Tribe. Outsiders had long
mistaken Yavapais for a band of Apaches. Even the famous Progressive Era Yavapai physician,
Carlos Montezuma, frequently referred to himself as an Apache or Mojave Apache.
2
Frank Harrison, quoted in Anne T. Denogean, “60 Years Ago in Arizona, Indians Won Right to
Vote,” Tucson Citizen, July 25, 2009.
3
Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson, Native Vote, 15–16; Denogean,
“60 Years Ago in Arizona.”

391
to Vote.”4 The Harrison decision remains a point of pride for Yavapais and other Arizona
Indians. My own cousin, Paul Russell, a long-serving tribal council member at Fort McDowell,
speaks admiringly of his predecessors and their valiant fight for the franchise. Harrison and
Austin descendants are often invited to speak at tribal commemorations.
The experiences of Frank Harrison and Harry Austin link with a prominent story in the
history of New Mexico’s Pueblo Indians. Isleta Pueblo citizen Miguel Trujillo Sr. had also
served in the Marine Corps in World War II. He attended the University of New Mexico, where
he earned a BA and MA. He went on to work as a Bureau of Indian Affairs schoolteacher at
Laguna Pueblo. In 1948, he attempted to register to vote in Valencia County. Valencia County
Recorder Eloy Garley refused to allow Trujillo to register, since Article 7, Section 1 of the New
Mexico Constitution read:
Every male citizen of the United States, who is over the age of twenty-one years, and has
resided in New Mexico twelve months, in the county ninety days, and in the precinct in
which he offers to vote thirty days, next preceding the election, except idiots, insane
persons, persons convicted of a felonious or infamous crime, unless restored political
rights, and Indians not taxed, shall be qualified to vote at all elections for public officers.5
Although New Mexico also grouped Indian with “idiots, insane persons, [and] persons convicted
of a felonious or infamous crime,” it denied the right to vote on the grounds that Indians were
“not taxed.” This was incorrect, since Indians paid nearly all the taxes other New Mexicans paid.
They only did not pay property tax on reservation trust land. Trujillo sued the county recorder,
and Felix Cohen, the father of federal Indian law, served as his attorney. On 3 August 1948,
mere weeks after the Arizona Supreme Court handed down the Harrison decision, the federal
4
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court in Santa Fe ruled in Trujillo v. Garley that Indians in New Mexico could no longer be kept
from voting.6 These events are commemorated among New Mexico’s Pueblo Indians and other
Native peoples. A poster celebrating Miguel Trujillo and the “Indian Vote” decorates the hallway
of the Indian Pueblo Cultural Center archives.
Peter Porter, a citizen of the Gila River Indian Community, was another prominent figure
in the fight for Indian voting in the twentieth century who proceeded the Harrison and Trujillo
cases by twenty years. In 1928, just four years after the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act,7
Porter tried to register to vote in Pinal County, Arizona. He was denied his voter registration on
account of the status of Arizona’s Indians as wards of the federal government. The Arizona
Supreme Court decided against Porter, thus closing the door to Indian voting for two more
decades. 8 A story printed in the Gila River Indian Community’s newspaper reads, “…to not vote
is a disservice to those who fought for decades to win that right for Native peoples.”9 Although
Porter lost his legal challenge to end Arizona’s discriminatory voting practices, his courage and
sacrifice are to be commended.
Such stories are important to Native peoples because they help us to remember. The act
of remembering helps us to reaffirm our identity, history, and existence. There is power in the
stories of Harrison, Trujillo, and Porter. These stories are repeated, their power grows, and they
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become foundational narratives for Native rights. I have heard these stories repeated many times
through the course of my life; I have retold them many times as well. The narrative is often
framed as one of a long struggle for Indian voting rights in New Mexico and Arizona, finally
culminating in the twentieth century. Consider the following passage from a recent work on the
history of New Mexico:
The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924…granted full U.S. citizenship to America’s
indigenous people. By 1947 states with large Indian populations, except Arizona and New
Mexico, had extended voting rights to the nation’s newest citizens….Trujillo, a
schoolteacher from Laguna Pueblo and former staff sergeant in the U.S. Marine Corps,
refused to be denied his right to vote. Trujillo…became a dissident voice representing
twenty thousand Indian people in New Mexico….In a stunning reversal on August 3,
1948, a federal triumvirate ruled that the New Mexico statute violated the Fifteenth
Amendment and was, therefore, null and void. Thirty-six years after gaining statehood,
New Mexico finally granted the right to vote to its American Indian citizens.10
The heroic actions of all of these individuals are worthy of our highest praise. We should retell
these stories to our children and attend the yearly commemorations. We should never forget the
efforts and sacrifices of those who came before us and secured the Indian vote for future
generations.
But we must also not forget those individuals—some of them in the more distant past—
who labored to secure the Indian vote in a different set of circumstances. Under the incredibly
constraining conditions of the colonialism, which in many ways still persist, Pueblos, Hopis,
Yaquis, and Pimas all fought to secure the right to govern their communities as they saw fit,
often through voting. This meant instituting and adapting colonial ideas of electoral politics that,
on the surface, may have seemed incongruous with Indigenous practice. But the governors,
lieutenant governors, and other officers, and the men, women, and children who supported them,
were involved in the crucial work of protecting the sovereignty of their Indigenous nations.
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Elected officers repeatedly confronted colonial power as stand-ins for their people. Their intense
focus on the internal community, while meeting the demands of the colonizers, preserved their
status as sovereign Native nations for future generations. Describing the centuries-old efforts by
Mohawks of Kehnawà:ke to preserve their sovereignty, Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson
writes:
The Mohawks of Kehnawà:ke are nationals of a precontact Indigenous polity that simply
refuse to stop being themselves. In other words, they insist on being and acting as people
who belong to a nation other than the United States or Canada. Their political form
predates and survives “conquest”; it is tangible (albeit strangulated by colonial
governmentality) and is tied to sovereign practices….As Indigenous peoples they have
survived a great, transformative process of settler occupation, and they continue to live
under the conditions of this occupation, its disavowal, and its ongoing life, which has
required and still requires that they give up their lands and give up themselves.11
Much of the same can be said of the Indigenous nations of this study. Through an ingenious
mixture of Indigenous tradition and colonially imposed practices, these groups simply refused to
stop acting like independent nations.
In celebrating only recent legal victories in the history of the Indian franchise, we can
unwittingly promote the sort of facile, triumphalist narrative that promotes an Anglo-American
agenda: people suffered under the unjust system of previous colonial administrations, but in the
courts of the United States of America, everyone can seek, and win, justice. This simply is not
the case. The story of struggle, and success, extends much farther into our past. We must,
therefore, celebrate and tell stories about the elected Cochiti Pueblo officers who traveled all the
way to Mexico City in an attempt to protect the Pueblo’s lands. Such a journey was long,
expensive, and dangerous. We must tell the story of the Yaqui governors who challenged the
authority of despotic, sadistic Jesuits who usurped Yaqui labor and meddled in matters of
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internal governance. These Yaqui governors also made the trek to Mexico City, and eventually
gave their lives in a struggle to protect the status of their communities as sovereign Indigenous
nations. We must tell the stories of O’odhams at San Xavier del Bac who subverted the allotment
process, maintaining traditional subsistence and economic practices. These Odhams refused to
embrace U.S. citizenship and the franchise, when their baffled Indian agent saw no reason why
they should not. We cannot know their exact motivations, but this simple act likely kept
O’odham lands free from an even stronger Anglo-American presence, as it would have led to
more allotment, more alienation, and decreased community autonomy. We must tell the stories
of the Yaqui founders of the southern Arizona communities, who forewent their intricate system
of electoral town government for a time so that their people could live safely in the United
States. We must tell the stories of elected Pueblo officers who repeatedly took Hispano and
Anglo-American squatters to court to have them ejected from Pueblo lands. These same officers
expressed their desire to officials in Santa Fe and Washington, D.C. to not become citizens of the
United States. To accept citizenship would have opened up their communities to external forces
they likely could not turn back. They would have been compelled to pay taxes on traditional
lands, thereby forcing them to sell off more territory, since their only cash-generating resource
was land. Perhaps many more similar stories are part of the hidden transcript that Pueblo, Hopi,
Yaqui, and Piman peoples tell one another. I would hope so. These are the stories that also need
to be shared repeatedly.
We must also realize that, historically, the Indian vote was far from perfect and fraught
with many hazards. Imposed ideas of democracy caused friction within communities, and on a
number of occasions, violently pitted those who supported such ideas against those who
vehemently opposed them. The Indian vote contributed to the deaths of several individuals at
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Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo, Pecos Pueblo, and Awatovi. This violence is also part of the legacy of
the Native vote.
But through such stories we come to understand that the Indians of New Mexico and the
Arizona-Sonora Borderlands were not simply colonized peoples with no rights during the
Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. territorial periods. On the contrary, they were enfranchised Native
nations who refused to relinquish internal control of their communities, and continued to
function as sovereign nations. More than anything else, for the Native groups in this study, the
vote was an act of refusal. Through this act, they refused to forget their past, abandon their
traditions, and bow their heads under a colonial yoke. Nuevamexicana historian Deena J.
González similarly wrote of the refusal by New Mexico Hispana women to abandon their
identity, thereby “stav[ing] off complete colonization.” Like the Indians of New Mexico and
Arizona, “Their resistance efforts were not always visible to the newcomers who wrote about
them, nor are they visible to contemporary historians who continue today to interpret these
events.” Like New Mexico’s Hispana women who confronted the U.S. takeover of their lands,
Indians of New Mexico and Arizona stood up to three separate colonial powers and “refused the
favor.”12 Through the vote, or their opposition to it, Pueblos, Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas all
refused to relinquish their status as sovereign nations, nations that remain strong today.
Still, in many other ways, the actions of these Indigenous groups were visible to the
colonizers. In practical terms, the Spanish arrival brought a system of town government that
included the vote as one of its central components. While the Franciscans and Jesuits who
oversaw the elections of Indian officers were, at times, dismissive of the Indian vote, the
franchise brought real power to these Indigenous communities. The Pueblos used the vote to
12
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continued pre-contact traditions of town government, and to fight to protect their land, water, and
culture. The degree to which Hopis implemented the Spanish colonial governing system is
unknown. What is known is that they eventually destroyed such a system and eradicated its
likely proponents from among themselves. For their part, Yaquis internalized concepts of voting
and town government to such a degree that they were willing to revolt when such rights were
infringed. The vote kept their communities strong, and provided a bulwark against Spanish
colonial authority. In Pimería Alta, Piman peoples lived under Jesuits who were often dismissive
of their right to vote freely. Nevertheless, Pima officers fought for their people and land as best
they could, while also battling population decline and increasing land encroachments.
In many ways, the vote remained important during the Mexican era. While Mexico’s
declarations of political equality for all ethnic groups brought very little substantive change in
some Indian communities, in a few cases it heralded unprecedented joint participation on
governing bodies by both Pueblos and Hispanos. In a singular episode of Pueblo-Hispano
cooperation, the two groups ousted the governor and briefly established an independent state—
the cantón—with an Indian as its governor. But Indians in the Arizona-Sonora Borderlands did
not fare so well. Mexican officials there had not embraced a spirit of coexistence, and viewed the
collapse of the mission system as a means to take away Pima lands. The authority of Pima
officers decreased significantly, and with the colonial pact broken, the Indian vote faded. Yaquis
found themselves similarly assailed by Mexican state power. They would again revolt, and fail as
they had in 1740. Yaquis had, perhaps, become too adept at governing their towns in the manner
imposed by the colonizers. Yaqui political power and sovereignty simply had to be broken.
To the far north, Hopis had, for the most part, successfully evaded colonial control since
that fateful winter morning in 1700. But the transition from Mexico to the United States signaled
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an unprecedented influx of outsiders. These newcomers brought American schooling, trading
posts, and an insistence on Hopi “progress” and assimilation. As Indian Agents touted their
success, believing they were on the cusp of ushering in a Hopi electorate who would vote in
territorial elections, the effort seems to have stalled. Hopis did not embrace the vote. To the far
south, Yaquis came under unprecedented assault in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Mexico waged wars of extermination, killing many Yaquis, forcing others to flee, and deporting
the rest to slave plantations. Many Yaquis found safety in the United States, but it came at a cost.
The Yaqui vote, which had sustained their communities for over two centuries, did not make the
trip north. Yaquis kept a low profile in order to avoid trouble. They would not again reestablish
patterns of self-government until after Arizona statehood.
Pueblos and O’odhams similarly refused to embrace U.S. citizenship and voting during
the U.S. territorial period. Although some Pueblos did head to the polls at various times during
this era, the United States takeover of the region pitted Pueblo and Hispanos against one another.
Within this setting, citizenship and voting could only decrease Pueblo sovereignty, and so they
refused, once again turning to the vote on the community level to protect the sovereignty of their
individual Pueblo nations. In Pimería Alta, the O’odham of San Xavier del Bac refused to
exercise the franchise, but it is difficult to know their exact motivations. Like the Pueblos, they
likely saw little material benefit to taking their place as citizens of Arizona and the United States.
Local, internal needs took precedence, and O’odhams to their focus to such matters. For all of
these groups, enfranchisement would have to wait until the post-World War II period, when the
growth of federal power in the West had increased the need for political participation and voting
in the American system. But through all of these changes, the element that remained constant
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was the desire by Pueblos, Hopis, Yaquis, and Pimas to protect their rights as sovereign Native
Nations. It remains so today.
And so I come full circle with another story. A short time ago, I sat in the familiar
confines of my mother’s home in rural Arizona—traditional Yavapai-Apache lands—with my
mother, sister, aunties, uncles, wife, and children. Even more familiar than the setting were the
evening’s activities: sitting around the table, eating beans and fry bread, and listening to family
stories. What made this gathering somewhat unique was that the family was celebrating an
election day. Three seats were up for grabs on our tribal council. I had forgotten to send in an
absentee ballot, and so I made the five and one-half hour drive home from Albuquerque to cast
my ballot. In a tribal election where voter turnouts usually total roughly two hundred people, the
saying “every vote counts” rings particularly true. Unfortunately, my uncle lost in his bid for the
Yavapai-Apache Nation Tribal Council, but he remained optimistic. He can easily run for office
again in the near future. The council is composed of seven council members, elected to staggered
three-year terms. The governing structure also includes an executive branch with a tribal chair
and vice chair, as well as a judicial branch with chief judge and tribal court.13 Under the terms of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, we adopted a tribal constitution and three-branch
governing structure on 24 October 1936, which were approved by the Secretary of the Interior of
the United States on 12 February 1937.14 Council members are frequently removed from
office—sometimes deservedly so, sometime not—resulting in emergency elections to fill vacated
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http://www.narf.org/nill/constitutions/yavapai_apache/, accessed 29 September 2015.
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seats. We have learned well from our colonizers. And yet, our elections generate much
excitement and clamoring for office because we realize that through our officers and our political
activities, we continue the fight to maintain our status as sovereign nations in an imperfect
system. This is the legacy of Indian voting.
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